Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals: Which Rules Govern? by Shany, Yuval
Competing Jurisdictions 
of International Courts and Tribunals: 
Which Rules Govern?
A dissertation written by Yuval Shany
Submitted for PhD in Law 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)
University of London
Supervised by Prof. Philippe Sands
ProQuest Number: 11015901
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 11015901
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
A bstract o f  thesis
\£r
Recent years have witnessed a sharp increase in the number of international courts and 
tribunals and greater willingness on the part of states and other international actors to 
subject themselves to the compulsory jurisdiction of international adjudicative 
mechanisms. However, because of the uncoordinated nature of these developments, 
overlaps between the jurisdictional ambits of the different judicial bodies might occur -
i.e., the same dispute could fall under the jurisdiction of more than one forum. This, in 
turn, raises the question of coordinating between the competing jurisdictions, with a 
view of promoting the smooth operation of international law and safeguarding the rights 
and interests of the disputing parties.
The purpose of the thesis is to study the implications of jurisdictional competition and 
to identify standards which may alleviate problems associated with the phenomenon. 
The first part of the thesis examines the jurisdictional ambits of the principal 
international courts and tribunals and delineates areas of overlap between their 
respective jurisdictions. It reveals considerable overlaps, which have already resulted, 
on occasion, in multiple proceedings. The second part discusses some of the potential 
systematic and practical problems that arise out of jurisdictional competition (e.g., 
forum shopping and multiple proceedings) and considers the expediency of mitigating 
them. Finally, the third part identifies and studies existing rules of international law, 
which govern inter-jurisdictional competition, and considers the introduction of 
additional norms and arrangements (e.g., the lis alibi pendens rule and the abuse of 
rights and comity doctrines).
The central conclusion of the thesis is that jurisdictional competition, while positive in 
some ways, ought to be mitigated, or else it could undermine the coherence of the 
international legal system. Although existing rules regulate some aspects of inter-fora 
competition, additional rules are needed in order to preserve and improve the 
harmonisation of the international legal system.
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Introduction
1. International law at a time o f  transformation: 
the proliferation o f  international courts and tribunals 
Every domestic system of law is designed to satisfy two basic needs, which are 
indispensable for the maintenance of social order: regulation of human conduct and 
peaceful settlement of disputes.1 In a modem society, the first function is primarily 
achieved through law-creating institutions, whereas the second goal is normally secured 
by dispute settlement mechanisms, such as courts and other judicial and quasi-judicial 
procedures. Similar social needs exist in the international sphere.2 Improved 
coordination and cooperation between the international actors [states, international
' i
organisations (IGOs), and, to some extent, natural and legal persons], which is needed 
to promote the well being of the international polity, can only be realised through 
increased regulation of these actors' conduct.4 Furthermore, since it is inevitable that 
disputes between international actors will continue to occur (given their frequently 
incompatible interests and needs)5 peaceful methods for dispute resolution ought to be 
put in place in order to prevent the breakdown of legal arrangements on which the 
viability of the international polity depends.
The last century has witnessed an explosion in international law making through treaties, 
state practice and soft law legislation.6 It has also witnessed the expansion of 
international law into what were before, by and large, unregulated areas of international 
relations (e.g., human rights and the protection of the environment). This extensive 
body of norms nowadays provides international actors with reasonable, (albeit 
imperfect) guidance on how should to conduct their affairs. However, international law
1 Joseph Raz, The Concept o f  a Legal System  (2nd ed., 1980)(1990 reprint) 229; Harry C. Bredemeier 
“Law as an Integrative Mechanism” Law and Sociology (W.M. Evan, ed., 1962) 73, 74.
2 Malcolm N. Shaw, International law  (4th ed., 1997) 717; Philip Allot “The Concept o f  International 
Law” 10 European Journal o f International Law (1999) 31,31; John A. Perkins “The Changing 
Foundations o f International Law: From State Consent to State Responsibility” 15 Boston University 
International Law Journal (1997) 433, 506.
3 Shaw, supra note 2, at 191-195.
4 Prosper Weil “Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?” 77 A.J.I.L. (1983) 413, 418-19.
5 J. G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (3rd ed., 1998) 1.
6 Soft law consists o f conduct-regulating norms, which lack binding force, and is created primarily 
through non-binding resolutions and standards adopted by international organisations. Paul Szasz 
“General Law-Making Process” 1 United Nations Legal Order (Oscar Schachter and Christopher C. 
Joyner, eds., 1995)35,45-47.
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has a far less satisfactory record in preventing and resolving international disputes 
concerning the interpretation and application of the said norms. Attempts to encourage 
states and other international actors to resort to effective international dispute settlement 
mechanisms, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), have encountered an 
almost insurmountable obstacle -  the notion of state sovereignty, and the concomitant 
requirement of state consent as precondition to the introduction of most international
Q
obligations, including procedural ones. Since it is well accepted that states cannot be 
compelled to participate in adjudication against their will, and given the disinclination of 
states to restrict their freedom of action, by subjecting themselves to the authority of 
international courts and tribunals,9 no comprehensive and compulsory system for 
international dispute settlement, equivalent to the one found under domestic systems of 
law, has so far emerged.10
Still, this structural deficiency does not mean that the international law has altogether 
refrained from developing dispute settlement mechanisms. Quite on the contrary, 
diplomatic methods of dispute settlement (e.g., negotiation) have always been part of 
international relations. Further, many states have been willing, on some occasions, to 
refer specific disputes, or even entire classes of disputes, to adjudication. However, the 
basic unwillingness on the part of most states to undertake to refer all of their disputes to 
binding adjudicative procedures has remained intact.11 Similar notions of aversion from 
becoming subject to the binding authority of international institutions has also thwarted 
the development of comprehensive and effective enforcement procedures designed to
7 Pierre-Marie Dupuy “The Danger o f the Fragmentation or Unification o f the International Legal System 
and the International Court o f Justice” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 791, 795.
8 The Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 10, at 18.
9 Lois Henkin, How Nations Behave (1979) 187. See also Stephen M. Schwebel “Reflections on the Role 
o f the International Court o f Justice” Justice in International Law  (1994) 3 ,10; Jeffrey L. Dunoff 
“Institutional Misfits: the GATT, the ICJ and Trade-Environment Disputes” 15 Mich. J. Int’l L. (1994) 
1043, 1089-90; J. Patrick Kelly “The International Court o f Justice: Crisis and Reformation” 12 Yale J. 
Int’l L. (1987) 342, 365. At the same time, disputes perceived as unimportant might also not be submitted 
to adjudication. Richard Baxter “Introduction to Symposium on the International Court o f  Justice” 11 Va. 
J. IntTL. (1971)291,291-94.
10 While the text o f  articles 2(3) and 33 o f the UN Charter suggests that such a duty exists, its precise 
scope is far from clear. Although, the UN Charter had imposed a clear prohibition against resolution of 
disputes through any means other than peaceful means, one can question whether it introduces a 
corresponding obligation to resolve disputes at all (i.e., a positive obligation to actively engage in dispute 
settlement). Shaw, supra note 2, at 718.
11 This reluctance is most aptly demonstrated by the fact that only less than a third o f  the members o f the 
UN have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction o f  the ICJ through the Optional Clause. Statute o f the 
International Court o f Justice, art. 36(2), 26 June 1945, Annex to the Charter o f  the United Nations, XV 
U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 355 [hereinafter ‘ICJ Statute’]. Further, only about a third o f  the states that have 
accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction have refrained from introducing reservations qualifying the 
scope o f  acceptance on their behalf.
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execute the decisions of dispute settlement bodies. The combined effect of the paucity of 
competent fora before which aggrieved parties may uphold their rights and the poor 
chances of non-voluntary enforcement of the judgments of international courts and 
tribunals, have put into question the effectiveness of international legal norms. On 
account of this, some commentators have even questioned the very definition of
1 9international law as a system of law.
However, with the intensification of international interdependence in recent decades, 
international law’s dispute settlement facilities have undergone remarkable 
transformation. The traditional reluctance on the part of states to commit themselves, in 
advance, to judicial and quasi-judicial dispute-settlement mechanisms has gradually 
eroded and a growing number of international courts and tribunals have been invested 
with compulsory jurisdiction. This trend has coincided with considerable progress made 
towards institutionalisation of dispute settlement mechanisms, moving from ad hoc to 
new and permanent procedures. Thus, many states (and other international actors) 
nowadays agree to refer disputes concerning many vital areas of international law to 
adjudication, and have accepted for this purpose the compulsory jurisdiction of 
permanent international courts and tribunals.
These remarkable changes can be explained, in part, through (1) the increased density, 
volume and complexity of international norms, which required correspondingly 
sophisticated dispute settlement institutions to guarantee the smooth operation of the 
new legal arrangements and the continued clarification and development of their 
norms;13 (2) the greater commitment to the rule of law in international relations, at the
12 Robert Y. Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds.) 1 Oppenheim's International Law  (9th ed., 1992) 8-13. See 
also infra Chapter 3, at pp. 96-97.
13 Georges Abi-Saab “Cours general de droit international public” 207 Recueil des corns (1987) 9, 93; 
Georges Abi-Saab “Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. 
(1999) 919, 925; Cesare P.R. Romano “The Proliferation o f International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of  
the Puzzle” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 709, 728-29.
Examples o f  new dispute settlement procedures incorporated in new and sophisticated legal regimes can 
be found under the WTO, UNCLOS and NAFTA. See e.g., Alan E. Boyle “Settlement o f Disputes 
Relating to the Law o f the Sea and the Environment” International Justice (Kalliopi Koufa, ed., 1997) 
295, 305; Robert Y. Jennings “A New Look at the Place o f  the Adjudication in International Relations 
today” 1 Collected Writings (1998) 450, 460; John H. Jackson “Fragmentation or Unification among 
International Institutions: The World Trade Organization” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 823, 827. 
One might also observe that the greater specificity o f  norms and the ensuing improved legal certainty has 
made states more comfortable with the idea o f adjudication. Jennings, Adjudication in Int’l Relations, 
supra, at 462; Robert Y. Jennings “The Discipline o f  International Law” 1 Collected Writings (1998) 314, 
325; Robert Y. Jennings “The Progress o f  International Law” 1 Collected Writings (1998) 271, 285;
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expense of power-oriented diplomacy;14 (3) the easing of international tensions, which 
had hampered in the past the growth of adjudicative procedures;15 (4) the positive 
experience with some international courts and tribunal [e.g., the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)], 
which has inspired the creation of similar bodies;16 and (5) the unsuitability of the ICJ 
and other pre-existing courts and tribunals to address all kinds of disputes,17 especially
1 ftthose involving complicated issues that require great specialisation or are perceived to 
be best addressed on a regional level.19
Tullio Treves “Recent Trends in the Settlement o f International Disputes” I Bancaja Euromediterranean 
Courses o f International Law (1997) 395, 401.
Finally, litigation tends to ‘level the playing field’ between large and small international actors, thus 
attracting the participation o f  the latter in regimes which offer compulsory adjudication. See e.g., Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law o f the Sea, 4th Sess., 58th mtg., V Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law o f  the Sea -  Official Records (United Nations, 1976) 10, 11, 25-26, 33. 41 ,48 ,
50. But see, U N C LO S-O ff Rec. id. at 34, 45.
14 Ideas o f  democracy and rule o f  law have gradually diffused from internal politics to international 
politics. Thus, promotion o f  good governance and the habit o f compliance with judicial decisions found 
in domestic law guide politicians and civil servants involved in international dealings. Shaw, supra note 2, 
at 11; Laurence R. Heifer and Anne-Marie Slaughter “Toward a Theory o f  Effective Supranational 
Adjudication” 107 Yale L.J. (1997) 273, 332. It is interesting to note that similar linkage between 
democratic values and international stability has already been identified by Kant. Immanuel Kant “Eternal 
Peace” The Philosophy o f  Kant (Carl J, Friedrich, ed., 1993)(1795) 475, 484 (in other publications the 
same article is titled “Perpetual Peace”).
At the same time, there are considerations o f  efficiency which support the de-politicising o f  many 
international disputes. Jonathan Chamey “The Impact on the International Legal System o f the Growth o f  
International Courts and Tribunals” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 697, 703-04; Emst-Ulrich 
Petersmann “Constitutionalism and International Adjudication: How to Constitutionalize the U.N.
Dispute Settlement System?” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 753, 783; Jackson, supra note 13, at 827.
15 Bruce Broomhall “Looking Forwards to the Establishment o f an International Criminal Court: Between 
State Consent and the Rule o f  Law” 8 Crim L.F. (1997) 317, 318; Romano, supra note 13, at 729-33. The 
transformation o f socialist and developing states from centralised into market economies has also 
contributed to the broadening o f  common international ground, which had enabled the development o f  
new sophisticated legal regimes.
16 John W. Bridge “The Court o f  Justice o f the European Communities and the Prospects for International 
Adjudication” International Courts fo r  the Twenty First Century (Mark W. Janis, ed., 1992) 87, 91; 
Romano, supra note 13, at 730.
17 For instance, the ICJ cannot adjudicate disputes to which non-state actors are parties. Thus, it can 
hardly be utilised in areas o f law where such actors play a central role (e.g., trade, human rights, 
investment). Jonathan Chamey “Third Party Dispute Settlement and International Law”36 Colum. J. 
Transnat. L. (1997) 65, 76. In addition, there has been considerable criticism directed at the inadequate 
procedures o f the ICJ and at what some states have perceived as political biases. Abi-Saab, General 
Course, supra note 13, at 255-57; Gilbert Guillaume “The Future o f International Judicial Institutions” 44
I.C.L.Q. (1995) 848, 851, 854; Shigeru Oda “Dispute Settlement Prospects in the Law o f the Sea” 44
I.C.L.Q. (1995) 863, 865; Petersmann, Constitutionalizing the UN, supra note 14, at 774 ; Jonathan I. 
Chamey “Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals” 271 Recueil des cours 
(1998) 101, 133.
18 Chamey, Is Int’l Law Threatened, supra note 16, at 351; Chamey, 3rd Party Dispute Settlement, supra 
note 16, at 76; Rosalyn Higgins “International Law in a Changing System” 58 Cambridge L.J. (1999) 78, 
86-87; Brigitte Stem “Concluding Remarks” 9 A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1995) 49, 51.
19 Bridge, supra note 15, at 91; Chamey, 3rd Party Dispute Settlement, supra note 16, at 76; Robert Y. 
Jennings “The Proliferation o f  Adjudicatory Bodies: Dangers and Possible Answers” 9 A.S.I.L. Bulletin
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It is hereby argued that the combined effect of these two recent developments -  greater 
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals and the 
institutionalisation of international dispute settlement mechanisms, entails the 
advancement of international law into new levels of effectiveness. In many cases, it is no 
longer possible for a recalcitrant party to frustrate dispute settlement before judicial 
bodies simply by withholding his or her consent or refusing to cooperate with the 
available procedure. On the contrary, in areas of law where compulsory adjudicative 
jurisdiction can be found, legal obligations can be enforced on states by other parties 
(i.e., state or non-state actors), through the unilateral activation of existing judicial 
bodies, in a manner not dissimilar to that utilised in domestic legal settings. This is an 
important qualitative change, which will clearly encourage states to take their 
international obligations more seriously. Still, despite these impressive achievements the 
process of graduation of international is far from being complete. This is mainly because 
the actual execution of judgments against defiant litigants (especially states) still 
remains a vexing problem.
The convergence between the two aforementioned trends, which was first observed in 
1920 in the context of the ‘optional clause’ introduced under the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ),20 has gained a particularly impressive 
momentum, since the beginning of the 1990’s. Recent years have evidenced a dramatic 
rise in the number of international judicial bodies (a phenomenon sometimes referred to 
as the ‘proliferation of international courts and tribunals’), and the attribution of some 
degree of compulsory jurisdiction to almost all new judicial institutions.
In fact, seven new permanent courts have started operating in the last decade. These are 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the Appellate Body of the 
World Trade Organisation dispute settlement system (WTO AB), the Court of the 
European Economic Area (EFTA Court), the Central American Court of Justice (CCJ), 
the Economic Court of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS Court) and the 
Court of Justice of the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA 
Court). This is a remarkable development, since before the 1990’s only some 6
(1995) 2, 3; W. Michael Reisman “Creating, Adapting and Designing Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
for the International Protection o f Human Rights” 9 A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1995) 8, 10.
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international courts have been actually working (the ICJ, the Courts of Justice of the 
European, Andean and Benelux Communities and the European and Inter-American 
Human Rights Courts).
Further, all of the new courts were invested with some degree of compulsory jurisdiction 
over the parties to their constitutive instruments: ITLOS was granted compulsory 
jurisdiction over all 133 state parties to the 1982 Convention Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
over a few narrowly defined matters;21 the WTO AB was invested with broad subject 
matter compulsory competence over all 140 parties to the WTO; and all but one of the 
regional courts were endowed with broad and mandatory powers over all states 
participating in the regional treaty regime.22
On top of the seven courts that have already started operating, several other international 
courts and are currently in the process of being created. Thus within a few years, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of 
West Africa (ECOWAS Court), the Caribbean Court of Justice (Caricom Court) and the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, may start functioning. All of these 
institutions are also expected to exert wide ranging compulsory powers of jurisdiction 
over all parties to their constitutive instruments.
Another notable development of recent years has been the establishment of new 
permanent and compulsory arbitration bodies invested with broad subject-matter 
jurisdiction. Such institutionalised arbitration mechanisms were introduced in the 1990’s 
in the context of the WTO (the Panels system), the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and MERCOSUR. One more new body, albeit invested with more 
limited powers, is the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, created under a 1992 
Convention, adopted under the auspices of the Organisation on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Once more, these developments are particularly 
impressive against the backdrop of only two pre-existing institutionalised arbitration
20 Statute o f  the Permanent Court o f International Justice, 16 Dec. 1920, art. 36, 6 L.N.T.S. 390 
[hereinafter ‘PCIJ Statute’]. According to this Article, states could declare that they accept ipso fa c t  the 
compulsory jurisdiction o f the Court vis-a-vis other states that have made a similar declaration.
21 United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea, 10 Dec. 1982, art. 187, 287, 290, 292, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. (1982) 1261 [hereinafter ‘UNCLOS’].
22 The only exception is found in the case o f the Central American Integration System (SICA), where only 
3 o f the 6 member states in the regime have accepted the jurisdiction o f  the Central American Court o f  
Justice (CCJ).
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procedures in the field of public international law [the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)].24
In addition to courts and other permanent adjudication mechanisms, several important 
quasi-judicial procedures have also emerged recently. Although the decisions of such 
bodies are not formally binding, they often exercise compulsory jurisdiction and can 
make a significant contribution to the settlement of numerous disputes. One can mention 
under this category of new bodies the World Bank Inspection Panels and the parallel 
investigation procedures adopted by the Inter-American and Asian Development Banks, 
the North American Environmental Co-operation Commission’s citizens’ submissions 
procedure, the new Collective Complaints procedure under the European Social Charter 
and the non-compliance procedures introduced under the Montreal Protocol and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. Another complaints procedure, launched by a new 
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Discrimination of Women, has just entered 
into force 25 There are also a number of proposals to create more quasi-judicial bodies
*)f\in the human rights and environmental spheres. These new procedures supplement the 
very small number of quasi-judicial bodies which had been created before the recent 
institutional ‘proliferation’ [the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the Committee 
against Racial Discrimination and Torture and the African Commission on Human 
Rights (ACHR)].
Finally, it should be noted that there has been in recent years a considerable expansion 
of the compulsory jurisdictions of two important long-standing international courts -  the 
ECJ and the ECHR, due to important reforms in their constitutive instruments.27 In 
addition, the membership in the Council of Europe and the EC (the two Courts’ 
respective sponsoring IGOs) has grown to a large extent since the mid-1980’s. As a
23 Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE, 15 Dec. 1992, 32 I.L.M. (1993) 557.
24 There are also several enduring arbitrations institutions maintained by private bodies (most notably, the 
International Chamber o f  Commerce). However, as will be elaborated below, these institutions do not 
generally apply international law, and are thus not considered truly international tribunals.
25 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination o f Discrimination against Women, 6 Oct.
1999, UN Doc. GA Res. A/54/4 (1999), 39 I.L.M. (2000) 281.
26 Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN  
Doc. E/CN.4/1997/105 (1996); Report o f the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Procedures and  
Mechanisms relating to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol, 17 Sept. 1999, UN Doc.
FCCC/SBI/1999/7 (1999).
27 Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection o f  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 11 
May 1994, E.T.S. 155; Treaty o f Amsterdam, 2 Oct. 1997, O.J. (C 340) 173.
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result, the scope of the subject matter and personal jurisdiction of the two judicial bodies 
has expanded significantly.
The result of this impressive proliferation of new judicial and quasi judicial bodies 
(some 15 new permanent adjudicative mechanisms and 8 new quasi-judicial procedures) 
and the augmentation of pre-existing compulsory jurisdictions, is that in many areas of 
international relations, and in regard to a significant number of international actors, 
international law now offers relatively sophisticated and rather effective dispute 
settlement procedures, culminating injudicial or quasi-judicial mechanisms. Thus, 
despite the lingering problem of enforcement, it is safe to assert that recent years’ 
improvements in dispute settlement facilities have contributed to greater legal normalcy 
in the operation of international law, assimilating to a considerable degree its dispute 
settlement procedures to those prevalent in domestic legal systems.
But, unfortunately, the process of graduation and institutionalisation of international law 
has not been exempted from certain notable weaknesses. In the absence of a central 
legislative organ, the emergence of international courts and tribunals has been sporadic 
and largely uncoordinated.28 The different courts and tribunals have been established 
independently, often by separate constituencies, paying little attention to the question of 
their compatibility with existing dispute settlement mechanisms. Hence, each body was 
typically invested with its own unique scope of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. 
Because of this decentralised method of delineation of competencies, overlaps between 
the jurisdictional ambits of the different existing courts and tribunals may occur - i.e., a 
single dispute might fall under the jurisdiction of more than one judicial body 29
By way of example, the ICJ, which has jurisdiction to adjudicate any legal dispute 
between states, may have concurrent jurisdiction over inter-state disputes referred to 
specialised international tribunals (e.g., ITLOS, WTO); or to regional courts (e.g., the 
ECJ, or one of the regional human rights courts). The WTO, which has competence over 
inter-state trade disputes, might compete for jurisdiction with the regional trade 
liberalisation procedures (e.g., ECJ, NAFTA, EFTA Court, and Andean Court of
28 Jennings, Proliferation o f  Adjudicatory Bodies, supra note 18, at 5; Shabtai Rosenne, II The Law and 
Practice o f  the International Court, 1920-1996 (1997) 529.
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Justice), and the HRC, which is a universal human rights quasi-judicial procedure, may 
have concurrent jurisdiction with regional procedures (European or Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, African Human Rights Commission) or other specialised 
human rights bodies (e.g., UN Committees against Racial Discrimination and Torture).
Furthermore, different courts and tribunals might claim jurisdiction over a single 
complex dispute, which raises issues under more than one branch of international law. 
For instance, it is conceivable that a dispute over the expropriation of a foreign 
investment may involve investors’ protection and human rights issues (e.g., breach of 
investment agreement and violation of right to property). As a result, the same situation 
can be brought simultaneously before one or more of the human rights procedures and 
an investment related procedure (e.g., ICSID). The same matter can also be probably 
referred, after espousal by the investor’s state of nationality, to inter-state adjudication 
mechanism such as the ICJ or bilateral arbitration. Similarly, the commission of the war 
crime of torture, if attributable to a state, might give rise to proceedings against the 
responsible state under the various universal and regional human rights procedures [e.g., 
UN Committee against Torture (CAT Committee), HRC, ECHR] and before the ICJ (on
*3 A
the basis of the doctrine of state responsibility). Further, the same set of facts might in 
the future result in a related prosecution before the ICC, which will adjudicate the 
individual responsibility of the perpetrators of the alleged crime.
Another example of jurisdictional interaction between courts and tribunals specialising 
in different branches of the law can be found with respect to trade and maritime 
disputes. In fact, a dispute over the legality of transit restrictions introduced by Chile 
against EC fishing vessels involved in the excessive taking of swordfish in international 
waters has been brought in the last months before both the WTO and UNCLOS dispute 
settlement machinery.31
29 Georges Abi-Saab “The International Court o f  Justice as a World Court” Fifty Years o f  the 
International Court o f  Justice (Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice, eds., 1996) 3 ,1 3 . According to 
Abi-Saab collision between different jurisdictions has become imminent.
30 At present, crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia are the subject o f  several proceedings before 
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and two cases before the ICJ - Application o f  the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f  the Crime o f  Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Yugoslavia); Application o f  the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f  the Crime o f  Genocide 
(Croatia v. Yugoslavia).
31 Chile -  Measures Affecting the Transit and Importation o f  Swordfish, case no. W T/DS193/1 
(complaint by the E.C); Fisheries dispute with EU escalates; Primacy o f  Conservation over Trade is at 
Stake, Latin America Weekly Report, 8 Aug. 2000, at 368 (reporting that Chile has formally requested 
arbitration under UNCLOS). However, the case has been settled out o f  court.
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The potential for jurisdictional overlap between international courts and tribunals might 
lead in turn to predicaments normally associated with the phenomenon of concurrent 
jurisdictions between judicial bodies coming from the same domestic legal system or
T9from different national legal systems. Grave practical concerns such as forum 
shopping, parallel litigation, lack of finality, incompatible judgments and accelerated 
fragmentation of the law have thus been introduced into public international law.
However, until recently, such problems have been, by and large, unfamiliar to 
international lawyers. This is because in the past the number of disputes amenable to the 
compulsory jurisdiction of adjudicative mechanisms had been very modest to begin 
with. Only in highly extraordinary circumstances would a single dispute be amenable to 
the jurisdiction of more than one judicial forum. Further, a large proportion of past 
jurisdiction-conferring instruments had provided for adjudication before ad hoc dispute 
settlement mechanisms, such as arbitration tribunals, whose jurisdiction was typically 
narrowly defined, and left little room for interaction with the meagre compulsory 
jurisdiction of other international courts and tribunals.33 So, although the potential for 
jurisdictional competition between international courts and tribunals has existed for a 
long time now (e.g., overlap between the ICJ and arbitration), the probabilities that 
forum shopping or multiple proceedings would actually taking place had been rather 
low.34
It is important to emphasise that the problems associated with jurisdictional competition 
do not merely raise practical concerns of a procedural nature. On the contrary, the 
question of the division of labour between international courts and tribunals poses a 
serious theoretic challenge and compels one to appraise the very nature of the
For exploration o f  other scenarios where similar overlaps might take place, see Lakshman D. Guruswamy 
“Should UNCLOS or GATT/WTO Decide Trade and Environment Disputes” 7 Minnesota Journal o f  
Global Trade (1998) 287,299.
32 See Guillaume, supra note 16, at 862; Shigeru Oda “The International Court o f Justice from the Bench” 
244 Recueil de cours (1993) 9, 139-155; Stem, supra note 17, at 52.
33 However, the problem o f competing international jurisdictions was not unheard-of before the recent 
surge in the number o f international courts and tribunals. As early as in the 1950's, the competition 
between ad hoc arbitration and the ICJ has been the subject o f  study by the International Law 
Commission. Model Draft on Arbitral Procedure, U.N. Doc. A/3859 [1958] II Y.B. Int. L. Comm. 80-88. 
Before that some academic writing addressed the competing jurisdictions o f  the PCIJ and arbitral bodies. 
See e.g., Giorgos T6n6kid6s “L’exception de litispendance devant les organisms intemationaux” XXXVI 
Revue generate de droit international public (1929) 502.
34 Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 13, at 924.
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international legal system. Simply put, the question at stake is whether there is one 
coordinated system of international law or rather an accumulation of independent 
self-contained regimes. Indeed, it will be shown that failure to regulate instances of 
jurisdictional conflict might intensity the tensions operating against the unity of the 
international legal order and exacerbate some of the traditional problems of international 
law such as predictability, effectiveness and credibility.
The novelty of the phenomenon of widespread competition between the compulsory 
jurisdictions of international courts and tribunals, the variety of the practical difficulties 
caused thereby, the magnitude of the underlying interests and the growing interest in the 
subject,36 all justify the need to study the problem and look for possible methods to 
regulate it. This is the goal of the present work.
2. Methodology
The purpose of this research is to investigate overlaps between the compulsory 
jurisdictions of international courts and tribunals. The first aim of the study shall be to 
examine the jurisdictional ambit of the principal existing international courts, tribunals 
and quasi-judicial procedures and to delineate areas of overlap between their respective 
compulsory jurisdictions. The second objective will be to discuss the anticipated 
consequences of the current situation and consider the expediency of mitigating it. 
Finally, the third goal is to identify and study rules of international law, which might 
govern competition between different jurisdictions, and to consider introducing 
additional norms and arrangements.
This last stage constitutes the core of the present thesis. It will embrace the study of 
several alternative legal sources for such jurisdiction-regulating norms:
1) Analysis of jurisdiction-regulating provisions found in the constitutive
instruments of international courts and tribunals and in other dispute settlement 
instruments;
35 Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 13, at 923.
36 See e.g., President o f  the World Court Warns o f  ‘Overlapping Jurisdictions ’ in Proliferation o f  
International Judicial Bodies, UN Press Release GA/L/3157,27 Oct. 2000, available at <http://www. 
pict-pcti.org/news/archive/months2000/october/ICJ. 10.27.prolif.html (last visited on 15 Nov. 2000).
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2) Examination of the relevant practice of international courts and tribunals in 
addressing situations of jurisdictional conflict, in order to identify any applicable 
rules of international law;
3) Evaluation of the possible importation into international law of traditional 
jurisdiction-regulating rules found in a variety of domestic legal systems, through 
their characterisation as 'general principles of the law’.
4) Discussion of the possibility of introducing into public international law new 
jurisdiction-regulating norms and engaging in structural reforms needed in order to 
confront any problems associated with the present situation.
While the first three potential sources for jurisdiction-regulating norms constitute lex 
lata the fourth source represents lex ferenda.
3. Scope o f  thesis
As has just been indicated, the purpose of this work is to study the problem of
0*7
competing jurisdictions of international courts and tribunals. However, more precise 
definition of the scope of research is needed in order to keep it within manageable
• o oproportions. In general, one can identify two categories of disputes that can be brought 
before courts and tribunals operating independently of any domestic legal system. These 
are disputes of a ‘public’ nature, normally governed by international law, and of a 
‘private’ nature, principally governed by domestic law or contractual arrangements. The
37 An international tribunal constitutes a judicial body which enjoys the following features: a) its decisions 
and procedure governed by law (normally - international law); b) it is authorised to render binding 
decisions, and not merely non-binding recommendations; it is created by international law’s legislative 
process (i.e., normally, through an international instrument); and d) is manned by an independent body o f  
judges. C f  H.J. Schlochauer, “Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit”, 2 Worterbuch (Karl Strupp, ed., 2nd ed., 
1961) cited  in Christian Tomuschat “International Courts and Tribunals with Regionally Restricted and/or 
Specialized Jurisdiction” Judicial Settlement o f  International Disputes: The International Court o f  
Justice, Other Courts and Tribunal, Arbitration and Conciliation (Max Planck Institute for Comparative 
Public Law and International Law, 1974) at 289; Tomuschat, id. at 288-312.
An international court is a permanent tribunal potentially invested with both retroactive and prospective 
jurisdiction, whose constitutive elements - the appointment o f  judges, the selection o f applicable law 
(including the applicable rules o f procedure) and the creation o f the administrative infrastructure, all come 
to being, as a rule, independently o f a particular dispute. Rosenne, I IC J Law and Practice, supra note 27, 
at 12.
But see, Romano, supra note 13, 711-12 (uses the terms - 'international tribunal' and 'international court' 
interchangeably).
38 A dispute necessarily involves opposite claims o f parties. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece 
v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 11 ( a dispute consists o f  a “disagreement on a point o f law or 
fact, a conflict o f legal views or o f  interests between two persons"),South West Africa (Ethiopia v. S.A.; 
Liberia v. S.A.), 1962 I.C.J. 319, 328 ("It must be shown that the claim o f  one party is positively opposed 
by the other"); Applicability o f  the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 o f  the United Nations 
Headquarters Agreement o f  26 June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 12, 27-30
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latter class mainly consist of commercial disputes addressed by private arbitration 
facilities such as the International Chamber of Commerce. Given the public international 
law focus of the present research (and of the present author), this study will concentrate 
primarily upon disputes predominantly governed by ‘public’ international law. This 
choice can also be justified by the fact that jurisdictional competition involving 
commercial arbitration procedures has already been dealt elsewhere, whereas very 
little had been written on competition in the public international law context.
Another group of international tribunals, which can be put aside for the purposes of the 
present study, are international administrative tribunals, adjudicating claims presented 
by staff members of international organisations. Although these bodies apply what may 
be considered a specific branch of international law and adjudicate disputes to which 
IGOs (which are clearly international actors) are parties, their function resembles more 
that of a domestic labour court than that of an international court or tribunal addressing 
issues of general international concern. In fact, one may argue that international 
administrative tribunals deal with what are essentially private law issues, often 
implicating a contract of employment. In addition, the law and procedure applicable 
before international administrative tribunals can be regarded as highly sui generisA0 As 
a result of these peculiarities, the capability of administrative tribunals to compete with 
courts and tribunals properly situated within the realms of public international law is 
somewhat negligible (with the possible exception of human rights issues) and shall not 
be expanded upon here.
Moreover, due to space limitations it is necessary to confine the research even further 
and concentrate on those areas of international law where interactions between 
international courts and tribunals are most likely to occur. Hence, this research will 
mainly focus on competition between courts and tribunals invested with broadly defined 
competence. This is because the broader the scope of jurisdiction is, the greater the 
chances are that an overlap with the jurisdiction of another court or tribunal will 
transpire. Naturally, some, or perhaps most conclusions reached in respect of
39 See e.g., Gary B. Bom, International Civil Litigation in United States Courts (3rd ed., 1996) 987-92; 
Andreas Lowenfeld, International Litigation and Arbitration (1993) 281-84, 331-45; J.D. McClean, 
Morris: The Conflict o f  Laws (4 th ed., 1993) 131-42; Eugene F. Scoles and Peter Hay, Conflict o f  Laws 
(2nd ed , 1992) 1018-24.
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competition between broadly empowered jurisdictions could also apply to cases of 
competition involving judicial bodies invested with narrow competencies.
In order to accommodate this last methodological concern, several distinctions will be 
offered in order to identify which courts and tribunals are typically invested with 
broad-based jurisdiction (and thus most likely to become involved in jurisdictional 
conflicts). The first proposed criterion for differentiation pertains to the ad hoc or 
permanent nature of the tribunal. It is contended that tribunals constituted exclusively 
for the purpose of dealing with a particular dispute are typically invested with 
jurisdiction over that dispute only.41 Thus, it may be asserted that, by their very 
definition, ad hoc tribunals are endowed with limited jurisdiction.42 Permanent courts 
and tribunals, on the other hand, are established to adjudicate a large (and sometimes 
indefinite) number of different disputes, over time, and therefore require a much broader 
scope of jurisdiction, which shall encompass the numerous disputes that could be 
referred to them 43
A second distinction ought to be made between ‘truly’ permanent international courts 
and tribunals, invested with both prospective and retroactive jurisdiction, on the one 
hand, and ‘semi-permanent’ tribunals that may be authorised to adjudicate numerous 
disputes, but are invested solely with retroactive jurisdiction, on the other hand. The first 
category of institutions may address disputes which had arisen before or after they have 
been constituted, while the second category of bodies may only adjudicate pre-existing 
claims. Only courts (e.g., the ICJ or WTO AB) and institutionalised arbitration 
mechanisms (such as the PCA or ICSID), are of a truly permanent nature, and can, in
40 Romano, supra note 13, at 726; Georges Vandersanden “Administrative Tribunals, Boards and 
Commissions in International Organizations” 1 Encyclopaedia o f  Public International Law  (Rudolf 
Bernhardt et al, eds., 1992) 27, 30.
41 However, it should be noted, that despite its narrow scope o f  coverage, the jurisdiction o f treaty-based 
dispute settlement procedures is comparable in many ways to the jurisdiction o f  permanent judicial 
institutions. Thus, for example, an international court invested with residual jurisdiction (a clause 
conferring the court jurisdiction unless the parties have agreed to settle their dispute in a different 
manner) is expected to decline jurisdiction both when faced with another competent permanent 
international court or tribunal or with a dispute settlement agreement.
42 Even where the jurisdiction-creating instrument (e.g., a compromissory clause or a general arbitration 
treaty) uses broad language encompassing a wide-ranging set o f  circumstances, the mandate o f  those ad  
hoc tribunals which had been actually established typically covers only the resolution o f  the immediate 
dispute at hand.
43 Claims commissions, which are semi-permanent tribunals, created to address a large, but finite, number 
o f disputes, are more similar in this respect to permanent courts and tribunals than to ad  hoc bodies. The 
need to refer a large number o f disputes to claims commissions (sometimes thousands o f  cases) also 
requires that their jurisdictional mandate be drafted in broad language.
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theory, operate indefinitely. In contrast, the dockets o f ‘semi-permanent’ tribunals 
invested with retroactive jurisdiction (even heavily burdened bodies such as the 
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal) are always exhaustible and after all disputes originating in 
situations occurring before the creation of the tribunal have been settled, the tribunal 
must be dissolved.
The rationale behind the distinction between ‘truly’ permanent and ‘semi- permanent’ 
courts and tribunals is quadruple. First, the existence of only retroactive jurisdiction 
necessarily denotes a limitation upon the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione 
temporis. This in itself might result in a narrower basis of jurisdiction than that enjoyed 
by a court of tribunal not limited in this manner, and thus not confined to a finite number 
of disputes.44
Second, and more significant, jurisdiction-conferring clauses that cover prospective 
disputes are necessarily drafted in more open-ended and general language than clauses 
that encompass only pre-existing claims. This is because the permanent fora are created 
at a time when the number of disputes to be eventually referred to them, their exact 
nature and the identity of the parties to each and every one of them, are mostly unknown. 
Given these uncertainties it is quite impossible to outline prospective jurisdiction in 
overly precise manner and vague language is often used.45 At the same time, the 
mandate of tribunals exclusively invested with retroactive jurisdiction is determined, as 
a rule, after the principal circumstances underlying the covered disputes have become 
known to the parties. In these conditions, jurisdiction can be strictly circumscribed, so as 
to include only specified disputes between specified parties.
Third, the constituency of ‘truly’ permanent tribunals is typically more diverse than that 
o f ‘semi-permanent’ ones. Experience shows that courts and institutionalised arbitration 
mechanisms have normally been established through multilateral instruments, whereas 
claims commissions have often been created as bilateral enterprises, in pursuance to
44 Claims commissions are however a notable exception to the proposition that only permanent courts 
enjoy a heavy case docket. Some claims commissions have received thousands, or even millions o f  claims 
(this has been, for example, the case with the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and with the UN Compensation 
Commission on Iraq).
45 See e.g., UNCLOS, art. 286 (“... any dispute concerning the interpretation or application o f this 
Convention sh a ll... be submitted at the request o f any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having 
jurisdiction under this section”).
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bilateral agreements. This, in turn, also contributes to the attribution to courts of greater 
potential for business, at least in terms of personal jurisdiction.
Finally, since the jurisdiction of ‘semi-permanent’ tribunals is usually determined after 
the facts underlying the relevant disputes have occurred, the parties may take into 
consideration, during the creation of the jurisdictional ambit of the tribunal, the 
availability of alternative venues for dispute settlement. Hence, they have the ability of 
defusing potential jurisdictional clashes simply by deciding whether to resort to 
pre-existing remedies or to conclude what is an essentially a special agreement to refer 
the dispute to a new adjudicative body. Such special agreement may arguably constitute 
lex posteriori and lex specialis, which presents a relatively minor jurisdictional 
challenge.46 But the same option is often unavailable for parties involved in the drafting 
of a jurisdiction-creating instrument encompassing future disputes. The indeterminate 
scope of issues falling under the jurisdiction of the newly created body, and the 
difficulties in predicting whether they will also fall under the jurisdiction of other 
dispute settlement arrangements (which might be equally ambiguous in their areas of 
coverage), makes a fortiori regulation of all potential jurisdictional conflicts a 
complicated, if not impractical, undertaking.
In sum, courts and other permanent mechanisms invested with prospective jurisdiction 
are expected to enjoy a broader scope of jurisdiction than ad hoc and ‘semi-permanent’ 
adjudicative bodies and are therefore more likely to confront the problem of competing 
jurisdictions. Consequently, the first group of judicial bodies is of greater interest to the 
present research.
Despite attempts to restrict the scope of this work, the realities of international dispute 
settlement cannot be ignored. These realities support the extension of the purview of 
study so to address another group of frequently invoked dispute settlement mechanisms - 
permanent quasi-judicial procedures (such as UN human rights committees, inspection 
panels and non-compliance procedures).47 Although these procedures do not meet the
46 For discussion on the relations between conflicting jurisdiction-creating treaties see infra Chapter 6, at 
pp. 281-84.
47 Like international courts and tribunals, quasi-judicial bodies have been created by international law 
instruments, their procedure is governed by legal norms and involves the study o f  specific disputes 
through contentious proceedings (conducted by complainants and respondents) and the dispute settlement 
process culminates in the issuing o f a decision which is determined on the basis o f  legal considerations,
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strict definition of international tribunals, because their decisions are non-binding in 
nature, they often operate in a manner very similar to that of ‘genuine’ courts or 
tribunals. Further, the realities of international relations are such that the binding nature 
of judicial decisions is often illusory. In the absence of enforcement procedures, 
international actors might, and sometimes do, ignore ‘binding’ judgments with relative 
impunity.48 At the same time, the recommendations of quasi-judicial bodies, such as the 
HRC, are normally (though, again, not always) complied with.49 Hence, the practical 
differences between judicial and quasi-judicial procedures are in many cases minimal.50 
Finally, quasi-judicial procedures are being invoked in an increasing rate and present a 
de facto viable alternative to formal adjudication.51 As a result, incidents of 
jurisdictional competition involving quasi-judicial procedures need also to be studied 
here.
4. Focal Questions
This research shall concentrate on three different points in time at which competition 
between different jurisdictions can be identified and will search for applicable rules of 
law to regulate each of these instances:
1) Choice o f forum  -  in situations where an international actor may bring a single 
dispute before more than one international court or tribunal, are there any norms 
that restrict his or her choice of procedure? In other words, does the claimant have 
unfettered discretion where to bring an international claim? Moreover, are there 
any restrictions upon the joint capacity of the parties to the dispute to select a 
specific forum, by way of agreement?
derived, as a rule, from the realm o f  international law. However their decisions are not legally binding. 
Romano, supra note 13, at 727-28.
48 See Merrills, supra note 5, at 163.
49 Tom Barkhuysen and Michiel van Emmerik “Improving the Implementation o f  Strasbourg and Geneva 
Decisions in the Dutch Legal Order: Reopening o f Closed Cases or Claims o f Damages against the State” 
The Execution o f  Strasbourg and Geneva Human Rights Decisions in the National Legal Order (T. 
Barkhuysen et al, eds., 1999) 3, 26.
50 Benedict Kingsbury “The Concept o f Compliance as a Function o f  Competing Conceptions o f  
International Law” 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. (1998) 345, 351; Gidon Gottlieb “The Nature o f International 
Law: Toward a Second Concept o f Law”, IV The Future o f  the International Legal Order — The 
Structure o f  the International Environment (Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk, eds., 1972) 331, 345; 
Weil, supra note 4, at 415-16. For instance, there are a few practical differences between judgments 
rendered by the Inter American Court o f Human Rights and 'views' issued Human Rights Committee, with 
respect to findings o f  human rights violations.
51 Tomuschat, supra note 37, at 285, 306.
29
2) Parallel proceedings -  in the event that proceedings are already pending before 
an international tribunal, can either of the parties to the case initiate proceedings, 
in relation to the same dispute, before another international court or tribunal?
3) Successive proceedings -  once a dispute had already been decided by an 
international court or tribunal, can either of the parties to the case initiate new 




The Overlap between the jurisdictions of 
international courts and tribunals
Chapter One:
What constitute competing proceedings?
A key concept in this thesis is that o f ‘jurisdictional competition’. Since only the 
existence of competition justifies the application of jurisdiction-regulating norms, it is 
essential to try and understand which circumstance gives rise to competition between 
the jurisdictions of international courts and tribunals.
Jurisdictional competition (or overlap) necessarily means that a certain dispute can be 
addressed by more than one available forum. Indeed, in most cases of competition 
between different courts and tribunals, the conflicting parties may decide, acting 
separately or jointly, to bring the case to one forum or the other. However, meaningful 
competition can only take place between viable alternatives. In other words, 
jurisdictions would be deemed to truly compete with one another for business only if the 
involved parties can hope to achieve comparable results from the rivalling procedures. 
For this to happen, the competing dispute settlements mechanisms must offer to the 
disputing parties equivalent features (e.g., third party resolution of the dispute in 
accordance with legal parameters). Further, the relevant issues in the two or more sets 
proceedings must exhibit a certain degree of similarity so that the parties consider them 
as potential alternatives. Thus, only proceedings which address similar or related 
disputes (i.e., similar or related sets of opposing claims)1 between similar or related 
parties can possibly qualify as competing procedures.
However, the definition of what are ‘competing procedures’ should not be proffered in 
abstracto, but rather should take into consideration the prevailing attitudes of the legal 
community toward this question. These attitudes are reflected, most prominently, in the 
manner of the application of traditional jurisdictional competition regulating rules, such 
as - lis alibi pendens and res judicata. The existing tests for the application of these
1 South West Africa (Ethiopia v. S.A.; Liberia v. S.A.), 1962 I.C.J. 319, 328.
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rules serve as a convenient yardstick to evaluate whether two adjudicative proceedings 
are in fact competing procedures.
Admittedly, this line of argumentation is circular, since it implies that the actual 
application of existing competition-regulating norms governs the definition of what 
should be considered situations of jurisdictional competition amenable to regulation. 
Still, the omnipresence and the longevity of the conditions for the applicability of the 
jurisdiction-regulating norms are indicative of the firm grasp they have on shaping legal 
perceptions as to what constitute conflicting judicial procedures. Their influence on 
legal thinking is also demonstrated by the extension of their rationale into new areas of 
competition-regulation. Hence, throughout this work reference to competing 
proceedings will mean that they share a sufficient degree of similarity, so as to fall 
within the scope of the two principal conditions for the application of the traditional 
jurisdiction-regulating rules discussed hereunder.
1. The traditional jurisdiction-regulating rules
Several potential jurisdiction-regulating rules applicable both in international and 
domestic law will be discussed throughout the present study. Some of them address the 
question of forum selection, whereas others address the management of multiple 
proceedings. Of the latter category, three traditional rules of law - lis alibi pendens, res 
judicata and electa una via, should be elucidated at this preliminary stage, since they 
will be used extensively throughout the work. It is the purpose of this section not merely 
to explain the terms, but also to discuss the conditions for their application. This is 
because, as explained above, these conditions shape the legal community’s perceptions 
of what constitute competing procedures.
The lis alibi pendens rule3 governs the relations between parallel proceedings. This 
doctrine of litispendence entails that during the pendency of one set of proceedings 
before a judicial body it is prohibited to commence another set of competing
2 E.g., the incorporation o f the ‘same parties’ and ‘same issues’ requirements into forum non conveniens 
and comity doctrines Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt, 3 ICSID Rep. 131, 144 
(1988); Restatement o f the Law, 2 , Conflict o f  Laws § 84, comment c (1971).
3 The term means in Latin: “a lawsuit pending elsewhere.” B lack’s Law Dictionary (7th ed., 1999) 942. 
The lis pendens rule is o f  wider potential applicability and also encompasses disputes pending before the 
same tribunal.
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proceedings over the same dispute before another judicial body.4 The res judicata rule,5 
also known as the doctrine of finality, implies that the final judgment of a competent 
judicial forum is bindings upon the parties (i.e., carries an obligatory effect) and cannot 
be litigated again (i.e., carries a preclusive effect).6 Thus, a final decision rendered in 
one set of proceedings bars any subsequent court or tribunal from exercising jurisdiction 
over the same dispute. While historically the res judicata rule operated to block 
successive claims, it is has been subsequently accepted that the rule may also preclude 
the re-litigation of distinct issues which had already been settled between the parties in 
past proceedings (even involving different disputes).7
The third, and in some ways the most expansive of the three rules, is the electa una via
o
rule, which is also less accepted than its two counterparts. This rule provides that once 
a party has selected a certain procedure for dispute resolution, he or she is precluded 
from seizing any other dispute settlement body.9 The choice of a specific forum can be 
perceived as indicative of the intent to resolve the dispute in the selected forum to the 
exclusion of all alternative fora. This means that a party is estopped from initiating 
parallel proceedings or re-litigating an already settled case, if the first-in-time forum was 
seized on his or her initiative (or with that party’s approval). In that sense the electa una 
via rule encompasses both the lis alibi pendens and res judicata rules. However, it 
should be realised that the electa una via rule, which is based upon the rationale of 
estoppel, only bars the plaintiff in the first set of proceedings. It does not, in itself, bar 
all other parties to litigations from pursuing multiple proceedings.
4 Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed, 1990) 931 (“The fact that proceedings are pending between a plaintiff 
and defendant in one court in respect to a given matter is a ground for preventing the plaintiff from 
taking proceedings in another court against the same defendant for the same object arising out o f  the 
same cause o f  action). Although this definition is limited to parallel proceedings initiated by the same 
party, it is generally accepted that the term can be also construed to bar the respondent as well from 
initiating a claim involving the same matter. See e.g., Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement o f  
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 27 Sept. 1968, art. 21, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, 2 9 1.L.M.
(1990) 1413 [hereinafter 'Brussels Convention'].
5 The full Latin maxim reads: “Res judicata pro veritate accipitur” (a matter adjudged is taken for truth)
6 B lack’s Law Dictionary (7th ed.) 1312 (“ 1. An issue that has been definitively settled by judicial 
decisions. 2. An affirmative defence barring the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same 
claim, or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series o f  transactions and that could have 
been -  but was not -  raised in the first suit”).
7 Bin Cheng, General Principles o f  Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (1987) 337, 
343-44.
8 The full Latin title o f  the principle is electa una via non datur recursus ad alteram. It means that “when 
one way has been chosen, no recourse is given to another”. Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed., 1999) 1633.
9 George Schwarzenberger, 1 International Law (1945) 378.
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2. The conditions fo r  application o f  the traditional rules 
What is common to all three rules is that their application depends upon a finding that 
the regulated sets of proceedings compete with each other. That is, that they share 
several prominent features, which intractably link them together. What is the rationale 
underlying this condition? As will be explained below, one of the central and common 
purposes of the three rules is to prevent the risk of incompatible judicial decisions. Thus, 
it is justifiable to regulate, on this basis, only those sets of proceedings capable of 
creating incompatibility -  proceedings which address sufficiently similar disputes.10
Further, a well-established principle of justice, found in virtually all municipal legal 
systems and in international human rights law, asserts that a party to a dispute is entitled 
to have his or her day in court (or to have his rights and obligations determined by a 
competent and independent judicial authority).11 This principle necessarily limits the 
sphere of application of jurisdiction-regulating rules. If the two relevant sets of 
proceedings do not deal with similar disputes, then excessive restriction of the right of 
access to adjudication before the second-in-time forum, by virtue of a previous, but 
different, set of proceedings, might conflict with the parties’ ability to have their day in 
a competent court with relation to each distinct claim.
What are the elements that transform two or more sets of proceedings into competing 
proceedings under international law? Most sources of international law -  treaties, case 
law, and the writing of jurists (as well as the predominant legal theory in most domestic 
law systems), have repeatedly insisted upon the identification of two prominent features: 
that the competing procedures involve the same parties and the same issues.12 These two 
elements seem to reflect an adequate balance between the rationales underlying the 
traditional jurisdiction-regulating rules. They reduce the risk of incompatible judgments,
10 Giorgos T^nekides “L’exception de litispendance devant les organisms intemationaux” XXXVI Revue 
generate de droit international public (1929) 502.
11 See e.g., Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 
761-62 (1989); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, art. 14(1), UN GA 
Res. 2200 A (XXI), GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 (A/6316) 52, UN Doc. A/CONF. 32/4 [hereinafter 
‘ICCPR’]; Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 Nov. 1950, art. 
6(1), E.T.S. 5 ,213 U.N.T.S. 221.
12 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6, at 
19-20 (jurisdiction); Benvenuti andBonfat Sri. v. Congo 1 ICSID Rep. 330, 340 (1980); Amco Asia, Pan 
American Development Ltd. v. Indonesia, 1 ICSID Rep. 389, 409, 453, 460 (1983); China Navigation 
Co., Ltd. (U.K.) V. U.S. (The ‘Newchwang’), VI R.I.A.A. 64, 65 (1921); Cases 172, 226/83, Hoogovens 
Groep v. Commission, [1985] E.C.R. 2843, 2846; Cases 358/85 and 51/86, France v. Parliament, [1988] 
E.C.R. 4846, 4850; Brussels Convention, art. 21; Cheng, supra note 7, at 339-47. See also Restatement o f  
the Law, 2nd, Judgments §§17 , 24; B lack’s Law Dictionary (7th ed., 1999) 1312.
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but, at the same time, limit unnecessary curbs on the rights of the parties to litigate all of 
their distinct claims.
The first condition, ‘same parties’, has been narrowly construed by international courts 
and tribunals. It can be observed that the dominant test that had emerged in practice has 
been that of ‘virtual identity’.13 Hence, only multiple claims between the very same 
parties involved in the first set of proceedings or those validly acting on their behalf are 
prohibited.14 Thus, for example, the HRC has held on several occasions that the lis alibi 
pendens rule, precluding parallel proceedings concerning the same dispute, does not bar 
a victim of an alleged human rights violation from seizing the Committee even if the 
same complaint is already pending before another international human rights procedure, 
provided that the first-in-time complaint had been submitted by complainants unrelated 
to the victim (i.e., not acting on his or her behalf).15 It is useful to note in this regard that 
the stare decisis doctrine, according to which decisions in one case should govern 
similar future cases between different parties, has never been accepted by international 
law.16 Thus, cases involving different sets parties cannot have a preclusive effect on 
each other, although they may, in appropriate circumstances, carry a considerable
1 7persuasive influence.
13 However, in domestic U.S. law one can find two main exceptions to the application o f  the res judicata 
rule between the same parties - privity and adequate representation o f  interests. Burns v. Unemployment 
Compensation Board o f  Review, 65 A.2d 445 (1945); Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 265 N.E.2d 739 (1970); 
Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas International Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1977).
14 See e.g., Comm. 75/1980, Fanali v. Italy, U.N. GAOR. 38th Sess., Supp. 40, at 160, 163 (Report o f  the 
HRC, 1983); Case C-406/92, The Tatry [1994] E.C.R. 1-5439, 5474 (in circumstance where only some of 
the parties to the first set o f proceedings are parties to the second, the second Court can apply the lis 
pendens rule only in respect o f  questions which involve only parties to the first set o f  proceedings); Tom 
Zwart, The Admissibility o f  Human Rights Petitions (1994) 181-82.
15 Comm. R. 13/56, Casariego v. Uruguay, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. 40, at 185, 187 (Report o f  the 
HRC, 1981); Comm. R.2/10, Altesor v. Uruguay, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. 40, at 122, 125 (Report 
o f the HRC, 1982); Comm. 74/1980, Estrella v. Uruguay, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. 40, at 150, 156 
(Report o f  the HRC, 1983). Cf. A.G. V.R. v. Netherlands, App. No. 20060/92, Decision o f the EHR 
Comm’n o f  10 April 1995, available in <http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/ Hudoc2doc/hedec/sift/ 1906.txt>(last 
visited on 13 Aug. 2000) (a complaint by one party before one tribunal cannot bar an identical complaint 
by another party to the same tribunal).
However, in one case, the I/A HR Comm’n has indicated that a claim presented to by an applicant 
unrelated to the victim may preclude the latter bringing the same matter again before it. Case 10.970, 
Mejia v. Peru, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report no. 5/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, Doc. 7, at 157, par. V (A)(1) 
(1996), available in <http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/1996/peru5-96.htm> (last visited on 4 Sept. 
2000).
16 Statute o f  the International Court o f Justice, art. 59, 26 June 1945, Annex to the Charter o f the United 
Nations, XV U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 355 [hereinafter ‘ICJ Statute’].
17 Cheng, supra note 7, at 341-42, 346; Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (1996) 
107-09.
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The second condition, ‘same issues’ has been described by some of legal authorities as 
comprised of two sub-categories - similar object and similar grounds.18 In any event, a 
sufficient degree of similarity is required both with relation to the facts and the law 
underlying the claim.19 While some international courts and tribunals have been willing 
to introduce a certain degree of flexibility into the ‘same issues’ test and require that the 
claims in question would be ‘essentially the same’,20 it is clear that mere linkage 
between the proceedings is not enough. The latter looser degree of similarity underlies 
the rule of connexity, which authorizes courts to join related claims to one set of
91 99proceedings, and has not been incorporated into general international law.
Two specific elaborations of the ‘same issues’ standard should be commented upon. 
First, it looks as if multiple litigation arising under different legal systems cannot be 
deemed to involve the ‘same issue’. In two PCIJ cases, the Court has held that parallel 
litigation before two tribunals applying international and domestic law, respectively,
9 0
does not qualify as jurisdictional competition. In fact, in one of these case the Court 
has expressed the view that the requirement that the parallel sets of proceedings should
18 Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1907, 1952 (1941); Case 2272 (1975), A v. B, excerpts in 
Collection o f  ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 (1990) 11, 13.
19 See Haya de la Torre (Peru v. Columbia), 19511.C.J. 71, 82 (previous judgment between the same 
parties is not preclusive because the first case dealt with the legality o f  a decision to grant diplomatic 
asylum, whereas the second decision - with the question o f  extradition o f  the same person); Compagnie 
Generale de I'Orenoque (France v. Venezuela) 10 R.I.A.A. 184, 279(1905)(counter-claims and claims 
for set-off are not the same actions as the original claim); Pauger v. Austria, App. No. 16717/90, 80 Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 24 (1995)(proceedings before the HRC on right to equality does not bar the 
claimant from bringing a petition against the same respondent to the Strasbourg machinery, alleging 
violation o f  due process rights); Pauger v. Austria, App. No. 24872/94, 80 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 170, 174 (1995)(when proceedings before the HRC and the Strasbourg machinery involve 
essentially the same allegations, the second in time petition is barred).
20 See Case 144/86, Gubisch Maschinenfabrik v Palumbo [1987] E.C.R. 4861, 4876 (the meaning o f the 
term ‘same cause o f  action’ found in article 21 o f the Brussels Convention “cannot be restricted so as to 
mean two claims which are entirely identical”); Case C-351/96, Drouot Assurances SA v. Consolidated 
Metallurgical Industries (CMI Industrial Sites) [1998] E.C.R. 1-3075, 3087-89(Opinion o f  
Advocate-General Fennelly)(for reasons of legal clarity one should adopt a more rigid test with respect 
o f the ‘same parties’ than with respect o f the ‘same cause o f  action’).
21 This rule o f discretion is found in many municipal legal systems (normally, as a rule o f judicial 
discretion) and in the Brussels Convention. Brussels Convention, art. 22 (claims are treated as related 
proceedings when “ ... they are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them 
together...”); Committee on International Civil and Commercial Litigation, Declining and Referring 
Jurisdiction in International Litigation - Third Interim Report submitted to the International Law 
Association London Conference (2000) 7 (copy with author).
22 S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 10, at 48 (Dissenting Opinion o f Judge 
Weiss).
23 Certain German Interests, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6, at 20; Factory at Chorzow  (Germany v. 
Poland), P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 9, at 31-32. See also George Schwarzenberger, 1 International Law  (3rd 
ed., 1957) 142.
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be conducted before tribunals of the same legal order is a third condition for the 
application of the lis alibi pendens rule.24
Second, it also seems that multiple claims relating to the same facts, but involving 
distinct legal claims under international law, do not necessarily meet the ‘same issues’ 
standard. The practice of the HRC can again provide useful guidance in that regard. 
Recent decisions of the Committee suggest that two identically phrased petitions, 
submitted to the Committee and to a competing procedure, would not be considered as 
the ‘same matter’ if there are relevant differences in the substantive scope of protection 
offered by the constitutive instruments of the two mechanisms. It remains to see 
whether this trend, which if applied in an overly technical manner might be open for 
abuse,26 will be followed by other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.
A separate issue that might arise with respect to the examination of the relations 
between the competing legal claims is whether a party that could but did not raise a 
claim in the first set of proceedings is barred from raising it in subsequent proceedings 
arising out of the same facts pattern. Although, it is sensible to hold that a party should 
be precluded from engaging in ‘piecemeal litigation’ and from evading the principle of 
finality by reason of his or her omission,27 there is no clear international precedent on 
the issue.28
24 Certain German Interests, 1925 P.C.I.J. at 20. Although the case dealt with the application o f  the 
litispendence rule, there is no reason why the same rationale would not apply in regard to the application 
o f other jurisdiction-regulating norms. See also Dan Ciobanu “Litispendence between the International 
Court o f Justice and the Political Organs o f the United Nations” 1 The Future o f  the International Court 
o f  Justice (Leo Gross, ed., 1976) 209, 215.
25 See Comm. 44/1990, Casanovas v. France, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. 40, at 131, at para. 5.1 
(Report o f the HRC, 1994); Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24 (52), para. 14, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6 (1994){electa una via  reservations should apply only where the legal rights and 
subject matter under the two competing instruments are identical). See also Laurence R. Heifer “Forum 
Shopping for Human Rights” 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. (1999) 285, 315-19.
26 Heifer, supra note 25, at 367, 370. However, mere difference in language between legal texts does not 
suffice to transform petitions into ‘different issues’ and that meaningful substantive differences in the 
scope o f rights or obligations should be demonstrated.
27 C f Henderson v. Henderson 67 E.R. 313, 319 (1843); H oystead v. Commissioner o f  Taxation [1926] 
A.C. 155, 165-66, 170 (P.C.); Fidelitas Shipping Co. Ltd. v. V/O Exportchleb [1977] 1 Q.B. 630, 640 
(Lord Denning M.R.); G. Richard Shell “Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects o f Commercial 
Arbitration” 35 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. (1988) 623, 640-41; Nina Zaltzman, Res judicata  in Civil Proceedings
(1991) 16 (in Hebrew).
28 In fact, human Rights bodies have adopted conflicting positions on this issue. Comm. 452/1991, 
Glaziou v. France, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. 40(11), at 250,255 (Report o f the HRC, 1994); Comm. 
584/1994, Valentijn v. France, 51st Sess, Supp. 40(11), at 253 ,257  (Report o f  the HRC, 1996)(new issues 
may be raised in subsequent litigation, despite the possibility o f raising them in the first set o f  
proceedings); Ajinaja v. U.K., App. No. 13365/87, 55 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 294, 296 (1988) 
(an applicant is barred from raising claims that he could have raised in previous set o f  proceedings).
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The res judicata rule, which is the most widely acceptable of the three rules and, 
consequently, the most developed, contains several additional conditions, which derive 
from its unique characteristics. Since the rule is applied only after a judicial decision had 
been rendered, it focuses on the issues actually addressed by the decision and not 
necessarily on all issues raised by the original statement of claims. In this manner, the 
rule can achieve a more accurate balance between the main conflicting policy goals 
applicable to re-litigation attempts - stability and justice (i.e., finality of legal decisions 
and the right to have contested issue determined by a competent judicial forum). It is 
therefore accepted that the res judicata rule only applies with regard to settled issues -  
the operative part of the judgment and all decisions on questions of fact and law which 
were actually determined by the judicial body and served as a basis of the operative 
part.30 There is no preclusion over issue raised in the proceedings, but glossed over by 
the decision. In contrast to these two clear-cut rules there is considerable controversy as
to whether the reasoning leading to the holding of the first-in-time tribunal is covered by
11
the res judicata rule.
With regard to preliminary and incidental issues, the decisions of the tribunal relating to 
them come within the scope of the res judicata rule only to the extent that they are an 
essential condition to the judgment on the merits. Where these preliminary issues fall 
outside the scope of normal competence of the judicial body its decision shall constitute 
res judicata for the purpose of that judgment only and the parties will be able to raise 
again the contested issue in proceedings before other judicial fora.33
29 Case C-281/89 Italy v Commission [1991] E.C.R. 1-347, para. 14; Case C-277/95 P Lenz v 
Commission [1996] E.C.R. 1-6109, 6125 (in both cases it was held that the principle o f res judicata  
applies only in respect o f matters o f  fact and law actually or necessarily settled by a judicial decision); 
Joined Cases T-305-07, 313-16, 318, 325, 328-29 and 335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV  v. 
Commission [1999] E.C.R. 11-931, 972 (earlier decision based on certain grounds does not preclude 
re-litigation o f  other grounds which were not decided in the first decision).
30 Compagnie Generale de VOrenoque, 10 R.I.A.A. at 276; Joined Case 97, 99, 193 and 215/86 Asteris v. 
Commission [1988] E.C.R. 2181, 2208.
31 Amco Asia, 1 ICSID Rep. 543, 550-51 (1988) (Resubmitted case)(It is unclear whether there is a rule 
in international which gives res judicata  effect to reasoning integral to the holding).
32 Cheng, supra note 7, at 353.
33 Cheng, supra note 7, at 353-54.
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Chapter Two
Delineation of jurisdictional overlap - theory and practice
The following Chapter will try to systematically map areas of jurisdictional overlap 
between the different procedures, on the basis of their respective competences. For 
methodological purposes international courts and tribunals will be sorted into 4 
jurisdictional categories, based on their geographical and subject matter reach:
(i) Courts and tribunals of universal jurisdiction ratione personae and general 
competence ratione materiae (universal courts and tribunals);
(ii) Courts and tribunals of universal jurisdiction ratione personae with specialised 
ratione materiae competence (global specialised courts and tribunals);
(iii) Regional courts and tribunals with general ratione materiae competence 
(regional courts and tribunals with unlimited competence); and
(iv) Regional courts and tribunals with specialised ratione materiae competence 
(regional specialised courts and tribunals).
This Chapter will discuss the potential for jurisdictional overlaps between judicial and 
quasi-judicial bodies belonging to different categories of courts and tribunals and 
between bodies belonging to the same category. In addition, those few occasions where 
direct or indirect conflict of jurisdictions had actually taken place will be highlighted. 
Finally, this Chapter will try to assess the probabilities for the occurrence of future 
jurisdictional conflicts in light of anticipated trends in the work of competing 
international courts and tribunals.
On the basis of the information considered here, it would become possible to appraise 
the magnitude of the phenomenon of competing jurisdictions. If the risk of concurrent 
proceedings is negligible, the present study is largely redundant (except perhaps as an 
academic exercise). But if, on the other hand, there is significant risk for incidence of 
jurisdictional conflicts, this work can hopefully make an important contribution in a 
relatively unexplored area of international law.
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1. Conflicts between different courts and tribunals o f  general personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction [category (i) tribunals]
The only permanent international courts and tribunals that may review any international 
dispute between any two or more states (i.e., endowed with universal personal 
jurisdiction and unlimited subject matter jurisdiction) are the ICJ and the PCA. So far, 
there has not been an actual case of jurisdictional competition between the two 
institutions. Further, given the paltry caseload of the PCA in recent decades and the 
modest rate of acceptance of the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction under the ‘optional 
clause’, this situation is not likely to change in the foreseeable future.
Still, inter-state disputes susceptible of being referred to the ICJ or the PCA can also be 
brought, on the basis of a compromis or a compromissory clause, before ad hoc 
arbitration tribunals. Thus, ad hoc arbitration may represent a potential jurisdictional 
alternative to both the ICJ and the PCA. Indeed, in a recent fisheries dispute -  the 
Southern Blue-Fin Tuna case, the claimant states could unilaterally refer the dispute to 
the ICJ, which had jurisdiction over all parties to the dispute by virtue of their optional 
clause declarations, but preferred to submit the case to arbitration, in pursuance to a 
compromissory clause (article 287 to UNCLOS).34
The potential for concurrency between the jurisdictions of the ICJ and arbitration 
tribunals does not merely expand the parties’ ability to forum shop. Rather, on a few 
occasions, multiple proceedings have actually taken place before the ICJ and arbitration 
tribunals. All of these cases follow a common pattern and consist of attempts to 
challenge the procedure or the decisions of arbitral tribunals before the ICJ (or its 
predecessor - the PCIJ). In some of these cases the ICJ (or PCIJ) was requested to 
supervise the proper conduct of arbitration (including the right to initiate proceedings),35 
but in three prominent cases the Court was requested to review de novo the merits of 
disputes decided by way of arbitration. The attempts to contest the final decision of 
arbitral tribunals before the ICJ raises in turn the question of the res judicata effect of
34 Southern Bluefm Tuna (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan), Award o f  4 Aug. 2000 (Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility), available at <http://www. worldbank.org/icsid/bluefmtuna/award080400.pdf> (last 
visited on 12 August 2000).
35 Interpretation o f  the Greco-Turkish Agreement o f  I December 1926, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 16; 
Interpretation o f  the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 1950 I.C.J. 65 (first phase) 
and 1950 I.C.J. 221 (second phase)\ Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 89; Ambatielos 
(Greece v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 10; Applicability o f  the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 o f  the 
United Nations Headquarters Agreement o f  26 June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 12. See discussion in W. Michael
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arbitral awards vis-a-vis other international tribunals, which will be discussed at 
greater length in a subsequent Part of this work.
In the Societe Commerciale case,37 the PCIJ had been asked by Belgium to confirm a 
commercial award rendered in arbitration proceedings between a Belgian firm and the 
Greek government. The Court held that since the arbitration clause had prescribed that 
the arbitral award was to be 'final and binding', it can neither confirm the award nor 
annul it.38 In the King o f Spain case,39 Honduras and Nicaragua had referred to the ICJ, 
by way of agreement, a dispute over the validity of a 1906 arbitral award concerning a 
frontier dispute between the two countries. Again, the Court refused to reopen 
substantive questions that were decided by the arbitral tribunal, but agreed to examine 
allegations that procedural irregularities had been found in the method of establishment 
and work of the tribunal (although, these allegations were eventually dismissed). Finally, 
in the 1989 Arbitral Award case,40 Guinea-Bissau had unilaterally referred to the Court 
on the basis of an ‘optional clause’ declaration a dispute with Senegal over the validity 
of an arbitral award concerning maritime delimitation between the two states. This time 
the Court held that it would not intervene in the legal conclusions of the arbitral tribunal 
unless the latter "acted in manifest breach of the competence conferred on it by the 
Arbitration Agreement."41 Since no 'manifest breach' had been found in the 
circumstances of the case, the Court refrained from upsetting the findings of the 
arbitrators.
These three examples demonstrate the possibility of seizing the ICJ after arbitration 
proceedings over the same dispute had been completed. This option is clearly feasible 
where both parties have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under the 
‘optional clause’. In these circumstances any party to arbitration can unilaterally seize 
the Court (as had been done by Guinea-Bissau in the 1989 Arbitral Award case).42 Still,
Reisman “Supervisory Jurisdiction o f the International Court o f  Justice: International Arbitration and 
International Adjudication" 258 Recueil des cours (1996) 9, at Ch. IIpassim.
36 Reisman, supra note 35, at 229.
37 Societe Commerciale de Belgique (Belgium v. France), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 78, at 160.
38 Id. at 174. For discussion, see Reisman, supra note 35, at 233-53.
39 Arbitral Aw ard made by the King o f  Spain on 23 December 1906 (Honduras v. Nicaragua), 1960 I.C.J. 
192. For discussion, see Reisman, supra note 35, at 253-90.
40 Arbitral Aw ard o f  31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal) 1991 I.C.J. 53.
41 Arbitral Aw ard o f  31 July 1989, 1991 I.C.J. at 69. For discussion, see Reisman, supra note 35, at 
290-311,316-71.
42 According to the jurisprudence o f the ICJ, the Statute does not place temporal limitation upon 
‘optional clause’ based jurisdiction. Thus, an applicant state may accept the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction, and immediately thereafter submit a claim against another state already subject to the
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the Court’s reluctance to interfere with substantive holdings of the arbitrators might 
deter some parties from attempting to utilise this procedural avenue.
In contrast, the risk of multiple proceedings, first initiated before the ICJ and 
subsequently submitted to ad hoc arbitration, or multiple proceedings before two 
different ad hoc arbitration proceedings (which can involve non-state parties, as well), 
can be regarded as rather minor. This is primarily because the jurisdiction of ad hoc 
arbitral tribunals is often based on a compromis signed shortly before the opening of the 
proceedings, and such instrument is not likely to be concluded when an alternative set of 
proceedings is impending. An exception to this proposition can be found in competition 
situations involving claims commissions (such as the Iran-U.S Claims Tribunal). Since 
the jurisdiction of such bodies is typically broader than that of ad hoc arbitral tribunals, 
and because their activation is less dependent upon cooperation by the parties, 
competition is more likely to ensue.
2. Conflicts between (i) courts and tribunals o f  general personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction and (ii) universal courts and tribunals o f  
specialised competence
An area of considerable jurisdictional overlap can be identified between the respective 
competences of the ICJ, PCA and arbitral tribunals, on the one hand, and specialised 
international courts and tribunals (or quasi-judicial procedures) available to a universal 
constituency, on the other hand. This latter category includes ITLOS, the WTO dispute 
settlement bodies, the new International Criminal Court, the UN human rights treaty 
bodies (HRC, CERD and CAT Committees, and the prospective MWC and CEDAW 
Committees), ICSID, ILO complaint mechanisms, the World Bank Inspection Panel, the 
Montreal Protocol Non-Compliance Procedure and the CWC Verification Procedure. 
The bottom line is that almost every dispute falling under the jurisdiction of the 
aforementioned global specialised courts and tribunals could also conceivably be dealt 
with, in some way, by the ICJ or submitted to one or another form of arbitration.43
Court’s jurisdiction under the ‘optional clause’. See e.g., Right o f  Passage over Indian Territory 
(Portugal v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 125, 147 (Preliminary Objection); Legality o f  Use o f  Force (Yugoslavia v. 
Belgium), Order o f  2 June 1999 (forthcoming in 1999 I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures).
However, some states have introduced reservations to their ‘optional clause’ declarations, imposing 
temporal limitations on proceedings initiated by another party on the basis o f  a new ‘optional clause’ 
declaration. See e.g., Declaration o f United Kingdom under article 36(2) o f  the ICJ Statute, 654 U.N.T.S. 
335 (1969).
43 See e.g., Christoph Schreuer “Commentary on the ICSID Convention”, 12 ICSID Rev., F.I.L.J. (1997) 
59,211.
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Indeed, particular attention has been paid in recent years to the overlap between the 
jurisdictions of the ICJ and ITLOS.44 This is because large parts of the jurisdiction of the 
latter body comprise disputes that also fall under the jurisdiction of the ICJ and, in fact, 
had been submitted to it on numerous past occasions.45 Further, the 1982 Convention on 
the Law of Sea specifically designated ICJ, arbitration (ordinary and special arbitration) 
and ITLOS as alternative venues for litigation of disputes over the interpretation and 
application of the Convention 46 This overlap, combined with a commonly held notion, 
according to which law of the sea disputes constitute a traditionally important and 
integral part of general international law, has led some ICJ judges to question the 
wisdom of establishing a new body to handle matters which the ICJ has effectively 
handled in the past.47
While, as a rule, cases amenable to the jurisdiction of the global specialised courts and 
tribunals can also fall under the jurisdiction of the universal bodies entrusted with 
unlimited subject-matter jurisdiction, this is not the situation vice versa. The potential 
subject matter jurisdiction of the ICJ, PCA or ad hoc arbitration tribunals is wider than 
the aggregate total of jurisdictions of the various specialised bodies, and, consequently, 
one can identify several issues that may be referred to the ICJ or arbitration but not to 
any of the global specialised courts or tribunals 48
44 Jonathan I. Chamey “The Implications o f Expanding International Dispute Settlement Systems: The 
1982 Convention on the Law o f  the Sea” 90 A.J.I.L. (1996) 69; Shigeru Oda “Dispute Settlement 
Prospects in the Law o f the Sea” 4 4 1.C.L.Q. (1995) 863; Bernard H. Oxman “ The Rule o f  Law and the 
United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea” 7 European Journal o f  International Law (1996) 353; 
Tullio Treves “Conflicts between the International Tribunal for the Law o f the Sea and the International 
Court o f  Justice” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 809.
45 See e.g., Fisheries (U.K. v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. 116; North Sea Continental Shelf (F.G.R. v. 
Netherlands, F.G.R. v. Denmark), 1969 I.C.J. 3; Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Iceland), 1974 I.C.J. 4; 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18; Gulf o f  Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246; Continental Shelf 
(Libya/Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13; Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen 
(Denmark v. Norway), 1993 I.C.J. 38.
46 United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea, 10 Dec. 1982 , art. 287, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122
(1982), 21 I.L.M. (1982) 1261 [hereinafter ‘UNCLOS’].
47 See e.g., Shigeru Oda “The International Court o f Justice from the Bench” 244 Recueil de cours (1993) 
9, 144-45; Oda, Dispute Settlement Prospects, supra note 44, at 864-65; Gilbert Guillaume “The Future o f  
International Judicial Institutions” 44 I.C.L.Q. (1995) 848, 855.
48 E.g., land border delimitation disputes have often been the subject o f ICJ or arbitration decisions. See 
e.g., Temple ofPreah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 1962 I.C.J. 6; Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/ 
Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554; Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba Area  (Egypt v. Israel), 27 I.L.M. (1988) 
1421. However, such questions could not be brought before most global specialised tribunals.
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A. D ifferences in the scope o f  jurisd iction  ratione p erson ae over states
At the same time, there are several caveats to the proposition that cases submitted to 
specialised tribunals can also be brought before the ICJ, PCA or ad hoc arbitration. The 
first caveat relates to the degree of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the latter 
institutions. Concurrency between the ICJ and a global specialised procedure presuppose 
that the both sets of procedures may exercise compulsory jurisdiction ratione personae 
over the same state parties to the dispute. However, since less than a third of the UN 
member states have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ (and most of the 
states that have done so appended reservations limiting their scope of acceptance), there 
are bound to be many instances in which only the global specialised courts or tribunals 
would enjoy jurisdiction over both parties to the dispute. For instance, the WTO dispute 
settlement procedures have compulsory jurisdiction over some 140 state parties, which 
is more than twice the number of states subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ 
and, as a result, many states are parties only to the compulsory jurisdiction of the former. 
This situation is even more acute in the case of the PCA, whose long dormancy and near 
lack of compulsory jurisdiction turn it into a nonexistent alternative to the global 
specialised courts and tribunals. Finally, proceedings before ad hoc arbitration tribunals 
are often of strictly consensual nature and cannot be initiated by way of unilateral 
recourse by one of the disputing parties. However, an agreement to resort to arbitration 
is unlikely if one or more of the disputing parties are interested in submitting the case to 
a competent global specialised body.
B. Differences in the legal standing of individuals
Another fundamental issue concerns the different locus standi standards employed by 
ICJ and the global specialised tribunals. The ICJ exercises contentious jurisdiction over 
inter-state disputes only. As a result, disputes to which non-state actors (e.g., IGOs or 
natural or legal persons) are parties cannot be brought directly to the ICJ. By way of 
example, an individual victim of human rights violations can file a complaint with to the 
HRC but cannot seize the ICJ. The same problem arises, inter alia, with regard to claims 
before WTO involving the EC as a party, complaints by ‘industrial associations’ under 
the ILO complaint procedure, all World Bank Panel inspections and ICSID proceedings, 
which involve, by definition, a non-state party, and criminal prosecution of individuals 
before the ICC.
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The problem of different locus standi standards can be partially rectified through 
elevating claims made on behalf of non-state entities into the inter-state level through 
‘diplomatic protection’.49 That is, espousal of individuals’ claims by their state of 
nationality,50 or in the case of corporations - by the state of their place of association or 
registered offices.51 Hence, with regard to human rights complaints and other 
individually initiated proceedings, competition between global specialised courts or 
tribunals and the ICJ presupposes the exercise of diplomatic protection before the latter 
instance by the relevant state of nationality. This possibility has been demonstrated in 
recent years by several ICJ cases where states had pursued human rights violations on 
behalf of their nationals.52 For example, the recent Diallo case, which is pending before 
the ICJ53 involves allegations by Guinea that Congo had discriminated against a foreign 
investor of Guinean nationality, and could also have been brought by the concerned 
individual to ICSID or one of the human rights tribunals.
However, diplomatic protection might not always be legally or politically feasible. The 
state of nationality could have formally pledged not to exercise diplomatic protection,54 
it may be unable to rely upon the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, or it simply might 
be unwilling to sacrifice good relations with a foreign state for the advancement of the
49 The exercise o f  diplomatic protection by a state is defined as "taking up the case o f  one o f  its nationals, 
by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality 
asserting its own right, the right to ensure in the person o f its nationals respect for the rule o f international 
law." Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Estonia v. Latvia), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 76, at 16. See also 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Great Britain), 1924 P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 2, at 12; Robert 
Y. Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds.), 1 Oppenheim's International Law  (9th ed., 1992) 512-15; Malcolm 
N. Shaw, International law  (4th ed., 1997) 562-67; Ian Brownlie, Principles o f  Public International Law 
(5th ed., 1998)406-07.
50 However there should be a genuine link between the individual and the espousing state. Nottebohm  
(Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1954 I.C.J. 4, 24.
51 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 43.
52 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Breard)(Paraguay v. U.S), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Provisional 
Measures), 1998 I.C.J. 248; LaGrand (Germany v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Provisional Measures). The 
interplay between the ICJ and human rights proceedings was demonstrated by the fact that the same 
issues raised in the Breard  and LaGrand  cases were also discussed by the I/A CHR (in pursuance to a 
request for advisory opinion by Mexico, not a party to any o f the two ICJ proceedings). Advisory Opinion 
OC-16/99, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework o f  the Guarantees o f  the 
Due Process o f  Law', Opinion o f 1 Oct. 1999, <
http://corteidh-oea.nu.or.cr/ci/PUBLICAT/SERIES_A/A_16_ING.HTM> (last visited on 20 June 2000).
53 Diallo  (Guinea v. DRC)(application by Guinea, 28 Dec. 1998), available at <
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igc/igc_orders/igc_iapplication_19981228.pdf> (last visited on 7 
July 2000)(the Court has not yet taken any substantive decisions on the case).
54 See e.g., Convention on the Settlement o f Investment Disputes between States and Nationals o f  Other 
States, 18 March 1965, art. 27, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ‘ICSID Convention’].
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interests of one of its citizens.55 Further, espousal is out of the question when complaints 
alleging human rights abuses are directed against the victim's own state of nationality.
Moreover, even where diplomatic protection is feasible, it is not clear whether after 
transformation into the inter-state level the dispute remains the same. In fact, the PCIJ 
has stressed the qualitatively different character of disputes espoused by states and 
disputes between state and foreign nationals.56 Simply put, the inter-state dispute might 
be considered fundamentally different from the original dispute, involving different sets 
of rights and interests. In that case, there will be no total overlap between the two 
alternative procedures, although they are bound to be closely related to each other.
In practice, there has been one notable occasion where the ICJ, two human rights 
arrangements and one regional economic integration court have all been seized 
simultaneously, albeit by different claimants, with related legal claims emanating from 
the same situation. As a result of France's decision in 1995 to resume underground 
nuclear testing in the South Pacific, New Zealand had submitted a claim against France 
to the ICJ arguing that the French experiments were unlawful and in breach of an 
specific undertaking not to conduct such experiments (a pledge on which the ICJ had 
relied in 1974 when it dismissed a claim against French atmospheric nuclear testing).58 
At the same time, two cases were initiated by private parties before the HRC and the 
EHR Comm’n against France (two complainants had been involved, at first, in both sets 
of proceedings, but have subsequently retired from one of them), alleging in both cases 
that the tests represented a threat to the right to life of the claimants.59 Finally, the 
legality of the French experiments was also challenged before the ECJ, in proceedings 
brought by yet a third group of individuals, residing in proximity to the testing area. 
These proceedings were introduced against the EC Commission for its assent to the
55 This is particularly the case where the individual in question may submit a claim on his or her behalf to 
an international tribunal.
56 Mavrommatis, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No 2, at 11. Cf. Donnelly v. U.K., App. No. 5577-5583/72, 16 
Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. (1973) 212 (the EHR Comm’n was inclined to hold that inter-state and 
individual human rights petitions raising the same issues involve different parties, and thus, do not 
preclude each other). See Jennings and Watts, 1 Oppenheim ’s Int 7 Law, supra note 49, at 512.
57 States engaged in international disputes have radically different interests and concerns than private 
litigants. Thus for instance, it is conceivable that a state exercising diplomatic protection would be 
willing to forgo an investor’s claim in return for future trade concessions on the part o f the host-state. See 
e.g., Heathrow Airport User Charges (U.S. v. U.K.), 102 I.L.R. 215, 278-81 (1992); Schreuer, supra note 
43, at 212 (parallel proceedings before ICSID and inter-state arbitration cannot ‘strictly compete’ with 
each other since they involve different sets o f parties).
58 Examination o f  the Situation in accordance with Paragraph 63 o f  the Court's Judgment o f  20 
December 1974 in the Nuclear Test (New Zealand v. France), 1995 I.C.J. 285.
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continuation of the French experiments in alleged violation of the provisions of the 
Euratom Treaty governing dangerous experiments.60
In the end, all four applications were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or lack of 
standing, and the relations between the different proceedings did not become an issue. 
Still, notwithstanding the differences between the identity of the parties and the specific 
legal claims raised in the various sets of proceedings, these cases demonstrate the 
potential for interaction between different international courts and tribunals addressing 
the same situation. It is possible to envision slightly different circumstances in which 
genuine competition would have existed. This would have happened, for instance, had a 
single claimant asserted essentially the same legal claims before all individual-initiated 
procedures (the human rights bodies and the ECJ), and had these claims been presented 
by a state espousing the same individual’s case before the ICJ.
C. Differences in the legal standing of international organisations
Disputes involving IGOs are even less likely to generate jurisdictional competition 
between the ICJ and the global and specialised courts and tribunals. This is because 
there is no doctrine of diplomatic protection that states may exercise vis-a-vis 
international organisations, which is comparable to that applicable to private parties.61 
However, indirect espousal of claims on behalf of an IGO is conceivable in certain 
extraordinary circumstances.
First, a claim on behalf of a person whose legal rights had been infringed while working 
in the service of an IGO can be espoused either by the said organisations or by his or her 
state of nationality.62 Thus, the same claims could be brought on the individual’s behalf 
before the ICJ, by the state of nationality, and before another forum, by an IGO. 
However, while diplomatic protection proceedings have taken place on occasion before
59 Tauira v. France, App. No. 28204/95, 83 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 112 (1995); Comm. 
645/1995, Bordes v. France, UN Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/645/1995 (Decision o f  the HRC, 1996).
60 Case T-219/95 R, Danielsson v. Commission [1995] E.C.R. 11-3051.
61 See Maclaine Watson v. Dept, o f  Trade and Industry [1989] 3 All E.R. 523, 529 (H.L.); Shaw, supra 
note 49, at 921-23. This disparity is explained through the historical origins o f  the diplomatic protection 
doctrine, which tended to equate an offence against a foreign national with an offence against his or her 
state o f  nationality. Mavrommatis, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No 2, at 11-12; Louis Henkin, Richard C. Pugh, 
Oscar Schachter and Hans Smit, International Law Cases and Materials (3rd ed., 1993) 375. No parallel 
rationale can be found in support o f espousal o f claims on behalf o f  inter-governmental organisation, 
especially since it is widely accepted that, unlike individuals, IGOs are independent owners o f  numerous 
rights and obligations under international law.
62 Reparation fo r Injuries Suffered in the Service o f  the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 185; Barcelona 
Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 39.
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ffKthe ICJ (even in cases brought by IGOs through advisory opinion proceedings), it is 
quite hard to envision diplomatic protection claims brought by IGOs before any of the 
global specialised courts or tribunals (in contrast with claims before regional specialised 
judicial bodies).64
Second, it cannot be ruled out that under certain conditions it will be possible to attribute 
to states international responsibility for acts committed by IGOs in which they 
participate or with whom they cooperate.65 For example, it is cannot be ruled out entirely 
that claims brought against the EC before the WTO dispute settlement bodies or against 
some of the institutions comprising the World Bank Group before the World Bank 
Inspection Panel, might not also be submitted to the ICJ as inter-state claims against 
some or all of the EC states or against the state in whose territory the contested World 
Bank project takes place.66 However, in all such cases, it seems difficult, if not 
impossible, to assert that the parties to both sets of international proceedings are the 
same.67
Finally, it should be remembered that the ICJ enjoys a broad advisory jurisdiction beside 
its contentious jurisdiction and it is conceivable that the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ 
might be invoked instead of, or in parallel with other proceedings to which IGOs are 
party. For instance, World Bank institutions may seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ
63 Reparation fo r  Injuries, 1949 I.C.J. 174; Differences Relating to Immunity from  Legal Process o f  a 
Special Rapporteur o f  the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. 62.
64 Indeed, the EC Commission has presented in the past a claim to the ECJ against Belgium on account o f  
the alleged violation o f  the privileges and immunities accorded to its employees under the Protocol on 
Privileges and Immunities o f the EC. Case 85/85, Commission v. Belgium [1986] E.C.R. 1149. In theory, 
an infringement o f privilege could also constitute a human rights violation and the employee’s state o f  
nationality could have brought inter-state proceedings against Belgium (provided that the employee is 
not Belgian).
65 See Report o f  the International Law Commission, Commentary on Draft Article 13 on State 
Responsibility, par.3, UN GAOR 51 Sess., Supp. No. 10, Doc. A/51/10 (1996), available at 
<http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/rcil/ILCSR/rft/Srl3.rtf> (last visited on 20 Oct. 2000)(“ ... it is not always 
sure that the action o f  an organ o f  an international organization acting in that capacity will always be 
purely and simply attributed to the international organization as such rather than, in appropriate 
circumstances, to the States members o f  the organization, if  it is a collective organ, or otherwise to the 
State o f  nationality o f the person or persons constituting the organ in question”). It should be noted 
however that article 13 was deleted from the 1998 version o f  the Draft Articles.
In the field o f  human rights, attempts to attribute responsibility to states for human rights violation by 
international organizations have been generally unsuccessful. See Comm. 217/1986, H.v.D.P. v. 
Netherlands, UN GAOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. 40, at 185, 186 (Report o f  the HRC, 1987). See also Maclaine 
Watson 1989] 3 All E.R at 529; Shaw, supra note 49, at 921-23.
66 C f  Daniel D. Bradlow “International Organisations and Private Complaints: The Case o f  the World 
Bank Inspection Panel” 34 Va. J. Int’l L. (1994) 553, 558.
67 It seems that the examples offered above implicate legal rights and obligations common to more than 
one international actor and it is hardly consistent with established legal doctrine to assert that 
proceedings involving different holders o f a common right or obligation are proceedings involving the 
same parties. See e.g., A.G. V.R., supra note 15.
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relating to a question which may also be subject to review by its own independent 
Inspection Panel.
Hence, it seems that despite the narrow rules of locus standi employed by the ICJ, some 
disputes involving non-state actors that could be addressed by global specialised courts 
or tribunals, could also find their way to the ICJ. Albeit, this result can only be achieved 
through the application of somewhat controversial legal doctrines (at least with regard to 
IGOs), whose ability to create genuine competition is in doubt.
D. Related proceedings
In other situations, where direct competition is unfeasible, there still might be 
considerable interaction between proceedings conducted before the ICJ and global 
specialised courts and tribunals, involving different, but somewhat related, sets of 
parties. An obvious example of related proceedings can be found in the litigation arising 
out of the events that took place in the Former Yugoslavia since the early 1990's. The 
egregious crimes committed during the civil war inside the Former Yugoslavia gave rise 
to numerous criminal proceedings before the ad hoc ICTY,68 designed to determine the 
individual criminal responsibility of the accused persons. At the same time the ICJ is 
presently adjudicating two inter-state claims between Bosnia Herzegovina and 
Yugoslavia69 and between Croatia and Yugoslavia,70 addressing inter alia the question 
of state responsibility for the alleged commission of the crime of genocide by state 
agents. Hence, although the proceedings before the ICTY and the ICJ involve different 
sets in parties, and cannot be deemed to truly compete with each other, they are 
intimately related. This is because both judicial bodies are required to reach findings on 
the same legal questions (e.g., whether genocide has taken place) in light of the same set 
of facts.71
A jurisdictional situation has recently been averted by virtue of the decision of the ICTY 
Prosecutor not to initiate criminal proceedings against NATO servicemen for acts
68 See e.g., Case IT-95-5-R61, Prosecutor v. Karadzic, 108 I.L.R. 86, 133-135 (1996) (Rule 61).
69 Application o f  the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f  the Crime o f  Genocide 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1993 I.C.J. 3 (Provisional Measures) and 1996 I.C.J. 595 
(Preliminary Objections).
70 Application o f  the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f  the Crime o f  Genocide (Croatia v. 
Yugoslavia)(application by Croatia, 2 July 1999), available at
<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icry/ icry_orders/ icry_iapplication_19990702.PDF> (last visited 
on 6 July 2000).
71 Theodor Meron “The Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals and the Proposed International 
Criminal Court” 9 A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1995) 15,18.
(fir .’i )
committed during the Kosovo crisis.72 Since Yugoslavia had brought legal proceedings
I ' Xagainst 10 NATO members before the ICJ, alleging that they are responsible for war 
crimes committed by their servicemen, ICTY trials of NATO personnel could have 
resulted in closely related proceedings, in which the legality of the same acts of war 
would have been addressed by two different international courts and tribunals.
E. Competition involving arbitral tribunals
The above-mentioned caveats, which mitigate the probabilities of competition between 
the ICJ and the global specialised tribunals, do not apply, in principle, with regard to the 
PCA and ad hoc arbitration tribunals, since these judicial bodies are open to non-state 
actors, as well as states. As a matter of fact, on a few occasions the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunals has competed with a global commercial arbitration institution - the 
International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration (which is open to all states and 
individuals, but exercises specialised competence, encompassing commercial disputes 
only).74 While jurisdictional interactions with this latter body have been mostly left 
outside the scope of the study, since International Chamber of Commerce arbitrations do 
not apply, as a rule, international law but rather contract and domestic law, this specific 
interaction, which resulted in multiple proceedings is of some interest to this study, since 
it demonstrates the potential for jurisdictional competition between arbitral tribunals and 
global specialised courts or tribunals.
je
In Flour Corp. v. Iran, the question of propriety of parallel arbitration proceedings was 
at issue. The case involved a contractual claim brought before the Iran-U.S. Claims
72 Office o f  the ICTY Prosecutor Press Release, 13 June 2000, Doc. PR/ P.I.S./ 510-e, available at 
<http://www.un.org/ icty/pressreal/p510-e.htm> (last visited on 7 July 2000); Final Report to the 
Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal 
Republic o f  Yugoslavia (2000), para. 90-91 <http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/ nato061300.htm> (last 
visited on 7 July 2000).
73 Legality o f  Use o f  Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Order o f 2 June 1999 (Forthcoming in 1999 
I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures); Legality o f  Use o f  Force (Yugoslavia v. Canada), Order o f  2 June 1999 
(Forthcoming in 1999 I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures); Legality o f  Use o f  Force (Yugoslavia v. France), 
Order o f 2 June 1999 (Forthcoming in 1999 I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures); Legality o f  Use o f  Force 
(Yugoslavia v. Germany), Order o f 2 June 1999 (Forthcoming in 1999 I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures); 
Legality o f  Use o f  Force (Yugoslavia v. Italy), Order o f 2 June 1999 (Forthcoming in 1999 
I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures); Legality o f  Use o f  Force (Yugoslavia v. Netherlands), Order o f  2 June 
1999 (Forthcoming in 1999 I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures); Legality o f  Use o f  Force (Yugoslavia v. 
Portugal), Order o f  2 June 1999 (Forthcoming in 1999 I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures); Legality o f  Use o f  
Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain), Order o f 2 June 1999 (Forthcoming in 1999 I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures); 
Legality o f  Use o f  Force (Yugoslavia v. U.K.), Order o f 2 June 1999 (Forthcoming in 1999 
I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures); Legality o f  Use o f  Force (Yugoslavia v. U .S.), Order o f  2 June 1999 
(Forthcoming in 1999 I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures).
74 See generally, Philippe Sands (ed.), Manual on International Courts and Tribunals (1999) 107-20.
75 Case 333, Flour Corp. v. Iran, 11 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 296 (1986)(Interim Award).
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Tribunal by an American company against the Iranian National Oil Company, with 
which it had been involved in several joint ventures, and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
was based upon the Algiers Declaration that invested the Tribunal with exclusive 
jurisdiction over certain disputes between American firms and the Iranian government 
(or government-owned entities). However, the original joint venture contracts contained 
an arbitration clause, referring disputes to ICC arbitration, and providing that claims 
must be initiated within a fixed period of time. Since Iran had raised several objections 
to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the claimant, fearing that its ability to initiate ICC 
proceedings might expire before the Tribunal decides whether it has jurisdiction over the 
case, has sought to commence parallel ICC litigation, but stated that it intends to pursue 
ICC proceedings only in respect of parts of the claim that would eventually fall outside 
the Tribunal’s scope of jurisdiction. Still, Iran requested the Tribunal to enjoin the 
claimant from initiating ICC proceedings by virtue of the exclusive nature of the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction, which ought to preclude adjudication before other fora.
The Tribunal has held that given the lack of certainty as to its competence over the 
claim, the declaration of intent of the claimant and the refusal of the respondent to waive 
time-bar objections before the ICC, it would be inappropriate to enjoin the claimant
77from initiating ICC proceedings. Moreover, it has held that the Algiers Declaration did 
not appear to preclude adjudication before arbitration panels (as opposed to adjudication
70
before courts). This last ruling seems to overturn an earlier decision of the Tribunal 
adopted in the Reading & Bates case,79 where the Tribunal ordered a stay of proceedings 
initiated by the claimant before the ICC with regard to a claim already pending before 
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.80
76 Claims Settlement Declaration, art. VII (2). On this basis the Tribunal has ordered stay o f proceedings 
before municipal courts on a number o f  occasions. See e.g., Case 338, E. Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 2 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 51 (1983)(Interim Award); Case 59, Questech, Inc. v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 96 (1983)(Interim Award); Case 93, Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp. v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. 
Cl. Trib. Rep. 281 (1983)(Interim Award); Case 370, Watkins-Johnson Co. v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 362 (1983); Case 480, Touche Ross and Co. v. Iran, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 59 (1983)(Interim 
Award); Case 928, CBA International Development Corp. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 53
(1983)(Interim Award); Case 159, Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp. v. Iran, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. 
Trib. Rep. 104 (1984) (Interim Award); Case 158, Aeronutronic Services v. Air Force o f  Iran, 7 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 217 (1984) (Interim Award); Case 395, Component Builders, Inc. v. Iran, 8 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 216 (1985)(Interim and Interlocutory Award) .
77 Flour, 11 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 298.
78 Flour, 11 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 297
79 Case 28, Reading and Bates Corp. v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 401 (1983) (Interim Award).
80 Eventually both the Reading & Bates and Flour cases were settled out o f  court.
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The Bendone-Derossi case81 raised the question of successive proceedings before 
multiple judicial fora, more specifically -  whether it is possible to rely on an award 
rendered by ICC arbitration in proceedings before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. The 
claimant, an American cloth manufacturer, has sued in 1980 (before the establishment of 
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal) the Iranian Air Force before the ICC Court of 
Arbitration, on the basis of a contractual arbitration clause in force between the parties. 
Arbitration proceedings took place (without Iranian participation) and an award was 
rendered in favour of the claimant. Since Iran refused to comply with the decision and 
pay damages to the claimant, the latter brought a claim before the Iran-U.S Tribunal to 
enforce the ICC award. However, the Tribunal has held that it had no jurisdiction over 
the claim since it is not authorized to grant exequatur to arbitral awards of other
89tribunals or to recognise the award as a separate cause of action. Thus, it would seem 
that the Tribunal refused to attribute any legal significance to the outcome of the 
previous set of proceedings.
Still, despite the experience of the Iran-U.S Tribunal, there are bound to be only a few 
instances of competition between arbitration and global specialised courts and tribunals, 
which might end up in multiple proceedings. This is because concurrency of 
jurisdictions presupposes agreement on the part of the parties to arbitrate a dispute also 
amenable to the jurisdiction of a global specialised body. However, such agreements are 
expected to be quite rare because of the unique nature of some specialised procedures 
available at the global level, which renders them unsuitable for arbitration, and 
because some or all of the parties might believe that it is redundant to establish a new 
arbitral tribunal when alternative permanent fora are readily available to them.
81 Case 375, Bendone-Derossi International v. Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 130 (1984)(Interim 
Award) and 18 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 115 (1988).
82 Bendone-Derossi, 18 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 118-19. The conclusion that awards o f other tribunals 
may not constitute an independent cause o f action is supported by another decision o f  the Tribunal on the 
status o f municipal judgments. Case 458, Marks v. Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 291, 296 
(1985)(Interlocutory Award); Ford Aerospace, 11 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 196.
83 E.g., it is unlikely to expect that there will be an agreement to arbitrate a dispute between a human 
rights violation victim o f violating state.
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3. Conflicts between (i) courts and tribunals o f  general personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction and (iii) regional courts and tribunals with 
unlimited jurisdiction ratione materiae
There are only a few international tribunals or quasi-judicial procedures that belong to 
the third category - regional bodies invested with general ratione materiae jurisdiction. 
These are the OSCE dispute settlement bodies - the Court of Conciliation and
OA
Arbitration, and the Valletta Mechanism, which may address any question of 
international law arising between OSCE states, and two Latin American economic 
integration courts -  the Central American Court of Justice (CCJ) and the prospective 
Caribbean Court of Justice (Caricom Court), who may address any inter-state dispute 
between the state parties subject to their jurisdiction.
In theory, it is possible that parties to an inter-state dispute will be simultaneously 
subject to the jurisdiction of the ICJ (or to PC A or ad hoc arbitration) and the OSCE or 
the Latin American judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.85 However, the prospects that 
such competition would result in multiple proceedings seem farfetched. Only a modest 
number of states have acceded to the compulsory jurisdiction of the OSCE Court of 
Arbitration (5 states) and the CCJ (3 states), whereas the Caricom Court has not even 
been established. Furthermore, several matters have been excluded from the compulsory 
jurisdiction ratione materiae of the CCJ, and may be excluded from the compulsory
0 7
jurisdiction of the OSCE Court. Thus, in statistical terms, it is improbable that two or 
more of the meagre number of states that might be parties to inter-state proceedings 
before one of the regional judicial bodies would also accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ or 
arbitration over the same dispute.
However, this line of analysis does not seem to apply with regard to the conciliation 
proceedings before the OSCE Court of Conciliation or the Valletta Mechanism. Both
84 Provisions for a CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement o f  Disputes, Report o f  Valetta, 8 Feb. 1991, 
30 I.L.M. (1991) 390 and Decision o f the Stockholm Council Meeting o f  the CSCE Council, 15 Dec. 
1992, both reprinted in Arie Bloed (ed.), The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe — 
Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993 (1993) 573, 869.
85 Thus, for example, four o f the five states that have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the OSCE 
Court have also accepted the compulsory jurisdiction o f the ICJ.
86 Agreement on the Statute o f  the Central American Court o f  Justice, 10 Dec. 1992, art. 22(a), 34 I.L.M. 
(1995) 921 [hereinafter ‘CCJ Statute’]. The matters excluded are frontier, territorial and maritime 
disputes. These matters can be referred to the CCJ by way o f agreement.
87 Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE, art. 26(2), 15 Dec. 1992, 32 I.L.M.
(1993) 557. Areas that may be excluded from the scope o f declaration o f  acceptance are disputes
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mechanisms enjoy compulsory conciliation jurisdiction over a considerable number of 
states (29 and 54 states, respectively), with regard to a broad scope of matters. Hence, 
they may represent a viable quasi-judicial alternative to adjudication and their 
jurisdiction might actually conflict with that of the ICJ or other universal tribunals. Still, 
in light of the dormancy until now of all OSCE dispute settlement bodies, competition 
with the ICJ (which has addressed only a relatively small number of disputes between 
OSCE states in recent years), or other arbitration bodies, is improbable, at present.
Another exception ought to be made with regard to the CCJ, where there seems to be 
even now some jurisdictional competition between it and the ICJ. Although the CCJ 
exercises jurisdiction only over three states, and has been active for merely 6 years, it 
has already handled several inter-state cases.88 Furthermore, all three states parties to the 
CCJ Statute have also accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, and had been 
parties to a 1992 ICJ case;89 two CCJ states - Honduras and Nicaragua had also been 
parties to a previous case before the ICJ90 and are at present parties to a pending case 
before the ICJ.91 Thus, given the predisposition of these countries to litigate their 
disputes between international courts and tribunals, it is certainly conceivable that the 
three states could someday get involved in multiple proceedings before the CCJ and the 
ICJ.
4. Conflicts between (i) courts and tribunals o f  general personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction and (iv) regional courts and tribunals o f  
specialised competence
In similarity to the jurisdictional relations between universal and specialised judicial and 
quasi-judicial bodies, operating at the global level, there is considerable overlap between
concerning a state’s territorial integrity, national defence, title to sovereignty over land territory, or 
competing claims with regard to jurisdiction over other areas.
88 Non-compliance or Violation o f  SICA Norms (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Decisions o f 30 Nov. 1999 and 
17 Jan. 2000; Revocation o f  laws, administrative and other acts adopted by the Republic o f  Nicaragua 
that affect and violate the law and operation o f  SICA (Honduras v. Nicaragua), Decision o f 12 Jan. 2000 
(Measures o f  Protection). Both decisions are available at <http://www.sicanet.org.sv/instituciones/ 
index.html > (last visited on 7 July 2000).
89 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras; Nicaragua intervening), 1992 
I.C.J. 351. However, the issues raised in these proceedings would have probably fallen under the 
exceptions to the compulsory inter-state jurisdiction o f the CCJ.
90 King o f  Spain, 1960 I.C.J. 192.
91 Maritime Delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. 
Honduras), Application o f  8 Dec. 1999, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iNH/ 
iNH_orders/Inh_iapplication_ 19991208.pdf >(last visited on 16 July 2000)(no decision has yet been 
rendered in the case).
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the jurisdictions of the ICJ, the PC A and ad hoc arbitration, on the one hand, and the 
regional specialised procedures, on the other hand. These latter courts, tribunals and 
quasi-judicial procedures consist primarily of economic integration judicial bodies (ECJ, 
the Benelux Court, Andean court of Justice, CCJ, EFTA Court, CIS Economic Court, 
COMESA, NAFTA and the future Caricom Court) regional human rights procedures 
(ECHR, I/ACHR and I/A HR Commission, African Commission and the ECSR) and 
investment bank inspection procedures (Inter-American and Asian Development Banks).
Here too, every dispute falling under the jurisdiction of the regional specialised bodies 
could, in theory, also be referred to the ICJ or to arbitration. The opposite is of course 
not true, given the narrowly defined jurisdiction ratione materiae of the regional
• 09specialised bodies and their only partial geographical reach. However, the same 
caveats concerning jurisdictional overlaps, which were discussed in the context of 
competition between universal and global specialised courts and tribunals, also apply 
vis-a-vis the jurisdictional interaction between universal and regional courts and 
tribunals. These caveats perhaps apply with even greater force here given the dominant 
role of individuals and IGOs in litigation before the regional and specialised courts and
09 »tribunals, and the intricate nature of most economic integration regimes, which renders 
voluntary acceptance of the jurisdiction of external bodies, such as the ICJ, over such 
complex issues, highly unlikely. Further, since no regional IGO has been authorised to 
seek advisory opinions from the ICJ until now, this type of jurisdictional competition 
between the ICJ and regional arrangements has also been precluded, for the time being. 
Still, it is perfectly reasonable to expect that similar questions, albeit involving different 
parties, may be raised in ICJ advisory proceedings and in advisory and contentious 
proceedings before the regional specialised courts and tribunals.94
92 E.g., in Asia, regional inter-state proceedings can only be referred to the universal procedures.
93 Most o f the disputes that have been submitted to the regional, to date, have involved non-state actors, 
as parties. See e.g., all but one o f  the contentious cases brought before the ECJ have involved EC organs. 
In addition, much o f the Court’s business has comprised o f  preliminary rulings proceedings that involve 
private parties. This is also more or less the contemporary record o f  other regional integration courts and 
tribunals. Non-state actors have been parties to all cases before the EFTA Court; to more than 99% of the 
cases before the Andean Court; to 22 out o f 25 cases before the CCJ; to more than 90% o f the cases 
before the CIS Economic Court; and to more than 90% o f NAFTA cases. Similarly, all but a handful o f  
the thousands o f cases handled by regional human rights tribunals have involved non-state parties, and all 
proceedings before the regional investment banks’ inspection mechanism involve, by definition, claims 
brought by individuals. An exception can be found in the practice o f the new COMESA Court -  in which 
only one o f  the two cases brought before it to date had involved non-state actors.
94 Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, "Other Treaties" Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction o f  the Court (Art.
64, American Convention on Human Rights), I/A Court H.R. (ser. A) No. 1, at para. 50 (1982), reprinted 
in 3 Human Rights Law Journal (1982) 140.
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In practice, there have been a few occasions in which similar issues were raised before 
the ICJ and regional and specialised judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, although the 
proceedings in question had involved different sets of parties. First, as indicated above, 
there had been one time in which a similar question (the legality of French nuclear 
testing) has been the subject of inter-state ICJ proceedings,95 complaint procedures 
before two human rights procedures, including a regional procedure - the European 
Commission on Human Rights96 and proceedings before a regional court of economic 
integration -  the ECJ 97
Another recent case of jurisdictional interaction has involved challenges against the 
legality of death sentences imposed by the U.S judicial system, when applied to foreign 
nationals. In a number of cases, the U.S. domestic authorities have failed to promptly 
inform foreign criminal suspects, who were eventually sentenced to death, of their right 
to receive consular assistance in accordance with the 1963 Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations 98 Several states whose nationals had been put on death row without 
being properly informed on the availability of consular help had brought proceedings 
against the U.S before international courts. Thus, Paraguay and Germany brought 
proceedings before the ICJ under a Protocol to the Consular Relations (the Breard and 
LaGrand cases)99 and Mexico had referred the same question to the I/A CHR, so it 
would pronounce on the matter in the form of an advisory opinion.100 For the sake of 
completion, it should be noted that another individual complaint case against Peru were 
also pending at the time before the I/A CHR, in which alleged violations of the same 
right to receive consular assistance had also been claimed.101
Both the nuclear testing and consular assistance cases demonstrate once more the real 
potential for jurisdictional interaction between the ICJ and the regional and specialised 
bodies. While the ‘competing’ cases have involved different claimants, it is easy to 
imagine circumstances in which the same state would initiate both the ICJ and regional
95 Examination o f  Nuclear Tests Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 285
96 Tauira, 83 D & R. 112 (1995).
97 Danielsson, 1995 E.C.R. 11-3051
98 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 24 April 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
99 Breard, 1998 I.C.J. 248; LaGrand, 1999 I.C.J. 9; LaGrand, Judgment o f  27 June 2001 (Forthcoming in 
2001 I.C.J.), available in <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm> (last visited on 10 
July 2001).
100 Consular Assistance, supra note 52. Since the U.S. did not ratify the FA HR Convention, inter-state 
proceedings were unavailable to Mexico.
101 Case 52, Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, Judgment o f 30 May 1999, available at 
<http://corteidh-oea.nu.or.cr/ci/PUBLICAC/SERIE_C/C_52_ESP.HTM> (last visited 6 June 2000).
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human rights proceedings. It is also conceivable that the same violation could give rise 
both to inter-state proceedings before the ICJ and to one or more individual petitions 
submitted to regional human rights tribunals by nationals of one of the parties to the ICJ 
litigation.
Finally, with regard to competition with arbitral tribunals, it seems that given the flexible 
rules of standing in arbitration (either before the PCA or ad hoc tribunals), all disputes 
that may be submitted to regional specialised courts and tribunals, including those 
involving non-state actors, could also be referred, in theory, to arbitration. However, it is 
rather improbable for parties to regional sub-systems to agree to supplement the readily 
available (and easily invoked) regional dispute settlement mechanisms, endowed with 
considerable expertise over their subject matter, with external procedures, such as 
consent-based arbitration proceedings. This is especially the case with regional 
integration regimes that offer their own internal arbitration services (thus making the 
reference to external arbitration largely redundant).102
5. Conflicts between different universal courts and tribunals o f  specialised  
competence [two category (ii) tribunals]
Although most universal and specialised courts and tribunals address distinct branches 
of international law (e.g., trade, maritime, criminal, human rights, investment, 
development and environmental law), certain overlaps can be identified between the 
competences of some courts and tribunals. The most conspicuous case of jurisdictional 
competition involves the HRC, on the one hand, and the more specialised UN human 
rights procedures -  the CERD and CAT Committees, on the other hand. Since the 
ICCPR prohibits any form of discrimination103 and outlaws torture,104 both CERD and 
the CAT Committees are in direct competition with the HRC over their business 
(although the lists of states subject to the jurisdiction of each procedure are somewhat 
different).105 Once the MWC and CEDAW Committees (which has just been entrusted
102 See e.g., Treaty Creating the Court o f Justice o f the Cartagena Agreement, 28 May 1979, art 38 ,18  
I.L.M. (1979) 1203, as revised by the Protocol Modifying the Treaty Creating the Court o f Justice o f the 
Cartagena Agreement, 10 March 1996, available in < http://www.comunidadandina.org/english/andean/ 
ande_trie2.htm> (last visited on 24 June 2000); CCJ Statute, art. 22 (ch); Treaty Establishing the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 5 Nov. 1993, art. 28, 33 I.L.M. 1067 (1994).
103 ICCPR, art. 2(1), 26.
104 ICCPR, art. 7.
105 98 states have accepted the competence o f the HRC to receive individual complaints, while only 29 
states have accepted this competence o f the CERD Committee and 44 states have accepted the 
comparable quasi-judicial jurisdiction under CAT. As to inter-state competence, 48 states and 41 state
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with quasi-judicial competence) will begin to exercise jurisdiction, they too will 
compete with the HRC, which affords protection under the ICCPR, to a number of 
foreign workers and women’s human rights.106
Despite the clear potential for jurisdictional overlap, there have not been any known 
cases to date in which the same complaints were brought before more than one UN 
Treaty body. This is hardly surprising with regard to the interaction between the HRC 
and the CERD Committee, since the latter procedure has hardly been ever used.107 In 
contrast, given the fact that the CAT Committee is experiencing an impressive and 
steadily growing caseload,108 a jurisdictional conflict between it and HRC seems to be 
inevitable.
Another area of overlap between global human rights mechanism can be found between 
the HRC and the ILO CFA. Both bodies monitor freedom of association issues,109 and 
have overlapping constituencies (nearly all parties to the ICCPR Optional Protocol are 
also ILO member states). However, the rules of standing before the two bodies are 
considerably different. Whereas complaints under the Optional Protocol must be brought 
by natural or legal persons who were victims of a breach of the Covenant, the CFA may, 
inter alia, receive complaints from groups that were not directly affected by the 
contested measure. Nonetheless, it is still plausible that an identical situation could be 
discussed by the two procedures in parallel and involve essentially the same 
complainants.110 Furthermore, it should be remembered that it is possible, although
have accepted the jurisdiction o f the HRC and CAT, respectively. In contrast, all 156 state parties to 
CERD are subject o the Committee's inter-state jurisdiction.
106 The MWC affords parallel protection to many o f migrant worker rights which are also protected by 
the ICCPR, such as the right to life, liberty, freedom from torture, due process, equality and protection o f  
family life. International Convention on the Protection o f the Rights o f  All Migrant Workers and 
Members o f  their Families, 18 Dec. 1990, art. 7-14,16-20, 24, 31 ,44 , G.A. res. 45/158, annex, 45 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 262, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990)[hereinafter ‘M W C’]; ICCPR, art. 6-27. 
Similarly, CEDAW protects various political, family and equality rights, which are also protected by the 
ICCPR. Convention on the Elimination o f all Forms o f Discrimination against Women, 18 Dec. 1979, 
art. 2-4, 7, 15-16, G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46; ICCPR, 
art. 6-27.
107 By April 2000, the number o f cases presented before the CERD Committee since its establishment 
totalled 17.
108 By February 2000, 154 complaints have been submitted to the CAT Committee against 19 states; 
most o f  them also parties to the Optional Protocol o f the ICCPR.
109 ICCPR, art. 22; Function o f the ILO and Mandate o f the Committee on Freedom o f Association, Doc. 
101, par. 5, Committee on Freedom o f  Association Digest o f  Decisions (1996).
110 Concurrent proceedings in direct competition to each other may take place in situations where a 
labour organisation itself is a victim o f a human rights violation. In that case, the directly affected trade 
union may seize, in its independent capacity, both the HRC and the ILO CFA. In contrast, where trade 
union leaders are affected both in their personal and official capacity by the challenged governmental 
policy (e.g., if  they are imprisoned for illegal trade union activity), they can bring the HRC complaint in
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rather improbable, that inter-state claims alleging non-compliance with freedom of 
association principles would be raised before both the HRC and the CFA.111
Once the MWC Committee will come into existence, it would exercise considerably
119overlapping jurisdiction with the various ILO complaint mechanisms. This might 
however result in direct competition only over inter-state cases (although a few, if any, 
such cases are expected), since individual petition cases before the MWC would be 
brought by individuals, who have no right of standing before the ILO machinery.
Until now, there has been one major case of competition between the HRC and the ILO 
CFA. In 1980, a Canadian national trade union submitted three consecutive petitions to 
the ILO CFA, challenging limitations imposed by the government of the province of 
Alberta, Canada on the right to strike in the public sector.113 Before the third CFA report 
was rendered, members of the trade union's executive committee, acting in their private 
capacity, submitted another communication concerning the same matter to the HRC.114 
Canada strongly urged the HRC to dismiss the communication by reason of lis alibi 
pendens (relying on Article 5(2) of the Optional Protocol), but the HRC has held the 
application to be inadmissible for other reasons and refrained from addressing the effects 
of the concurrent proceedings.115
Outside the human rights field, only a small number of conflicts between the 
jurisdictions of global specialised courts and tribunals are expected given the different 
areas of specialisation the various bodies. However, competition could take place 
between inter-state proceedings conducted before the WTO DSB and Montreal Protocol
their individual capacity, but the ILO complaint must still be brought by the union (and the leaders could 
participate in the proceedings as representatives o f  the union). Although, technically, there are different 
claimants in each procedure, one could argue that they are essentially the same.
111 To date, no government has ever brought proceedings before the HRC, and only a few inter-state 
proceedings had been initiated before ILO bodies.
112 The MWC introduces a host o f  labour standards and freedom o f association rights which are also 
protected by numerous ILO conventions. Cf. MWC, art. 25-27 ,40 ,42-43 , 52, 54; Freedom of  
Association and Protection o f  the Right to Organize Convention, 9 July 1948, ILO Convention No. 87; 
Convention concerning Migration for Employment (Revised 1949), 1 July 1949, ILO Convention No.
97; Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion o f  Equality o f  
Opportunity and Treatment o f  Migrant Workers, 24 June 1975, ILO Convention No. 143. Even at present 
there is normative overlap between UN human rights mechanisms and the ILO in questions related to 
migrant workers. Theodor Meron “Norm Making and Supervision in International Human Rights: 
Reflections on Institutional Order” 76 A.J.I.L. (1982) 754, 760.
113 Case 893, Canadian Labour Congress v. Canada, LXIII ILO Official Bulletin (ser. B) No. 3 (1980) 
(Report o f  the CFA).
114 Comm. 118/1982, J.B. v. Canada, UN GAOR, 41st Sess, Supp. 40, at 151 (Report ofthe HRC, 1986).
115 Id. at par. 7.
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Non-Compliance procedure or the CWC Verification Procedure (over the legality of 
trade restrictions) or between individually initiated proceedings against states before 
ICSID and the HRC (over the discriminatory treatment of foreign investors).
Many other scenarios, which may result in related proceedings before different 
specialised judicial and quasi-judicial bodies can also be envisioned (however, between 
different set of parties). For instance, the ICC and HRC might address similar factual 
and legal questions (e.g., whether international crimes, which also constitute human 
rights violations, had taken place); and similarly, the World Bank Inspection Panel 
might address human rights issues that can also be examined by the HRC (e.g., whether 
population resettlement required by a Bank Project conforms with human rights 
standards). Finally, a case of alleged mistreatment of foreign investors by a host state 
might be discussed in ICSID proceedings and by the WTO (e.g., alleging breach of the 
national treatment standard under TRIMs).116
In practice, there have been only a few examples of multiple proceedings before more 
than one global specialised tribunal (outside the human rights field). Under the old 
GATT system, conflicts could arise between dispute settlement procedures established 
under the GATT and the other related trade agreement, and in some instances limited
117jurisdictional competition did take place. With the establishment of the WTO and the 
consolidation of the different dispute settlement machineries into the DSB, this problem 
was supposed to be eliminated. However, an oversight has been revealed in the Bananas 
litigation, with relation to competition between post-report arbitration proceedings on 
the permissible level of suspension of concessions due to the non-complying member 
state and on the consistency of measures taken to comply with Panel or AB reports with
1 1 o
WTO law. It seems that the DSU does not regulate at present the precise relations
116 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, 15 April 1994, (Annex 1A to the Agreement 
establishing the World Trade Organisation,, 15 April 1994, available at <http://www.wto.org/ 
english/docs_e/legal_e/18-trims.pdf> (last visited on 1 Nov. 2000).
117 Emst-Ulrich Petersmann “International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System 
1948-1996: An Introduction” International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System 
(Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, ed., 1997) 5, 53.
118 Non-compliance with a Panel or AB report could lead to two or more distinct proceedings taking place 
simultaneously. The first set o f  proceedings is to be litigated before a DSB Panel (preferably, the original 
Panel that had adjudicated the merits o f the dispute) and is aimed at identifying whether measures taken 
by the non-complying state are consistent with the report; Understanding on the Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlements o f Disputes, Annex 2 to the Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), 15 April 1994, art. 21.5, 33 I.L.M. (1994) 1226 [hereinafter ‘D SU ’]. The second set 
o f proceedings is arbitration, which may or may not take place before the original Panel, aimed at 
reviewing the legality o f  sanctions applied against the non-complying state. DSU, art. 22.6. In the 
Bananas case, the DSB instituted in the same month (January, 1999) three proceedings. The first two were
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between these two proceedings, and it is not inconceivable that two separate arbitration 
panels would convene and reach inconsistent results.119
Perhaps the most prominent case of multiple proceedings before global and specialised 
tribunals, to date, is the case of an investment dispute referred to ICC arbitration, and 
brought subsequently before ICSID. The Southern Pacific Properties case (the 
‘Pyramids case’) involved a dispute between a Hong Kong based corporation and the 
government of Egypt over a cancelled investment project in Egypt. The case was 
submitted to ICC arbitration, in pursuance to a contractual compromissory clause, and 
the arbitrators ruled in favour of the foreign company, after rejecting the Egyptian 
challenge to their jurisdiction.120 However, Egypt has subsequently managed to get the 
arbitral award nullified by a French court (France being the situs of the arbitration), by
191reason of lack of jurisdiction of the ICC tribunal. In parallel to the annulment
proceedings, Southern Pacific initiated new arbitration proceedings, this time before an 
ICSID tribunal, relying upon an Egyptian law accepting ipso facto the jurisdiction of the 
Centre. The ICSID tribunal accepted jurisdiction over the case (rejecting the Egyptian
1 99claim that previous rulings in the case had res judicata effect), and adjudicated the 
merits of the dispute, holding, like its ICC counterpart, in favour of the private company. 
While the details of the reasoning of the ICSID tribunal will be discussed at some length
article 21.5 proceedings, designed to examine the conformity o f  the new EC regulations with the Panel 
and Appellate Body reports, and were established at the request o f  the EC and Ecuador, respectively. EC - 
Regime fo r  the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f  Bananas - Recourse to Article 21.5 by the EC, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS27/RW/EEC (1999); EC  - Regime fo r  the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f  Bananas - 
Recourse to Article 21.5 by Ecuador, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/RW/ECU(1999). The third was article 22.6 
arbitration intended to examine the proportionality o f U.S. suspension o f  concessions (convened at the 
request o f the EC). EC  - Regime fo r  the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f  Bananas - Recourse to 
Arbitration by the EC Under Article 22.6 o f  the DSU, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/ARB (1999). Fortunately, the 
DSB assigned all three proceedings to the same Panel that has handled the original dispute and all three 
reports were issued on die same day (April 6, 1999). Thus the risk o f  embarrassingly conflicting decisions 
had been averted this time. It should be noted that in the arbitration proceedings, the Panel had rejected 
EC's request to commence litigation only after the other proceedings were concluded (which, if  adopted as 
a general policy could have improved inter-proceeding coordination), citing the strict time limits fixed for 
arbitration under art. 22.6 o f the DSU. Bananas, (art. 22.6 arbitration), at p. 3.
The same dispute was also subject in 1998 to another set o f  arbitration proceedings before a single 
arbitrator, aimed at fixing the duration for implementation o f  the report. EC - Regime fo r  the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution o f  Bananas - Arbitration under article 21.3(c) o f  the DSU, WTO Doc.
WT/DS27/15 (1998).
119 The panel in the Bananas case conceded that the present sate o f things was unsatisfactory since there 
remained problems o f  coordinating between the different roles it has been entrusted with. Bananas, (art. 
21.5 recourse by EC), at p. 15.
120 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt, 3 ICSID Rep. 45 (1983)(ICC Award).
121 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt, Judgment o f  12 July 1984, 3 ICSID Rep. 79 
(France, Cour d’appel); Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt, Judgment o f 12 July 
1984 ICSID Rep. 92 (Netherlands, District Court).
122 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt, 3 ICSID Rep. 112 (1985) and, 3 ICSID Rep. 
131 (1988). For discussion, see infra Chapter 6, at pp. 257-58, 278-80.
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in Part III of this study, it is sufficient to note here that the case highlights the potential
1for jurisdictional conflicts between different specialised courts.
In the last few months another high profile case of competing jurisdictions has emerged. 
A dispute over the legality of transit restrictions introduced by Chile against EC fishing 
vessels involved in the taking of swordfish in international waters has been brought by 
the EC before both the WTO dispute settlement system (challenging the Chilean 
invocation of the environmental exception to the GATT) and by Chile to the UNCLOS 
dispute settlement machinery (challenging the environmental soundness of EC fishing 
practices).124 Although the case was settled, it again underscores the actual likelihood of 
jurisdictional competition between different specialised bodies.
6. Conflicts between (in) regional courts and tribunals with unlimited 
jurisdiction ratione materiae and (ii) or (iv) courts and tribunals o f  
specialised competence
In theory, the OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration and the Valletta Mechanism 
can handle any inter-state dispute. This is also the case, with the almost unlimited 
compulsory jurisdiction ratione materiae of two Latin American economic integration 
courts -  the CCJ and the planned Caricom Court, over inter-state disputes. As a result, 
these bodies have the jurisdictional potential to deal with any disputes that falls under 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the specialised courts and tribunals, whether they 
operate on the global or at the regional level, provided that the state parties to the dispute 
are subject to the jurisdiction ratione personae of the competing procedures.
However, as has been commented with regard to the ICJ, the aforementioned regional 
procedures have unlimited subject matter jurisdiction only over inter-state cases, while 
many of the specialised international procedures permit participation by non-state actors
123 Generally similar circumstances took place in the MINE v. Guinea case, where arbitration proceedings 
took place before the American Arbitration Association and subsequently, following refusal by U.S. 
Courts to enforce the award, before an ICSID arbitral tribunal. Marine International Nominees 
Establishment (MINE) v. Guinea, 4 ICSID Rep. 54, 68-69 (1988). See discussion in Schreuer, supra note 
43, at 156-58.
124 Chile -  Measures Affecting the Transit and Importation o f  Swordfish, case no. W T/DS193/1 
(complaint by the E.C); Fisheries dispute with E U  escalates; Primacy o f  Conservation over Trade is at 
Stake, Latin America Weekly Report, 8 Aug. 2000, at 368. For exploration o f  other such scenarios, see 
Lakshman D. Guruswamy “Should UNCLOS or GATT/WTO Decide Trade and Environment Disputes” 
7 Minnesota Journal o f Global Trade (1998) 287, 299.
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| in the proceedings. As a result, competition is often not feasible (except where states are
j  willing and able to exercise diplomatic protection).
Further, given the dormancy of the OSCE mechanisms, the limited acceptance of the
Court of Arbitration's compulsory jurisdiction and the non-existence of the Caricom
Court, reference of cases amenable to the jurisdiction of specialised procedures to these
virtually non-functioning regional mechanisms seems to be unrealistic. Nonetheless, the
situation with regard to the CCJ seems to be slightly different. Although its compulsory
jurisdiction encompasses only 3 states, these states have demonstrated in the last decade
their willingness to litigate inter-state dispute both before the ICJ125 and the CCJ.126
Hence, it is possible that they might also try to litigate their future disputes before the
CCJ in competition with proceedings before specialised courts and tribunals such as
ITLOS (with regard to their maritime differences)127 or the WTO (with regard to some
1
of their trade-related disputes).
7. Conflicts between (ii) universal and (iv) regional courts and tribunals o f  
specialised competence
Another important area of jurisdictional overlap is found in the relations between the 
respective competences of global and regional tribunals. This pertains primarily to two 
jurisdictional interactions -  between the WTO and regional trade arrangements, and 
between the HRC and regional human rights mechanisms.
125 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, 1992 I.C.J. 351.
125 Non-compliance or Violation o f  SICA Norms, supra note 88; Revocacion o f  laws, administrative and  
other acts, supra note 88.
127 At present, only two o f  the three CCJ states (Honduras and Nicaragua) are parties to UNCLOS, 
though none o f  them accepted the compulsory jurisdiction o f  ITLOS. Still, it is interesting to note that 
questions o f  maritime delimitation, amenable to the jurisdiction ratione materiae o f  UNCLOS, had been 
the subject o f the ICJ case, to which all three states were parties, and one recent inter-state case before 
the CCJ.
128 This is made possible by the fact that all three states subject to the jurisdiction o f the CCJ are also 
WTO member states. Indeed in a recent case, Honduras joined a request o f  consultations brought to the 
WTO against Nicaragua -  a fellow member state subject to the compulsory jurisdiction o f  the CCJ. See 
infra, at n. 157.
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A. Trade-related jurisdictional conflicts
Jurisdictional overlaps with regard to trade-related matters have been made possible by 
the fact that most parties to regional economic integration or trade liberalisation regimes 
(such as the EC, EEA, Andean Community, SICA, COMESA and NAFTA) are also 
parties to the WTO,129 and that many trade-related issues are regulated both by the 
GATT (or one of the other WTO side agreements) and by the substantive law applicable 
in the regional arrangements’ courts and tribunals. As a result, numerous disputes 
concerning direct or indirect restrictions on regional trade can be brought both before the 
WTO and a competent regional dispute settlement procedure.130
In practice, most multiple proceedings trade-related cases to date have taken place in the 
context of disputes between the member states of NAFTA whose reciprocal trade 
relations are governed both by NAFTA and the GATT/WTO (all three state parties to 
NAFTA are members of the WTO). Similarly, prior to the conclusion of NAFTA, the 
disputes concerning the trade relations between Canada and U.S. were also addressed 
both by the dispute settlement bodies of NAFTA’s precursor - the Canada-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA)131 and the GATT.
Indeed, on four major occasions there have been multiple proceedings before both the 
FTA/NAFTA and GATT/WTO adjudicative mechanisms. Two of the four cases have 
been of similar nature and arose out of the imposition of antidumping countervailing 
duties by the U.S. on certain products imported from Canada. In the pork cases, an 
administrative determination made by the U.S. Department of Commerce, imposing 
countervailing duties on pork products from Canada (by reason of a Canadian subsidy 
program) was challenged by Canada in 1989 before both the GATT132 and an FTA 
binational Panel, established under Chapter 19 of the FTA (which is similar to Chapter
129 The EC itself and all o f its member states are parties to the WTO Agreement. So are all member states 
o f EFTA, the Andean Community, SICA and NAFTA. By contrast, almost none o f  the member-states o f  
the CIS are WTO members.
130 See generally, Gabrielle Marceau “NAFTA and WTO Dispute Settlement Rules -  A Thematic 
Comparison” International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System  (Emst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, ed., 1997) 489; Gabrielle Marceau “Review Essays o f  Dispute Settlement Mechanisms -  
Regional or Multilateral: Which One is Better” 31 J. World Trade (1997) 167, 176-79; Jeffery L. Dunoff 
“Institutional Misfits: The GATT, The ICJ and Trade-Environment Disputes” 15 Mich. J. Int’l L. (1994) 
1043, 1077-79.
131 U.S- Canada Free Trade Agreement, 2 Jan. 1988, 27 I.L.M. (1988) 868.
132 Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from  Canada (Canada v. U.S.), GATT 
BISD (38th Supp.) at 30 (1991)(Panel’s Report issued on 18 Sept. 1990).
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19 to NAFTA).133 The GATT Panel found the challenged U.S. determination to be 
inconsistent with the GATT, while the FTA binational Panel (which issued its report 
only ten days later) has reached a similar result only with respect to certain parts of the 
determination.
In the lumber cases, two closely-related determinations of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce imposing countervailing duties on Canadian lumber products (by virtue of a 
Canadian export subsidy programme), have also been challenged by Canada before the 
GATT dispute settlement machinery and a binational FTA Chapter 19 Panel. The GATT 
Panel found the interim duties (imposed by the U.S. pending conclusion of the 
investigation) to be incompatible with the GATT,134 and the FTA binational Panel, 
seized by the Canadian government at a time when GATT proceedings were still 
pending, addressed the final determination of the U.S. Department of Commerce 
(adopted at the end of the investigation) and held that significant parts of the 
determination were unclear or incorrect under U.S. law.135
Interestingly enough, the decisions of the various GATT and FTA panels in the pork and
lumber cases did not attribute any significance to the concurrency between the
procedures (although the GATT report was admitted into evidence in the FTA Lumber
case). This is perhaps explained by the fact that reports rendered by GATT Panels were
decided in accordance with international law (mainly, the GATT), whereas Chapter 19
• 1 • »FTA Panels have applied U.S. domestic law. Thus, it is questionable whether genuine 
competition between the two proceedings has taken place (although the cases were
■j n n
clearly related to each other).
133 Case USA-89-1904-06, Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork (Canada v. U.S.), Report o f  28 Sept.1990 
(binational Panel) available at < http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/images/pdf/ ua89060e.pdf> (last visited 
on 8 July 2000).
134 Measures Affecting Imports o f  Softwood Lumber from  Canada (Canada v. U.S.), GATT B.I.S.D. (40th 
Supp.) at 358 (1993)(the Panel’s Report was issued on 19 Feb. 1993).
135 Case USA -92-1904-01, Certain Softwood Lumber Products from  Canada (Canada v. U.S.), Report o f  
6 May 1993 (FTA binational Panel), available at < http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/images/pdft 
ua92010e.pdf> (last visited on 8 July 2000).
136 However, it is well established that U.S. law should be read in light o f  the GATT. See e.g., Lumber, 
supra note 134, at 105.
137 Another factor might have been the differences in the identity o f the parties to the two cases. While 
Canada was the sole applicant in the GATT cases, the FTA proceedings were brought by the government 
o f Canada together with several provincial governments and Canadian producers o f  meat and lumber 
products, as co-applicants. However, one can regard both cases as involving essentially the same parties, 
since Canada, in effect, represented the interests o f its domestic producers and municipal authorities also 
before the GATT machinery. In any case, at least with regard to the rights and obligations o f the 
Canadian government full competition seem to have taken place.
65
In a recent case, a dispute between the U.S. and Mexico over an antidumping 
investigation by the Mexican authorities concerning high fructose com syrup imported 
from the U.S., was submitted by the US to the WTO DSB while a case concerning 
essentially the same issues, but between different parties was pending before a NAFTA
Chapter 19 binational Panel (the NAFTA case was brought by private parties, without
• 1the involvement of the US government). During the WTO proceedings, a controversy
had arisen as result of an attempt by the U.S. to enter into record alleged discrepancies 
between the positions that Mexico had taken before the two tribunals, in order to 
undermine its credibility. Mexico strenuously objected to this attempt, arguing that the 
two dispute settlement mechanisms were of different nature and addressed disputes 
between different parties. In the end, the WTO Panel has admitted the piece of evidence 
requested by the U.S. but held, at the same time, that the alleged discrepancies were 
insignificant, thereby evading the need to rule on the precise nature of the relations 
between the two proceedings139
Another example of multiple proceedings had been the filing of subsequent applications 
to GATT and FTA panels concerning Canadian restrictions on exportation of certain fish 
products. In 1986, the U.S. initiated GATT proceedings against Canada challenging the 
legality of a Canadian ban on the export of unprocessed salmon and herring and a GATT 
Panel found the Canadian restrictions to be incompatible with Articles XI and XX of the 
GATT.140 A subsequent dispute over a substitute measure introduced by Canada after 
removal of the unlawful export ban was referred in 1989, by way of agreement, to an 
arbitral panel constituted under Chapter 18 of the FTA (similar to Chapter 20 to 
NAFTA). The FTA panel reviewed the legality of the new Canadian measure inter alia 
under Articles XI and XX of the GATT (which were incorporated in the FTA) and 
explicitly adopted the reasoning employed by the earlier GATT panel. Consequently, it 
has held that the Canadian requirements were incompatible with the GATT and the 
FTA.141 Still, it is not clear whether these two closely related sets of proceedings could
138 Mexico-Anti Dumping Investigation o f  High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from  the U.S., WTO Doc. 
WT/DS132/R (Panel Report, 28 Jan. 2000), available at < http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
5405d.pdf > (last visited on 8 July 2000); Case M EX-USA-98-1904-01, Imports o f  High-Fructose Corn 
Syrup Originating in the U.S. (NAFTA Chapter 19 Panel)(still pending).
139 High Fructose Corn Syrup (WTO), supra note 138, at 185.
140 Measures Affecting Exports o f  Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (U.S. v. Canada), GATT BISD (35th 
Supp.) at 98 (1988)(Panel’s Report issued on 20 Nov. 1987).
141 Case CDA-89-1807-01, Landing Requirement fo r  Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring (U.S. v.
Canada), Report o f  16 Oct. 1989 (FTA Chapter 18 Panel), available at <
http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/images/ pdf/cc89010e.pdf> (last visited on 8 July 2000), reprinted in 
1989 FTAPP LEXIS (1989)6 .
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be regarded as being in complete competition with each other. Although, both 
procedures had involved the exact same parties, had been governed by international law 
and had addressed essentially the same legal arguments, they had different ‘object’ -  
since the challenges targeted different Canadian measures.
The overlap between WTO and NAFTA procedures was demonstrated once more 
through the response of the international community to the Helms-Burton Act 
introduced by the U.S. in 1997 (imposing trade sanctions on foreign companies trading 
with Cuba).142 Following the adoption of the act, consultations have been initiated by 
the EC before the WTO and before NAFTA by Canada and Mexico.143 Canada also 
jointed the WTO proceedings as a third party. Although litigation was not actively 
pursued, the possibility of parallel proceedings had clearly been a real one.144
The existence of competition between NAFTA and the WTO is further underlined by the 
fact that eight inter-state trade-related claims between NAFTA members had been 
referred since 1995 to the WTO machinery145 and not to that of NAFTA (which also had 
competence to address these issues). At the same time, five inter-state cases without any 
involvement of private parties -  thus, also potentially amenable to the jurisdiction of the 
WTO machinery, had been referred only to NAFTA Panels.146 Given the propensity of
142 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-91 (1997).
143 U.S. - The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, case no. WT/DS38 (complaint by the EC); See 
Christopher L. Doerksen “The Restatement o f  Canada’s Cuban (American) Problem”, 61 Sask. L. Rev. 
(1998) 127, 152-53.
144 Iran had also brought proceedings against the U.S. before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal with relation 
to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (which is comparable to the Helms-Burton Act). U.S. Policy Toward 
Iran Doesn't Violate Algiers Accords, United States Says, 12(9) Mealey's International Arbitration Report 
(Sept. 1997).
145 Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WTO Doc. WT/DS31/AB/R (1997)(Report o f the 
AB)(complaint by the U.S.); Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation o f  Milk and the Exportation o f  
Dairy Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS103/AB/R (1999)(Report o f the AB)(complaint by the U.S.); Canada -  
Patent Protection Terms, WTO Doc. WT/DS170/R (2000)(Panel Report)(complaint by the U.S.); U.S. -  
Measures Treating Export Restraints As Subsidies (case no. WT/DS194/1, complaint by Canada)(still 
pending); U.S. -  Reclassification o f  Certain Sugar Syrups (case no. DS 180/l)(complaint by 
Canada)(still pending); U.S. -  Countervailing Duty Investigation with respect to Live Cattle from  
Canada (case no. WT/DS167/l)(complaint by Canada)(still pending)(the case was initially also referred 
to a NAFTA proceedings, which were however discontinued); U.S. -  Certain Measures Affecting the 
Import o f  Cattle, Swine and Grain from Canada (case no. W T/DS144/l)(complaint by Canada) (still 
pending); U.S. - Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Imports o f  Fresh or Chilled Tomatoes from Mexico 
(case no. WT/DS49, complaint by Mexico) (settled by agreement).
146 Case CDA-95-2008-01, Tariffs applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural Products 
(U.S. v. Canada), Report o f 2 Dec. 1996 (NAFTA binational Panel), available at 
<http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/images/pdf/cb95010e.pdT> (last visited on 9 July 2000)(complaint by 
the U.S.); Case USA-97-2008-01, U.S. Safeguard Action taken on Broomcorn Brooms from  Meixco 
(Mexico v. U.S.), Report o f 30 Jan 1998 (NAFTA binational Panel), available at <http://www. 
nafta-sec-alena.org/images/pdft ub97010e.pdf > (last visited on 8 July 2000). 2 Other cases brought by 
Mexico against the U.S. are still pending before NAFTA Panels. Case no. USA-98-2008-01,
Cross-border Trucjing Services and Investment; Case USA-98-2008-02, Cross-border Bus Serives.
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the parties to NAFTA to litigate their trade disputes, their inclination to utilise both the 
global and regional dispute settlement procedures available to them and the fact that 
closely related multiple proceedings have occurred in the past, it can be expected that 
there is considerable likelihood that parallel or successive proceedings would take place 
in the future before the two competing jurisdictions. However, as will be discussed 
below, this possibility has been significantly circumscribed by the text of NAFTA, 
which bars most types of multiple proceedings.147
Outside North America there has been one prominent case of interaction between 
proceedings conducted under the GATT/WTO and the EC trade regimes in respect of 
the banana importation policy of EC states. In the early 1990's, before the introduction 
of a common EC banana importation policy, the Italian policy of imposing a consumer 
tax on bananas imported from non-EC states has been subject to a number of challenges 
before Italian domestic courts by private importers of bananas from Latin American 
states (including inter alia Columbia, Honduras and Saint Lucia). On a few occasions 
the Italian courts referred questions that had arisen in these domestic proceedings to the
14ftECJ for preliminary rulings, and the latter court had to address the compatibility of the
i L
Italian government's measures with Community law, the GATT and the 4 Lome 
Convention [which granted preferential trade conditions to some African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) states].149
While proceedings on the legality of the trade restrictions had been pending before the 
Italian courts and the ECJ, Columbia and 4 other Latin American banana-exporting 
countries initiated parallel GATT Panel proceedings against the EC, challenging the 
legality of its quantitative restrictions on importation of bananas and the tariff 
preferences granted to ACP states by several EC states, including Italy.150 The Panel 
accepted the complaint and held that the trade policies of the reviewed EC states are 
inconsistent with the GATT (however, the report was never adopted by the GATT 
Council). Shortly thereafter, the ECJ rendered its preliminary rulings in Chiquita Italia, 
in which it has ruled that the GATT has no direct effect in the EC and that as a result its
147 North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 Dec. 1992, art. 2005, 32 I.L.M. (1993) 289 and 605 
[hereinafter ‘NAFTA’]. See infra Chapter 5, at pp. 221-22.
]48 Case C-228/90, 234/90, 339/90. 353/90, SimbaSpA  v. Ministero delle Finanze [1992] E.C.R. 1-3713; 
Case C-469/93, Administrazione delle finanze dello stato  v. Chiquita Italia SpA [1995] E.C.R 1-4533.
149 Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, 15 Dec. 1989, 1991 O.J. (L 229) 1.
150 EEC Member States' Import Regimes fo r  Bananas (Columbia et al v. EEC), GATT Doc. DS32/R  
(1993), 1993 GATTPD LEXIS 11.
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provisions may not be invoked before a municipal court.151 As a result of the position of 
the ECJ, it is perhaps understandable that the ECJ did not consider the findings of the 
GATT Panel relevant for guiding the Italian courts.
Multiple proceedings have also been observed with relation to the importation of 
bananas after the EC has adopted in 1993 a new common policy on the matter.152 The 
new policy had been challenged in 1994 before the ECJ (in a case brought by 
Germany)153 and before the GATT (in a case brought by several Latin American 
countries).154 While the GATT Panel report (which was never adopted) found that the 
regulation violated the most-favoured nation requirement under the GATT, the ECJ 
again refused to rely upon the provisions of the GATT and held the regulations to be 
legal under EC law. As is well-known, subsequent challenges to a revised version of the 
EC regulations had also been made before the WTO DSB, which found this EC policy to 
be illegal too.155 Thus, the Bananas litigation serves as a useful reminder of the potential 
of complex trade issues to produce voluminous litigation before regional and global 
trade tribunals.
The potential for competition between the WTO and regional economic integration 
regimes has also been shown by a recent trade related dispute between two members of 
Mercosur - Brazil and Argentina, which had been referred to the WTO and not to the 
alternative (though dormant) arbitration machinery of Mercosur,156 and by a claim 
brought against Nicaragua, to which Honduras -  a fellow member of SICA (and, like 
Nicaragua, a state subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the CCJ), has joined.157
151 Chiquita Italia, [1995] E.C.R., at 1-4565-66. The Court did not however consider the effects o f  the 
conclusion o f the WTO on the status o f GATT rights and obligations. Chiquita Italia, 1995 E.C.R., at 
1-4533 (Opinion o f Advocate-General Lenz).
152 Council Regulation (EEC) 404/93 o f 13 Feb. 1993 on the Common Organisation o f the Market in 
Bananas, 1993 O.J. (L 47) 1.
153 Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council, [1994] E.C.R. 1-4973, 5071-74.
154 EEC- Import Regime fo r  Bananas, 34 I.L.M. (1995) 177 (GATT Panel Report, 1994).
155 E C . - Regime fo r  the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f  Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/R (1997) 
(Panel Report); E.C. - Regime fo r  the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f  Bananas, 37 I.L.M. (1998) 
243 (Report o f the AB, 1997).
156 Argentina — Transitional Safeguard Measures on Certain Imports o f  Woven Fabrics o f  Cotton and 
Cotton Mixtures Originating in Brazil (case no. W T/DS190/l)(still pending).
157 Nicaragua -  Measures Affecting Imports from  Honduras and Colombia (I) (case no. W T/DS188/1) 
(request by Columbia)(still pending). Honduras recently requested from the DSB to initiate consultations 
on this matter. Nicaragua — Measures Affecting Imports from  Honduras and Colombia (II) (case no. 




| So, it can be asserted that many GATT/WTO cases have the proven capacity of falling
I under the jurisdictional ambit of regional economic integration arrangement.I
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that this is not necessarily the case vice versa. The 
GATT and its related agreements regulate only limited areas of international economic 
law whereas the subject-matter jurisdiction of regional tribunals (i.e., ECJ, Andean 
Court, EFTA Court, COMESA and NAFTA) is generally broader. Consequently, many 
disputes amenable to the jurisdiction of the regional bodies cannot fall under the 
jurisdiction of the GATT/WTO mechanism.158 In addition, unlike regional tribunals, the 
WTO does not afford locus standi to private parties and offers only limited access to 
IGOs.159 By contrast, the vast majority of trade-related disputes brought to date before 
the regional economic integration bodies have involved private parties or IGOs as 
litigants. Still, the rather common practice of espousing private trade-related grievances 
by states (without formal diplomatic protection) can enable some of these issues to reach 
the WTO nonetheless (albeit between different sets of parties).
B. Jurisdictional conflicts between human rights bodies
Perhaps, the most vivid example of competition between global and regional dispute 
settlement procedures is found in the practice of the HRC and the regional human rights 
bodies. The HRC handles complaints alleging violation of the ICCPR, a text that largely 
corresponds to provisions found in regional human right conventions.160 Consequently, 
almost all cases presented to date before the HRC have been within the potential 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the regional procedures. Furthermore, the large majority of 
parties to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR participate in one of the regional human 
rights sub-systems.161 Since there are millions of individuals, which have locus standi 
both before the HRC and one of the regional mechanisms, and given the inclination of 
individuals to vindicate their rights through litigation (unlike states, that are often
158 For example, the ECJ may address environmental questions, even if  not directly related to trade. 
Philippe Sands, Principles o f  International Environmental Law  (1995) 544-50.
159 The EC is at present the only international organisation that enjoys membership privileges before 
WTO dispute settlement bodies.
160 For a detailed comparison between the ICCPR and the European HR Convention, see Report o f the 
Committee o f Experts to the Committee o f Ministers o f  the Council o f  Europe, Problems arising from  
the Co-existence o f  the United Nations Covenants on Human Rights and the European Convention on 
Human Rights -  Differences as regards the Rights Guaranteed, 1 Aug. 1970, Doc. No. H (70) 7; 
Parliamentary Assembly o f  the Council o f Europe, Information Report on the Protection o f  Human 
Rights in the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol and in the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 27 April 1976, pp. 4-6, Doc. No. 3773; Girogio Gaja “New  
Instruments and Institutions for Enhancing the Protection o f  Human Rights in Europe?” The E U  and  
Human Rights (Philip Alston, ed., 1999) 781, 783-84.
161 All but 17 o f  the 98 state parties to the Optional Protocol are subject to the jurisdiction o f  some 
regional human rights procedure.
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reluctant to litigate),162 the number of instances of multiple litigation in this area of the 
law can be expected to be relatively high. And indeed, at least on 40 occasions, virtually 
the same human rights complaints have been brought before both global and regional 
procedures.
As far as the HRC is concerned, multiple proceedings are governed by Article 5(2)(a) of 
the Optional Protocol, which bars the admissibility of communications simultaneously 
pending before other international investigation or settlement procedures (a lis pendens 
clause). It should be noted that this clause, which will be further analysed in Part III of 
this study, does not preclude the admissibility of successive communications that had 
already been settled by another human rights procedures. However, several of the parties 
to the Optional Protocol have introduced a reservation excluding from the jurisdiction of 
the HRC communications that were previously reviewed by other procedures (electa una 
via reservations). Most of the discussion of multiple proceedings by the HRC was 
undertaken within the legal framework of these two jurisdiction-regulating provisions, 
and will be described below, in accordance with the conditions for their application.
The first group of cases where jurisdictional conflicts have occurred are cases brought to 
the HRC after they had been dealt with by another human rights procedure. In more than 
10 cases, not covered by any electa una via reservation, the HRC simply took note of the 
fact that the communications had also been the subject of other international 
proceedings.164 It is notable that in a few of these cases the Committee has reached
162 Laurence R. Heifer and Anne-Marie Slaughter “Toward a Theory o f Effective Supranational 
Adjudication” 107 Yale L.J. (1997) 273,285.
163 To date, 19 states have submitted a reservation to this effect, most o f  them in pursuance to a 
recommendation made in a Report issued by a Committee o f  Experts, operating along the Council o f  
Europe’s Committee o f Ministers. Report o f the Committee o f  Experts to the Committee o f  Ministers o f  
the Council o f Europe, Problems arising from  the Co-existence o f  the United Nations Covenants on 
Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights -  Part I: Problems arising from  the 
Co-existence o f  the Two Systems o f  Control providedfor by the European Convention and by the UN 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 29 Feb. 1968, pp. 7-11, Doc. No. CM (68) 39.
164 Comm. R.2/8, Lanza v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. 40, at 111, 113 (Report o f the HRC, 
1980); Comm. R.7/28, Weinberger v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. 40, at 114, 116 (Report o f  
the HRC, 1981); Comm. R.10/44, Pietroroia  v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. 40, at 153, 155 
(Report o f  the HRC, 1981); Comm. 201/1985, Hendricks v. Netherlands, UN GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. 
40, at 230 ,235  (Report o f the HRC, 1988); Comm. 210/1986, 225/1987, Pratt v. Jamaica, UN GAOR, 
44th Sess., Supp. 40, at 222, 226 (Report o f the HRC, 1989); Comm. 401/1990, J.P.K v. Netherlands,
UN GAOR, 46 Sess., Supp. 40, at 405,409 (Report o f  the HRC, 1991); Comm. 403/1990, T. W.B.Mv. 
Netherlands, UN GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. 40, at 411, 414 (Report o f  the HRC, 1991); Comm. 381/1989, 
L.E.S.K. v. Netherlands, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. 40, at 374, 377 (Report o f the HRC, 1992); Comm. 
402/1990, Brinkhof v. Netherlands, UN GAOR, 48th Sess., Annex, par. 7.3, UN Doc. CCPR/C/48/ 
D/402/1990 (1993); Comm. 453/1991, Coerielv. Netherlands, UN Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/453/1991 
(Report o f  the HRC, 1994); Comm. 824/1998, Nicolov v. Bulgaria, para. 8.2, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/68/D/824/1998 (Report o f the HRC, 2000).
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decisions inconsistent with those reached by the regional bodies that have previously 
reviewed the same matter.165
In situations governed by electa una via reservations (about 10 more cases), the HRC 
has tended to decline jurisdiction only where the competing procedure examined the 
substance of the same communication (during either the admissibility or the merits 
stage),166 although there have been exceptions to this trend.167 Thus, where dismissal by 
the first procedure was made on purely procedural grounds, the Committee generally 
held that the reservation was inapplicable.168 Only in a handful of cases did the 
Committee find communications addressed by other procedures to be inadmissible.169
The second category of cases involves parallel proceedings before the HRC and a 
regional court or tribunal. In some 10 cases, where the HRC has observed the existence 
of litispendence involving another international procedure, it simply requested the author 
of the communication to withdraw the complaint which had been pending before the
165 Brinkhof supra note 164 (difference between permissible grounds for conscientious objection could 
be deemed discriminatory); Brinkhof v. the Netherlands, App. No. 14215/88, Eur. Comm’n Decision o f  
13 December 1989 (application is ill-founded). Coeriel, supra note 164 (refusal to register surname 
change for its foreign sound is arbitrary); id. at para. 2.4 (EHR Comm’n decided on 2 July 1992 that an 
application by the same applicants should be struck o ff the list o f  cases as ill-founded).
166 The same matter being the same claim concerning the same individual. Fanali, supra note 14, at 163; 
Comm. 191/1985, Blom  v. Sweden, UN GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. 40, at 211, 216 (Report o f  the HRC, 
1988). Cf. Mejia v. Peru, supra note 15, at par. V (A)(1) (importing the test adopted by the HRC with 
respect to what constitutes the same case under the Inter-American System). See Manfred Nowak, A 
Commentary on the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1993) 702.
167 Comm. R.26/121, A.M. v. Denmark, UN GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. 40, at 212,213 (Report o f the HRC, 
1982). See discussion in Dominic McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee (1991) 184-85; Nowak, 
supra note 166, at 702; R. Ghandi “The Human Rights Committee and the Right o f  Individual 
Communication” 57 B.Y.I.L. (1986) 201, 231. Cf. X v . Switzerland, App. No. 8878/79, 20 Eur. Comm’n 
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 240, 245 (1980)(holding that a case terminated by the EHR Comm’n on technical 
grounds does not bar the submission o f a new petition to the same body on the same matter).
168 Comm. 158/1983, O.F. v. Norway, UN GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. 40, at 204,211 (Report o f  the HRC, 
1985); Casanovas v. France, supra note 25, at 133-34.
169 A.M. v. Denmark, supra note 167; Comm. 168/1984, V.Ov. Norway, UN GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. 40, 
at 232, 234-35 (Report o f  the HRC, 1984); Comm. 467/1991, V.E.M. v. Spain, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/48/D/467/1991 (Report o f  the HRC, 1993)(holding that the Spanish reservation is broader than 
most other electa una via reservations and precludes the very act o f  submission to two procedure); 
Comm. 421/1990, Trebutien v. France, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. 40(11), at 277, 281 (Report o f the 
HRC, 1994); Glaziou v. France, supra note 28, at 255; Valentijn, supra note 28, at 257. See also Heifer, 
supra note 25, at 302.
In two other cases the Committee found the communications inadmissible for other reasons and did no 
discuss the applicability o f either the lis pendens clause or electa una via reservation. Comm. 217/1986, 
H. v. d.P. V. v. Netherlands, UN GAOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. 40, at 185, 186 (Report o f the HRC, 1987); 
Comm. 393/1990, A.C. v. France, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. 40, at 384, 387 (Report o f the HRC, 
1992).
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competing regional procedure (the I/A HR Comm’n, in the vast majority of cases).170 
Upon withdrawal of the case, the HRC proceeded to address the communication.171
In other cases in which parallel proceedings were pending, the HRC construed the lis 
pendens clause narrowly. For example, in four cases it held that parallel communications 
submitted to the other international procedure before the entry into force of the Optional 
Protocol, were not covered by the lis pendens clause.172 In three other cases the HRC 
held that communications submitted to other international procedures by complainants 
unrelated to the victim of the alleged violation do not bar the latter (or those entitled to
1 7^submit communications on their behalf) from seizing the HRC simultaneously.
It should also be noted that the HRC has also encountered instances of interaction with 
international dispute settlement procedure, which do not fall under the Optional 
Protocol’s definition of a competing international procedure.174 Hence, parallel 
international procedures conducting general investigation of human rights situations, 
which were not adversarial-type review of individual complaints (e.g., thematic or 
country studies by the UN Human Rights Commission’s Rapporteurs), were not deemed 
to be covered by the lis pendens clause (notwithstanding the fact that such procedures
170 Nowak, supra note 166, at 695; Christina Cema “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 
its Organization and Examination o f Petitions and Communications” The Inter-American System o f  
Human Rights (David J. Harris and Stephen Livingstone, eds. 1998) 65, 94.
171 Comm. R .l/4 , Ramirez v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. 40, at 121,123 (Report o f  the HRC, 
1980); Comm. R.14/63, Antonaccio v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. 40, at 114,116 (Report of 
the HRC, 1982); A ltesor, supra note 15, at 125; Comm. 84/1981, Barbato v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 38th 
Sess., Supp. 40, at 124, 126 (Report o f  the HRC, 1983); Comm. 85/1981, Romero v. Uruguay, UN  
GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. 40, at 159, 161 (Report o f  the HRC, 1984); Comm. 123/1982, Lluberas v. 
Uruguay, UN GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. 40, at 175, 179 (Report o f  the HRC, 1984); Comm. 321/1988, 
Thomas v. Jamaica, UN GAOR, 49 Sess., Supp. 40 (II), at 1 ,2  (Report o f  the HRC, 1994); Comm. 575, 
576/1994, Guerra v. Trinidad and Tobago, UN Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/575/1994 and 576/1994 (Report o f  
the HRC, 1995); Comm. 645/1995, Bordes v. France, UN Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/645/1995, at par. 5.2 
(Report o f  the HRC, 1996); Comm. 577/1994, Campos v. Peru, UN Doc. CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994 
(Report o f  the HRC, 1998).
172 Comm. 8/1977, Lansa v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. 40, at 111, 113 (Report o f  the HRC, 
1980); Comm. R .l/6 , Sequeira v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. 40, at 127, 128 (Report o f the 
HRC, 1980); Comm. R .2/11, Motta v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. 40, at 132, 133 (Report o f  
the HRC, 1980); Comm. 32/1978, Touron v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. 40, at 120, 123 
(Report o f the HRC, 1981); Comm. 1/1976, A. v. S., UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 17 (1984).
173 Altesor, supra note 15, at 125; Casariego, supra note 15, at 187; Comm. 74/1980, Estrella, supra note 
15, at 156. See also Sequeira v. Uruguay, supra note 172, at 127 (reference to the individual 
circumstances o f the author in a two-line statement in a case involving hundreds o f  persons brought to 
the I/A HR Commission by an unrelated third party, does not bar the HRC from reviewing the case); For 
criticism, see Meron, Norm Making and Supervision, supra note 112, at 776.
The I/A HR Commission has seem to have adopted a different view on the preclusive effect o f  unrelated 
third party claims. Mejia, supra note 15, at para. V (A)(1).
174 Nowak, supra note 166, at 696-98.
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may examine individual cases during their investigation).175 Similarly, review of
i nf\complaints by NGOs was held not to qualify as a parallel ‘international’ procedure.
The third group of cases includes complaints that had been brought first to the HRC and 
only subsequently to a regional human rights procedure. As a result, the need to make 
judicial pronouncements on the permissibility of such multiple proceedings has been 
delegated to the regional procedures, in accordance with their own rules on 
admissibility.
On a couple of occasions the EHR Comm’n held, by virtue of article 35(2) [ex-article 
27(1 )(b)] of the European HR Convention, which is an electa una via clause, that 
petitions previously presented to other dispute settlement procedures were 
inadmissible.177 There has also been one case before the African Human Rights Comm’n 
where a similar decision was reached.178 However, no similar practice has been found 
with regard to the I/A HR Comm’n.
As is the case in trade-related matters, the overlap between regional and global human 
rights procedures is not absolute. Regional bodies generally enjoy broader based 
jurisdiction ratione materiae than the HRC, since the ICCPR fails to address certain 
economic and social rights that are protected by the regional instruments (most notably, 
the European Social Charter).179 In addition, there have been some significant
175 A. v. S., supra note 172 (referral o f  the same dispute to the UN bodies under the procedure o f  
ECOSOC Res. 1503 or to UNESCO does not constitute the 'same matter', since these bodies deal with 
the study o f  general situations); Comm. 146/1983 Baboeram  v. Suriname, UN GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. 
40, at 187, 191-92 (Report o f  the HRC, 1984); Comm. 172/1984, Broeks v. Netherlands, UN GAOR,
42nd Sess., Supp. 40, at 139, 144 (Report o f  the HRC, 1987); Comm. 180/1984, Danning v. Netherlands, 
UN GAOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. 40, at 151,153 (Report o f the HRC, 1987); Comm. 182/1984, Zwaan-de 
Vries v. Netherlands, UN GAOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. 40, at 160, 162 (Report o f  the HRC, 1987); Comm. 
441/1990, Blanco v. Nicaragua, UN GAOR, 49 Sess., Supp. 40, at 12, 13 (Report o f the HRC, 1994); 
Comm. 540/1993, Atachahua v. Peru, UN GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. 40(11), at 112, 113 (Report o f the 
HRC, 1995). For criticism, see Meron, Norm Making and Supervision, supra note 112, at 767.
176 Baboeram  v. Suriname, supra note 175, at 191-92; Blanco v. Nicaragua, supra note 175, at 13.
177 Fornieles v. Spain, App. No. 17512/90, 73 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 214,223-24 (1992); 
Pauger (EHR Comm’n App. No. 24872/94). supra note 19, atl74. It should be noted that in some cases, 
where successive application were submitted, the Secretariat o f  the Commission had advised the 
applicant to withdraw the complaint without registering it. Directorate o f  Human Rights o f  the Council o f  
Europe, Effects o f  the Various International Human Rights Instruments providing a Mechanism fo r  
Individual Communications on the Machinery o f  Protection established under the European Convention 
on Human Rights, 1 Feb. 1985, p. 12, Doc. No. H (85) 3 ,11 .
178 Comm. 15/88, Mpaka-Nsusu Andre Alphonse v. Zaire, 7th Annual Report o f the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1993-94, 30th Sess. (1994), available at < 
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/ africa/ACHPR2.htm> (last visited on 15 Oct. 2000)
179 See First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
20 March 1952, art. 1-2, E.T.S. 9 (1952) [hereinafter ‘European HR Convention, Protocol l ’](right o f  
property and right to education); Inter-American HR Convention, art. 14 (right to rfeply), art. 18 (right to
74
inconsistencies, in terms of personal jurisdiction over states, between the global 
procedure and its regional counterparts.180 Hence, it is not unimaginable that certain 
human rights violations will be amenable to the jurisdiction of one human rights 
procedure only. Furthermore, locus standi standards before the HRC differ from those 
applicable in proceedings before two out of the three principal regional procedures. 
While the HRC and the ECHR admit only claims presented by directly affected 
individuals or on their behalf,181 the Inter-American and African complaint procedures 
allow NGOs and other interested persons, even if not directly affected, to bring 
complaints.182 In contrast, the standing requirements before the ECSR, where only 
collective complaints by specifically designated NGOs are admissible, are, as a rule,
• 183narrower than those applied by the HRC.
The European and Inter-American Human Rights Commissions have also had the 
opportunity of dealing with conflicts of jurisdiction in their relations with universal 
procedures other than the HRC. Both Commissions have addressed cases that were 
previously submitted to the ILO CFA (the EHR Comm’n has found, on one occasion, a 
case to be inadmissible for that reason).184 At the same time, the ILO had on a couple of 
occasions the opportunity to deal with cases after they had been decided by regional
18Shuman rights procedures.
a name), art. 21 (right to property); and AHR Charter, art. 14 (right to property), art. 15 (right to 
equitable work conditions), art. 16 (right to health), art. 17 (right to education).
180 For example, 6 out o f the 41 states subject to the jurisdiction o f  the ECHR have not ratified the 
Optional Protocol; similarly, 8 out o f  the 25 states parties to the I/A HR Convention have not ratified the 
Optional Protocol.
181 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, art. 1,
UN GA Res. 2200 A (XXI), GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 (A/6316) 52, UN Doc. A/CONF. 32/4. See 
McGoldrick, supra note 167, at 134.
182 American Convention on Human Rights, 22 Nov. 1969, art. 44, O.A.S. T.S. 36, O.A.S. Off. Rec. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, Doc. 21, Rev. 6 (1979), 9 1.L.M. (1970) 673 [hereinafter ‘I/A HR Convention’]; 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 27 June 1981, art. 55, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 
5, 21 I.L.M. (1982) 58 [hereinafter ‘AHR Charter’].
183 Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System o f  Collective Complaints, 9 
Nov. 1995, E.T.S. 158.
184 Martins v. Spain, App. No. 16358/90, 73 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 120, 134-35 (1992); C f  
Council o f  Civil Services Unions v. U.K., App. No. 11603/85, 50 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 228,
237 (1987)(holding that a complaint submitted to the ILO CFA by one trade union does not bar another 
trade union from raising the same matter before the EHR Comm’n); Case 11.381, Nicaraguan Customs 
Service v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report no. 14/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, Doc. 7 rev. 535, at par. 
38-47 (1997)(holding that an ILO case concerning right to strike does not preclude the I/A HR Comm’n 
from admitting a case arising out o f the same events but involving also questions o f  due process). In an 
earlier case before the I/A HR Comm’n it was held that the ILO proceedings do not constitute a 
competing dispute settlement procedure, which precludes proceedings under the I/A HR Convention. 
Cema, supra note 170, at 95 (cites Case 7579, Salazar v. Nicaragua). See also Heifer, supra note 25, at 
319-321.
185 Case 1318, German Worker's Confederation v. Federal Republic o f  Germany, LXVIII ILO Official 
Bulletin (ser B) No. 3 (1985) (Report o f  the CFA)(holding that previous decision o f the EHR Comm’n
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Like the HRC, the regional bodies have also encountered interaction with dispute
settlement procedures, which they did not deem capable of creating genuine
competition. The I/A HR Comm’n refused in one case to block petitions pending in
parallel before an international mechanism for investigation of general human rights
situations.186 A similar decision was adopted by the EHR Comm’n in a case involving an
international fact-finding committee.187 In another case, the EHR Comm’n held that the
fact that the complaint in question had been previously reviewed by an international
NGO is not a bar to its admissibility.188 Finally, the ACHR has held, in one case, that
previous proceedings before another tribunal in which no decision on the merits had
180been reached, are not covered by the African Charter’s res judicata clause.
Another overlap, similar to the one existing between the HRC and the regional 
procedures, might be observed in the relations between the latter procedures and the 
CERD, CEDAW and CAT Committees (and in the future, vis-a-vis the MWC 
Committee). Since all regional procedures prohibit discrimination (including 
discrimination against women and migrant workers)190 and torture,191 they seem to be in 
direct competition with the specialised UN mechanisms, which include some of the 
participants in the regional sub-systems.
that the petition is inadmissible is o f no relevance to the ILO CFA); Observance o f  the Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. I l l ) ,  by the Federal Republic o f  Germany, LXX 
ILO Official Bulletin (ser. B) Supp. 1 (1987)(Report o f  Commission o f Inquiry) (relying, inter alia, on 
two decisions o f the ECHR with regard to the persons whose dismissal was at issue before the ILO).
186 Case 10.580, Quinones v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report no. 10/95, OEA/ser.L./V/II.91, Doc. 7, 
at 76, par. II.2 (1996); Case 11.227, Diaz v. Colombia, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report no. 5/99, 
OEA/ser.L/V/II.95, Doc. 7 rev 99, at par. E.69 (1997). This outcome is specifically prescribed by the 
rules o f  procedure o f  the I/A HR Comm’n on parallel proceedings. Regulations o f  the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, art. 39(2)(a), O.A.S. Official Records OAS/Ser.L.V/II, Doc. 31, rev. 3 
(1980).
187 Varnava v. Turkey, App. No. 16064-66, 16068-73/90, Decision o f  the EHR Comm’n o f 14 April 
1998, available at < http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=l&Action=
Html&X=709212229 &Notice=0&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=0 > (last visited on 9 July 2000).
188 Lukanov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 21915/93, 80 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 108, 124 (1995).
189 Case 40/90, Ngozi Njoku v. Egypt, ACHR Report o f  11 Nov. 1997, 11th Annual Activity Report o f  the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1997/98, 22nd and 23rd Ordinary Sessions, Annex 
II (1998), available at < http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/ africa/1 lthannex2.html > (last visited on 9 July 
2000).
190 Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 Nov. 1950, art. 14, 
E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, as revised by Protocol No. 11, 11 May 1994, E.T.S. 155 [hereinafter 
‘European HR Convention’]; Protocol no. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 26 June 2000, E.T.S. 177 [hereinafter ‘European HR Convention, Protocol 12’]; 
I/A HR Convention, art. 24; AHR Charter, art. 2-3.
191 European HR Convention, art. 3; I/A HR Convention, art. 5; AHR Charter, art. 5.
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To date there have been two cases before the CAT Committee which were also 
presented to regional bodies. In both cases, the Committee has held that the applications 
are inadmissible (but only in one of the two cases, by reason of the preclusive effect of
1Q?the competing set of proceedings).
C. Other areas of overlapping jurisdictions
Another example of parallel jurisdiction can be found in the review of the activities of 
international investment banks. Since international development projects can be 
financed by more than one investment bank, it is possible that complaints against the 
adverse effects of a planned project will be brought, at the same time, and at the 
initiative of the same directly affected individuals, before the World Bank Inspection 
Panel and one or more of the two regional review procedures. However, it should be 
realised that such proceedings are not in full competition with each other, since they will 
necessarily involve different respondents, and because there might be significant 
variations between the different banks’ policies and procedures, that had been allegedly 
violated.
This exact scenario has transpired in the context of a joint Argentinean/Paraguayan 
project -  the Yacyreta hydroelectric project, which has been co-financed by the World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. The same Paraguayan NGO has filed 
two simultaneous complaints to the World Bank Inspection Panel, and the IDB’s 
Independent Investigation Mechanism, alleging a variety of adverse repercussions of the
planned project. This has resulted in two separate inspection proceedings, resulting in
• 1two reports published one day apart from each other. Both reports have identified
generally similar shortcomings in the project and recommended to introduce certain 
improvements so to enable the continued execution of project. This good level of 
conformity may be explained, in part, by the fact that the two panels had consulted each 
other throughout their respective investigation.194
192 Comm. 10/1993, A.E.M. v. Spain, UN GAOR, CAT, 13th Sess. Annex 5, at 43, UN Doc. A/50/44, 
para. 3.3-5.2 (1994)(inadmissible on other grounds); Comm. 26/1995, Mbulu v. Canada, UN Doc. 
CAT/C/15/D/26/1995 (1995)(dismissed for being previously reviewed by the I/A HR Comm’n).
193 Argentina/Paraguay: Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project, Report o f the Inspection Panel o f  16 Sept. 
1997, available at <http://www.worldbank.org/html/ins-panel/Yacyreta%20Panel%20Review%20 
Sept%2016 %201997.htm> (last visited on 10 July 2000); Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project, Report o f 15 
Sept. 1997, IDB Doc. GN-1947-8, available at <http://www.iadb.org/cont/ poli/yacyreta/yacying.htm> 
(last visited on 30 June 2000).
194 IDB Yacyreta Report, supra note 193, at Preface, 3rd Para.; Richard E. Bissel “Recent Practice o f the 
Inspection Panel o f  the World Bank” 91 A.J.I.L. (1997) 741, 743.
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Other less evident areas of potential overlap between global and regional specialised 
bodies, which do not seem to have arisen to date, can nevertheless be identified in the 
following cases:
■ The ILO complaint mechanisms, the African Commission and the ECSR
collective complaint mechanism all have jurisdiction with regard to work 
conditions.195
■ Investment disputes might be amenable to the jurisdiction of ICSID and the
regional economic integration tribunals, which have competence over trade in 
capital (e.g., ECJ,196 EFTA Court197 and NAFTA198).
■ Investment disputes concerning loss or depreciation of investment as result of
governmental act or omission could fall under the jurisdiction of ICSID and the 
ECHR, I/A CHR and ACHR (all of which protect the right to property).199
■ Disputes over detention of vessels and crew, which entail harm to property and
curbs on the ability of the crew to leave the place of detention, may be subject to 
the compulsory jurisdiction of ITLOS200 and to that of the regional human-rights 
procedures (competent to adjudicate complaints over violation of the right to 
property and freedom of movement).201
■ Disputes concerning national policies for emission control of substances covered
by the Montreal Protocol can be referred both to the Protocol’s Implementation 
Committee and to the ECJ, by virtue of the EC legislation on the protection of 
the ozone202 or to the CEC, on the basis of the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation.203
195 See e.g., Convention concerning Occupational Safety and Health and the Working Environment, 22 
June 1981, ILO Convention no. 155; AHR Charter, art. 15; European Social Charter, 18 Oct. 1961, part 
II, 529 U.N.T.S. 89, E.T.S. 35.
196 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, art. 56-58, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 
as revised in 10 Nov. 1997, 1997 O.J. (C340) 173.
197 Agreement on a European Economic Area, 2 May 1992, art. 40-42, 1994 O.J. (LI) 3.
198 NAFTA, art. 1101-1114. According to NAFTA, the parties to an investment dispute may choose 
whether to bring it before ICSID or to arbitration, in accordance with the UNCITRAL Rules. NAFTA, 
art. 1120.
199 European HR Convention, Protocol 1, art. 1; I/A HR Convention, art. 21; AHR Charter, art. 14.
200 UNCLOS, art. 292.
201 European HR Convention, Protocol 1, art. 1; Protocol no. 4 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 16 Sept. 1963, art. 2, E.T.S. 46; I/A HR Convention, art. 21-22; AHR 
Charter, art. 12, 14.
202 Sands, Principles o f ln t ’lE n v ’lLaw, supra note 158, at 556-57.
203 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 14 Sept. 1993, art. 3 ,22-24, 32 I.L.M.
(1993) 1480 [hereinafter ‘NAAEC’).
78
8. Conflicts between different regional tribunals o f  specialised competence 
[two category (iv) tribunals]
The last cluster of potential jurisdictional overlaps can be found in the relations between 
different regional and specialised courts and tribunals with comparable jurisdiction 
ratione personae. This applies primarily to the interaction between regional human 
rights protection mechanisms and economic integration regimes, where several areas of 
overlap can be identified.204
The most prominent example of this interaction is found in the context of the relations 
between the ECJ and the ECHR. Many aspects of everyday life in Europe are governed 
by both EC and European human rights law, and the ECJ has consistently viewed
AC
fundamental human rights as general principles of Community law. Thus, for 
instance, labour standards, which include the principle of non-discrimination, applicable 
in the territory of the EC member states, are governed both by EC legislation, on the one 
hand, and the provisions of the European HR Convention and the European Social 
Charter (both instruments are binding upon all member states of the EC), on the other 
hand 206 Similarly, restrictions on the movement of persons and items might violate both 
human rights and EC law.207
In addition, the actions of EC institutions may themselves give rise to human rights 
concerns. By way of example, the employment practices of EC bodies or the use of
204 Juliane Kokott and Frank Hoffmeister, “Opinion 2/94, Accession o f  the Community to the European 
Convention for the Protection o f  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” 90 A.J.I.L. (1996) 664,
666; Francis G. Jacobs “The Protection o f Human Rights in the Member States o f  the European 
Community - the Impact o f the Case Law o f  the Court o f  Justice” Human Rights and Constitutional Law: 
Essays in Honour o f  Brian Walsh (James O'Reilly, ed., 1992) 243, 249-250.
205 Case 29/69, Stauder v. IJlm [1969] E.C.R. 419,425. See also Jacobs, supra note 204, at 244-49.
206 See e.g., Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena, [1978] E.C.R. 1365 (age discrimination against employed 
women); Case 236/87, Bergemann v. Bundesanstaltfur arbeit, [1988] E.C.R. 5125 (eligibility o f  
foreigner married to local citizen for unemployment benefits); Case T -12.93, CCE de Vittel v. 
Commission, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1247 (duty to consult with workers’ organisations while considering 
changes in business ownership); Case C -13/94 P  v. S. [1996] E.C.R. 1-2143 (dismissal o f  worker for 
being a transsexual); Case C-249/96, Grant v. South West Trains Ltd. [1998] E.C.R. 1-621 (refusal to 
accord a worker's non-married spouse work benefits conferred upon married spouses). EC case law may 
also involve ILO-related obligations. Case C-345/89, France v. Stoeckel, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4047; Case 
C-158/91, France v. Levy, [1993] E.C.R. 1-4287; Case C-13/93, Office N ational de I ’Emploi v. Minne,
[1994] E.C.R. 1-371. See also Case C-41/90, Hofner v. Macrotron GmbH, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1979.
207 See e.g., Case 60, 61/84, Cinetheqe SA v. Federation nationale des cinemas ffangais, [1985] E.C.R. 
2605 (restrictions on videotape releases raise issues o f freedom o f  movement o f  goods under EC law and 
freedom o f  expression under the European HR Convention).
208 See e.g., Case C-308/87, Grifoni v. Commission, [1990] E.C.R. 1-1203 (compliance o f  Euratom with 
ILO work safety standards); Case T-45/90, Speybrouk v. European Parliament, [1992] E.C.R. 11-33 
(termination o f employment o f  a pregnant EC worker); Case 404/92 P., X  v. Commission [1994] E.C.R. 
1-4737 (requirement that new Community employees undergo medical examination).
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the Commission’s investigation powers209 might be regarded inconsistent with human 
rights standards.210 It is also often that regulation of European economic life by EC
t
organs affects the level of enjoyment of a considerable number of human rights (e.g.,
911regulation of the media market may affect the freedom of expression, and introduction
212of environmental safeguards might affect the enjoyment of a host of human rights ). In 
particular, the conferring of commercial rights and obligations upon individuals under 
EC law (e.g., through intellectual property or trade licensing rules) might collide with
91^traditional human rights such as the right to property and freedom of association.
The area of overlap between the ECJ and the ECHR has been significantly increased of 
recent, following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which authorises the 
ECJ to exercise jurisdiction with respect to certain police and judicial cooperation 
matters 214 With the recent conclusion of a EU Charter on Fundamental Rights,215 the 
overlap between the two dispute settlement systems is bound to increase even further.
It should also be noted that given the similarities between EFT A and EC law, some of 
the aforementioned situations might also give rise to multiple proceedings involving the
91 f\EFTA Court. Furthermore, the same jurisdictional overlaps can be found, more or 
less, in the relations between the ACHR and I/A HR Comm’n and Court, on the one 
hand, and African and American regional economic integration arrangements 
(COMESA, ECOWAS, Andean Community, CCJ,217 Caricom, Mercosur, NAFTA), on 
the other hand.
209 Joined cases 209-215 and 218/78, Heintz van Landewyck S.a.r.i. v. Commission, [1980] E.C.R. 3125 
(due process violations by Commission); Case 46/87, HoechstAG D ow Benelux M etal v. Commission 
[1989] E.C.R. 2875 (respect o f right to privacy by EC competition investigators).
210 Another example is public access to EC documents. Cases C-174, 189/98 P, Netherlands v. 
Commission, Judgment o f 11 Jan 2000 (forthcoming in 2000 E.C.R.)
211 Case C-23/93, TV10S.A. v. Commissariaat Voor de Media [1994] E.C.R. 1-4795.
212 See e.g., Guerra v. Italy, 26 E.H.R.R. 241 (1998).
213 Case 5/88, Wachauf v. Bundesamt fur Emdhrung und Forstwirtschaft, [1989] E.C.R. 2609 (right to 
compensation o f  traders deprived o f milk quotas by EC legislation).
214 Treaty Establishing the European Union, 7 Feb. 1992, art. 35, 46, 1992 O.J. (C224) 6, as revised in 10 
Nov. 1997, 1997 O.J. (C340) 145 [hereinafter ‘EU Treaty’]. The Treaty o f  Amsterdam also opened the 
door for expansion o f the Court’s jurisdiction into other areas by those states interested in closer 
cooperation. EU Treaty, art. 40. For discussion, see Bruno De Witte “The Past and Future Role o f  the 
European Court o f  Justice in the Protection o f Human Rights” in EU  and Human Rights, supra note 160, 
at 859, 885-86.
215 Charter o f Fundamental Rights o f  the European Union, 18 Dec. 2000, 2000 O.J. (C364) 1.
216 Carl Baudenbacher “Between Homogeneity and Independence: The Legal Position o f  the EFTA Court 
in the European Economic Area” 3 Columbia Journal o f European Law (1997) 169, 200.
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So far, there has been little known practice, where the same dispute was addressed both
by human rights and economic integration regional courts and tribunals. One of the few
cases where some interaction between the ECJ and the ECHR was evidenced concerned
the ban in Ireland on the advertisement of abortion clinics in the U.K., which has been
the subject of proceedings before both institutions (however, involving different sets of
218parties). In Society for the Protection o f the Unborn Children v. Grogan, the ECJ has
addressed a request for preliminary ruling arising out of proceedings before the Irish 
courts, which were initiated by an anti-abortion NGO that sought to enforce the 
advertising ban against a student organisation that distributed information pamphlets on 
abortion services. The Court held that the case at hand was not covered by EC law (since 
the students could not be regarded as service providers),219 and thus refrained from
220reviewing the human rights aspects of the case. In Open Door Counselling v. Ireland, 
the ECHR was confronted with the consequences of the decision of the Irish courts in 
another case arising under the same ban, initiated by the same anti-abortion organisation, 
but directed, this time, against the providers of counselling services, and held that the 
sweeping ban on the activities of the counselling services constituted an unnecessary and 
disproportional restriction on the applicants' freedom of expression. Although both the 
ECJ and the ECHR acknowledged the existence of concurrent proceedings, there was 
little interaction between the two procedures. This can be explained in part by virtue of 
the reasoning adopted by the ECJ, neutralising the human rights factors of the case 
before it.
Competition between different regional and specialised courts and tribunals might take 
place not only in between human rights and economic integration dispute settlement 
bodies. In the European context, there is also jurisdictional overlap between the 
competences of the ECHR and ECSR, which can address some similar human rights 
issues (e.g., in discrimination in employment or freedom of association cases). Finally, 
jurisdictional conflicts may also take place in respect of environment-related disputes 
involving the state parties to NAFTA, who are also subject to the jurisdiction of the
217 However, competition between the CCJ and human rights bodies is circumscribed by the CCJ Statute, 
which excludes from the court’s jurisdiction questions falling under the exclusive competence o f the FA  
CHR. CCJ Statute, art. 25.
218 Case C-159/90, The Society fo r  the Protection o f  Unborn Children In Ireland Ltd. v. Grogan [1991] 
E.C.R. 1-4685.
219 Society fo r  Unborn Children, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-4740.
220 Open Door Counselling L td  v. Ireland, 15 E.H.R.R. 244 (1992).
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NAAEC dispute settlement machinery.221 Indeed, in one recent case, involving a 
Californian ban over certain gas products, a foreign gas company had initiated 
proceedings against the U.S. both under Chapter 11 to NAFTA (providing for arbitration 
of investment disputes) and a citizen submission under article 14 to the NAAEC. The 
risk of multiple proceedings had nevertheless been averted since the CEC Secretariat has 
held that it is barred from hearing the case by virtue of the I is alibi pendens clause found 
in article 14(3)(a) of the NAAEC.222
9. Multi-faceted disputes
Jurisdictional competition is not limited to instances where a single legal and factual 
question falls squarely under the jurisdiction of more than one international court or 
tribunal. International disputes are by their very nature complicated and often raise a 
host of different issues. In addition, the growing complexity of the law also leads to 
greater proximity between distinct legal branches.223 As a result, it is possible that one 
complex set of facts would raise a multitude of questions in different areas of the law, 
which would fall under the respective competences of different courts and tribunals.
By way of example, breach of an obligation under international law by one state might 
lead inter alia to the imposition of retaliatory trade sanctions. The ensuing dispute will 
thus raise questions under trade law and one or more additional branches of international 
law 224 As a result, the same set of events might give rise to claims before a trade 
tribunal (e.g., the WTO or a regional economic integration court or tribunal) and another 
general or specialised tribunal (e.g., ICJ, ITLOS, human rights tribunals, ILO 
Procedures, ICSID, the Montreal Protocol Implementation Committee or the CWC 
Verification Procedure).
221 The NAFTA agreement sets out an obligation to implement certain international agreements on the 
protection o f the environment. NAFTA, art. 104. As a result, it seems that derogation by one NAFTA 
member state from these standards may be challenged before the NAFTA dispute settlement machinery. 
See generally, Joseph F. Dimento and Pamela M. Doughman “Soft Teeth in the Back o f the Mouth: the 
NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement Implemented” 10 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. (1998) 651, 661-62. 
However, to the extent that the same environmental standards are also protected by the domestic laws o f  
the state concerned, failure to apply them may also be brought before the CEC. Such a complaint can be 
brought by an NGO or a member state in pursuance to the NAAEC. NAAEC, art. 14, 22-24. See Kevin 
W. Patton “Dispute Resolution under the North American Commission on Environmental Co-operation” 
5 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 87, 108-109 (1994); Richard H. Steinberg “Trade-Environment Negotiations 
in the EU, NAFTA and WTO: Regional Trajectories o f Rule Development” 91 A.J.I.L (1997) 231, 248.
222 Methanex Corp. v. U.S., Determination o f  30 June 2000, Doc. A14/SEM/99-001/06/14(3)(CEC  
Secretariat), available at <http://www.cec.org/files/english/99001dis.pdf >(last visited on 29 July 2000).
223 Philippe Sands “Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization o f International Law” 1 Yale Human 
Rights and Development Law Journal (1998) 85, 89.
82
Similarly, an act of aggression which had been retaliated with a counter-attack that 
caused an environmental disaster, such as a major oil spill, might involve questions of 
the legality of the use of force, human rights (loss of life in war, the right to a clean
environment as a component of the right to healthy life),225 environmental law and a host
006of issue under general international law (e.g., state responsibility for damages). As a 
result, a variety of tribunals can potentially be seized.
Since there might be considerable differences in the scope of jurisdiction of the
alternative courts and tribunals, it is possible that they might be involved in partial
competition only -  that is, competition with respect to some elements of the claims
* 0 0 0which can be raised before both sets of proceedings.
Another type of interaction between different proceedings, though not capable of 
generating direct jurisdictional competition, is found in situations where the procedure 
applied by one court or tribunal, has been challenged before another court or tribunal for 
alleged inconsistency with international standards. This interaction does not amount to 
genuine jurisdictional competition because the issues at the second set of proceedings 
(the propriety of the first set of proceedings) are technically different from the issues 
raised in the first set of proceedings (the merits of the original dispute). However, in 
reality, the second set of proceedings must often examine the merits of the original 
dispute in order to pass judgment on the conduct of the first in time court or tribunal.
As mentioned above, the ICJ had, on several opportunities reviewed the propriety of 
arbitral procedures. Furthermore, allegations of human rights (due process) violations in 
the operation of the EC dispute settlement machinery had been submitted in one notable 
case- Melchers,228 to the EHR Comm’n. However, in that case the Comm’n held that it
224 See e.g., U.S. -  Import Prohibition o f  Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 38 I.L.M. (1999) 118 
(Report o f  the AB, 1998).
225Cf. Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 E.H.R.R. 277 (1995).
226 Cf. Legality o f  the Threat or Use o f  Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (use o f nuclear weapons raises 
a host o f  humanitarian law, human rights and environmental law issues).
227 For example, in competition between WTO and ITLOS over a dispute composed o f the following 
three factual elements: 1) systematic breach o f the terms o f fishing license by a foreign vessel; followed 
by 2) imposition o f trade sanctions by the coastal state against the flag state; and 3) unilateral revocation 
o f the fishing license by the coastal state, the WTO DSB will have jurisdiction over elements 1 and 2, 
whereas ITLOS will have jurisdiction over elements 1 and 3.
228 Melchers & Co. v. Germany, App. 13258/87, 1990 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 138 (Eur. Comm’n on 
H.R.).
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does not have jurisdiction to review the activities of Community organs, since the EC is 
not a party to the European HR Convention.229
10. Interim conclusions
The above survey clearly establishes that jurisdictional conflicts between different 
international courts and tribunals (and quasi-judicial procedures) are not only possible, 
but also a real and inevitable phenomenon. In a number of cases, the entire jurisdiction 
of a surveyed court or tribunal falls squarely under the jurisdiction of another judicial or 
quasi-judicial body as well. This is typically the case with the jurisdictional relations 
between courts and tribunals invested with unlimited subject matter jurisdiction either on 
the global or regional level (e.g., ICJ, arbitration, the OSCE bodies and some Latin 
American courts), or between these judicial fora and all other specialised courts and 
tribunals (provided that jurisdiction ratione personae conditions have been met). This 
state of relations can also be found in the relations between the HRC and the more 
specialised UN human rights bodies, such as the CERD or CAT Committees.
In a number of other cases, partial overlap has been identified in relation to important 
areas of international law. Thus, the relations between global and regional specialised 
tribunals, operating in the same area of the law (e.g., WTO and NAFTA or HRC and 
ECHR or I/A CHR) generally exhibit considerable overlap, as do some of the 
interactions within the categories of global and regional specialised courts, when dealing 
with multi-dimensional issues, which fall under more than one area of the law (e.g., 
ICSID and HRC, or ECJ and ECHR). Finally, some situations can be envisioned in 
which complicated and multifaceted disputes arise. Such disputes may give rise to a 
number of separate legal claims that fall under the jurisdiction of more than one judicial 
body.
What's more, jurisdictional overlaps are not a hypothetical scenario. In several dozens of 
instances competition between courts and tribunals, resulting in multiple proceedings 
has actually taken place. These cases have mostly arisen in two areas of international 
law -  human rights and trade liberalisation law, a phenomenon that can perhaps be 
explained by the prominent role that private parties play, directly and indirectly, in such 
multiple litigation. The propensity of private parties to resort to judicial and 
quasi-judicial mechanisms and the accessibility of human rights and trade liberalisation
229 See also CFDT  v. Council, App. 8030/77, 13 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 231 (1978).
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dispute settlement mechanisms to a vast number of individuals (or to states representing 
the interests of a large number of immediately concerned private parties, such as 
businesses involved in international trade), make these mechanisms most susceptible to 
jurisdictional competition. Indeed, as will be shown below, human rights and trade 
liberalisation mechanisms are generally characterised by a more meaningful level of 
jurisdictional regulation than most other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, although 
several deficiencies in such jurisdictional arrangements will be subsequently identified 
and discussed at some length. Still, cases of actual or close to actual jurisdictional 
competition have been encountered in nearly all areas of international law, and with 
respect to almost all types of international courts and tribunals.
In sum, the growing intricacy of international disputes, on the one hand, and the 
proliferation of courts and tribunals and the expansion of their ratione personae and 
ratione materiae jurisdictions, on the other, dramatically increase the probabilities that 
international disputes would generate a variety of legal issues which might fall under the 
respective jurisdictions of more than one body or procedure. Moreover, even today such 
possibility is a real one and not merely speculative.
On the basis of the conclusion that there are considerable overlaps between the 
jurisdictions of international courts, tribunals and quasi-judicial procedures, and that 
there are real chances of encountering multiple proceedings, it is necessary to move to 
the next stage of the study and examine the desirability of regulating this phenomenon. 
In other words, does competition between international courts and tribunals present a 
problem to the international legal community?
230 Georges Abi-Saab “The International Court o f Justice as a World Court” Fifty Years o f  the 
International Court o f  Justice (Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice, eds., 1996) 3, 13.
Part II
Legal and Policy Issues Concerning the Competition between the 
Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals
Chapter Three: 
Jurisdictional competition in view o f  
the systematic nature of international law
1. The jurisdictional implications o f  the proliferation o f  international courts 
and tribunals
The situation in which multiple fora may be seized by the parties to one international 
dispute may give rise to a host of practical and theoretical questions. However, until 
recently, matters such as forum shopping or parallel and successive proceedings have 
been seldom discussed by international lawyers. While this might not be surprising 
given the novelty of the phenomenon of overlapping jurisdictions in the international 
sphere, at least in its current dimensions, it means that the present review of the 
jurisdictional implications of the multiplicity of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies must 
proceed in mostly uncharted territory.
It would seem that the most significant effect of the upsurge in the number of 
international courts and tribunals (and the expansion of the jurisdiction of existing 
bodies) is an increase in the role of adjudication in international relations, in general, and 
in international dispute settlement, in particular. Potential parties to international 
litigation now have a greater variety of fora to choose from and, as a result, there is 
greater likelihood that they will find a court or tribunal that accommodates their 
concerns and interests.1 This evolution is accentuated by the fact that many of the new 
international judicial bodies have been entrusted with a considerable degree of 
compulsory jurisdiction and can be seized unilaterally by any of the disputing parties. 
Hence, more international fora are available for judicial dispute settlement, and referral 
of cases to adjudication is easier than ever before.2 The combination of these two
1 Tullio Treves “Recent Trends in the Settlement o f International Disputes” I Bancaja Euromediterranean 
Courses o f  International Law (1997) 395, 421.
2 Jonathan I. Chamey “The Implications o f  the International Dispute Settlement System o f  the 1982 
Convention on the Law o f the Sea on International Law” 9 A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1995) 33, 35; Benedict
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developments has already begun to bring about enhanced resort to international courts
'i
and tribunals.
The enhanced role of international courts and tribunals has some notable advantages and 
disadvantages. In a nutshell, it would seem that more disputes could be expeditiously 
resolved through adjudication and that the more frequent reference to legal standards in 
litigation would strengthen the rule of law in international relations4 and encourage the 
further development of international law.5 At the same time, one might fear that the 
increased resort to courts and tribunals might circumscribe resort to diplomatic methods 
of dispute settlement, which are often less contentious and rigid, and more time and 
cost-efficient than litigation.6
In any event, a discussion on the pros and cons of the increased resort to adjudication 
would not be further elaborated upon here since it is obviously beyond the scope of the 
present work. The multiplicity of courts and tribunals is by now an accomplished fact 
and reviewing the desirability of this reality is therefore, in essence, an academic and
Kingsbury “Forward: Is the Proliferation o f  International Courts and Tribunals a Systematic Problem” 31 
N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 679, 686.
3 Bernard H. Oxman “The Rule o f Law and the United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea” 7 
European Journal o f  International Law (1996) 353, 370.
4 Stephen M. Schwebel, Address to the Plenary Session o f  the General Assembly o f  the UN, 26 Oct. 1999, 
available at < http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/SPEECHES/iSpeechPresidentGA54_ 19991026. 
htm > (last visited on 12 July 2000)(increased resort to adjudication may create an healthy 'judicial 
habit'); Jonathan Chamey “Third Party Dispute Settlement and International Law”36 Colum. J. Transnat. 
L. (1997) 65, 76; Pierre-Marie Dupuy “The Danger o f the Fragmentation or Unification o f  the 
International Legal System and the International Court o f Justice” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 791, 
796.
5 Georges Abi-Saab “Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & 
Pol. (1999) 919, 926; Steven P. Croley and John H. Jackson “WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard o f  
Review, and Deference to National Governments” 90 A.J.I.L. (1996) 193, 193. At the same time, the 
existence o f clear rules governing the issues at hand may encourage settlements o f  disputes out o f court. 
John H. Jackson “Fragmentation or Unification among International Institutions: The World Trade 
Organization” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 823, 828.
6 See e.g., Robert A. Green “Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between Governments: A 
Comparison o f  the International Tax and Trade Regimes” 23 Yale J. Int'l L. (1998) 79.
Still, the actual effects o f compulsory adjudication procedures on the utilisation o f  diplomatic dispute 
settlement procedures are far from clear. It could be argued that without the 'threatening shadow' o f  
compulsory adjudication in the background, the chances that parties will resort to any form o f  dispute 
settlement, or will agree upon a settlement, would be rather low. See Alan E. Boyle “Settlement o f  
Disputes Relating to the Law o f the Sea and the Environment” International Justice (Kalliopi Koufa, ed., 
1997) 295, 302; Jonathan I. Chamey “Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International 
Tribunals?” 271 Recueil des cours 101, 352 (1998); Jonathan I. Chamey “The Implications o f  Expanding 
International Dispute Settlement Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law o f  the Sea” 90 A.J.I.L. 
(1996) 69, 71; Robert Y. Jennings “The International Court o f  Justice and the Judicial Settlement o f  
Disputes” 1 Collected Writings (1998) 433, 433; Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 687; Harold H. Koh “Why 
Do Nations Obey International Law?” 106 Yale L.J. (1997) 2599, 2649; Emst-Ulrich Petersmann 
“International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System 1948-1996: An Introduction” 
International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, ed., 
1997) 5 ,81.
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futile retrospective exercise. This study rather focuses on working within the existing 
system of multiple fora and examining the necessity of introducing measures, which 
may be needed to improve upon the current situation.
The present work is mainly interested in one important feature associated with the new 
multiple-jurisdictional legal environment. This is the question of jurisdictional relations 
between the various international courts and tribunals, or, more specifically, the question 
of coordinating and harmonising the operation of different judicial or quasi-judicial 
procedures. The question of coordination and harmonisation arise primarily in two 
contexts: (1) concurrency of jurisdiction over a single dispute (jurisdictional 
competition), and (2) consistency in the lines of decisions rendered by the different 
courts and tribunals, pertaining to similar legal questions, but arising out of different
n
disputes (coherent development of the law).
The second question will not be discussed comprehensively here because, among other 
thing, it has already been addressed elsewhere, and so far has not proved to constitute a 
major doctrinal problem (albeit, this might arguably change in the future).8 This work 
rather focuses on the first question, namely, investigation of situations in which different 
international courts and tribunals exercise competing jurisdictions over a single dispute. 
However, some of the insights offered hereby are bound to be influenced by the views of 
the present author on the need for developing international law in a coherent manner.
In light of the findings of the previous Part, it can be ascertained with confidence that 
certain classes of international disputes are amenable nowadays to the jurisdiction of 
more than one international court or tribunal. Furthermore, there have already been a 
few notable instances where a single dispute gave rise to multiple proceedings before 
different international fora. This state of affairs has several practical and theoretical 
implications which need to be assessed.
First, there are questions that pertain to the choice of forum. It seems that unless the 
situation is regulated, parties to a given dispute may exercise their utter discretion and 
select any available forum for the conduct of proceedings. Such choice may be 
undertaken by one of the parties acting unilaterally (assuming that the selected forum
7 Tullio Treves “Conflicts between the International Tribunal for the Law o f the Sea and the International 
Court of Justice” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 809, 810.
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enjoys compulsory jurisdiction), or by all parties to the case, by way of agreement. 
Although the right to choose is generally regarded as a commendable expression of party 
autonomy, unilateral seizing of courts by interested parties might give rise to several 
problems. The ability to bring a case before more than one forum induces 'forum 
shopping', which is sometimes regarded as a form of manipulation of the legal system 
and the cause of undue hardship to some of the parties to litigation. It also creates the 
risk of a 'race to the court house' between the parties to the dispute (especially where a 
jurisdiction-regulating rule accords preference to the first-seized forum). Further, it is 
conceivable that referral of disputes to inappropriate fora (e.g., a forum which cannot 
effectively protect and promote the interests of the entire international community), even 
by way agreement, might be perceived as undesirable from a systematic point of view.
Second, if more than one court or tribunal enjoys jurisdiction over a single dispute, 
simultaneous proceedings might take place before multiple fora. This state of things 
might cause major inconvenience to the parties and introduce the risk of conflicting 
judgments. This situation also raises practical questions relating to the effective 
utilisation of international judicial resources.
Third, there exists the question of finality of proceedings. The availability of more than 
one court or tribunal presents the possibility that the same dispute will be submitted to 
more than one forum in a successive order. If a party may re-litigate a case already 
settled by one judicial forum before another court or tribunal, grave concerns might arise 
with regard to authority of the first judgment, not to mention the inconvenience caused 
to the parties unwillingly exposed to prolonged proceedings. This scenario might also 
have systematic implications on the efficiency and the credibility of international law.
This Part will examine, in detail, the jurisdictional implications of the existence of 
multiple fora. Since only a few international law precedents exist on this subject, the 
examination will be based to a large extent on the experience gathered by domestic legal 
systems, which have addressed comparable situations of competition between judicial 
bodies operating within the same national legal system (domestic or intra-systematic 
interaction) and between courts of different nations (cross-border or inter-systematic 
interaction). Although, there are significant conceptual and other differences between the
8 Chamey, Is Int’l Law Threatened? supra note 6.
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international and national legal systems,9 it is submitted that methods by which different 
domestic legal systems have tackled problems associated with concurrent jurisdiction10 
may inspire the international legal system in moulding its own jurisdiction-regulating 
regime.11 In particular, attention should be given to the special case of competition 
between international and domestic courts (e.g., in the area of international criminal 
law), since the regulation of this situation often involves the application international 
standards and policy considerations.
As will be shown, different jurisdiction-regulating measures have been adopted under 
domestic laws to accommodate different types of jurisdictional interaction. These 
measures can be described in accordance with their of levels of intensity, which range 
from mere jurisdictional coordination (allowing for a certain degree of jurisdictional 
competition, but mitigating its results) to stricter rules of harmonisation (barring 
jurisdictional competition, fully or partially). It will be hereby contended that selection 
of the applicable jurisdiction-regulating measure by domestic legal systems has been 
highly influenced by institutional considerations, namely, the structural relations 
between the competing fora. Generally speaking, competition occurring within the 
framework of a single legal system has been less tolerated than competition occurring 
between judicial bodies from different legal systems. Thus, it will be argued that 
international law should follow a similar path and embrace jurisdiction-regulating 
measures which are required to meet the structural needs of the system.
It therefore seems that evaluation of the propriety of the current level of regulation of the 
jurisdictional interaction between international courts and tribunals and discussion of the 
need for introducing new rules, requires the prior examination of the systematic nature 
of international law and of the structural relations between international courts and 
tribunals. In other words, an attempt will be made to situate the relations between 
international courts and tribunals on a continuum between a full-fledged judicial system 
(comparable to a national legal system) and a non-system (comparable to the relations 
between different national legal systems) and to identify, on that basis, the legal regime 
which should regulate jurisdictional competition between international judicial bodies.
9 See e.g., Robert Y. Jennings “The Judicial Enforcement o f  International Obligations” 1 Collected 
Writings (1998) 494, 502.
10 There is, in effect, no international law govemning allocation o f jurisdiction within a single state and 
only very rudimentary rules governing cross-boundary jurisdictional conflicts.
11 It is acknowledged, however, that importation o f  rules developed under domestic law into international 
law can be done only with 'great care'. Jackson, Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 5, at 829.
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Such findings will serve as the basis for the next Chapter of this study in which 
jurisdiction-regulating rules found in domestic legal systems will be critically analysed 
and the desirability of introducing them into international law discussed.
2. Influence o f  the structural relations between competing fora  on the 
selection o f  jurisdiction-regulating rules
Jurisdictional overlaps can be said to raise two main classes of problems - practical 
problems (e.g., costs to the parties and judicial economy), which will be expounded in 
the following Chapter, and doctrinal problems (e.g., inconsistency of judicial decisions), 
which will be discussed in the present Chapter. The study will show direct correlation 
between the potential gravity of the doctrinal problems at hand, as viewed by courts and 
tribunals involved in jurisdictional competition, and their level of tolerance towards its 
occurrence. In other words, the greater is the perceived threat to the legal system's 
welfare, the more hostile are the system’s judicial organs towards jurisdictional 
competition. At the same time, no similar correspondence can be found with respect to 
the practical problems associated with jurisdictional competition. In fact, the opposite 
might be true. One might find a loose level of jurisdictional-regulation in situations 
presenting serious practical difficulties (e.g., multiple proceedings before courts of 
different nations), whereas tougher standards have been applied in more manageable 
circumstances (e.g., strict allocation of jurisdictions between domestic courts and 
tribunals).
As will be shown below, jurisdictional competition within a single legal system that 
might lead to inconsistent judgments has not been normally tolerated and many domestic 
legal systems have employed clear-cut rules designed to abate jurisdictional competition 
and to maintain and restore, where necessary, the coherence of the legal system. But, by 
contrast, in situations of competition between courts and tribunals operating in different 
national legal systems, flexible jurisdiction-regulating rules have often been adopted 
(notwithstanding the weighty practical concerns supporting the suppression of 
cross-border jurisdictional competition).
This change in outcome can be explained, in part, through conceptual differences 
relating to the essence of the dispute (courts from different countries might even differ 
as to whether they have the same dispute at hand), parochial notions of distrust in
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foreign courts and specific public policies justifying litigation before local courts (even 
if resulting in multiple proceedings).
However, it is submitted that the principal cause for the tolerant attitude taken by the 
courts of one state towards jurisdictional competition with courts of other states is of a 
doctrinal nature. While domestic legislators and courts often regard competition within 
the same legal system as having the disruptive potential of undermining the
19effectiveness and credibility of the entire system, they do not necessarily perceive 
competition between different national courts to threaten the continued integrity and 
coherence of the legal system in which they operate. Because local courts enjoy inherent 
superiority over courts of other nations in determining what law applies in their territory, 
foreign judgments might be considered inferior, or even irrelevant, under domestic 
law.13 As a result of this rule of precedence, conflicting decisions of foreign courts 
present only a minor challenge to the domestic legal order. This is of course also true 
vice versa - from the vantage point of the foreign legal system.
Consequently, the incentive to regulate inter-systematic competition in inter-state cases 
may be considerably smaller than that found in cases arising within the same system of 
law, and a certain degree of jurisdictional coexistence may be permitted (especially, if 
justified by other pertinent considerations). Simply put, competition between equals 
(courts operating in the same legal universe) is more problematic and in need of 
regulation than competition between 'non-equals' - a competent local judicial forum and 
a foreign court lacking power of authority outside its state’s territory.
In sum, it is possible to envision a continuum between watertight legal systems which 
permit little, if any, internal judicial competition and apply 'rules of harmonisation' (rules 
designed to prevent jurisdictional conflicts), on the one hand, and an interplay between 
different legal systems, where a few, if any, rudimentary 'rules of coordination' (rules 
designed to mitigate some of the effects of jurisdictional conflicts) govern the relations 
between the competing legal proceedings
12 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986) 217; H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 
(1983) 116; Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory o f  Law  (M. Knight trans., 1970) 205; Michel van de Kerchove and 
F rancis Ost, Legal System Between Order and Disorder (Ian Stewart trans., 1994) 51.
13 Neil MacCormick “Institutional Normative Order: A  Conception o f  Law” 82 Cornell L. Rev. (1997) 
1051, 1059.
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The third model presented in this Part - competition between international and national 
procedures, is somewhat of a conundrum, and the level of regulation of jurisdictional 
competition between international and national courts and tribunals has been quite 
varied. This perhaps reflects doctrinal disagreements on the relations between 
international and national law, which are in place in different national jurisdictions.14 
Indeed, empirical review of the rules governing the interaction between international and 
national courts and tribunals (e.g., in the human rights or economic integration spheres) 
produces a rather mixed record. In some regimes rules of harmonisation can be found 
(e.g., EC doctrines of direct effect and supremacy),15 whereas in other areas only a few 
rules of coordination exist.16 Further, in some areas of interaction between international 
and national judicial bodies (e.g., in the criminal sphere) special considerations apply, 
which support the existence of a sui generis regime, whose jurisdictional-regulating 
rules might be inapplicable to other jurisdictional interactions.
As a result of this inconsistent picture, the international-national model of jurisdictional 
interaction seems to be of relatively limited utility to the search for an appropriate model 
for the relations between international courts and tribunals. Still, the next Chapter will 
examine the jurisdictional-regulating rules governing this relationship in order to try and 
identify whether any international standards have emerged, that could be adapted to 
apply in cases of pure international competition.
The next section of this Chapter will examine the nature of the relations between the 
different international courts and tribunals in order to evaluate what type of regime 
should govern the interaction between them. For this purpose, it is first necessary to 
situate the structural links between international fora on a continuum between a 
full-fledged judicial system and an anarchical non-system. Simply put, the question 
presented here is whether there is an international 'system' of courts and tribunals? On 
the basis of this analysis one can assess which of the two principal models of regulation
14 According to the monist theory, applicable in most continental law countries, international law is part 
of the law o f the land (i.e., part o f the same legal system). According to the dualist theory applied in 
England, and in some other common law countries, international law (mainly -  treaty law) is a separate 
system o f law, and has no validity within the domestic law system, unless it has been transformed thereto 
via domestic legislation. See Robert Y. Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds.), I  Oppenheim’s International 
Law (9th ed., 1992) 53-81; Ian Brownlie, Principles o f  Public International Law  (5th ed., 1998) 31-33.
15 Case 26/62, Van Gend enLoos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] E.C.R. 1; Case 
6/64, Costa v. ENEL [1964] E.C.R. 585.
16 E.g., all human rights courts and tribunals permit successive litigation -  since they require that recourse 
to them be made after domestic procedures had been exhausted.
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(harmonisation or coordination), or perhaps an interim model, should apply to the 
interaction between international judicial bodies.
3. Is there a system o f  international courts and tribunals?
The relations between international courts and tribunals are at the heart of the present 
research. It is necessary to ascertain the nature of these relations in order to identify the 
type of jurisdiction-regulating regime that ought to govern international jurisdictional 
competition. However, it also crucial to understand the nature of these inter-relations in 
order to determine that a jurisdictional overlap exists in the first place. The proposition 
that there exists a jurisdictional overlap - i.e., that the same international dispute (a 
dispute between the same parties concerning the same issues) might be amenable to the 
jurisdiction of more than one international judicial body, presupposes that the nature of 
the international dispute remains the same before all international fora. However, since 
most international courts and tribunals adjudicate disputes in accordance with specific 
instruments (e.g., GATT/WTO, UNCLOS, ICCPR, European HR Convention, Rome 
Statute), competition can take place only if it is shown that an international dispute has 
overriding common attributes even when addressed under different specific treaty 
regimes (which might belong to different branches of international law).
By way of example, a situation involving the discriminatory taking of property 
belonging to a foreign investor by a host state might give rise to proceedings under 
universal and regional human rights procedures (e.g., HRC and ECHR), arbitration (e.g., 
ICSID) and inter-state adjudication (e.g., ICJ). However, for the four proceedings to 
constitute competing procedures one must establish that they involve the same parties 
and essentially the same subject matter. One of the difficult questions, which arise in this 
regard, is whether claims concerning the same set of facts, but grounded in different 
legal bases, can be regarded as essentially the same. In other words, could a claim 
presented before ICSID (which adjudicates disputes primarily in accordance with the 
texts of private contracts and the domestic and international law applicable in the 
territory of the host state), be deemed to raise the ‘same issues’ as a claim against the 
same state conduct which is brought before the ICJ (which will address it under general 
international law)?17 Further, does a legal claim before the HRC under the ICCPR
17 The PCIJ has held in the past that adjudication by courts and tribunlas operating under domestic law 
cannot compete with adjudication before international courts. Certain German Interests in Polish Upper 
Silesia (Germany v. Poland), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6, at 20 (Jurisdiction); Factory at Chorzdw 
(Germany v. Poland), P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 17, at 27. Applying this case law to cases o f competition
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remain the same when it is brought to the ECHR under the European HR Convention, 
especially, if the relevant rights are somewhat differently defined in the two human 
rights instruments?
In order to confront these issues, one must adopt a stance on the very nature of 
international law. Is it a unified system of law in which disputes can be considered from 
a broad and integrated international context, or merely an assortment of independent 
legal regimes?18 This question is, in a way, a mirror image of the question relating to the 
classification of the interaction between international courts and tribunals. If the 
relations between international judicial bodies comport to the intra-systematic model 
than surely all international disputes can be said to arise within the same legal system. 
Thus, proceedings concerning similar sets of facts may truly overlap with each other, 
notwithstanding the different legal claims that have been presented by the parties (in 
order to fall under the jurisdiction of a particular dispute settlement mechanism).19 
However, if international courts and tribunals fall under the inter-systematic model, then 
it might be the case that 'competing procedures' before different courts and tribunals are 
not really in competition with each other.
The main point seems to be that whenever proceedings are brought under different legal 
systems, their very nature might not the same (despite factual similarities between the 
claims). Indeed, the case law of some international courts and tribunals leans towards the 
view that the decisive test for determining whether two claims involve the same issues - 
is legal (whether the same legal assertions can be made in each case) and not factual 
(whether the facts underlying each claim are the same).20
between ICSID and the ICJ, it would seem that the different legal basis o f  the decision precludes a 
genuine overlap.
18 See e.g., Gunther Teubner “’Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society” Global Law 
Without a State (Gunther Teubner ed., 1996) 3 ,4  (Global law can only be explained on the basis o f legal 
pluralism reflecting differentiation within international communities); Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or 
Unification, supra note 5, at 926.
19 E.g., the 2000 EC/Chile dispute over trade restrictions in response to allegedly unlawful fishing 
practices was characterised as a predominantly trade issue and referred to the WTO and by Chile as 
predominantly a law o f  the sea issue, and referred to the judicial bodies competent under Part XV to 
UNCLOS.
In the same manner, mixed issues falling under more than one legal branch o f domestic law (e.g., 
contracts and torts; administrative and constitutional law) might be presented as predominantly falling 
under one legal branch in order to secure a certain remedy. Cf., Leslie E. John “Formulating Standards for 
Awards o f  Punitive Damages in the Borderland o f Contract and Tort” 74 Calif. L. Rev. (1986) 2033, 
2034-35; A.J. Stone, III “Consti-Tortion: Tort Law as an End-Run around Abortion Rights after Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey” 8 American University Journal o f Gender, Social Policy & the Law (2000) 471, 
472-74.
20 There is clear support in the case law o f the PCIJ to the proposition that there can be no competition 
between courts and tribunals belonging to different legal orders. Certain German Interests, 1925 P.C.I.J.
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A third alternative model of inter-fora relations beside the intra- and inter-systematic 
models is also conceivable. Even if different international proceedings are deemed to 
compete with each other, either because it is possible to link them to a more or less 
coherent system of international law, or because an objective and factual definition of 
the nature of the dispute is to be preferred over a legal one, the relations between the 
different international courts and tribunals might still not comport to the traditional 
intra-systematic model. As will be discussed below, it is possible to imagine a body of 
norms which constitutes a coherent legal system but is being applied by judicial bodies 
that do not form a meaningful judicial system. Hence, the existence of a halfway model, 
whereby judicial bodies are only loosely related to each other - mainly through their 
reference to a common normative system, must also be explored.
Obviously, the discussion here is going to be somewhat circular, for it is the very 
existence or lack of existing jurisdiction-regulating measures which enables one to form 
an opinion on whether the various international judicial bodies constitute a system. 
However, expanding the scope of discussion from specific jurisdiction-regulating rules 
to the structure of the international judiciary might offer some unique perspectives. For 
instance, it may help in singling-out norms, which do not comport to the overarching 
model of the structural relations between international courts and tribunals stemming 
from the totality of jurisdiction-regulating rules. Further, additional 
jurisdiction-regulating measures might be proposed in order to accommodate the current 
level of systemisation of international courts and tribunals or even to promote a new and 
improved vision of the international legal system.
A. International law as a system of law
Pinning down the nature of international law has been the source of controversy for 
some time now. Given the absence of organised enforcement procedures designed to 
ensure compliance with the prescriptions of international law and in light of the feeble 
guarantees against the use of force which are in place, some scholars have even
(ser. A) No. 6 at 20; Chorzdw Factory, P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 17, at 27. Further, recent case law of the 
HRC suggests that proceedings before multiple treaty bodies applying differently defined human rights 
under their respective instruments are not in competition with one another. Comm. 44/1990, Casanovas v. 
France, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. 40, (Report o f the HRC, 1994) at para. 5.1; Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment 24 (52), para. 14, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6 (1994). See also 
Laurence R. Heifer “Forum Shopping for Human Rights” 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. (1999) 285, 315-19.
96
questioned whether international law is really law.21 Other modem theories, while 
accepting the validity of international legal norms, in theory, have cast serious doubts as 
to whether international law influences state conduct in the 'real world' in any 
meaningful manner.22 For understandable reasons these theoretical debates are outside 
the scope of the present study. Still, it seems safe to assert that there is relative 
consensus among modem scholarship that international law should be regarded as law, 
as this concept is normally perceived,23 and that rules of international law do effectively 
shape the conduct of international actors in most situations.24 Therefore, the question 
that is going to be discussed in this segment is not whether international law is really law 
or effective, but rather whether international law can be regarded as a legal system.
I. Definition o f a ‘legal system ’
A system can be defined as a purposeful arrangement or constellation of inter-related 
elements or components, which cannot accurately be described and understood in 
isolation from one another 25 It is submitted that the working definition that ought to be 
adopted here should incorporate three central ideas which are captured by the term 
'system’: (1) a set of elements; 2) arranged in an order (characterised by the interaction 
between the different elements); and 3) possesses a certain degree of unity or cohesion
Ofi(which facilitates apprehension of the elements as parts of a bigger whole). This 
definition also enables one to delineate the outer limits of any system and to determine 
whether particular elements belong to it or not.27
21 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651)(C.B. Macpherson, ed., 1981) 189-217; John Austin, The Province o f  
Jurisprudence Determined (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., 1995) 171. For survey o f  positions contesting the 
legal nature o f  international law, see Prosper Weil “Cours g£n6ral de droit international public” 237 
Recueil des cours (1992)9 ,46-47 .
22 Henry Morgenthau, Politics Amongst Nations (6th ed., 1985) 312. For survey o f  positions contesting the 
social effect o f international law, see Weil, Cours general, supra note 21, at 43-46.
23 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept o f  Law  (2nd ed., 1994) 219-20; Gidon Gottlieb “The Nature o f  International 
Law: Toward a Second Concept o f Law”, IV The Future o f  the International Legal Order -  The Structure 
o f  the International Environment (Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk, eds., 1972) 331, 358-61.
24 Ian Brownlie, The Rule o f  Law in International Affairs (1998) 13; Thomas M. Franck, The Power o f  
Legitimacy Among Nations (1990) 24; Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave (2nd ed., 1979) 47; Oscar 
Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (1991) 9; Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law  (4th 
ed., 1997) 6; Gottlieb, supra note 23, at 353. See also Jonathan Chamey “Universal International Law” 87 
A.J.I.L. (1993) 529, 533; Weil, Cours g£n6ral, supra note 21,at 48.
25 Jean Combacau “Le Droit International: Bric-^-Brac ou Syst£me?” 31 Archives de Philosophie du 
Droit (1996) 85, 86.
26 Santi Romano, L'ordre juridique (L. F ran cis and P. Gothot, trans., 2nd ed., 1975) 7; Abi-Saab, 
Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 5, at 920.
27 Van de Kerchove and Ost, supra note 12, at 5-6; Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 5, 
at 920 ("[ejvery legal order has its own frontiers").
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Several attempts have been made in the past to define what constitute a legal system and 
to determine whether international law should be considered as one. These attempts 
have tended to focus on the second ingredient of the present working definition, and 
discuss the necessary relations between different components of a legal system that 
transpose an assortment of rules and institutions into a coherent order distinguishable 
from other rules and institutions (i.e., identification of the 'principle of integration' of the 
system).29 Five of these attempts merit special consideration given the stature of the 
authors and their influence on legal theory. These five theories can be roughly divided 
into two categories - normative theories, focusing on the rules of the legal system, and 
institutional theories, focusing on the function of legal institutions in social life. After 
briefly reviewing these five theories a sixth model, which is in essence a marriage of two 
normative and institutional theories, will be offered.
H.L.A. Hart had observed that legal systems constitute the union of primary and 
secondary norms.30 He also stated two conditions which he deemed necessary and 
sufficient for the existence of a legal system: (a) general obedience to the rules of the 
system by its subjects; and (b) acceptance of a secondary rule of recognition by the 
system's officials.31 The second criterion is the hallmark of Hart's theory in his seminal 
work -  ‘the Concept of Law'. According to Hart, the existence of an accepted rule of 
recognition provides officials with authoritative criteria for identifying and changing 
primary rules and for deciding whether primary rules have been violated and if so, what 
sanctions to apply. Consequently, the rule of recognition constitutes a basic unifying 
feature which transforms a set of binding rules into a coherent system of law.32 Applying 
his criteria of analysis, Hart had concluded that international law deserves to come 
within the concept of law, i.e., it consists of binding and effective norms, but it does not 
contain a meaningful rule of recognition, and cannot be considered a system of law.
28 For example, Austin has defined a legal system as a set o f laws legislated by the same sovereign, who is 
superior to the subjects o f the laws and is habitually obeyed. Austin, supra note 21, at 19. Under this 
definition, international law, lacking a 'sovereign' cannot be regarded as a legal system (or even as law).
29 Van de Kerchove and Ost, supra note 12, at 10.
30 Hart, supra note 23, at 94.
31 Hart, supra note 23, at 116-17. According to Hart, one should distinguish between primary rules, which 
directly regulate behaviour and secondary rules, which facilitate the operation o f  primary rules. Cf. 
MacCormick, supra note 13, at 1058.
32 Hart, supra note 23, at 92.
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I Nevertheless, he conceded that future developments might lead to a different
conclusion.33
Kelsen, who introduced his 'Pure Theory of Law' several decades before Hart's 'Concept
of Law', has adopted a somewhat similar approach to that offered by Hart, but reached a
very different conclusion on the nature of international law. According to Kelsen, a
plurality of norms form a single legal system if the validity of the norms can be traced
back through norms higher in their constitutional ranking to a common basic norm
(grundnorm)34 This is the Kelsenian 'chain of validity'. Since all valid rules of the
system derive from the same basic norm, a common attribution, which constitutes the
principle of integration of the system (equivalent to Hart’s rule of recognition), is found.
In addition, Kelsen posited that there should be 'general correspondence' between the
prescriptions of the legal system and reality in order for a system to be considered valid
(a principle of effectiveness).35 International law, whose basic norm according to Kelsen
is that reciprocal behaviour of states creates law, from which all international customs
 ^ are derived (including pacta sunt servanda, which is the basis of treaty law), meets the
| Kelsenian requirements for structural hierarchy and thus qualifies as a legal system.36
II
f
| Of these two opinions on the nature of international law the conclusions articulated by
| Kelsen seem to be more in touch with contemporary reality (despite their greater
! longevity). For even if one accepts Hart's model, international law does appear to meet
I today the conditions for identifying a legal system. One can identify within international
I law both primary rules (regulating the conduct of international actors) and secondary
rules, governing the conditions for validity and enforcement of primary rules (rules on 
emergence of custom, laws of treaties, state responsibility etc.).37 Moreover, among the 
secondary rules, several possible rules of recognition can be found.38 This could be a 
general principle accepted by the various branches of international law as the source of
33 Id. at 236-37. Hart's view is shared by other scholars; John W. Head “ Supranational Law: How the 
Move toward Multilateral Solutions is Changing the Character o f ‘International’ Law” 42 Kan. L. Rev.
(1994) 605, 662-63); and criticised by others. Brownlie, Rule o f  Law in Int 7 Affairs, supra note 24, at 6.
34 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems o f  Legal Theory (1934)(1992 reprint) 55. Raz criticizes this 
part o f Kelsen theory and posits that 'basic norms' may derive from a different legal order (e.g., law o f a 
colonial power). He therefore suggests using the term 'basic power' instead of'basic norm'. Joseph Raz, A 
Concept o f  a Legal System (2nd ed., 1980)(1990 reprint) 102-05.
35 Kelsen, Introduction to Legal Theory, supra note 34, at 62; Gottlieb, supra note 23, at 366. However, 
general correspondence does not imply a perfect record o f  compliance. Id. at 372.
36 Kelsen, Introduction to Legal Theory, supra note 34, at 108. Furthermore according to Kelsen, 
international law is at the basis o f all municipal legal systems. Id. 120-121. But see, Shaw, supra note 24, 
at 41-42.
37 Dupuy, Danger o f the Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 4, at 793.
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validity of all international norms (e.g., pacta sunt servanda or 'obligations entered into 
must be performed');39 or a more detailed list of sources of international law (such as 
that found in article 38 of the ICJ Statute).40 In practical terms, a readily available list of 
sources seems to meet Hart's conditions, since it provides international actors with 
sufficiently precise guidance as to which normative prescriptions should be considered 
valid law and on how to modify the law (e.g., conclusion of treaties or formation of new 
custom). In addition, international judicial and quasi-judicial fora habitually rely upon 
such lists in order to adjudicate disputes (determine whether violation has occurred and 
what sanctions to apply). As a matter of fact, the situation under international law is not 
very different form that under various domestic systems of law, where officials 
(including courts) are instructed, (sometimes in vague language) to apply a host of legal 
sources - legislation, case law, international law and domestic customary law.41
It is therefore submitted that a unifying principle, which transform international law into 
a system of law, whether defined as a basic norm or a rule of recognition, can be 
identified under both the Haitian and Kelsenian models.42 Still, under both theories one 
has to examine the general effectiveness of the system.43 It is submitted that this 
requirement is generally fulfilled nowadays, despite the moderate levels of efficacy 
attributed to formal enforcement procedures under international law, such as forcible 
sanctions.44 As a result, international law should qualify as a system of law under both 
theories.
A different approach than that presented by Hart and Kelsen is found in the writings of 
Joseph Raz. Raz's central thesis is that legal systems consist of an intricate web of
38 Georges Abi-Saab “Cours g6n6ral de droit international public” 207 Recueil des cours (1996) 9 ,122 .
39 Combacau, supra note 25, at 90-91. Another formulation that has been suggested is 'common consent o f  
the international community to create binding law'. Jennings and Watts, I Oppenheim's ln t’l Law, supra 
note 14, at 14.
40 Chamey, Universal Int’l Law, supra note 24, at 534; Gottlieb, supra note 23, at 361. See also Raz, supra 
note 34, at 200.
41 Brownlie, Rule o f  Law in Ini 7 Affairs, supra note 24, at 5.
42 For support, see Chamey, Universal Int’l Law, supra note 24, at 531.
43 C f  Raz, supra note 34, at 205. Raz argues that the examination o f  systematic efficiency should avoid 
oversimplified computation, attribute different weight to different offences, take into account relevant 
circumstances and intentions, consider the actual effects o f law on behaviour, examine utilisation o f  
power-conferring rules and attach great importance to constitutional law. Applying Raz's comments to 
international law, it would seem that the assertion that international law is normally followed, might not 
suffice to conclude that it is an efficacious system, since breaches o f the most important norms o f  
international law (e.g., prohibition o f  the use o f force) have occurred from time to time and have 
sometimes gone relatively unpunished.
44 Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes, The New Sovereignty - Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements (1995)(1998 reprint) 32-33.
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inter-connected norms. Such inter-relations may be characterised as 'genetic relations' 
(hierarchy of norms) or 'operative relations' (substantive links such as that between a 
duty and a sanction).45 Among the latter links, Raz considers enforcement of legal duties 
by way of coercion and institutionalised control over the use of force to constitute 
particularly important features of a legal system.46 This implies a minimal substantive 
content found in all valid systems of law.47 The contents of a legal system, at any given 
time, must be determined through the practice of the system’s law-applying organs (this
4 o
is Raz's version of the Haitian rule of recognition). The important role that Raz 
designates for law-applying organs necessarily implies also a minimal institutional 
structure in every system of law.49 Finally, Raz links between law and society and 
argues that legal systems always serve as defining features of a social entity (e.g., state, 
religion, tribe, etc.),50 although Raz argues that the term society should be interpreted 
very loosely.51
Applying Raz's criteria to international law, one is able to identify a rudimentary, but 
nevertheless a genuine system of law (although Raz himself did not address this issue). 
All norms of international law are linked through 'genetic relations' to what is sometimes 
referred to as the constitutional component of international law (rules on custom and 
treaty formation, criteria of statehood, etc.). In fact the 'genetic relations' required by Raz 
are not significantly different than the Kelsenian 'chain of validity' doctrine, whose 
existence has already been established. In addition, the existence of rules such as those 
that address state responsibility52 and individual criminal responsibility53 seem to 
provide the system with the necessary 'operative relations' and perhaps with a sufficient 
coercive element. Since 1945, the use of force in international law has been normatively 
regulated, and various institutionalised and centralised law-applying organs (courts,
45 Raz, supra note 34, at 183-85. An attempt to elaborate the contents o f such operational links has been 
made by van de Kerchove and Ost. These writers identify several operative features that exist in every 
legal system: deductive relations can be found between some o f the system’s norms, norms are not 
repetitive o f each other and are consistent with each other, and the entire gamut o f  norms provides 
completeness - i.e., ability to address every legal question. Van de Kerchove and Ost, supra note 12, at 
38-45, 50-55. However, it may argued that these tests may more appropriately serve as criteria for 
evaluation o f the coherence o f the system, rather than to check its ultimate validity.
46 Raz, supra note 34, at 185-86, 192-94.
47 Id. at 141 .
48 Id. at 191-92,212.
49 Id. at 212.
50 Id. at 188,211.
51 Id. at 208.
52 See ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 37 I.L.M. (1998) 440.
53 Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/Conf. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 
(1998) 999 [hereinafter ‘ICC Statute’].
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IGOs, the UN Security Council, etc.) routinely identify and apply the law. As to the 
social component, one could probably speak of a loosely constructed international 
community or society, which constitutes a political framework for cross-boundary 
interaction. Hence, it would seem that even under Raz's more exacting (but, perhaps, 
more appropriate) standards, international law would meet the requirements of a legal 
system, though barely.
An alternative approach altogether to the question of what characterises a legal system is 
found in the writings of Santi Romano and Georges Abi-Saab, which might be
thcatalogued under the law and society school of thought. Romano, an early 20 century 
jurist, has considered the existence of institutions and mechanisms designed to apply 
legal norms to be the cornerstones of a legal system.54 According to Romano, legal 
institutions and processes, being the means through which society seeks to achieve its 
goals, as reflected in its laws, provide the framework and inner-structure that are the 
distinctive elements of a system.55 Thus, in theory, a legal system can exist without 
norms, but it can never exist without institutions.56
Abi Saab, in his Hague Lectures, has accepted Romano's main thesis that law cannot be 
viewed separately from the society in which it operates. At the heart of the system are 
institutions and mechanisms that play vital social functions - legislative, adjudicative 
and executive functions.57As a result, Abi-Saab has rejected both Kelsen and Hart's 
normative theories of what constitutes a legal system for being overly technical and
C Q
oblivious of the strong links between law and the society in which it functions.
However, Abi-Saab also criticised Romano for putting an exaggerated emphasis on 
institutions, while failing to appreciate the importance of norms in maintaining the 
coherence of the legal system.59 Hence, in Abi-Saab's view, the decisive factor in 
determining the boundaries of the legal system is the common basis of legitimacy 
attributed to the system's rules and procedures.60 The system's institutions derive their 
legitimacy from the social order,61 and, at the same time, bestow legitimacy upon norms
54 S. Romano, supra note 26, at 10, 29-31.
55 Id. at 17-19.
56 Id. at 14-15.
57 Abi-Saab, Cours general, supra note 38, at 126; Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 5, 
at 920.
58 Abi-Saab, Cours gdn6ral, supra note 38, at 120.
59 Id. at 114.
60 Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 5, at 920.
61 Id. at 921.
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(created, applied and enforced by these institutions) and other institutions operating 
within the same system.
Applying the institutional approach to international law, both Romano and Abi-Saab 
have concluded that international law should be considered a legal system.62 Indeed, one 
can identify within the international community various legal institutions performing a 
variety of legislative, adjudicative and executive roles (e.g., courts, IGOs and 
treaty-making conferences). These institutions derive their legitimacy from a common 
source - they reflect the will of the international community or polity. As far as they 
function satisfactorily, they promote the legitimacy of international law.
In the opinion of the present author, the chasm between the two schools of thought is 
bridgeable, along the lines suggested by Raz and Abi-Saab. It is submitted that modem 
legal systems have both normative and institutional components, which although closely 
linked to each other, may also be described separately. In order to fully assess the level 
of systemisation of a given legal system one must look at the coherence of both its body 
of norms and institutional structures.63 In addition, one ought to examine the strength of 
links found between the system’s normative and institutional components (i.e., to what 
degree do norms and institutions influence one another).
Thus, at one end of the scale, one may find a full-fledged legal system (such as the 
developed national legal systems) whose ingredients - norms and legal institutions, can 
be described, jointly and separately, as a system - i.e., a coherently organised assortment 
of elements. In such a system, norms and institutions have strong and reciprocal links 
(law is created and applied by institutions which are governed by law), which derive 
their ultimate legitimacy from the social polity in which they function. At the other end 
of the spectrum there may be anarchical societies, where there exist several 
uncoordinated rules and institutions. The relations between different national legal 
systems may conform to this description. When viewing the relations between the 
English and French legal systems, one can hardly find unifying factors which would 
enable to view the two sets of norms and legal institutions as part of a bigger whole, on
62 S. Romano, supra note 26, at 39-48; Abi-Saab, Cours general, supra note 38, at 125.
63 Coherence (or integrity) implies a shared set o f preferences regarding principles o f justice, fairness and 
due process ('community o f  principles') from which rules derive in a logical manner. See Dworkin, supra 
note 12, at 225-26, 243. Some however deny that legal systems are characterised by high levels o f  
coherence, and regard law rather as a process o f ad hoc political compromises between conflicting 
policies and interests. Id. at 272.
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either the normative or institutional level (although they do occasionally interact). In 
between these two extreme poles there could be numerous intermediary models, 
representing different levels of systemisation of the normative or institutional 
component of the legal order. In sum, it is submitted that the discussion whether a set of 
norms and institutions forms a legal system should, in principle, involve a three-pronged 
analysis -  examining the rules and institutions of the scrutinised ‘system’ and their 
interrelations.
II. Is international law a legal system?
Moving to apply this method of analysis with regard to international law, one might 
reasonably deduce from the above discussion that the norms of international law can be 
viewed as a system of norms according to the most important legal theories (of which 
Raz's is arguably the most sophisticated). There are also obvious links between 
international norms and institutions (one can identify law making and law applying 
institutions governed by international law). However, with regard to the institutional 
component of the system, when viewed separately, a more problematic picture emerges.
Generally speaking, the various institutions of international law (e.g., political 
organisations, judicial and quasi-judicial bodies and treaty-making conferences) enjoy 
poor levels of coherence. Due to the decentralised nature of the international 
community, and the ad hoc nature of many legal institutions (most notably, arbitration 
tribunals and treaty-making conferences), only a few structural links have been built 
between international organs from different geographical regions and between those 
operating in diverse areas of the law.64 The following section will demonstrate that even 
between a group of international institutions performing a similar function - judicial and 
quasi-judicial bodies, one can hardly make out a unified structure. As a result, while 
international law can be viewed as a system on the normative level, it enjoys only 
limited degree of institutional coherence. Therefore, international law is probably
64 As a rule, outside the UN structure, there have been a few, if  any cross-regime organisational links 
between important bodies such as the WTO, the ILO, the ECJ, the OSCE, the World Bank Group and the 
UN. See Klaus T. Samson “Human Rights Coordination within the UN System” The United National and  
Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Philip Alston, ed., 1992) 620, 658; Nicolas Valticos “A ctiv ity  
Normatives et Quasi Normative: Controle” A Handbook on International Organizations (Ren6 Jean 
Dupuy, ed., 2nd ed., 1998) 461, 483-84.
However, there have been some notable examples o f  institutional links within regimes operating in a 
single region or in special subject matters. For instance, strong institutional links can be found between 
the Council o f Europe, the ECHR, ECSR and various treaty-making bodies (experts committees, 
committees o f deputies, etc.) operating under the auspices o f  the Council. Similarly, the UN Organisation
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somewhere in the middle of the continuum between an anarchical and a full-fledged 
legal system.
Nevertheless, the bottom line seems to be that international law can be regarded as a 
legal system.65 This is because even a limited degree of coherence, in some systematic 
features, might suffice to transform an assortment of legal elements into a system, albeit, 
of a loose nature. Thus, despite the poor level of systemisation of international 
institutions, the degree of coherence found in the other relevant interactions -  between 
norms and between norms and institutions, could satisfy the minimum requirements of a 
legal system. Further, as will be elaborated below, the normative coherence of the norms 
international law reflects upon the relations between the functioning institutions, 
endowing them with a limited level of coherence as well. In light of this conclusion on 
the systematic nature of international law, it may be argued that jurisdictional 
competition, with its potential for introducing inconsistent judgments into international 
law, might jeopardise even the modest degree of normative harmonisation achieved so 
far and introduce disharmonising tensions into the international legal system.
III. Differences between the international legal system and domestic legal systems 
Although international law can probably be described as a legal system, it must be 
acknowledged that it is a system that differs from the paradigm of domestic legal 
systems in some significant ways.
Unlike domestic legal systems, where a more or less clear hierarchic normative structure 
is in place (e.g., constitution, primary legislation, secondary legislation), international 
norms (customs, treaties and general principles of law) are generally considered to be on 
the same normative level. The lack of hierarchy is most troubling in respect of certain 
important secondary rules (such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), 
which belong to the same normative level of the very primary rules they regulate.66 This
includes a net o f institutional links between organs such as the UN General Assembly, the various 
councils, the ICJ, the ILC and treaty making conferences (such as UNLCOS).
65 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1994)(1996 reprint) 1; 
Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development o f  International Law by the International Court (1958) 165-66; 
Jennings and Watts, I  Oppenheim’s In t’l Law , supra note 14, at 12-13; Shaw, supra note 24, at 53;
Rosalyn Higgins, “Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process” 17 I.C.L.Q. (1968)
58-84. But see Anthony Carty, The Decay o f  International Law? (1986) 1.
66 Combacau, supra note 25, at 89; Prosper Weil “Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?”
77 A.J.I.L. (1983)413 ,428 .
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has led some writers to cast doubts upon the truly systematic nature of international 
law.67
In response to these concerns, one might argue that hierarchy is not an indispensable 
feature of a legal system. Normative hierarchy is only one of the means to an end -  the 
maintenance of systematic coherence, which can also be achieved through alternative 
ways.68 Furthermore, there are noteworthy exceptions to the proposition that 
international law lacks hierarchical structures.69
As Kelsen pointed out, one can identify a basic norm, superior to all other international 
norms.70 In addition, certain customary norms are deemed nowadays to be jus cogens
71and cannot be derogated from by treaty or custom. Hence, they are constitutionally 
superior to 'ordinary' norms.72 Furthermore, the UN Charter, the most fundamental 
international agreement, enjoys prominence over other treaties, and is perceived by 
some as the constitution of the world community.74 Finally, it has been common practice 
to authorise international organisations to promulgate secondary legislation, which is 
constitutionally inferior to the norms found in the organisations’ constitutive treaties. 
However, it must also be acknowledged that, at present, international law possesses only 
sporadic 'constitutional' norms, and that, as a result, its hierarchical features are in the
67 Van de Kerchove and Ost, supra note 12, at 68.
68 S. Romano, supra note 26, at 40; Gottlieb, supra note 23, at 335-36, 365-66. Some modem  
jurisprudential approaches reject the notion o f  an unwavering principle o f  hierarchy in law and point 
instead to circular method o f  interaction and reciprocal influences between norms o f  all normative levels. 
Van de Kerchove and Ost, supra note 12, at 67-72.
69 Jennings and Watts, I Oppenheim ’s International Law, supra note 14, at 12.
70 Kelsen, Introduction to Legal Theory, supra note 34, at 107-08.
71 Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, 23 May 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
‘Vienna Convention’]. See Chamey, Universal Int’l Law, supra note 24, at 541-42.
72 Weil, supra note 66, at 421.
73 UN Charter, art. 103. See also Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldem “Hierarchy o f  Treaties” Essays on the Law o f  
Treaties', a collection o f  essays in honour o f  Bert Vierdag (Jan Klabbers and Ren6 Lefeber, eds., 1998) 7, 
16-18.
74 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “The Constitutional Dimension o f the UN Charter Revisited” 1 Max Planck Year 
Book o f UN Law (1997) 30-33; Bardo Fassenbender “The United Nations Charter as Constitution o f  the 
International Community” 36 Colum. J. Transnat. L. (1998) 529, 584; Emst-Ulrich Petersmann 
“Constitutionalism and International Adjudication: How to Constitutionalize the U.N. Dispute Settlement 
System?” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 753,767. But see James Crawford “The Charter o f  the United 
Nations as a Constitutions” The Changing Constitutions o f  the United Nations (Hazel Fox, ed., 1997) 3, 
9-15. It has also been suggested that in certain sub-systems, such as the European Human Rights system 
and the EU, constitutional norms can be identified. Joseph H.H, Weiler and Ulrich R. Haltem 
“Constitutional or International? The Foundations o f  the Community Legal Order and the Question o f  
Judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz” The European Courts and National Courts - Doctrine and 
Jurisprudence (Ann-Marie Slaughter et al, eds., 1998) 331, 339; Alec Stone Sweet “Constitutional 
Dialogues in the European Community” id. at 305, 306-08.
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nature of a patchwork, especially when compared to the more methodical structures
76found in most domestic legal systems.
Another important difference between international and domestic law goes to the 
relations between lawmakers and the subjects of the law. In contrast with national legal 
systems, where legislators prescribe norms that are binding upon the entire population, 
international legislators (first and foremost, states) create laws which primarily bind 
themselves in their relations with each other.77 The convergence between the role of 
states as the supreme lawmakers, interpreters and enforcers of the law, on the one hand, 
and as primary actors, on the other hand, has conferred upon the international legal 
system a unique structure, resembling, in some ways, contractual relations under 
domestic private law. Although the powers of the individual state in international law 
are on the decline,78 international law still has even today some quintessential 
characteristics of an 'inter-subjective'79 or 'horizontal' legal order.80
But the special mode of organisation of international law should not deny it the status of 
a legal system. There seems to be no reason to embrace a particular modality of relations 
between norms, institutions and legal subjects as an exclusive model for systemisation. 
On the contrary, it is submitted that differently structured systems are conceivable, as 
long as unifying features or certain forms of organised relations between the elements of 
the system, can be identified. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that the 
decentralised, largely voluntary and inter-subjective nature of the international legal 
system detracts from its level of uniformity, coherence and effectiveness.
75 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 249 (ex-article 189), 25 March 1957,298  
U.N.T.S. 3, as revised by the Treaty o f  Amsterdam, 2 Oct. 1997, O.J. (C 340) 173 [hereinafter ‘EC 
Treaty’].
76 It ought to be remembered that not all domestic systems o f  law have formal constitutions or even a 
clear hierarchical dichotomy between primary and secondary norms. See e.g., England and Israel have 
fairly developed legal systems, without a formal constitution providing hierarchy between different laws.
77 Combacau, supra note 25, at 96; Gary L. Scott and Craig L. Carr “Multilateral Treaties and the 
Formation o f Customary International Law” 25 Denv. J.I.L.P. (1996) 71, 71; Weil, supra note 66, at 420. 
Furthermore, the dichotomy found in national systems between public and private lawmaking (e.g., 
legislation v. contract) is largely absent from international law. Id. at 89-90. Another, less important 
difference is the prominence of'civil' responsibility in international law (compared with the modest role 
of criminal responsibility), whereas in domestic law criminal and civil responsibility are equally 
important.
78 One example is the increase in the role o f international organisations (IGOs) as lawmakers and actors; 
EC Treaty, art. 249 (ex-article 189); Reparations fo r  Injuries Suffered in the Service o f  the United 
Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174. Another example is the increased rights and duties conferred by international 
law upon private persons.
79 Combacau, supra note 25, at 95-96.
107
Finally, there are considerable differences between the institutional structures of the 
international and domestic legal systems. It is undeniable that international law lacks 
important legal institutions that are at the heart of domestic legal systems such as a 
central legislator and a supreme court. Furthermore, the operations of most institutions 
found under international law are, at best, only loosely coordinated. Since one of the 
central roles of legal institutions is to maintain and promote the coherence and 
effectiveness of the law, the institutional weaknesses of international law, which include 
the lack of systematic codification of the law by a central legislative or adjudicative 
branch, adversely affect the normative integrity of the system. An even greater danger 
might materialise in the event of conflicting pronouncements as to what the law is by 
different international law-applying institutions.81 Furthermore, without effective 
lawmaking and law-applying agencies, even the most organised system of norms might 
fall into desuetude or anarchy.82
But again, the absence of institutions such as a central legislator or a supreme court 
should not necessarily negate the viability of the international system. One can think of 
national legal systems where law emanates from a number of diffused sources (e.g., 
legislator, courts, parties to contracts and custom),84 and is enforced, in part, through 
decentralised avenues (e.g., self-help doctrines such as the contractual right to withhold 
compliance in response to breach and the right of self-defence). Hence, the differences 
between international and domestic legal systems may be viewed as quantitative 
(establishing a different proportion between centralised and decentralised lawmaking 
and law-enforcement) rather than qualitative.
At the same time, one can identify a clear process of empowerment of international 
institutions, which may, in turn, gradually strengthen the systematic nature of 
international law. For example, the recent trend towards investing international courts 
and tribunals with compulsory jurisdiction over a host of issues may result in more 
litigation aimed inter alia at harmonising between what might be prima facie 
incompatible legal norms. Moreover, specific legal regimes in a number of areas of
80 Higgins, Problems and Process, supra note 65, at 1; Gottlieb, supra note 23, at 336.
81 Gottlieb, supra note 23, at 367.
82 Hart, supra note 23, at 103-04; Hans Kelsen General Theory o f  Norms (Michael Hartney, trans., 1991) 
138-39.
83 Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Value (1995) 3.
84 See e.g., Andrea M. Seielstad “Unwritted Laws and Customs, Local Legal Cultures and Clinical Legal 
Education” 6 Clinical Law Review (1999) 127, 138.
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international law have undergone a process of institutionalisation and are now subject to 
regulation through the directives of 'legislators', which are enforced by competent courts 
and tribunals and executed by special organs (see e.g., WTO/GATT law, EC law, etc.). 
There is also an ongoing process of some improvement of inter-institutional links, which 
might contribute to greater normative harmonisation (e.g., through the practice of 
consultations or according 'observer status' to concurrent institutions), although clearly 
there is still much room for improvement.
Even if one regards international law, on account of its institutional and other 
deficiencies, as a 'primitive' system of law, where enforcement of obligations is
O /
facilitated mainly by self help and social pressure, this should not arguably affect its 
categorisation as a legal system,87 provided that it still possesses a minimal degree of 
normative integrity.88 Thus, the existence of effective institutions guaranteeing the 
continued development and maintenance of the coherence of the law should not be 
considered a sine qua non, without which there can be no legal system.89 Put differently, 
effective institutions and sanction mechanisms should be considered as important means 
to ends - system coherence, enforcement, dispute resolution, etc., which can be 
achieved, at least in part, through other means. Put to the extreme, it may be argued that, 
in opposition to Romano, it would seem that legal systems might exist without 
institutions (albeit, this would most likely be an unhappy existence), while the reverse 
situation is close to impossible, since without norms (even ad hoc ones) law cannot 
achieve its social goal of guiding future conduct.
Nonetheless, it is impossible to completely divorce between the systematic welfare of 
norms and institutions. The existence of a normative system necessarily introduces a
85 See e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea, 10 Dec. 1982, art 169, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. (1982) 1261 [here in forth and hereinafter ‘UNCLOS’]; Convention 
on the Prohibition o f the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use o f  Chemical Weapons and their 
Destruction, 13 Jan 1993, art. X(10), 32 I.L.M. (1993) 800; Rules o f  Procedure o f  the Human Rights 
Committee, 11 Aug. 1997, Rule 67, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev.5 (1997). For earlier examples o f  
inter-institutional cooperation, see Constitution o f the International Labour Organisation, 9 Oct. 1946, art. 
12, 15 U.N.T.S. 40; Agreement establishing the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
27 Dec. 1945, art. V(8), 2 U.N.T.S. 134.
86 Hans Kelsen, General Theory o f  Law and State (1949) 338; Morgenthau, supra note 22, at 312; Shaw, 
supra note 24, at 4. For criticism, see Grigorii I. Tunkin, Theory o f  International Law  (William E. Butler, 
trans., 1974) 241; Abi-Saab, Cours g6n6ral, supra note 38, at 124-25.
87 The question is ultimately one o f definition, since there are views that 'primitive' tribal societies also 
have a legal system. Max Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society (1965) 182. Van de 
Kerchove and Ost view international law on account o f its weak institutional structures as a 
'semi-complex' legal system. Van de Kerchove and Ost, supra note 12, at 157.
88 See Rosalyn Higgins “International Law in a Changing System” 58 Cambridge L.J. (1999) 78, 81.
89 Gottlieb, supra note 23, at 357.
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rudimentary level of harmonisation between the various institutions operating within 
that same legal system. This is because common reference to the same body of norms 
creates de facto between the different institutions. In other words, the existence of 
common normative/institutional links necessary implies that some of the systematic 
coherence that exists between legal norms will also be achieved between institutions.
IV The relations between the various branches o f international law 
Having concluded that international law is a system of law (though, admittedly, a rather 
loosely structured one), and accepting that all systems of law enjoy a certain degree of 
coherence,90 one must view the various branches and subsystems of international law as 
linked to each other, being parts of a bigger whole. Thus, even 'self-contained' 
international regimes91 - i.e., subsystems which embrace a comprehensive set of 
secondary rules to the exclusion of the general rules of international law,92 such as the
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EC, can be ultimately linked to general international law. Support to this proposition 
can be found in that some so-called closed regimes do occasionally resort to legal norms 
originating in other international sub-systems or general international law.94 A 
prominent example is found in the practice of the WTO DSB. Although the
90 According to Kelsen, the principle o f non-contradiction is part o f  the basic norm o f  a legal system. 
Kelsen, General Theory o f  Law and State, supra note 86, at 406.
91 The term 'self-contained regime1 was brought to the forefront by the ICJ in the Tehran Hostages case, 
where it was held that the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations has created a 
'self-contained' international regime with its own special remedies. United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 40. According to the ICTY, every international 
court or tribunal operates within a 'self-contained' system. Case IT-94-1-AR72, Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 
I.L.M. (1996) 32, 39 (Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction)(Appeals Chamber, 1995).
92 Bruno Simma “Self-Contained Regimes” XVI Neth. Y.B. Int’l Law (1985) 111,117; Abi-Saab, 
Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 5, at 926.
93 According to Simma even the EC - the most developed 'self-contained' regime, preserves links to 
general international law and in case o f  a systematic breakdown (e.g., persistent violation), general 
remedies o f international law, such as counter-measures may be sought. Simma, supra note 92, at 128-29. 
However, it should be noted that the case law o f the ECJ seems to suggest otherwise. Van Gend en Loos 
[1963] E.C.R. at 12 (“the Community constitutes a new legal order o f  international law for the benefit o f  
which the states have limited their sovereign rights”); Case 90, 91/63, Commission v. Luxembourg [1964]
E.C.R. 1217,1232; Henry G. Schermers “Constituent Treaties o f  International Organizations” in Essays 
on the Law o f  Treaties, supra note 73, at 19, 29. But Simma argues that the creation o f  a new 
self-contained regime only implies a duty to exhaust all existing remedies within the subsystem. It does 
not negate the ultimate possibility o f  falling back on the general system. See also Dupuy, Danger o f the 
Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 4, at 797 (considers the doctrine o f  self-contained regimes as 
'misleading').
94 See e.g., reliance upon the Vienna Convention by the I/A CHR in Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, The 
Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework o f  the Guarantees o f  the Due Process o f  
Law, Decision o f 1 Oct. 1999, para. 112-113 available at <http://corteidhoea. nu.or.cr/ci/
PUBLICAT/SERIES_A/ A_16_ING.HTM> (last visited on 20 June 2000). One may also mention the 
practice o f  the ECHR in attempting to construe the European HR Convention in light o f  other 
international obligations o f  the member states. See e.g., Jersild  v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A)(1994), at para. 30 (Denmark’s obligations under the European HR Convention must be interpreted as 
reconcilable with its obligations under the CERD). But c f  Case 71, Grimm v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
110
GATT/WTO regime had been described by some as ‘self-contained’,95 WTO Panels and 
the AB have resorted on a number of occasions to general international law (in fact, 
reference to principles of treaty interpretation found under general international law 
were specifically mandated by article 3.2 of the DSU).96
Therefore, it seems that there can be no real ‘self-contained’ regimes under international 
law. Each sub-system that meets international law's principle of normative integration 
(i.e., linked to other international norms through 'genetic' and/or 'operational' links, or 
can be identified by international law's rule of recognition) has necessarily been created 
as part thereof and derives its legitimacy from that of the international legal system. 
However, in order to remain part of international law, the specific regime must be able 
to resist pressures to break away from the main system.97 A regime that has severed all 
normative links with other branches of international law might be considered as an 
independent legal system and no longer an international regime (this is arguably the case 
with the EC, which has been described as a supranational legal system, enjoying its own 
independent source of legitimacy, and not part of international law).98 Therefore, dispute 
settlements mechanisms that normally apply domestic law (e.g., ICSID and NAFTA 
Chapter 19 arbitral panels) are not linked through normative relations to other
Rep. 78 (1983) (the Iran-U.S Claims Tribunal has no jurisdiction to address general human rights law, 
without explicit authorisation in its constitutive instruments).
95 See Restrictions on Imports o f  Tuna (EC v. U.S.), 16 June 1994, 33 I.L.M. (1994) 839, 890-94; Raj 
Bhala “The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade” 14 American University International Law 
Review (1999) 845, 859; Pieter J. Kuyper, “The Law o f  the GATT as a Special Field o f  International 
Law: Ignorance, Further Refinement or Self-Contained System o f International Law” XXV Neth. Y.B. 
Int’l Law (1994) 227, 251-52.
But see, Jackson, Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 5, at 828-29; David Palmeter and Petros C. 
Mavroidis “The WTO Legal System: Sources o f Law” 92 A.J.I.L. (1998) 398,413.
96 See U.S. - Standardfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline and Like Products o f  National 
Origin, 35 I.L.M. (1996) 603, 629 (Report o f  the AB)(“ ... the General Agreement is not to be read in 
clinical isolation from public international law”). See also E.C. - Regime fo r  the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution o f  Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R (1997), at para. 10 (Report o f  the AB); U.S. -  
Import Prohibition o f  Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 38 I.L.M. (1999) 118, 165 (Report o f the 
AB, 1998)(reliance upon the genreal principles o f good faith and abus de droit); U.S. -  Tax Treatment fo r  
“Foreign Sales C orp.", WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/R (2000), at para. 166 (Report o f the AB)(reliance on 
the good faith principle). See also Peter C. Maki “Interpreting GATT Using the Vienna Convention on 
the Law o f Treaties: A Method to Increase the Legitimacy o f  the Dispute Settlement System” 9 
Minnesota Journal o f Global Trade (2000) 343,352-60; Jeffrey Waincymer “Reformulated Gasoline 
under Reformulated WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Pulling Pandora out o f  a Chapeau?” 18 Mich. 
J. Int’l L. (1996) 141, 165.
97 Abi-Saab describes such pressures as the 'centrifugal effect o f  specialisation'. Abi-Saab, Fragmentation 
or Unification, supra note 5, at 925. According to Oda the creation o f  separate bodies o f  specialised areas 
o f the laws might lead to the destruction o f  the very foundation o f  international law. Shigeru Oda 
“Dispute Settlement Prospects in the Law o f  the Sea” 44 I.C.L.Q. (1995) 863, 864.
98 Weiler and Haltem, supra note 74, at 339. However, in the field o f  human rights, the ECJ draws 
extensively upon the case law o f the ECHR.
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jinternational courts and tribunals, could probably maintain some self-contained
99existence.
Consequently, it is possible to describe a dispute arising under a specific international 
regime also as an international dispute - i.e., a dispute under international law, provided 
that international law is the applicable law in the proceedings. As a result, it is desirable 
that dispute settlement bodies operating in one specific area of international law should 
pay heed to the viewpoint of other relevant branches. In the same vein, it seems sensible 
that specialised courts or tribunals would resort to general international law, to address 
issues that the specific regime at hand failed to regulate.100
International dispute settlement mechanisms that refuse to invoke rules derived from 
other branches of international law or general international law might fail to meet the 
legitimate expectations of the parties to the dispute that their entire gamut of 
international rights and obligations would be taken into consideration. They also risk a 
divorce between the ‘self-contained’ dispute settlement procedure and the complex and 
| interrelated sets of interests that make up the reality of international relations. Such
| detachment might portray the specific court or tribunal as unduly biased towards a
particular political agenda (e.g., pro-trade or pro-integration) and could, in the long run, 
adversely affect its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.101
j Thus, if one chooses to look at conflicts from a realistic point of view, he or she must
! acknowledge that international disputes and the policy considerations underlying them
are strongly interrelated (e.g., trade issues are influenced by human rights issues and 
environmental concerns) and that any attempt to nicely compartmentalize disputes in 
accordance with a scheme of separate branches of international law is artificial, and will 
ultimately doom to fail.
99 Carolyn B. Lamm and Abby Cohen Smutney “The International Centre for Settlement o f Investment 
Disputes: Responses to Problems and Changing Requirements” 12 Mealey’s International Arbitration 
Report (1997) 20, 21; Christoph Schreuer “Commentary on the ICSID Convention”, 12 ICSID Rev.,
F.I.L.J. (1997)59, 154.
100 See e.g., Case IT-94-A-1, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment o f 15 July 1999, para. 98 (Appeals 
Chamber), available at <http://www. un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/main.htm>(last visited on 15 
July 2000). See also Philippe Sands “Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization o f  International Law” 1 
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal (1998) 85, 92.
101 One o f  the main strands o f criticism against the WTO dispute settlement machinery is grounded in the 
perception that it operates in detachment from the real needs o f  the international community. See e.g., G.
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This means that courts and tribunals addressing international disputes should, in
principle, unless instructed otherwise by the litigating parties, apply norms derived from
1 •the list of sources prescribed by general international law. As a result, disputes 
addressed by distinct specific international dispute settlement mechanisms may clearly 
overlap. For instance, an ICSID arbitration tribunal authorised to apply international 
law103 can consider human rights issues;104 a WTO panel can consider questions of 
environmental law;105 and the European Court of Human Rights can address questions 
relating to the international system of registration of patents106 and the protection of the 
environment.107 Further, all international courts and tribunals can address general issues 
such as treaty interpretation108 and state responsibility109
Indeed, the conclusion that international law is a more or less coherent system composed 
of various branches and specific treaty regimes is supported by the rather rich practice of 
international courts and tribunals endowed with specific subject-matter jurisdiction. 
These judicial bodies have, on occasion, addressed questions arising under other 
branches of international law and general international law,110 a point that has been 
recently underscored by Prof. Jonathan Chamey in his Hague Lectures.111
Chamey studied the practice of a variety of international courts and tribunals with 
relation to seven areas of international law, in respect of which the IC J has made general
Richard Shell “Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: an Analysis o f the World Trade 
Organization” 44 Duke LJ. (1995) 829, 922.
102 Simma argues that the burden to show that the parties to an agreement intended to exclude other 
international procedures should rest with the party arguing against the applicability o f  general 
international law. Simma, supra note 92, at 133.
103 According to the Washington Convention establishing ICSID, international law can be applied by 
ICSID tribunals only to the extent that it is the law selected by the parties, or the applicable law in the 
host state. Convention on the Settlement o f Investment Disputes between States and Nationals o f  Other 
States, 18 March 1965, art. 42(1), 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ‘ICSID Convention’]. See e.g., Tradex 
Hellas S. A. v. Albania, Award o f  28 April 1999, para. 69 (ICSID), <http://www. worldbank.org/ 
icsid/cases/T-award.pdf> (last visited on 14 July 14, 2000).
104 See e.g., Azinian v. Mexico, Award o f 1 Nov. 1999, para. 103 (ICSID), available at <http://www. 
worldbank.org/icsid/cases/robert_award.pdf > (last visited on 27 Oct. 2000)(denial o f justice had been 
alleged).
105 See e.g., EC -  Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (1998), para. 123 (Report o f the AB); Import o f  Shrimp, 38 I.L.M. 
118.
106 British-American Tobacco Co. Ltd. V. Netherlands, 331 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)(1995).
107 See e.g., Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 E.H.R.R. 277 (1995); Guerra v. Italy, 26 E.H.R.R. 241 (1998).
108 See e.g., Consular Assistance, supra note 94, at para. 112-13.
109 Loizidou v. Turkey, 1998 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. VI).
110 See e.g., Reformulated Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. at 621-24 (1996)(AB applied to the rules o f treaty 
interpretation found in the Vienna Convention); Dean Spielmann “Human Rights case Law in the 
Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts: Conflicts, Inconsistencies and Complementarities” The EU  and 
Human Rights (Philip Alston, ed., 1999) 757-80 (application o f European human rights law by the ECJ).
111 Chamey, Is Int’l Law Threatened? supra note 6, at 101-373.
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and specific judicial pronunciations. His conclusions were that despite minor variances,
119no major challenges to the coherence of international law had been identified. In other 
words, the practice of the different international courts and tribunals from different legal 
branches has developed along rather similar lines, using similar sources of law and, on 
many occasions, with explicit or implicit cross-reference to decisions of other 
international fora. The more or less uniform invocation of overarching legal principles 
and the practice of other judicial institutions from similar and different branches of law 
can be best explained by way of examining the role of international courts and tribunals 
from a systematic perspective. According to this view, courts and tribunals strive 
towards more or less consistent application of international law because they view 
themselves as distinct judicial elements operating within the same legal system.
This portrayal of the structure of the international legal system carries important 
implications for international law on both the normative and procedural level. If 
sub-systems, including ’self-contained' regimes are part of international law, and bound 
by its basic rule of recognition,113 then a court or tribunal operating under a specific 
sub-system should determine disputes before it, in accordance with all relevant norms 
international law. Particularly pertinent to the present work are the implications of the 
systematic conception of international law on the applicability of jurisdiction-regulating 
norms. If such norms can be shown to exist under general international law, than in the 
absence of a specific rule of law to the contrary, it seems that they should be applied by 
all international courts and tribunals.
In sum, if international law is indeed a more or less viable legal system, then there surely 
is considerable potential for jurisdictional overlap, even between the judicial organs of 
specific sub-systems. As a result, an international dispute can be the subject of 
jurisdictional competition, between any two or more international courts and tribunals 
applying international law, provided that the traditional requirements for competition 
(‘same parties’ and ‘same issues’) have been met. The jurisdictional overlap may be 
total, if the competing claims raise essentially the same issues (similar facts and similar 
legal claims), or partial - only to the extent that common issues under 'general' 
international law arise (e.g., the question of conditions for statehood might arise in 
proceedings between the same two international actors before ITLOS and the WTO).
112 Charney, Is Int’l Law Threatened? supra note 6, at 347-50.
113 Hart, supra note 23, at 116-17.
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Such overlaps may involve different branches of the law or be observed with respect to 
proceedings arising under the same branch of law, but amenable to the jurisdiction of 
different institutional arrangements (e.g., HRC and the ECHR).114
B. Can international courts and tribunals be considered a system?
The conclusion reached on the systematic nature of international law, resolves only part 
of the theoretical difficulties associated with the present study. For even if international 
law is considered a system of law, the relations between the judicial institutions 
operating there under, which are the main focus of this work, should still be explored.
I. The dichotomy between the normative and institutional components o f a legal system 
It has already been asserted that an important distinction ought to be made between the 
normative and institutional components of any legal system.115 It was further posited that 
there are considerable differences between the level of systemisation of these normative 
and institutional components under international law. In other words, while the rules of 
international law can probably be viewed as a system of norms, due to the existence of 
unifying principles, it is conceivable that institutions operating within that same legal 
system do not display in their reciprocal relations a consequential level of coherence. 
Indeed, it will be shown that the various judicial bodies operating under the guise of 
international law generally act as independent entities and do not share among them 
unifying characteristics which could transform them into a coherent judicial system.
At first sight this proposition might seem extraordinary. This is because in domestic 
legal systems there is usually good measure of correlation between law as a body of 
norms, the polity over which it governs and the comprehensive nature of its institutional 
framework, including the jurisdictional powers of its judicial organs. Indeed, it would 
seem that French law, the polity called France and the French system of courts cannot 
have an existence separate from each other. But is it really the case? If one observes the 
application of foreign law in national courts, through conflict of laws rules, then it is 
possible to identify two different legal systems at play - a foreign normative system, 
whose norms are applied by a domestic judicial system (which also applies some
114 However, it is not clear whether competition is possible in cases where two human rights regimes offer 
significantly different degrees o f human rights protection. Casanovas, supra note 20.
115 See Van de Kerchove and Ost, Supra note 12, at 25.
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domestic norms, at least on questions of procedure).116 However, the fact that French 
law can be applied by an English court surely does not mean that the latter has become 
part and parcel of the French legal system,117 nor that French law has become part of the 
English legal system (unless one chooses to unduly stretch the concept of what 
constitutes a national legal system). What this example does establish is that parts of the 
normative contents of a legal system (excluding norms that directly govern the structure 
and operation of the system’s legal institutions) may have an independent life outside the 
original law-applying organs of that same system.118
A few other examples will hopefully further demonstrate this point. The common law, as 
developed in England, may most probably be regarded as a normative system, since in 
contains a rather complete body of legal rules. However, the same body of rules is 
routinely applied by the courts of several other common law countries (Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, etc.) whose courts do not constitute nowadays part of the English 
judicial system. Similarly, canonical law, also arguably a normative system, was applied 
during medieval times by ecclesiastical courts of different political units, who had little 
interaction with each other;119 and Jewish law has survived for many centuries without
1 9 0any institutional framework at all. However, the most glaring example seems to be 
international law itself. This body of norms is being applied, on a regular basis, by 
domestic courts of various nations (applying both treaty law and customary law). 
However, one cannot, in good faith, see these different domestic courts as part of one 
institutional system.
116 J.D. McClean Morris: The Conflict o f  Laws (4th ed., 1993) 385. At the very least, domestic 
jurisdictions apply the ‘conflict o f  laws’ norms o f the domestic normative system.
117 Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence, supra note 12, at 342 (application o f  foreign law in domestic court does 
not reduce the two legal systems involved into one unity).
118 This is supported by Dworkin's proposition that a system o f  law contains within it a pure body o f  law 
(e.g., basic principles o f  law), which operates in detachment o f  legal institutions. Dworkin, supra note 12, 
at 406-07. But c f  Philip Allot “The Concept o f  International Law” 10 European Journal o f  International 
Law (1999) 31,50 ("The international legal system, like any legal system, implies and requires an idea o f  
a society whose legal system it is..."). It is my understanding o f  Allot's position that a certain political 
and social framework is required in order to stimulate the creation and nurturing o f  a legal system  
(although the existence o f international law seems to strain this notion). This does not necessary imply 
that the said political and social structures must conform to a specific contour (e.g., that they must include 
a system o f  courts). See Raz, supra note 34, at 188-89.
119 Henkin, In t’l Law, supra note 83, at 3 fii *; van de Kerchove and Ost, supra note 12, at 145; 
MacCormick, supra note 13, at 1067; William Ewald “Comment on MacCormick” 82 Cornell L. Rev.
(1997) 1071, 1078.
120 See e.g., Jose Faur “Law and Hermeneutics in Rabbinic Jurisprudence: a Maimonidean Perspective”
14 Cardozo Law Review (1993) 1657, 1657. However, Santi Romano would have considered religion to 
represent, by definition a social institution. S. Romano, supra note 26, at 36.
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Hence, it can be asserted that the fact that different courts apply the norms of the same 
legal system does not suffice in order to view them as participating in the same judicial 
system. Applying this contention to international law, one can infer that the fact that 
international courts and tribunals apply international law (as do their domestic 
counterparts) is not enough to establish that there exists an international judicial system.
Still, one could argue that international courts and tribunals share more than a common 
set of applicable norms. They are all constituted under international law and derive their 
legitimacy therefrom. Moreover, they belong to the same polity - the international 
community.121 While this is true, of course, it is submitted that such common attributes 
do not seem sufficient to transform international courts and tribunals into a coherent 
judicial system. In fact, all international institutions - judicial and non-judicial, share 
these very same common features. There is no denying that international courts and 
tribunals are part of international law and consequently, of the international legal 
system. The question is whether these judicial bodies compose an institutional system of 
their own, conceived through their reciprocal relations with each other, and not through 
their interaction with an external normative and political umbrella under which they, and 
other non-judicial institutions, function.
II Do international courts and tribunals meet the definition o f a system?
It is time now to apply the aforementioned working definition as to what constitutes a 
system - a set of elements, arranged in order and possessing a certain degree of cohesion, 
with respect to international courts and tribunals. In order to be able to identify a system 
of international courts and tribunals, one must look for an integrating principle 
governing the relations between the different judicial bodies. It is submitted that the 
integrating principles proposed by Hart and Kelsen's are largely irrelevant for this 
endeavour, since both of these eminent scholars have focused on normative 
systematisation. Similarly, Romano and Abi-Saab's 'institutional' theories of law do not 
provide a clear principle of integration, which can operate exclusively between 
international courts and tribunals (as opposed to all other institutions of the same polity). 
Their theories rather examine, from a broad perspective, the interaction between 
institution, norms and the society in which they exist.122 In contrast, Raz's approach,
121 Weil, supra note 66, at 422.
122 Abi-Saab him self seems to acknowledge that a different test should apply with regard to a 'legal order' 




I which focuses on the internal relations between the various elements of the system,
; seems to be most appropriate in order to examine the relations between international
courts and tribunals, as well.
Hence, it could be asserted that one ought to examine the network of relations between 
the various international judicial bodies in order to ascertain whether they form a judicial 
system. Such inter-relations should exhibit unity of purpose and coordinated method of 
operation characteristic of an order that can be regarded as one whole. Otherwise, the 
'international judicial system' might constitute a mere assortment of judicial institutions 
with somewhat similar functions and features (as are arguably the courts of England and 
France). In other words, the conditions for the existence of a genuine system at the 
institutional level must concern the structural relations between the various institutions.
Structural relations imply some form of interaction between the various courts and 
tribunals. A similar role, procedure or even applicable law is not enough. For example, a 
commercial arbitral tribunal operating in England is not normally considered part of the 
English court system, despite the fact that courts and arbitral tribunals share similar 
functions and may even apply the same law (and even though courts enjoy certain 
supervisory powers over arbitration).124 This popular perception can be explained by the 
minimal interaction and, therefore, the paucity of integrative structural relations between 
arbitral tribunals and the 'ordinary' court system.
The need to find an integrating principle which is exclusive to judicial bodies means that 
these institutions should have additional unifying factors that are not to be found in other 
components of the legal system. This should come as no surprise, since a judicial system 
can be regarded as equivalent to a sub-system of the larger legal system under which it 
operates. Sub-systems typically possess both the common denominators characteristic of 
the overarching legal system and their own distinctive unifying features. Naturally, the 
sub-system’s distinctive integrating principle cannot be identical to the unifying
system is the correlative link between its components. Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 
5, at 921.
123 C f  Henkin, Int V Law, supra note 83, at 7. Henkin, when referring to the state 'system' has asserted that 
- "some measure o f unity or community" is necessary for an aggregation o f  states to constitute a genuine 
system.
124 Royal Aquarium andSummer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson [1892] 1 Q.B. 431,437; 
King v. Thomas McKenna Ltd [1991] 1 All E.R. 653 (C.A.). See also Case 102/81, Nordsee Deutsche 
Hochseefischerei GmbH  v. Reederei M ond Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG  & Co. KG  [1982] E.C.R.
1095, 1095.
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principle of the whole system, but must supplement it. As a result, it can be expected 
that legal sub-systems will be smaller units of greater coherence and tighter 
inner-structure, when compared to the general legal system to which they belong.
Applying this method of analysis to the judiciary in a domestic legal system, one can 
generally identify close links between different judicial bodies, which cannot be found in 
the relations involving non-judicial bodies. For instance, the English Court of Appeal 
and the High Court are not merely organic creatures of English law (as are also 
Parliament and various administrative agencies), but they also share jurisdictional and 
organisational links of such a nature, which enables to view them as part of a single 
operational unit - the judiciary. Further, the judicial bodies comprising the judiciary 
enjoy a high level of cohesion, which is not found in the relations between courts and 
other social institutions. While the judiciary is expected to 'speak with one voice',125 it is 
not unusual that different branches of government (characterised with lower level of 
cohesion) would adopt conflicting positions - in fact, this is one of the premises upon 
which the constitutional theory of'checks and balances' is founded.126
What might then be the distinctive features that grant coherence to a judicial system? At 
the national level, the coherence of the court system is maintained through three salient 
features: coordinated allocation of jurisdictions, specific rules regulating jurisdictional 
competition (rules of harmonisation) and, most importantly, hierarchic structures.127 
Indeed, all courts operating within national legal systems (of one state or federal unit) 
are typically subject to the jurisdiction of appellate courts, which safeguard the coherent 
development of the case law produced by different instances in different jurisdictional 
districts. Alternatively, other methods of judicial harmonisation (which involve implicit, 
rather than explicit forms of hierarchic relations) can be envisioned. For instance, within 
the EC, (a complete legal sub-system on both the normative and institutional level), 
national interpretation of EC law is monitored and harmonised by the ECJ, primarily
125 Hooker v. Burson, 960 F. Supp. 1283, 1285 (M.D. Tenn. 1996); Deanell Reece Tacha “Judges and 
Legislators: Enhancing the Relationship” 44 American University Law Review (1995) 1537, 1550. But 
see Joseph Raz “The Relevance o f Coherence” 72 B.U.L. Rev. (1992) 273, 309.
126 See e.g., Stanley M. Brand “ ‘To Endure for Ages to Come’: a Bicentennial V iew o f  the Constitution: 
Battle Among the Branches: The Two Hundred Year War” 65 North Carolina Law Review (1987) 901, 
901; Christine E. Burgess “When May a President Refuse to Enforce the Law?” 72 Texas Law Review  
(1994) 631, 636-37. However, there is body o f opinion that conflicts between branches o f  government are 
impermissible in some circumstances (e.g., in respect to decisions affecting foreign states). The Arantzazu 
Mendi [1939] 1 All E.R. 719, 722 (H.L.) (Opinion o f Lord Atkin).
127 See Georges Abi-Saab “The International Court as a World Court” Fifty Years o f  the International 
Court o f  Justice (Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996) 3, 13.
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through the mandatory reference procedure of article 234 (ex-article 177) of the EC 
Treaty.128 Additionally, organisational links (e.g., avenues of professional promotion, 
formal and informal interaction between judges of different instances, shared 
professional supervisory mechanisms, use of similar facilities, common bar of attorneys, 
etc.) also contribute to the level of coherence of the judicial system. It seems that these 
jurisdictional and organisational links satisfy the need for internal integrating principles 
that underlie the existence of a judicial system.
Moving back to International law, the survey conducted in Part I of this study reveals 
that the jurisdictions of various international courts and tribunals are not neatly divided 
and that jurisdictional conflicts occur from time to time. While this also happens within 
domestic legal systems despite the prevalence of a more orderly division of jurisdiction 
between courts, which limits the occurrence of overlaps in the first place, national legal 
systems usually have in place clear rules that regulate such conflicts. But in international 
law, as will be subsequently shown in Part III, the positive rules regulating competition 
between international judicial bodies are either sporadic and rudimentary, or absent 
altogether. Hence, for instance, only a few of the constitutive instruments of 
international judicial bodies contain Us alibi pendens or res judicata rules,129 while most 
domestic systems ban multiplicity of proceedings, at least in cases arising within the 
same legal system. Thus, it can be observed that international judicial bodies have been 
constituted as isolated ‘islands of jurisdiction’ with little, if any, attention being given to 
regulating the jurisdictional interaction between the various distinct ‘islands’.
Furthermore, the most effective measure of inter-court integration does not exist in the 
international sphere. International courts and tribunals do not function in a hierarchic 
environment and there is no international supreme court to which all questions of law 
can eventually converge.130 The ICJ, which had a certain potential of establishing itself 
as a supreme court, because of its position as the ‘principle judicial organ of the UN’ - 
the most important global international organisation,131 and because of its unique
128 Case 61/79, Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v. Denkavit italiana Sri. [1980] E.C.R. 1205, 
1223; John W. Bridge “The Court o f Justice o f  the European Communities and the Prospects for 
International Adjudication” International Courts fo r  the Twenty First Century (Mark W. Janis, ed., 1992) 
87, 100.
129 See infra Chapter 5.
130 Shabtai Rosenne, 2 The Law and Practice o f  the International Court, 1920-1996 (3rd ed., 1998) 529.
131 Charter o f the United Nations, art. 92, 26 June 1945, XV U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 355 [hereinafter ‘UN  
Charter’]; Statute o f the International Court o f Justice (Annex to UN Charter), art. 1 [hereinafter ‘ICJ 
Statute’]; Rosenne, 1 The Law and Practice o f  the ICJ, supra note 130, at 139.
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position as a permanent court of a universal constituency endowed with unlimited 
subject matter jurisdiction, has failed to assume this role. This can be explained, in part, 
by virtue of its lack of compulsory jurisdiction over appellate cases (with a few minor 
exceptions)132 and other structural deficiencies (e.g. cumbersome procedures, 
inaccessibility to non-state actors, etc.).133 As a result, while the ICJ exerts important 
influence over the development of international law,134 it does not perform the role of a 
supreme court in a national system of law.135
Since the international judiciary has few, if any hierarchical structure, alternative forms 
of inter-fora structural relations should be looked for. However, in practice, the 
jurisprudential coordination between different international courts and tribunals has 
been, as a rule, either voluntary - subject to the good will of the judges and the parties to 
the case, or non-existing altogether. It is certainly feasible that different courts and 
tribunals would adopt different views on questions of international law, and would 
maintain incompatible lines of jurisprudence for an indefinite period of time. This 
situation is exacerbated by the scarcity of organisational links between international 
judicial bodies (in fact, courts and tribunals seem often not to be aware of the decisions 
of their counterparts). As a result, the opportunities for formal or informal interaction 
and exchange of information between the various international fora are quite limited. 
Under these conditions, the level of uniformity and coherence generated from the 
operation of the various international courts and tribunals is expected to be poor.137
III. The practice o f different international courts and tribunals as indicative o f their 
level o f systemisation
Chamey's survey, which demonstrates only haphazard reliance by international courts 
and tribunals on the jurisprudence of their counterparts,138 supports the proposition that
132 Rosenne, 1 The Law and Practice o f  the ICJ, supra note 130, at 141-42.
133 See Petersmann, Int’l Trade Law and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 6, at 28.
134 Legality o f  the Threat or Use o f  Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 345 (Dissenting Opinion o f Judges 
Weeramentry)(the Court is situated at the ‘apex’ o f  international tribunals).
135 Jonathan Chamey, The Impact on the International Legal System o f  the Growth o f International Courts 
and Tribunals” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 697, 705.
136 See e.g., Samson, supra note 64, at 658.
137 Indeed, some o f  the delegates to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law o f the Sea objected 
to the creation o f  the proposed ITLOS because o f  the risk it presented to the uniformity o f  the law o f sea 
from possible inconsistent decisions. Third United Nations Conference on the Law o f the Sea, 4th Sess., 
59th mtg., V Third United Nations Conference on the Law o f  the Sea -  Official Records (United Nations, 
1976) 15-48.
138 See e.g., Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Norway v. Denmark), 
1993 I.C.J. 38, 62 (ICJ relying on arbitral decisions); Reformulated Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. at 620-29 
(Appellate Body citing judgments o f the ICJ, ECHR and I/A CHR); Case U SA -95-1904-02, Gray
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the current level of inter-fora coordination is unsatisfactory. Some judicial bodies 
habitually cite to the work of other fora, whereas some courts and tribunals generally
1 'XQignore their counterparts; and decisions cited are sometimes followed and sometimes 
not.140 Moreover, even when the jurisprudence of other adjudicative bodies has been 
cited and essentially followed, it was usually because of the persuasive weight of the 
legal analysis adopted by the other forum,141 and not because of an imbedded sense of 
obligation to strive to follow the case law of other judicial authorities. In fact, it looks as 
if reliance on the case law of international courts and tribunals tends to conform with the 
manner of treatment accorded to other complementary sources of international law - the 
writings of jurists and domestic court decisions.142 All these sources have been used as 
persuasive, but not authoritative statements on what the law is or should be. This implies 
that decisions of international judicial bodies are merely one method to establish the 
applicable law, among several other legitimate methods.
However, the treatment of international judicial precedents as one among equally 
forceful complementary sources ignores the independent importance of jurisprudential 
continuity and consistency in international law.143 While the hesitancy to rely on 
precedents can be explained in part due to the absence of a stare decisis doctrine144 from
Portland Cement and Clinker from  Mexico (Mexico v. U.S.), Report o f  13 Sept. 1996, at p.23 (NAFTA 
binational Panel), available at < http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/images/pdfi' ua95020e.pdf > (last visited 
on 26 Oct. 2000)(relying on an ICJ case); Case 157, Esphahanian v. Bank ofTejarat, 2 Iran-US Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 157, 163 (1984)(relying on ICJ and ad  hoc arbitration cases); Tadic (1995), 35 I.L.M. at 61-62 
(relying on an ICJ judgment); Agrotexim  v. Greece, 21 E.H.R.R. 250 ,284  (1996)(relying upon an ICJ 
judgment); Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions o f  the Constitution o f  Costa Rica 
(Advisory Opinion), I/A Court H.R. (ser. A) No. 4 (1984) 96-97 (relying on decisions o f  the ICJ and the 
ECHR); Consular Assistance, supra note 94, at para. 113-14, 131-32 (relying upon case law o f the ICJ, 
the ECHR and the HRC). See also Monica Pinto “ Fragmentation or Unification among International 
Institutions: Human Rights Tribunals” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 833, 840.
139 For example, the ECJ has hardly ever cited decisions o f other bodies (except the ECHR); and no 
judgment o f  the ICJ rendered in the Court's first 50 years o f operation has cited any decision o f  another 
permanent international court or tribunal (although a few citations were made in individual opinions). 
Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (1996) 39.
140 See e.g., Tadic (1999), supra note 100, at para. 115 (citing and rejecting the holding the ICJ Nicaragua 
case on the attribution o f  state responsibility for acts committed by paramilitary units).
141 Restatement o f  the Law, 3 rd, Foreign Relations Law o f the United States § 103, comment b 
(1987)(decisions o f  international courts and tribunals are persuasive evidence o f  what the law is). The 
WTO AB has further held that reasoning found in unadopted GATT panel reports may be looked at for 
legal guidance. Japan -  Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R (1996) at para. 5.6 
(Report o f the AB). This underlines the fact that the dominant consideration is the quality o f  the 
argumentation and not the need to harmonise between different valid statements o f the law.
142 See ICJ Statute, art. 38(l)(d).
143 Palmeter and Mavroidis, supra note 95, at 402.
144 The Stare decisis doctrine derives from the Latin maxim ‘stare decisis et non quita movera ’ (to stand 
firmly by things decided and not to disturb settled points). B lack’s Law Dictionary (7th ed., 1999) 1414.
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international law,145 the implications of this state of affairs for the ‘systematic 
well-being’ of international law are problematic. This is because international law lacks 
alternative coordination and harmonisation mechanisms found in civil law systems, such 
as a formal doctrine of jurisprudence constante (attributing binding force to a line of 
consistent decisions) or the availability of appellate proceedings (which, inter alia, 
pressures lower court judges to comport with anticipated decisions of the appellate 
courts). The lack of binding precedent under international law (even a consistent line of 
cases is not formally binding as such, unless it can be said to represent custom),146 
combined with the poor level of jurisdictional coordination and absence of structural 
harmonising devices, threatens the coherence of international law. Indeed, it is 
conceivable, perhaps inevitable, that different international judicial fora will reach 
different conclusions on similar legal questions, even pertaining to the same dispute. 
Since there are no available inter-fora mechanisms for averting or solving such 
differences of opinion, jurisprudential discrepancies might remain in place indefinitely.
Doctrinal inconsistencies have in fact already been observed in decisions of different 
international courts and tribunals relating to diverse questions such as the permissibility 
of reservations made in declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of 
international judicial bodies,147 the use of advisory proceedings in order to address what
1 dfi • *are in essence inter-state disputes, the margin of discretion accorded to the authorities
145 See ICJ Statute, art. 59; Bhala, Myth about Stare Decisis, supra note 95, at 863, 900; Chamey, 3rd 
Party Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, at 72. But see, Mannely O. Hudson, The Permanent Court o f  
International Justice 1920-1942 (1943) 626 (nothing in the text o f the Statute o f  the PCIJ, was intended 
to prevent the Court from finding guidance in previous judgments).
Exceptions to this assertion can be found in the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court o f Justice,
15 Oct. 1999, art. IX (I), available at <http://www. caricom.org/expframes2.htm> (last visited on 4 Sept.
2000)(“Judgments o f the [Caribbean Court o f Justice] shall be legally binding precedents for parties in 
proceedings before the Court”); and in article 29(8) to the Rules o f  Procedure o f  the CIS Economic Court 
(“rulings o f  the Plenum o f  the Economic Court and other decisions that have precedental value"). 
Gennady M. Danilenko “The Economic Court o f the Commonwealth o f  Independent States” 31 N.Y.U.J. 
Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 893, 908-10.
146 Chrisopher A. Ford “Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(l)(c ) and ‘General 
Principles o f Law’” 5 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. (1994) 35, 58.
147 Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. France), 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 74 at 23-24 (reservations are 
permissible and jurisdiction exists only to the extent it was recognised); Loizidou v. Turkey, 20 E.H.R.R. 
99, 136 (1995)(territorial reservation to declaration o f acceptance o f the ECHR's jurisdiction is invalid). 
For discussion, see Robert Y. Jennings “The Proliferation o f Adjudicatory Bodies: Dangers and Possible 
Answers” 9 A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1995) 2, 5-6.
148 Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5 (advisory opinions cannot be used to circumvent the need 
to secure state consent to adjudication); Consular Assistance, supra note 94, (the I/A CHR may render an 
advisory opinion in a case which had been in essence an inter-state dispute); Opinion No. 14/95/C-1/7-96, 
Interpretation o f  the Agreement on Recognition and Regulation o f  Property Rights, 3 (23) Sodruzhestvo 
Informatsionni Vestnik [CIS Information Bulletin] (1996) 82, cited  in Danilenko, supra note 145, at 
904-05 and Opinion No. 11/95/C-1/4-96, Interpretation o f  Agreement on Free Trade, 3 (23)
Sodruzhestvo Informatsionni Vestnik [CIS Information Bulletin] (1996) 88, cited  in Danilenko, supra, at
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of a confiscating state in determining the level of compensation,149 the application of the 
rule of proportionality in continental shelf delimitation cases,150 the right of 
conscientious objectors to evade military service,151 the right to silence during pre-trial 
investigation,152 the legal effect of provisional measure orders,153 and the applicability of 
the precautionary principle in environmental cases.154 In 1999, a notable doctrine of the 
ICJ on state responsibility has been explicitly rejected by the ICTY,155 and other 
inconsistencies might emerge in the near future. In fact, inconsistent decisions have been 
sometimes observed even within the jurisprudence of the same court or tribunal.156
While Chamey seems to be right in concluding that the diverging practice of 
international courts and tribunals has not presented until now a major challenge to the
905 (in both cases the CIS Economic Court issued advisory opinions relating to ongoing interstate 
disputes).
149 Lithgow  v. U.K., 8 E.H.R.R. 329, 372-73 (1986)(the confiscating government is accorded wide 'margin 
o f  appreciation' in determining whether full compensation is due); Case 129, SEDCO Inc. v. NIOC, 10 
Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 180, 187(1987)(the normal standard for compensation is full value o f  the property 
taken).
150 Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya) 1982 I.C.J. 18, 61-76, 91 (the Court should precisely calculate the 
relations between coastline lengths and maritime areas created by equidistance); Delineation o f  the 
Continental Shelf (U.K. v. France), 54 I.L.R. 5 (1979)(the arbitral panel should merely take impression o f  
the proportionality issues).
151 See Brinkhofv. Netherlands, UN GAOR, 48th Sess., Annex, UN Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/402/1990 
1993)(recognizing on an equal basis the right to conscientious objection on religious and non-religious 
grounds); N  v. Sweden, App. No. 10410/83, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 203 (1985)(holding that 
there is ground for differentiation between religious and non-religious conscientious objectors). See 
Heifer, supra note 20, at 331-35.
152 Case 374/87, Orkem v. Commission [1989] E.C.R. 3283 (there is no right to silence during 
anti-competition investigation under EC law); Funke v. France, 256 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)(1993)(Article 
6 o f the European HR Convention encompasses the pre-trial stage). See discussion in Julliane Kokott and 
Frank Hoffmeister “Case Review - Opinion 2/94 Accession o f the Community to the European 
Convention for the Protection o f  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” 90 AJ.I.L. (1996) 664, 666; 
Spielmann, supra note 110, at 766-70.
153 Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 210 Eur. Ct .H.R. (Ser. A) at 36 (199 l)(provisional measures o f  the ECHR are 
non-binding); LaGrand  (Germany v. U.S.), Judgment o f 27 June 2001 (Forthcoming in 2001 I.C.J.), 
available in <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm> (last visited on 10 July
2001)(provisional measures o f  the ICJ are legally binding)
154 Meat Hormones, supra note 105, at para. 123 (it is not clear whether the precautionary principle has 
been incorporated into international law); Gabgikovo -Nagymaros (Hungary/Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 3, 
42-45 (scientific uncertainty as to environmental consequences precludes invocation o f  the doctrine o f  
necessity by the party claiming risk to the environment); Southern Bluefm Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; 
Australia v. Japan), order o f  27 August 1999, at para. 77-80 (ITLOS), available at <http://www. 
un.org/Depts/ los/ITLOS/Order-tuna34.htm> (last visited on 15 July 2000)(in face o f scientific 
uncertainty over the danger to the survival o f  a fish stock the parties must act with 'prudence and caution' 
and take steps to ensure conservation o f  the stock).
155 Tadic (1999), supra note 100, at para. 115-137.
156 Shaw, supra note 24, at 439 (discrepancies have been identified between the position o f  the ICJ in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf and the Tunisia/Libya cases on role o f equity in marine delimitation); John R. 
Cook “The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the United Nations Compensation Commission: New  
Machinery for Resolving Claims” 9 A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1995) 28, 29 (inconsistencies have been 
encountered in the practice o f different chambers o f the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal).
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coherence of international law,157 there is no guarantee, or indeed considerable 
likelihood, that this will remain so in the future. On the contrary, with the increase in the 
number of fora, and the concomitant rise in the number of cases submitted to
i r o
adjudication, the pressures on the integrity of the system will increase. This is 
particularly worrisome given the fact that different sub-systems pursue incompatible 
idiosyncratic ideological agendas (e.g., trade-liberalisation v. promotion of labour 
standards or the state of the environment), which might further hinder the achievement 
of uniform interpretation of international law.159 The experience of domestic systems, 
where conflicting decisions of lower courts are a common phenomenon, suggests that 
international court and tribunals, who are generally less well-informed on concurrent 
practice than their domestic counterparts, are at least as likely to experience similar 
problems, if not worse.
Therefore, one may conclude that international courts and tribunals do not at present 
form a coherent system, at least not under the national court system paradigm.160 Even 
outside the domestic model, it would seem that given their poor levels of coordination 
and structural interaction, international courts and tribunals fail to meet a meaningful 
definition of a coherent system.161 On the other hand, it must be recalled that 
international courts and tribunals form part of a bigger system - international law, and 
share some common attributes, which are also enjoyed by the other components of the 
international legal system. In other words, they are not an autonomous sub-system, but
157 Chamey, Is Int’l Law Threatened? supra note 6, at 347. See also Treves, Recent Trends, supra note 1, 
at 433-34. With the increase in number o f international actors and the enlargement o f  the community o f  
international judges, practitioners and academic scholars, there is reason to believe that there will be more 
diversity in the construction o f  international norms.
158 Abi-Saab, ICJ as a World Court, supra note 127, at 13; Dupuy, Danger o f  the Fragmentation or 
Unification, supra note 4, at 797-98; Jennings, Proliferation o f Adjudicatory Bodies, supra note 147, at 6. 
Even Chamey admits that in theory the increase in the number o f  international courts and tribunals might 
jeopardise the coherence o f  international law. Chamey, 3rd Party Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, at 77. 
Still, he thinks that this risk is minimal. Chamey, Impact o f  the Growth o f  Int’l Courts and Tribunals, 
supra note 135, at 700.
159 Chamey, Impact o f the Growth o f  Int’l Courts and Tribunals, supra note 135, at 706. It has been 
argued that some o f  the decisions o f  the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system in trade and environment 
issues have been influenced by the pro-trade bias o f  that sub-system. Jeffery L. Dunoff “Institutional 
Misfits: The GATT, The ICJ and Trade-Environment Disputes” 15 Mich. J. Int’l L. (1994) 1043, 1063, 
1111; Lakshman D. Guruswamy “Should UNCLOS or GATT/WTO Decide Trade and Environment 
Disputes” 7 Minnesota Journal o f  Global Trade (1998) 287, 312.
160 See also Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 5, at 921; Cesare P.R. Romano “The 
Proliferation o f  International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces o f  the Puzzle” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 
709, 723.
161 In the alternative, international courts and tribunals may be described as a loose system o f  institutions. 
Henkin, In t’l Law, supra note 83, at 54. However, such characterisation is meaningless for our purposes 
since no real degree o f coherence is required or generated from such a system.
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rather a group of elements with undeniably similar characteristics, functioning within a 
system to which other groups of elements also belong.
Because of the evident link between the availability of a minimally harmonised judiciary 
and the overall coherence of the legal system, the present state of things also adversely 
affects the integrity of the normative dimension of international law. International legal 
norms are at present applied by a decentralised assortment of actors and institutions 
including states162- who often construe the law in different manner,163 uncoordinated 
international judicial bodies - lacking in many cases compulsory jurisdiction, IGOs and 
the domestic courts of different countries. As a result, being essentially an 
inter-subjective system without central authoritative law-creating and law-applying 
organs, international law inherently enjoys rather low levels of coherence. While 
increased adjudication can, in principle, promote the cohesion of the system, since courts 
may serve as agents for unity (entrusted, inter alia, with the task of systemising the 
law),164 the proliferation of uncoordinated international courts and tribunals threatens to 
rather exacerbate the problem, through the introduction of incompatible authoritative 
statements on what constitutes the law.165
IV Which jurisdiction-regulating regime should govern international courts and 
tribunals?
Returning now to the research question pertaining to the identification of the model of 
inter-fora interaction, which should, in turn, influence the choice of 
jurisdiction-regulating rules that ought to govern the relations between international 
courts and tribunals, one must reject both the intra-systematic and inter-systematic 
models.166 Since international judicial bodies do not currently form a coherent judicial 
system, a regulatory regime that seeks to eliminate all antinomies arising between
162 Koh, supra note 6, at 2631.
163 Abi-Saab, Cours general, supra note 38, at 225-26.
164 This is one o f  the most important roles o f judges operating within national legal systems. Dworkin, 
supra note 12, at 217. But see, Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System  (1993) 106 (the process o f  
the division o f law into more and more specific branches and categories undermines its unity). With 
respect, it would seem that this trend is a side effect o f the greater complexity o f  human activities 
regulated by law, which requires the promulgation o f rules o f  greater specificity and Courts are faced with 
the unique challenge o f coordinating and harmonising between the various specific branches o f the law.
165 J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (3rd ed., 1998) 310.
166 C f  Giorgos. T6n6kides “L ’exception de litispendance devant les organismes intemationaux” XXXVI 
Revue g6n6rale de droit international public (3r Ser., 1929) 502, 503 (“On ne serait en effet lui appliquer, 
ni les regies du Droit interne, car la transposition des regies du Droit civil dans le Droit des gens a 6te 
condamn^e de tout temps, ni celles du Droit international, car il n ’y a ni similitude ni analogie entre le cas 
d’un litige pendant devant deux ou plusieurs juridictions internes, relevant du pays different et celui d’un 
litige dont deux ou plusieurs juridictions d’ordre international se trouveraient simultandment saisis”).
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different independent courts and tribunals, seems to be inappropriate. Indeed, the 
introduction of strict jurisdiction-regulating norms comparable to those found within 
domestic legal systems (e.g., rules mandating reference of cases to the court or tribunal 
most intimately connected with the dispute) without the concurrent adoption of 
complementary measures of legal harmonisation would not solve the problem of 
coordinating between the lines of decisions rendered by the various fora. At the same 
time, strict jurisdiction-regulating rules would seem to unduly curtail the autonomy of 
the parties to litigation in circumstances where, given the presence of persistent 
differences between the lines of jurisprudence embraced by competing fora, the freedom 
to select the litigation forum has special importance.
Likewise, competition between courts from different states, belonging to different legal 
orders, is not analogous to competition between international courts and tribunals. The 
fact that all international judicial bodies belong to the same legal system creates stronger 
pressures in favour of maintaining normative coherence than these encountered in 
inter-systematic cases. Through authoritative reference to a common system of rules 
international courts and tribunals take part, wittingly or unwittingly, in the effort to 
systemise international law. As a result, inconsistent application of a rule of law by two 
international judicial fora carries far more serious systematic implications than 
conflicting decisions of the English and French courts (even, regarding the same 
dispute). Again, simply put, international courts and tribunals pronounce law for a single 
legal community, while courts of different states pronounce law for different legal 
communities. Consequently, the rather modest level of coordination of jurisdictional 
competition found on the inter-state level might not commensurate with the role 
assumed by international courts and tribunals under international law.
It is therefore contended that a third, middle way must be trodden. Since international 
courts and tribunals constitute either a very loosely structured system or a group of 
unorganised elements operating within a larger systematic context, they are probably 
located somewhere in the middle of the scale between a full-fledged judicial system and 
an assortment of unrelated judicial bodies having some common features. It is submitted 
that the degree of jurisdictional regulation of the relations between international courts 
and tribunals should correlate to these systematic attributes. Hence, the structure of the
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present international judiciary supports the introduction of jurisdiction-regulating rules 
that should strive not only to attain elementary coordination (as is warranted by the 
inter-systematic model) but also to reach moderate levels of harmonisation, without 
being overly intrusive. Such a compromise model will eliminate the most troublesome 
aspects of jurisdictional competition, while preserving some degree of beneficial 
competition, which may, as will be discussed later on, inter alia, create an incentive for 
courts and tribunals to do better in order to attract new business.
A possible modality for the 'middle way' approach may be found in the jurisdictional 
relations that exist under domestic legal systems between courts and arbitration 
tribunals. These two sets of institutions are not perceived as part of a unitary judicial 
system since there are only limited structural relations between them (courts do not 
normally have the power to interfere with the substantive holdings of arbitral tribunals 
and there are few organisational links between these sets of institutions). However, they 
still operate within the same polity, derive their authority from a common legal system 
and often apply the same law. Hence, special attention will be accorded in the survey 
conducted below to norms and practice relating to the jurisdictional competition between 
such bodies.
4. Should international law encourage rules regulating jurisdictional 
competition?
1 ASIn line with modem approaches to international law, legal research should not merely 
describe positive rules and procedures, but also study values and interests and seek to 
identify desirable courses in light of which the law should be construed and further 
developed. Hence, unlike positive or pure legal theories, modem legal doctrines would 
pose the following question - should international courts and tribunals strive to reach
167 Juan Jos6 Quintana “The International Court o f Justice and the Formulation o f  General International 
Law: The Law o f  Maritime Delimitation as an Example” The International Court o f  Justice -  Its Future 
Role after Fifty Years (A.S. Muller, D. Raic and J.M. Thuransky eds., 1997) 367, 371-72.
168 Two theories are particularly relevant to this method o f analysis - N ew  International Legal Process and 
Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence. Abram Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich and Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International 
Legal Process: Materials fo r  an Introductory Course (1968); Harold H. Koh “Transnational Legal 
Process” 75 Neb. L. Rev. (1996) 181, 188; Mary Ellen O’Connell “New International Legal Process” 93 
A.J.I.L. (1999) 334, 337-79; Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence fo r  a Free 
Society and Policy  (1992); Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework 
fo r  Political Inquiry (1950); W. Michael Reisman and Aaron M. Schreiber, Jurisprudence:
Understanding and Shaping Law  (1987); Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process, supra note 65, at 5; 
Higgins, Policy Considerations, supra note 65, at 58-59; Siegfried Wiessner and Andrew R. Williard 
“Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public 
Order o f Human Dignity” 93 A.J.I.L. (1999) 316, 317-21.
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coherence in their operations through jurisdiction-regulating rules? On the basis of this 
examination, existing rules should be evaluated, construed and deconstructed169 and new 
rules should perhaps be developed.
A. The importance of systematic coherence
As effective legal system cannot in the long run tolerate serious inherent 
inconsistencies.170 The need for coherence within the legal system, in general, and 
within the international judiciary, in particular, is supported by values such as 
legitimacy, credibility, effectiveness and the perceived fairness of international law (i.e., 
that similar cases will be treated alike).171 Legal certainty and the process of developing 
clearer normative standards are also at stake.172 Although one can identify areas of 
judicial interaction where predictability and stability are particularly important (e.g., 
uniformity is arguably more important in international economic relations than in the 
human rights sphere),173 it is safe to assert that such differences represent variations in 
degree and not in the very need for legal harmony.174
As will be demonstrated below, jurisdictional competition might compromise each of 
the important values underlying the need for systematic coherence, and as a result
17S •jeopardise the prospects for the long-term success of international law. Hence, it
169 This is the unique contribution o f  the Critical Legal Studies (C.L.S.) or the ‘new thinking/new 
approaches’ movement. David Kennedy “When Renewal Repeats: Thinking against the Box” 32 N.Y.U.
J. Int'l L. & Pol. (2000) 335,457-461; Martti Koskenniemi “Letter to the Editors o f  the Symposium” 93 
A.J.I.L. (1999) 351, 358.
170 Kelsen, Pure Theory o f  Law, supra note 12, at 205; Gilbert Guillaume “The Future o f International 
Judicial Institution” 44 I.C.L.Q. (1995) 848, 862; Laurence R. Heifer and Anne-Marie Slaughter “Toward 
a Theory o f Effective Supranational Adjudication” 107 Yale L.J. (1997) 273, 374-75; Jennings, The ICJ 
and Judicial Settlement, supra note 6, at 435; van de Kerchove and Ost, supra note 12, at 51.
171 President o f  the World Court Warns o f  'Overlapping Jurisdictions ’ in Proliferation o f  International 
Judicial Bodies, UN Press Release GA/L/3157, 27 Oct. 2000, available at <http://www. 
pict-pcti.org/news/archive/months2000/october/ICJ. 10.27.prolif.html (last visited on 15 Nov. 2000); 
Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 5, at 922; Bhala, Myth about Stare Decisis, supra note 
95, at 907, 940; Chamey, Impact o f  the Growth o f  Int’l Courts and Tribunals, supra note 135, at 699; 
Charney, 3rd Party Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, at 84; Gottlieb, supra note 23, at 374; Palmeter and 
Mavroidis, supra note 95, at 402.
172 Hans Wehberg, The Problem o f  an International Court o f  Justice (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1918) 
46-47; Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 5, at 922; Palmeter and Mavroidis, supra note 
95, at 402.
173 Jackson, Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 5, at 825 (1999). According to Jackson, this 
landscape is significantly different than that found in the human rights area and in other areas o f  
international relations. Id. at 824-26.
174 Further, the notion o f  predictability itself is a relative matter, since there can never be full 
predictability in a genuine dispute. Robert Y. Jennings “A New Look at the Place o f  the Adjudication in 
International Relations Today” 1 Collected Writings (1998) 450, 485-86.
175 See e.g., Shigeru Oda “The International Court o f Justice from the Bench” 244 Recueil des cours 
(1993) 9, 145 (“... if  the development o f the law o f the sea were to be separated from the general rules o f
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would seem that anyone interested in the success of international law should support, in 
principle, the introduction of coherence-strengthening measures, including 
jurisdiction-regulating rules.
Hence, one can assert with relative confidence that, as a matter of desirable policy, the 
coherence of international law, should be strengthened and not undermined.177 In light of 
international law’s unique and traditional problems of legal certainty and legitimacy, it 
can be argued that there is a special urgency to work towards improving the coherence 
of the international legal system, inter alia, through the harmonisation of the work of 
international judicial bodies.178 Greater coherence can contribute to the reputation and 
legitimacy of international law,179 encourage, as a result, better level of compliance with
i  • |  o  iits norms and further strengthen the international polity.
The importance of coherence within a legal system and the unique role played by 
judicial institutions in its achievement is underlined by the operation of courts belonging 
to national legal systems, who often compensate for the shortcomings of other branches 
of government. It is commonplace for national courts, functioning within a hierarchic 
and coordinated system of judicial bodies, to try to identify, interpret and implement the
international law and placed under the jurisdiction o f  a separate judicial authority, this could lead to the 
destruction o f  the very foundation o f  international /mv”)(emphasis added).
176 It should be noted that the more fundamental question - should one support the success o f  the 
international legal system, as it is presently construed, has been left unanswered. This is because the 
question is a meta-legal and philosophical one, which falls beyond the scope o f  the present study. 
However, it seems safe to contend that the international community, as any other society, has generally 
viewed the administration o f international law as an important prerequisite for its efficient functioning 
(despite occasional rifts concerning specific rules and institutions). John A. Perkins “The Changing 
Foundations o f International Law: From State Consent to State Responsibility” 15 Boston University 
International Law Journal (1997) 433, 457-58, 506; Jianming Shen “The Basis o f  International Law: Why 
Nations Observe” 17 Dickinson Journal o f International Law (1999) 287, 307. This is evidenced, inter 
alia, through the universal acceptance o f  the rules o f international law.
Indeed, the international community has clearly expressed, in the past, a commitment to the progressive 
development o f  international law over time, a fact that suggests relative consensus as to the positive 
utility o f having a viable system o f  international law. See e.g., UN Charter, art. 13(l)(a).
177 Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 5, at 926; Bridge, supra note 128, at 100. See also 
van de Kerchove and Ost, supra note 12, at 62-63, 94; MacCormick, supra note 13, at 1061.
178 South West Africa (Second P/zase)(Ethiopia v. S. A., Liberia v. S.A.) 1966 I.C.J. 6, 240-41 (Dissenting 
Opinion o f Judge Koretsky)(“ ... the principle o f immutability , o f the consistency o f  final judicial 
decisions, which is so important for national courts, is still more important for international courts”); 
Heifer and Slaughter, supra note 170, at 285; Palmeter and Mavroidis, supra note 95, at 402.
179 Dworkin, supra note 12, at 217 (lack o f legislative or adjudicative integrity threatens the basis o f  
legitimacy o f a political community); Franck, Legitimacy among Nations, supra note 24, at 26; Hart, 
supra note 23, at 116; Chamey, Is Int’l Law Threatened? supra note 6, at 360; Leila Nadya Sadat and S.
Richard Carden “The New International Criminal Court: an Uneasy Revolution”, 88 Geo. L.J. (2000)
381,398.
180 Heifer and Slaughter, supra note 170, at 319-20.
181 Heifer and Slaughter, supra note 170, at 367, 370-71.
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1 89norms and values of the relevant legal system in a more or less harmonised manner. 
Furthermore, incidents of antinomy - i.e., conflicting decisions rendered in the context of 
a single dispute or the emergence of inconsistent lines of jurisprudence, have been, as a 
rule, promptly dealt with by domestic courts and the challenge they present to the 
integrity of the system has been eventually eliminated. It should be noted that even civil 
law jurisdictions, which traditionally rejected the stare decisis doctrine, have developed 
alternative theories,183 so to protect the legitimate expectation of parties to proceedings 
that similar cases will be treated similarly.184
On the basis of this empirical evidence of universal adherence to the principle of legal 
coherence, it is submitted that the unity of the judicial system seems to be one of the
i  o r
most important, perhaps indispensable characteristics of a sophisticated legal system, 
and one of the primary conditions for its success. In other words, one can assert that the 
more an assortment of judicial bodies will resemble a coherent judicial system, the better 
are the chances that the overarching legal system will function effectively.
B. Jurisdiction-regulating rules as a method of increasing systematic coherence
It has already been demonstrated that there are close and reciprocal links between the 
normative and institutional components of international law. The normative integrity of 
international law depends upon the systemic relations between the international judicial 
bodies, and the strength of the relations between the various international courts and 
tribunals depends, inter alia, upon the level of cohesion of the common body of norms 
to which all judicial bodies refer. As a result, evaluation of the type of legal regime that 
is most suitable for governing the relations between the constituent elements of the 
international judiciary must derive from contemporary perceptions of international law 
in general.
182 According to Dworkin, this is the ‘Herculean’ task o f  the judge. Dworkin, supra note 12, at 239.
183 For instance, the French Cour de cassation o f  may intervene in decisions o f  lower courts o f appeals 
when these courts have rendered decisions inconsistent with earlier case law. Peter Herzog, Civil 
Procedure in France (1967) 437. However, admittedly, the development o f  quasi-precedental theories has 
also been justified by virtue o f the need to promote judicial economy and not only be reason o f the need 
to preserve systematic coherence. Christian Dadomo and Susan Farran, The French Legal System  (2nd ed., 
1996) 41-42; Bhala, Myth about Stare Decisis, supra note 95, at 938.
184 L. Neville Brown and Francis G. Jacobs The Court o f  Justice o f  the European Communities (3rd ed., 
1989) 311. The end result has been that the traditional differences between common law and civil law 
courts with regard to the attribution o f persuasive weight to judicial precedents have been largely eroded, 
and all domestic legal systems today apply legal measures designed to harmonise judicial decisions. John 
H. Merryman The Civil Law Tradition (2nd ed., 1985) 47; Bhala, Myth about Stare Decisis, supra note 95, 
at 910-14.
185 Chamey, 3rd Party Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, at 84; Brigitte Stem “Concluding Remarks” 9 
A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1995) 49, 52.
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Keeping in mind the need to promote the systematic coherence of international law, one 
ought to look for ways in which the international judiciary can be reformed so to reduce 
the number and frequency of inconsistencies between the decisions it renders. Since 
hierarchical reorganisation of the existing international courts and tribunals, or 
reallocation of the current division of labour between the different jurisdictions is, at 
present, an unrealistic vision, the main viable alternatives for increasing systematic 
coherence through the international judiciary are to introduce stronger 
jurisdiction-regulating norms, to improve the organisational links between international 
judicial bodies and to encourage jurisprudential harmonisation through reliance on 
decisions of other fora.186 Thus, in view of the need to promote the coherence of 
international law, the introduction of jurisdiction-regulating rules capable of preventing 
multiple proceedings that might result in inconsistent decisions, must be deemed 
commendable. Such measures, when combined with improved level of normative 
harmony, could also eventually transform the current assortment of international courts 
and tribunals into one coherent judicial system.
In addition, as will be elaborated below, jurisdictional competition can raise a host of 
other serious practical difficulties, essentially involving notions of procedural fairness 
and efficiency, both for the individual parties to the dispute at hand and for the involved 
courts and tribunals. The introduction of jurisdiction-regulation rules, which can 
mitigate these problems, may be supported from this direction as well. The norms 
governing jurisdictional competition should then be construed in light of these declared 
objects and ought to be developed to satisfy the policies of greater coherence, fairness
t 87and effectiveness.
Of course, other values might also come to play and the need for coherence, procedural 
fairness and efficiency promoted by jurisdiction-regulating rules must to be balanced 
against them. Most notably, judicial consistency, an important element of legal 
coherence, might conflict with the requirements of justice (e.g., the need to avoid an
186 See infra Chapter 7.
187 The merger o f  lex lata  and lex ferenda  as a method for legal decision making is advocated by scholars 
o f  the Policy-Jurisprudence school. Higgins, Problems and Process, supra note 65, at 10. This stance is 
not shared by the present author, who believes that it is crucial for the future o f  international lawmaking 
that the two concepts will not be interchangeably used. However, o f  course, one may use teleological 
method o f interpretation to some degree. For support, see MacCormick, supra note 13, at 1064-65.
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previous unjust ruling)188 and neat division of labour between courts might conflict with
• 1 RQnotions of party autonomy (e.g., the need to control the conduct of the proceedings). 
Similarly, there might be cases where the plurality of international courts and tribunals, 
each free to pursue its own course, might promote a beneficial process of judicial 
dialogue (sometimes referred to as ‘judicial cross-fertilisation’ or ‘percolation’).190 
Throughout this dialogue different idea will be exchanged and existing rules will be 
re-examined, culminating, hopefully, in the emergence of the best possible norm.191 This 
process of cross-fertilisation might be in some way desirable even with regard to a single 
dispute.192 However, it is submitted that even where forum selection or multiple 
proceedings are justifiable, the systematic values of coherence, procedural fairness and 
efficiency should always be taken into consideration.
Clearly, the different competing values and interests must be balanced against each 
other. However, a balancing formula cannot be drafted in abstract, through a clear-cut 
but arbitrary sweeping rule of precedence. Rather, balancing ought to be made on a 
case-to-case basis, or at least with respect to specific categories of jurisdictional 
competition. The next Chapter will therefore address specific balance formulas between 
the rights and interests compromised by different potential jurisdiction-regulating rules 
and will offer some insights on the degree to which the existing rules accommodate the 
competing concerns, and what new rules, if any, are needed.
C. An alternative approach - inconsistencies as a catalyst for legal development
An alternative approach to the one just described might view the existence of short-term 
conflicts as beneficial to the development of international law in the long run. According 
to this position, legal inconsistencies bring contested questions to the international front 
stage and encourage public and judicial debate over sensitive issues, which might even
188 Dworkin, supra note 12, at 218,404. Dworkin also points out that the adjudicative branch must 
sometimes implement legislation, which in itself is inconsistent with central values o f the legal system. 
Hence, legal coherence sometimes is frustrated by democratic principles (separation o f  branches o f  
government and legislative supremacy). Id. at 405-06.
189 See infra Chapter 4, at p. 145.
190 Chamey, Impact o f  the Growth o f Int’l Courts and Tribunal, supra note 135, at 700; Chamey, 3rd 
Party Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, at 82-83; Theodor Meron “Norm Making and Supervision in 
International Human Rights: Reflections on Institutional Order” 76 A.J.I.L. (1982) 754, 776; Petersmann, 
Constitutionalizing the UN, supra note 74, at 778; Spielmann, supra note 110, at 779; Treves, Recent 
Trends, supra note 1, at 436.
191 Chamey, 3rd Party Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, at 82.
192 This seems to be the underlying rationale behind the French rule that the decisions o f the highest court 
of the land, the Court o f Cassation, when exercising its appellate competence, do not bind lower courts 
who receive the case on remand (except where the cases has been decided by the Court o f Cassation for 
the second time). Chamey, 3rd Party Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, at 83.
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spur legislation on the matter.193 They also engage courts and tribunal in the process of 
cross-fertilisation and might compel judicial bodies to improve their methods of 
operation and quality of work in order to attract more business.194
As to the need to improve systematic coherence by way of increased judicial 
harmonisation, the alternative view might adopt a ‘progress by catastrophe’ line of 
reasoning. Thus, it could be argued that the problem of lack of harmonisation between 
various international fora would only be addressed by the international community once 
a major jurisdictional conflict has erupted. Hence, deterioration of judicial relations, in 
the short run, might inspire, in the long run, a radical solution to the problem of 
inter-fora relations, such as the reallocation of competencies or the introduction of 
clearer jurisdiction-regulating standards, which will take care of the problem of 
jurisdictional competition once and for all.
An historical example supposedly supporting this point of view is found in the gradual 
development of the English legal system in the previous millennium. In England, 
panoply of courts had coexisted side by side for many centuries.195 Although the 
jurisdictions of these courts often overlapped, they had applied different procedures and 
different substantive rules.196 It has been argued that competition over judicial business 
between the different courts has led to procedural improvement and to cross-fertilisation 
on substantive matters, which resulted in improvements in the law of England.197
193 Treves, Conflicts between ITLOS and the ICJ, supra note 7, at 810.
194 Chamey, Implications o f  the 1982 Convention, supra note 2, at 34; Chamey, 3rd Party Dispute 
Settlement, supra note 4, at 87; Guruswamy, supra note 159, at 297.
195 E.g., local and national courts, crown and common courts, courts o f  law and courts o f  equity, courts o f  
different crown divisions (Chancery, Exchequer, etc.), courts for domestic and foreign affairs and secular 
and religious courts. See generally, John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (1990) 
15-154; Radcliffe and Cross, The English Legal System (G.J. Hand and D.J. Bentley, eds., 6th ed., 1977) 
23-24, 58-60, 122-23
196 For instance, land ownership claims could be heard in the 18th century before Common Pleas Courts, 
the King's Bench and the Exchequer o f Pleas (presented in the last two cases as a claim for ejectment). 
While litigation before courts o f  Common Pleas should have commenced upon the service o f  writs, which 
limited the scope o f  available remedies, other, more flexible techniques such as bills, actions on the case 
and subpoenas were employed by other courts. Baker, supra note 195, at 45-60. Another major area o f  
overlap had been between common law courts and the Court o f  Chancery, where equity was applied. 
Radcliffe and Cross, supra note 195, at 132. Most remarkably, courts o f  equity could decide cases in 
variation from common law, after the same case had been decided by an ordinary common law court. 
Baker, supra, at 125.
197 For instance, lack o f business before the King's Bench had led in the 15th century to procedural 
innovations such as fictitious use o f writs to entertain jurisdiction. Similarly, decline in the attractiveness 
o f the courts o f  the Chancery and the Common Pleas has led to organisational reforms in the first half o f  
the 19th century. Baker, supra note 195, at 60, 131; Radcliffe and Cross, supra note 195, at 155-56,
163-68.
134
It can be alleged that the anarchic state of the institutions comprising the international 
legal system and the growing competition between different international courts and 
tribunals might also result in procedural reforms and development of equitable and 
efficient legal rules, as had happened in England. According to this view, jurisdictional 
competition would encourage the ICJ, for example, to innovate its rules of procedures,
1QRin order to escape from being marginalized by competing, and more flexible fora. 
Similarly, with respect to normative cross fertilisation, it could be argued that the 
different holdings of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case and the ICTY Appeals Chamber in 
the Tadic case will promote dialogue and brainstorming on the question of state 
responsibility over acts committed by paramilitary bodies, eventually resulting in the 
adoption of the best possible rule, perhaps in the framework of an international treaty. A 
jurisdiction-regulating regime providing for rigid allocation of competences would 
arguably take away the incentive for courts and tribunals to do better. In the same vein, 
an excessively rigid rule of judicial harmonisation, (e.g., according stare decisis to first 
in time judgments), might sterilise potential jurisprudential discourse and entrench
. . 1 9 9conservative positions.
Appealing as it is, the position that inconsistencies ought to be encouraged is not shared 
by the present author. As indicated above, legal coherence and harmony are only relative 
values, which should be balanced against other values such as justice, efficiency and 
party autonomy, sometimes, on a case-to-case basis. Thus, it is acknowledged that 
general policy considerations might justify the preservation of a healthy degree of 
inter-fora competition in order to encourage procedural improvements. Similarly, 
considerations of justice, the forum’s public policies, the particular needs of the parties 
to litigation and the specific circumstances of the case at hand might justify divergences 
between the jurisprudence of different courts and tribunals. Thus, there clearly are cases 
where an unwarranted result reached by one judicial body must not be followed by a 
subsequent court or tribunal,200 and the Tadic case might be one of these exceptional 
instances. Since the interest of judicial harmonisation ought not to prevail in all 
circumstances, ample room will be left for the promotion of other important interests of 
the international community.
198 Chamey, Implications o f  Expanding Int’l Dispute Settlement, supra note 6, at 71-72.
199 Raj Bhala “The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication” 9 Journal o f  
Transnational Law and Policy (1999) 1, 130.
200 Heifer and Slaughter, supra note 170, at 387.
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Still, in all cases, courts and tribunals should accord due consideration to the interests of 
coherence and harmony. In other words, they ought to at least consider the possibility of
• 901following the case law of other judicial fora relating to the questions before them
909(whether it pertains to findings of fact or law).
Further, the weight accorded to such exercise of ‘comity’ might change in accordance 
with the seriousness of the potential jurisdictional conflict. Arguably, the weight of the 
argument in favour of judicial harmony should be overwhelming where the same matter 
arises between the.sajne parties and has been referred to multiple adjudication before 
more than one judicial forum. In these circumstances, if conflicting judicial decisions 
would be rendered, the parties might be placed in an impossible situation. Thus, there is 
a special need in this case to apply strict jurisdiction-regulating measures. In the same 
vein, the weight accorded to consistency in litigation before the same body should be 
greater than in situations where the dispute is adjudicated by different fora.203 This is 
because a high degree of uncertainty as to the direction of the case law of a particular 
court or tribunal, might undermine that forum’s credibility, discourage from its 
utilisation and upset the legitimate expectations of potential litigants 204
But even when a similar question arises between different parties and before different 
fora it is sensible, as a matter of judicial policy (also supported by considerations of 
judicial economy), to expect that one body will, at least, accord due regard to a decision 
already reached by its counterpart. This means that case law of competing jurisdictions 
would be admissible and carry significant, though certainly not absolute, persuasive
201 See e.g., EEC- Restrictions on Imports o f  Desert Apples, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 93, 123-24 
(1989)(the Panel will take into consideration the legitimate expectation o f  the parties that it would follow  
a previous decision given in similar circumstances, although it is not bound to do so). See also Chamey, 
Impact o f the Growth o f  Int’l Courts and Tribunals, supra note 135, at 707-08; Chamey, 3rd Party Dispute 
Settlement, supra note 4, at 73; Heifer, supra note 20, at 350. This might imply in some cases the 
allocation o f  the burden o f persuasion on the party arguing for deviating from an established precedent. 
Palmeter and Mavroidis, supra note 95, at 402-03.
202 Palmeter and Mavroidis, supra note 95, at 405.
203 Shahabuddeen, supra note 139, at 3 (the ICJ will not lightly exercise that power to deviate from its past 
decisions); Palmeter and Mavroidis, supra note 95, at 401-02 (WTO panels should follow their own 
precedents, unless there are good reasons to do otherwise); Joined cases C-267/95 and C-268/95, Merck 
& Co. Inc. v. Primecrown L td [ 1996] E.C.R. 1-6285, 6343-45 (Opinion o f  Advocate-General 
Fennelly)(the Court is not formally bound to follow its own decisions but w ill deviate from them only on 
the basis o f  ‘strong reasons’); Carlton K. Allen, Law in the Making (6th ed., 1958) 280-81.
204 Japan  -  Taxes on A lcoh o lic  B everages, W TO D oc. W T /D S 8/A B /R  (1996 ), at para. 5.4 
(Report o f  the A B )(“[adopted panel reports] create legitimate expectations among WTO members and, 
therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute”).
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authority.205 Such refutable presumption implies that jurisprudential divergence ought to 
be tolerated only when justified by good reasons 206 In fact, some courts and tribunals 
have already pursued such a course.207
As to the 'progress through catastrophe' argument, according to which a continued state 
of anarchy would contribute to the development of international law in the same manner 
that it contributed to the development of English law, one could say that this is a rather 
awkward argument. Why should the fact that the English legal system had suffered for 
many centuries from 'growing pains' in the form of competing uncoordinated 
jurisdictions208 justify the conclusion that international law, which has encountered a 
similar phenomenon in the last 80 years, should continue to endure similar ‘pain and 
suffering’ in centuries to come? If English law has eventually opted for uniformity and 
cohesion, by way of reforming the court system throughout the 19th century,209 why 
should international law not adopt the same solution now, thereby avoiding the adverse
91 nconsequences of future jurisdictional conflicts? While uninhibited competition might 
create certain unexpected benefits, there seems no reason why not to attempt and create 
a better legal regime, which removes the problems associated with such competition, 
while preserving some of the benefits of competition.
Further, it could be maintained that the unique predicaments of international law merit 
greater urgency in tackling jurisdictional problems than had been the case in medieval 
England. The absence of an international central legislator and effective executive 
branch means not only that the international legal system enjoys poor levels of 
coherence to begin with, but also that the enforcement of judicial decisions depends, to a 
considerable extent, on the good will of the parties. The credibility of the international
205 Gerald Fitzmaurice “Some Problems regarding the Formal Sources o f  International Law” Symbolae 
Verzijl (1958) 172. Cf. House o f  Lords, Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234.
206 Heifer and Slaughter, supra note 170, at 377.
207 See e.g., Comm. 470/1991, Kindler v. Canada, UN GAOR, 48th Sess. Supp. no. 40, Annex XII, at 
138, 156, UN Doc. A/48/40 (Report o f the HRC, 1993)(the HRC showed ‘careful regard’ to a decision o f  
the ECHR). There are also various decisions o f  the I/A HR Commission that rely upon decisions o f  other 
human rights procedures. See e.g., Case 11.245, Gimenez v. Argentina, Report No. 12/96,
Inter-Am.C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91 Doc. 7 at 33, at para. 75-103 (1996)(extensive reliance on ECHR 
cases); Case 11.430, Rodriguez v. Mexico, Report No. 43/96, Inter-Am.C.H.R.,OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 
rev. at 485, at para. 106 (1997)(reliance on an ECHR case).
208 It is undeniable that competition between various English courts gave rise to numerous difficulties. See 
e.g., Radcliffe and Cross, supra note 195, at 23.
209 See Uniformity o f Process Act, 1832; Judicature Act, 1873.
210 Antonio Perez “WTO and UN Law: Institutional Comity in National Security” 23 Yale J. Int’l L.
(1998) 362 ("There is no reason to think choice o f law brinkmanship will not lead to protracted 
institutional conflicts...").
137
judicial process is therefore one of its primary assets and a central incentive for
compliance with international judgments. Conflicting legal pronunciations might
threaten to undermine confidence in international judicial bodies and exacerbate the
211adoption of auto-interpretations as to the state of the law.
Finally, it should be kept in mind that 'progress through catastrophe' might imply 
progress, but also incur the risk of a disabling catastrophic outcome, from which 
international law might not be able to bounce back from for a very long time.
5. Interim conclusions
The professed observations offered so far suggest that international law constitutes a 
system of law. Thus, disputes of international character arising under the various 
branches of international law or the different specific legal regimes (which are in fact 
international sub-systems) can also be described as disputes under international law.
This means that the so called ‘self-contained’ international regimes that resort from time 
to time to international law standards, such as the WTO (and arguably, the EC), are not 
really ‘self-contained’ and form part of the bigger picture of international law. 
Consequently, whenever international disputes are amenable to the jurisdiction of more 
than one international judicial procedure, an overlap may be identified, at least to the 
degree that questions of general international law are involved (provided that the case 
involves the ‘same parties’ and ‘same issues’). It has also been suggested that courts and 
tribunals should take into consideration all rules of international law applicable to the 
dispute at hand, even if originating from other areas of law, unless specific norms in 
their constitutive instruments provide otherwise.
While international law is arguably a legal system, it has been shown that, at present, 
there is no real international judicial system, comparable to those found under domestic 
legal systems. As a result, rules harmonising domestic jurisdictional competition (the 
‘intra-systematic model’), which are premised upon the existence of a coherent system 
of adjudicative institutions, are prima facie inapplicable to international courts and 
tribunals where one finds looser forms of jurisdictional coordination and harmonisation. 
At the same time, the relations between international courts and tribunals are different 
than those found between the courts of different states (the ‘inter-systematic model’).
211 Chamey, 3rd Party Dispute Settlement, supra note 4, at 81; Guillaume, supra note 170, at 862; John 
Jackson, The World Trade Organization (1998) 109.
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International judicial bodies belong to a single legal system and are responsible for 
promoting its coherence as much as possible. No similar considerations can be found to 
apply in relation to the putative need of regulating the jurisdictions of different national 
courts belonging to different legal systems.
Hence, the theoretical analysis supports the view that the present state of international 
law justifies the adoption of a halfway regime of jurisdictional regulation between 
different international courts and tribunals, comparable to that found in the relations 
between courts and arbitral tribunals operating within the same legal system. Such a 
regime would reflect the reality in, which there ure strong, normative links between .the , 
various judicial and quasi-judicial bodies (i.e., they all refer, at some level, to a common 
body of norms), but only sporadic structural and jurisdictional links between the 
different fora. It is submitted that the nature of the international judiciary requires a 
jurisdictional regime which seeks to reduce, as much as it can, challenges to the 
coherence of international law (e.g., by preventing the existence of conflicting judicial 
pronunciations), but is not necessarily expected to achieve full coordination on the 
institutional level (e.g., by tolerating some forum shopping tactics that do not lead to 
conflicting judgments). In fact, allowing for the persistence of a certain level of 
jurisdictional competition should not be deemed to constitute a significant problem and 
might even be viewed as beneficial in some ways.
But in the future, given the need to strengthen the coherence of the international legal 
system, new methods ought to be explored in order to further unify the international 
judiciary and alleviate procedural problems associated with jurisdictional overlaps, inter 
alia, through introducing additional jurisdiction-regulating rules capable of providing 
greater level of coordination and harmonisation to the relations between the various 
international courts and tribunals. It is submitted that the combined effect of more 
organised jurisdictional inter-fora relations and a higher degree of jurisprudential 
consistency could transform international courts and tribunals into a judicial system, 
enjoying meaningful levels of inner-coherence, and result in the strengthening of the 
unity of international law.
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Chapter Four: 
Jurisdiction-regulating norms governing competition involving 
domestic courts: should they be introduced into international law?
This study will now proceed to examine specific rules designed to regulate particular 
jurisdictional conflicts. Since historically such rules had been first developed under 
domestic law and have undergone there considerable elaboration, it seems prudent to 
first introduce these rules and discuss the rationales for their creation, in the context of 
the domestic legal environment. Following this, Part III will deal, at length, with 
jurisdiction-regulating norms governing competition between international courts and 
tribunals, as developed by international law.
As will be shown, there are a few, if any, international standards that govern inter-fora
competition involving domestic courts. As a result, instances of jurisdictional
competition are subject, as a rule, to the vagaries of domestic legal system, in
0 1accordance with their idiosyncratic particularities . However, some general trends and 
common principles, which might even qualify as general principles of law under article
0 1 'X38(l)(c) to the ICJ Statute, may be identified. Furthermore, special attention will be 
given to those few international standards that have emerged in order to regulate 
cross-boundary jurisdictional competition (most notably, treaties such as the Brussels 
Convention)214 and the to competition between international and national tribunals 
(most notably, the Statutes of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals).215 This is 
because such standards may reflect broad international consensus as to what constitute
212 Jennings, Enforcement o f  Int’l Obligations, supra note 9, at 503 (“... there is usually no such thing as 
an international private international law”).
213 ICJ Statute, art. 38(l)(c)(“[The Court shall apply] the general principles o f  law recognised by civilised 
nations”). See Brownlie, Principles o f  In t’l Law, supra note 14, at 15-18; Shaw, supra note 24, at 77-82; 
Chamey, Universal Int’l Law, supra note 24, at 535-36. For the purposes o f  the present study it is 
understood that general principle o f  law are rules and principles found to operate in virtually all domestic 
legal systems with potential applicability in analogous circumstances under international law (e.g., good 
faith, res judicata, duty to compensate for damage, etc.).
214 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement o f Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 27 
Sept. 1968, art. 16, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32 ,29  I.L.M. (1990) 1413 (updated version)[hereinafter 'Brussels 
Convention'].
215 Statute o f  the International Tribunal for the Prosecution o f  Persons Responsible for Serious Violations 
o f the International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory o f  the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 
SC Res. 827,25 May 1993, art. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), 32 I.L.M. (1993) 1203 [hereinafter 
‘ICTY Statute’]; Statute o f  the International Tribunal for the Prosecution o f  Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Serious Violations o f the International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory 
o f Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the 
Territory o f Neighbouring States, between 1 Jan. 1994 and 31 Dec. 1994, S.C. Res. 955, 8 Nov. 1994, art. 
3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. (1994) 1598 [hereinafter ‘ICTR Statute’].
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just and effective competition-regulating measures, divorced from the particular 
sensitivities of domestic legal systems. Hence, international standards on competition 
may be more suitable for transposition to the relations between international fora than 
comparable domestic standards.
Despite conceptual and other differences between international law and national laws, 
the ways in which domestic systems have addressed problems associated with 
concurrent jurisdiction can inspire the international system in moulding its own 
jurisdiction-regulating regime.216 Hence, after analysing domestic
4 4 4j urisdiction-regulating'norms, the question 4of the appropriateness of regulating4 similar.................
jurisdictional interactions between international courts and tribunals will be addressed.
1. Regulation ofjurisdictional problems associated with forum selection
A. Unilateral forum selection
The process throughout which one of the parties to a dispute attempts to bring a claim 
before the forum most advantageous to him or her is normally referred to as 'forum 
shopping'.217 Forum shopping has been a familiar concept in many domestic law 
systems and in private international law, for a long time now. Following the recent 
increase in the number of international courts and tribunals, parties to some 
international disputes may also engage in forum shopping and determine, by way of 
unilateral or joint action, the identity of the forum before which the dispute will be 
heard. The longer experience of domestic systems in addressing this phenomenon might 
help to evaluate whether regulation of international forum shopping is needed.
216 There are some scholars that question the legitimacy o f extrapolating domestic law 
jurisdiction-regulating norms into the international sphere. J.H.W. Virzijl, The Jurisprudence o f  the World 
Court (1965) 24. But most jurists are o f  a different opinion. Dan Ciobanu “Litispendence between the 
International Court o f  Justice and the Political Organs o f  the United Nations” 1 The Future o f  the 
International Court o f  Justice (Leo Gross, ed., 1976) 209, 215; Megalos A. Caloyanni, 38 Recueil des 
cours (1931) 651, 684; Salvatore Messina “Les tribunaux mixtes et les rapports interjuridictionnels en 
Egypte” 52 Recueil des cours (1932) 363, 470-71.
217 Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed., 1999) 666 (“The practice o f  choosing the most favourable jurisdiction 
or court in which a claim might be heard”); Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad, 315 U.S. 698, 706 (1942); 
Covey Gas & Oil Co. v. Checketts, 187 F. 2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1951); Chaplin v. Boys, [1971] A.C. 356, 
406.
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I. Forum shopping in private law
A paragon of domestic forum shopping, in the private law context, can be found in the 
American legal system,218 where parties engaged in widespread commercial activity can
910be sued before the courts of several states, or before Federal courts, under different 
laws. This state of things has been conducive for litigation tactics employed by parties
to litigation designed to channel proceedings to a favourable forum, for a variety of
221reasons.
A particular type of forum shopping can be found in international commercial and other 
- - -disputes, where parties can choose to pursue litigation before one out of several national , 
jurisdictions.222 In these cross-boundary situations, the incentives for forum shopping
999are even greater than in domestic forum shopping cases because of the greater 
differences between national laws and procedures, the longer distances between the 
competing courts and the possible bias against the foreign party to litigation. So far, the 
most prominent cross-boundary forum shopping cases have involved attempts to seize 
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in tort cases arising out of events that took place outside
224its territory.
218 Gary B. Bom, International Civil Litigation in United States Courts (3rd ed., 1996) 68; Gray v. 
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Burger King Corp., v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
219 To a large extent this is due to the American diversity rule, permitting parties coming from different 
U.S. states (or foreign countries) to insist upon litigation before Federal courts; U.S. Constitution, art. Ill, 
§ 2 .
220 See e.g., Ferens v. John Deere, Inc., 494 U.S. 516 (1990); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 
U.S. 286 (1980). Forum shopping was cynically described by one writer as "a national legal pastime". 
Skelly Wright “The Federal Courts and the Quality o f State Law” 13 Wayne L. Rev. (1967) 317, 333.
221 Considerations applied by prospective forum shoppers may include geographic convenience, the wish 
to create bargaining leverage against the other party, by compelling him or her to litigate in an 
inconvenient forum, hospitability o f  the substantive or procedural law o f the selected forum, perceived 
biases o f the judge or jury towards certain categories o f parties (e.g., parties who enjoy 'home court 
advantage' or 'hometown justice', product liability plaintiffs, members o f  minority groups etc.) or the size 
o f the court’s docket and its reputation for efficiency (both o f  which could affect the speed o f  justice). 
George D. Brown “The Ideologies o f Forum Shopping - Why Doesn't a Conservative Court Protect 
Defendants?” 71 N.C.L. Rev. (1993) 649, 653-54; Donald C. Dowing “Forum Shopping and Other 
Reflections on Litigation Involving U.S. and European Businesses” 7 Pace International Law Review
(1995) 465,470; Friedrich K. Juenger “Forum Shopping, Domestic and International” 63 Tul. L. Rev. 
(1989) 553, 555, 558-59; Note “Forum Shopping Reconsidered”, 103 Harv. L. Rev. (1990) 1677, 1678.
222 This is explained, in part, by virtue o f  the expansive nature o f some domestic jurisdiction statutes. See 
e.g., French Civil Code, art. 14 (entrusting French courts with jurisdiction over all contract claims brought 
by French parties) or Z.P.O. § 23 (entrusting German courts with jurisdiction over all owners o f  property 
located in Germany).
223 The main rationales for selecting a particular national forum in cross-boundary forum shopping 
include, inter alia, the substantive and procedural laws applicable by the selected forum, its reputation for 
efficacy, fairness and quality o f  judgments, the familiarity o f the plaintiffs with the forum’s method o f  
operation and the balance o f conveniences to the parties. See e.g., The Atlantic Star, [1972] 3 ALL E.R. 
705, 709 (C.A.)(Lord Denning MR).
224 See e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 577 F. Supp. 348 (D.D.C. 1983), 559 F. 
Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1983), 568 F. Supp. 84 (D.D.C. 1983), 604 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1984); Laker
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II. Policy arguments for and against forum shopping
The traditional attitude of jurists towards forum shopping has been one of hostility and 
many forum-shopping-associated evils have been identified. First and foremost, 
forum shopping has been perceived as a threat to legal certainty, as it deprives parties of 
foreknowledge as to which set of substantive and procedural laws would eventually 
govern their conduct and thus unduly burdens their conduct. This state of things has 
been perceived to work primarily in favour of plaintiffs whose ability to forum shop is 
typically greater than that of respondents. Consequently, it has been perceived that 
respondents sued in a forum that applies a body of laws unfamiliar to them have been 
unfairly treated.226 It has also been suggested that the risk of forum shopping might 
compel potential respondents to invest, in advance, extra costs in familiarising 
themselves with a multitude of potentially applicable legal standards, thus raising the 
'transaction costs' of engaging in cross-jurisdiction commercial activities 227
Second, it has been professed that forum shopping might lead to excessive litigation 
costs, since the removal of trials to distant fora might oblige the parties to incur 
unnecessary travel and legal costs. The moving away of litigation from the ‘natural 
surroundings’ of the dispute might also make the production of witnesses and
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 
U.S. 408 (1984); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 
1987); Andreas Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest fo r  Reasonableness: Essays in Private 
International Law  (1996) 52-57.
These cases have led Lord Denning to comment that "[a]s a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant 
drawn to the United States". Smith Kline & French Labs. v. Bloch [1983] 2 All E.R. 72, 74 (C.A.). 
Naturally, cross-boundary forum shopping has also been frequently practiced with relation to non-U.S. 
jurisdictions, such as England. See e.g., D uPont de Nemours & Co. v. I.C. Agnew, [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 
240 (C.A.); The Atlantic Star, [1973] 2 All E.R. 175 (H.L.); Order o f Nov. 12, 1985, Oberlandesgericht 
Frankfurt, 5 Praxis des Intemationalen Privat und Verfahrensrechts 297 (1986)(intemational forum 
shopping before German Courts); Case 21/76, Handelskwekerji G.J. Bier B. V. v. Mines de Potasse 
d'Alsace, [1979] E.C.R. 1735 (discussing international forum shopping before Dutch courts).
225 Atlantic Star [1973] 2 All E.R. at 181 (Lord Reid)(“There have been many recent criticisms o f  ‘forum 
shopping; and I regard it as undesirable”) Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' 
Compensation Board), 102 D.L.R. (4th) 96, 104 (Supreme Court o f Canada, 1993)([new developments do 
not mean] that "forum shopping" is now to be encouraged); Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 
(1965); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987); Torres v. S.S. 
Rosario, 125 F. Supp. 496 (D.C.N.Y. 1954)(Federal change o f  venue clause is necessary to remedy the 
‘evils o f forum shopping’); Schultz v. Boy Scouts o f  America Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 686-87 (1985); 
Neumeier v. Keuhner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 129, 286 N.E.2d 454, 458 (1972); Brinco Mining Ltd. v. Federal 
Insurance Co., 552 F. Supp. 1233, 1242 (D.D.C. 1982)(referringto a "well-founded aversion to forum 
shopping on an international scale"); Brown, Ideologies o f  Forum Shopping, supra note 221, at 666-67.
226 In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court held that changes in the applicable law caused by forum shopping 
may be viewed as a kind o f unjustified discrimination between plaintiffs. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64, 74-76 (1938).
227 Michael H. Gottesman “Draining the Dismal Swamp: the Case for Federal Choice o f  Law Statutes” 80 
Geo. L.J. (1991) 1, 13.
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documents more costly (if not impossible).228 The expenditure associated with forum 
shopping could be particularly onerous if it results in procedural battles, sometimes in
• • 9 9 0more than one jurisdiction, over where to litigate the merits of the dispute.
Third, in the era of congested court dockets, leaving the choice of forum solely in the
9T0 • •hands of the plaintiff (who might consciously select an improper one) might not bring 
about optimal results from a systematic point of view (which favours an expedient 
allocation of cases between competent courts). It has also been sometimes argued that 
the jurisdiction most connected with the dispute has an independent interest in 
adjudicating the case, and that this public interest merits protection. Correspondingly, a 
forum only remotely connected to the dispute might be justifiably reluctant to invest 
scarce judicial resources (including, in some legal systems, imposition of jury service)
9T1in order to facilitate its resolution.
Finally, the proliferation of lawsuits, exacerbated by forum shopping, has been regarded
9^ 9
by some as a deleterious social phenomenon by itself. On account of those and other 
weighty reasons,233 forum shopping has often been viewed as a negative phenomenon, 
which the courts should resist.234
However, the view on the offensive nature of forum shopping is far from uniform.235 It 
has been observed that accounts of the hardship caused to respondents by forum
228 Brown, Ideologies o f  Forum Shopping, supra note 221, at 667. See e.g. Kepler v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 
860 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Animation Station v. Chicago Bulls, LP, 992 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998).
229 See South Carolina Insurance Co. v. Assurantie Maatschappij 'de Zeven Provincien'NV  [1985] 2 All
E.R. 1046,1052 (C.A.)("Litigation is expensive enough as it is, and if a party fighting a case in this 
country has to face the prospect o f fighting procedural battles in whatever other jurisdiction his opponent 
may find a procedural advantage, it may impose intolerable burdens, and encourage the worst and most 
oppressive form o f  forum shopping").
230 This might be the case i f  the plaintiff knowingly brought proceedings before a crowded court in order 
to pre-empt a counter-claim by the respondent before a more expeditious forum.
231 G ulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).
232 Walter K. Olson, The Litigation Explosion - What H appened when America Unleashed the Lawsuit 
(1991)2.
233 An additional concern, explaining some o f  the objections to forum shopping is the notion that this 
practice undermines the myth o f equality o f the law. If manipulative forum selection determines the 
outcome o f the case, than the legal process in each competing forum might be viewed as inherently biased 
towards one o f  the parties. Furthermore, forum shopping emphasises some embarrassing inconsistencies 
o f the law. Note, supra note 221, at 1684.
234 Brown, Ideologies o f Forum Shopping, supra note 221, at 668. Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co. 
Inc. v. Fay, 165 C.L.R. 197, 253 (1988)(Opinion o f Deane J.).
235 Atlantic Star [1973] 2 All E.R. at 188 (Lord Morris o f  Borth-Y-Gest)(“It is natural and inevitable and, 
indeed, is an inherent feature o f the recognised system that a plaintiff w ill choose the place where he 
considers that his legitimate interests will be best advanced”); Goad  v. Celotex Corp., 831 F. 2d 508, 512 
n.12 (4th Cir. 1987)("There is nothing inherently evil about forum shopping"); Theodore Eisenberg and
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shopping were often exaggerated. This is because large multi-jurisdictional actors (who 
are typical respondents in forum shopping cases) are well equipped to adjust their 
conduct to the highest level of care and to defend themselves before a variety of courts 
of different jurisdictions.236 In addition, many jurists now regard the notion that there
O'XI • •exists a 'natural forum' for dispute settlement as antiquated. Hence, plaintiffs 
litigation tactics may be perceived as a mere corrective measure intended to offset 
undue advantages to the respondent in another competent forum. Moreover, the 
plaintiffs freedom to choose a forum should, according to some, be respected as part of 
his or her individual autonomy.239 According to this line of argument, shopping for 
justice should not be considered more reprehensible then shopping for any other type of 
merchandise.240 Finally, since lawsuits serve to promote the rule of law, forum shopping 
has been viewed by some as an acceptable price to pay for increased enforcement of 
legal norms.241
The actual practice of courts, especially in the U.S. and in England, in cases where 
forum shopping was exercised at the domestic level also evidences ambivalence 
towards the phenomenon. The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a clear stance 
disfavouring attempts to transfer cases from state to federal courts,242 but, at the same 
time, has assumed a 'hands off position in respect of state-to-state forum shopping.243 
Similarly, in England, there is no clear jurisprudence on the matter and courts have 
expressed opinions for and against forum shopping.244
Moreover, there are some jurisdictions where forum shopping is usually permitted. In 
Australia, forum shopping has been generally tolerated and has often been exercised
Lynn M. LoPucki “Shopping for Judges: an Empirical Analysis o f  Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 
Reorganizations” 84 Cornell L. Rev. (1999) 967, 971.
236 Allan R. Stein “Erie and Court Access” 1 Yale L. J. (1991) 1935,1951; Brown, Ideologies o f Forum 
Shopping, supra note 221, at 669; Note, supra note 221, at 1691-92.
237 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 301 (1980)(Brennan J., dissenting).
238 Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg “Exorcising the Evil o f  Forum Shopping” 80 Cornell L. 
Rev. (1995) 1507, 1511-12; Louise Weinberg “Against Comity” 80 Geo. L.J. (1991) 53, 71; Note, supra 
note 221, at 1688-89.
239 Judith Resnik “Tiers” 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. (1984) 837, 847.
240 Neil Andrews, Principles o f  Civil Procedure (1994) 101.
241 Brown, Ideologies o f Forum Shopping, supra note 221, at 671-72; Weinberg, supra note 238, at 70 
(plaintiffs are 'private attorney generals'); Note, supra note 221, at 1692-93.
242 Erie, 304 U.S. 64; Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 
(1980).
243 Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 779 
(1984); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
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between different state courts245 and between state and federal courts.246 In Israel, civil 
and religious courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over various personal status issues and
• 7 4 7  • »forum-shopping tactics, although heavily criticised, are permissible. Finally, in 
Germany and other Civil Law countries, domestic forum shopping is regarded as a 
legitimate exercise of the right of access to the court system.248 It thus seems that, 
generally speaking, domestic legal systems do not employ prohibitive rules against 
forum shopping in the purely domestic law context.
III. Cross-boundary forum shopping
The review of cross-boundary forum shopping cases also reveals ambivalent reactions 
vis-a-vis the phenomenon. Many Civil Law countries do not view cross-boundary forum 
shopping as a problem.249 However, many of these legal systems have usually opted for 
a constricted definition of the their courts’ jurisdiction, which guarantees that they only 
exercise jurisdiction over disputes to which they have a real connection. A similar 
regime, which permits forum shopping, but requires that choice can only be made 
between courts that have substantial links to the dispute can be found under the Brussels
244 The Atlantic Star, [1972] 3 ALL ER at 709 (C.A., Lord Denning MR)("You may call this 'forum 
shopping', if  you please, but if  the forum is England, it is a good place to shop in ..."); South Carolina 
Insurance [1985] 2 All E.R. at 1052.
245 McKain v. R. W Miller & Co. (S. Austl.) P ty Ltd., 175 C.L.R. 1 (1991); Stevens v. Head, 176 C.L.R. 
433 (1993).
246 The introduction of'cross vesting' legislation, according to which all superior state courts and Federal 
courts are authorised to exercise the jurisdiction o f all other superior and Federal courts, where 
appropriate, has increased the popularity o f  forum shopping in Australia since it has allowed the plaintiff 
to 'shop at home'. Jurisdiction o f  Courts (Cross-vesting) Act, 1987 (Austl.); Peter Nygh “Choice o f Law 
Rules and Forum Shopping in Australia” 46 South Carolina L. Rev. (1995) 899,905-06. However, this 
process has been dealt a serious set back by a decision o f the Australian High Court proclaiming the 
Cross-Vesting legislation to be unconstitutional. Re Wakim, ex parte McNally and others, 163 Aust. L. 
Rep. (1999) 270. The Court’s decision does not reveal, however, an objection to the purpose o f the 
invalidated legislation, but rather to its formal basis o f validity.
247 Amendment o f  Family Laws (Alimony) Law, 1959, art. 18; Jurisdiction o f  Rabbinical Courts 
(Marriage and Divorce) Law, 1953, art.31; Mehanshe Shawa “The Relation between the Jurisdiction o f  
the Family Court and the Jurisdiction o f  the Rabbinical Court” 44 Hapraklit (1998) 44 (in Hebrew).
248 Markus Lenenbach “Antisuit Injunctions in England, Germany and the United States: Their Treatment 
under European Civil Procedure and the Hague Convention”, 20 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. (1998)
257, 297.
249 Haimo Schack “Report on Germany” Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law (J. J.
Fawcett, ed., 1995) 189, 196. Other states that do not regard international forum shopping as a problem 
are Argentina, Finland, Greece, New Zealand and Sweden. J.J. Fawcett “General Report” in Declining 
Jurisdiction, supra, at 1, 20-22.
250 See e.g., Netherlands Code o f Civil Procedure (WBRv), art. 429c (11) ("[a] court has no jurisdiction if  
the petition is insufficiently connected with the legal sphere o f The Netherlands"); New Code o f  Civil 
Procedure (N.C.P.C.), art. 92 (France)(a judge may declare lack o f competence "[if] the case ... cannot be 
decided by French courts"); Kurt Siehr “Report on Switzerland” in Declining Jurisdiction, supra note 
249, at 381, 382-83.
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Jurisdiction Convention251 (and to some extent under the U.S. constitutional 'minimum 
contacts' test).252
Another method for addressing cross-boundary forum shopping has been the Common 
Law’s forum non conveniens doctrine,253 which enables competent courts to decide, on 
a case-to-case basis, whether to decline jurisdiction where another, more appropriate, 
foreign forum is available.254 In this way, courts allow some degree of forum shopping 
(in justifiable circumstances), but minimise the parties' ability to engage in abusive 
forum shopping tactics. The doctrine is applied today in Common Law countries, such 
as England or the U.S.,255 where the basis of jurisdiction over foreign parties is 
generally wide and no specific links to the dispute are required.256
In the application of the doctrine, courts balance between the interest of the plaintiff in 
controlling the conduct of the proceedings and pursuing his or her legitimate 
advantages, on the one hand, and the need to ensure justice to the respondent, on the 
other hand.257 This requires, inter alia, an examination of the balance of conveniences 
of the parties (e.g., ease of access to evidence, availability and cost of producing 
witnesses, feasibility of on-site inspections and other practical considerations for an 
expeditious and inexpensive trial).258 In the U.S., courts may also consider ‘public
^CQ
factors’, embodying the interests of the involved legal systems, which may include
251 Brussels Convention, art. 16.
252 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
253 The doctrine was however originally developed in Scotland, a Civil law country. Sim v. Robinow, 19 
Sess. Cas. (R.) 665, 668 (1892); La Societe du Gaz de Paris v. La Societe Anonyme de Navigation, "Les 
Armateurs Frangais, [1926] Sess. Cas. 13, 22 (H.L.).
254 In a recent report prepared by a sub-committee o f the International Law Association (ILA), it has been 
suggested that whenever courts from one domestic legal system decline jurisdiction in favour o f the 
courts o f another state, they should confirm that referral o f  the case to that competing jurisdiction is 
feasible. Such a rule is designed to prevent situations in which the parties are left without access to any 
forum that can offer them effective relief (i.e., negative conflict o f  jurisdiction). Committee on 
International Civil and Commercial Litigation, Declining and Referring Jurisdiction in International 
Litigation - Third Interim Report submitted to the International Law Association London Conference 
(2000) 18, 26-27 (copy with author).
255 However, some U.S. states have enacted statutes, or have adopted court decisions restricting the 
application o f  the doctrine. Louis F. Del Duca and George A. Zaphiriou “Report on the U.S.A” in 
Declining Jurisdiction, supra note 249, at 401,405-06. A similar trend has been evidenced in the 
Commonwealth o f  D om inica., which has adopted a law limiting the ability o f  domestic courts to decline 
jurisdiction in product liability cases that were dismissed by other jurisdictions. Zanifa McDowell
“Forum Non Conveniens: The Caribbean and its Response to Xenophobia in American Courts ” 49 
I.C.L.Q. (2000) 108, 115-28.
256 E.g., in England, the mere presence within the jurisdiction suffices as a basis for jurisdiction. This is 
also the law in Australia, Canada, Israel and New Zealand. Fawcett, supra note 249, at 4.
257 See Atlantic Star, [1973] 2 All E.R. at 194 (Lord Wiberforce).
258 Atlantic Star, [1973] 2 All E.R. at 202 (Lord Kilbrandon).
259 G ulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09.
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the weighing of the respective sizes of the competing courts' dockets, the need to 
minimise jury duties in cases unrelated to the forum, difficulties in applying foreign law 
and exercise of comity towards the interest of foreign courts in adjudicating 'local 
claims'.260 The application of this balancing test is instructive of the attitude held 
towards forum shopping. The more courts are ready to decline jurisdiction in favour of 
another more appropriate forum (necessarily, not the forum selected by the plaintiff), 
the less hospitable is the legal environment for forum shopping.
In earlier times, a restrictive doctrine of denial of jurisdiction has prevailed in 
England.261 Its application had been reflective of the view of forum shopping as an
7 6  7unavoidable, and probably justifiable, practice. Although this restrictive rule is still 
prevalent in some Common Law countries such as Australia,263 English courts have 
demonstrated in recent decades greater readiness to curb lawsuits brought before them 
despite the availability of a more appropriate foreign forum.264 This trend has 
culminated in 1987 with the formal incorporation of the forum non-conveniens doctrine 
into English law through the House of Lords decision in the Spiliada case. Most other 
Common Law countries, such as Canada, New Zealand and Israel, have followed suit
9 6 6shortly afterwards.
Although Civil Law legal systems do not, as a rule, invest domestic courts with wide
• 9 6 7  •discretionary powers (including discretion on whether to decline jurisdiction), some
260 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Howe v. Goldcorp Investments, Ltd., 946 F.2d 944 
(1st Cir. 1991); Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories Division o f  American Home Products Organization, 510
F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
261 This is the 'vexatious and oppressive' standard applied in England until 1973. St. Pierre v. South 
American Stores (Gath & Chaves) Ltd. [1935] All E.R. 408 ,414 (C.A).
262 St. Pierre [1935] All E.R. at 414; Atlantic Star [1973] 2 ALL E.R. at 188 (Lord Morris, Dissenting 
opinion)("If the law o f  one country is more favourable than the law o f  another country, is the plaintiff to 
be criticized for choosing the former?"); Id. at 197 (Lord Simon, Dissenting opinion)('"Forum shopping1 
is a dirty word; but it is only a pejorative way o f  saying that, if  you offer a plaintiff a choice o f  
jurisdictions, he will naturally choose the one in which he thinks his case can be most favourably 
presented: this should be a matter neither for surprise nor for indignation.").
263 Oceanic Sun Line, 165 C.L.R. 197. The 'oppressive and vexatious' standard has been interpreted by the 
Australian High Court as indicating the clear inappropriateness o f  the Australian forum. Id. at 242 
(Opinion o f Deane J.). See also Voth v. Manildra Flour Mills P ty Ltd., 171 C.L.R. 538 (1990).
264 MacShannon v. Rockware Glass Ltd. [1978] A.C. 795; The "Abidin Dover" [1984] A.C. 398; Atlantic 
Star [1973] 2 All E.R. 175.
265 Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd. [1987] A.C. 460, 476. See also RTZ v. Connolly [1998] A.C. 
854.
266 See Amchem Products, 102 D.L.R. 107, 111-12; Civil Code, art. 3135 (Quebec). See also McConnell 
Dowell Constructors Ltd. v. L loyd’s Syndicate 396 [1988] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257 (New Zealand);.Civ. App. 
2705/91, Abu-Ghichla v. The East Jerusalem Electric Co., 48 (1) P.D. 556 (1993)(Supreme Court o f  
Israel); The Adhiguna Meranti [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 384 (Hong Kong C.A.); Brinkerhoff Maritime 
Drilling Corp. v. PT  Airfast Services Indonesia [1992] 2 Singapore Law Reports 776.
267 Fawcett, supra note 249, at 22-23.
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Civil Law countries have in effect authorised their courts to decide whether to impede 
abusive forum shopping. Hence, Japan and Sweden , for instance, have shaped their 
jurisdiction-conferring laws so to exclude competence over disputes that their courts 
view, on a balance, to be only remotely related to the forum, and now essentially follow 
a variation of the forum non-conveniens doctrine. In other Civil Law countries, 
substitute doctrines have developed to counter abusive forum shopping (e.g., through
97 napplication of the abus de droit rule).
Finally, the recognition and enforcement of judgments procured in a foreign country 
through illegitimate forum shopping might be withheld by courts of both the Common 
and Civil Law legal systems.271
In sum, the above investigation confirms the view that there is no comprehensive bar 
against forum shopping neither at the domestic nor the cross-boundary level.272 
However, most of the surveyed jurisdictions do apply measures designed to mitigate 
abusive forum shopping -  i.e., referral of disputes to clearly inappropriate courts out of 
illegitimate motives.273
This conclusion as to the general permissibility of forum selection is also confirmed by 
the practice of different courts from different jurisdictions involved in competition over 
criminal cases (although, given the differences in identity of the prosecuting authorities, 
the alternative prosecutions do not strictly qualify as competing procedures under the 
working definition of the present study) 274 Such practice confirms that there are a few,
268 Goto v. Malaysian Airlines System Berhad, 26 Jap. Ann. Int’l L. (1983) 122 (Supreme Court, 1981); 
Masato Dogauchi “Report on Japan” in Declining Jurisdiction, supra note 249, at 303, 309-10.
269 Michael Bogdan “Report on Sweden” in Declining Jurisdiction, supra note 249, at 371, 373-74.
270 For instance, in France and Germany, a case can be dismissed if  the plaintiff can show no legitimate 
interest in taking legal action Fawcett, supra note 249, at 25; Alexander Reus “Judicial Discretion: A 
Comparative View o f the Doctrine o f Forum Non Conveniens in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and Germany” 16 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. (1994) 455,491-92. A similar abuse o f  right doctrine can 
be found in Greece. Fawcett, supra, at 25.
271 Z.P.O. § 328 (1); Code o f  Civil Procedure No. 6, art. 797 (1) (Quebec); Foreign Judgments 
Enforcement Law, 1958, art. 6(a)(3)(Israel; Simitch, Cass, le  civ., 6 Feb. 1985 [1985] R.C. 369 (France). 
Similarly, in most U.S. states, judgments rendered by courts lacking jurisdiction (as defined by U.S. 
standards) will not be enforced. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, § 4 (a)(2)-(3), 13 
Uniform Laws Annotated 263 (1980 & 1991 Supp.).
272 Report o f  the ILA Committee, supra note 254, at 3 (“The truth is that all systems o f  civil 
jurisdiction afford the parties a wide degree o f  choice as to where to sue in cross-border cases o f any 
complexity); Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict o f  Laws (1963) 177-85.
273 Cf. Report o f the ILA Committee, supra note 254, at 24.
274 This is the case when a crime is linked to more than one national jurisdiction (typical jurisdictional 
links being the location o f the crime, the nationality o f the perpetrator or victim and the national interest 
implicated by the criminal act). Brownlie, Principles o f  In t’l Law, supra note 14, at 314; Bartram S.
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if any limits upon the right of national authorities to decide upon the proper trial 
forum.275 In other words, national prosecution authorities may, in the absence of a 
specific agreement to the contrary, freely determine whether to prosecute, extradite or 
take no measures against a suspect,277 or in the case of multiple extradition requests - to 
which country to surrender him or her. Thus, it can be asserted that no general 
principle against forum selection can be identified in situations of cross-boundary 
competition in the criminal law sphere either.
IV A race to the courthouse
A particularly troublesome phenomenon associated with the availability of multiple fora 
might be the occurrence of a 'race to the courthouse'. Such a race may take place when 
the disputing parties are interested in litigating before different courts or tribunals and 
one or more of the competing fora gives priority to the first-seized juri sdiction. Speed of 
action can in these circumstances determine the identity of the competent forum.
Brown “Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction o f  National Courts and International 
Criminal Tribunals” 23 Yale J. Int’l L. 383, 391-93 (1998); Gerald Fitzmaurice “The General Principles 
o f International Law Considered from the Standpoint o f the Rule o f  Law” 92 Recueil de cours (1957) 1, 
213. It is also the case where a crime has been defined by international law as an international crime (e.g., 
piracy, slave trade, serious violation o f  international humanitarian law). R  v. Bow Street Metropolitan 
Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [1999] 2 All E.R. 97, 177 (H.L.)(opinion o f Lord 
Millett); In re Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 556 (1985); Eichmann v. Attorney-General o f  Israel, 36 
I.L.R. 277, 304 (1962)(Supreme Court o f Israel); Restatement o f the Law, 3rd, Foreign Relations Law o f  
the United States § 404; Henkin, In t’l Law, supra note 83, at 240.
275 Brown, Primacy or Complementarity, supra note 274, at 393 ("international law establishes no definite 
priority among [the various grounds for criminal jurisdiction]"); S.Z. Feller, Extradition Law  (1980) 262 
(in Hebrew).
276 It should be noted that international law has not even introduced a general duty to extradite. However, 
some extradition laws or treaties offer guidance on the way in which the custodial state should exercise its 
discretionary ‘forum selection’. United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition, 14 Dec. 1990, art. 4 (a),(f),
G.A. Res. 45/115, U.N. Doc. A /Res/45/116 (1991), 30 I.L.M. (1991) 1407 [hereinafter ‘UN Model 
Extradition Treaty’]; European Convention on Extradition, 13 July 1957, art. 6, 7(1), E.T.S. 24 
[hereinafter ‘European Extradition Convention’]; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f  the 
Crime o f  Genocide, 9 Dec. 1948, art. VI, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Convention against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. 10 Dec. 1984, art. 5, G.A. Res. 39/46, annex, 39, 
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) [hereinafter ‘CAT’].
277 Restatement o f the Law, 3rd, Foreign Relations Law o f  the United States § 475, comment a (1990); 
Henkin, In t’l Law, supra note 83, at 250; Kenneth S. Gallant “Securing the Presence o f  Defendants before 
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Breaking with Extradition” 5 Crim L.F. (1994)
557, 567. However, with regard to international crimes, one can often find an obligation to extradite or try 
the accused. See e.g., Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment o f  Prisoners o f  War, 12 Aug. 
1949, art. 129, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; M. Cherif Bassiouni “Accountability for International Crime and Serious 
Violations o f  Fundamental Human Rights: Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice -  The Need for 
Accountability” 59 Law and Contemporary Problems (1996) 9, 17; M. Cherif Bassiouni, International 
Extradition: United States Law and Practice (2nd rev. ed., 1987) 13-24; Colleen Enache-Brown and Ari 
Fried “Universal Crime, Jurisdiction and Duty, the Obligation o f  Aut Dedere Aut Judicare in International 
Law” 43 McGill L.J. (1998) 613, 633.
278 Extradition Act 1989, s. 12 (5)(England); UN Model Extradition Treaty, art. 16; European Extradition 
Convention, art 17 ; Feller, supra note 275, at 267. But cf. Inter-American Convention on Extradition, 25 
Feb. 1981, art. 15, 20 I.L.M. (1981) 723 [hereinafter ‘American Extradition Convention’].
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Unlike 'ordinary' forum shopping which has its proponents and opponents, the objection 
| to the practice of rushing to court seems to be ubiquitous. Indeed, it has been described
77Q 7ftflby courts of different legal systems a s ‘embarrassing’, ‘invitation of abuse’, and
i 7 ft 1‘problematic’. This is understandable given the adverse effects that this practice has 
on the propensity of the disputing parties to reach out-of-court settlements and on the 
tendency of litigation to polarise, rather than bridge over, the positions of the parties. It 
also introduces an undesirable fortuitous element into the operation of justice, since the 
outcome of the cases may be perceived not to depend on the strength of the parties' 
relative legal position, but rather on their shrewdness (the winner might be the party 
'who drew first blood').
Nonetheless, no distinct legal doctrine has been developed to tackle this particular 
procedural evil. Instead, the problem of the 'race to the courthouse' has been addressed 
by domestic courts through partly effective measures such as conditioning the 
jurisdiction of the first seized court upon the non-availability of a more appropriate 
forum (e.g., through application of the forum non conveniens doctrine),282 or mitigating 
the advantages of being first in time by allowing parallel proceedings to continue 283 
However, in that last case, a 'race to judgment' might ensue between competing sets of 
proceedings, in the hope of being the first to create a res judicata effect, which might 
bar the other fora from continuing to handle the case.
V Forum selection involving international and national courts or tribunals 
Beside competition between domestic judicial bodies (belonging to the same or 
different national legal systems), jurisdictional interaction can also be identified 
between international and domestic courts and tribunals. One prominent example of 
such interaction can be found in the prosecution of international crimes, which can take 
place before national courts or before international courts and tribunals such as the 
ICTY, the ICTR and, once established, the ICC. Unlike the only sparsely regulated 
interplay between different domestic courts in criminal matters, the relationships 
between international and domestic criminal proceedings were quite comprehensively
279 Laker, 731 F .2dat928.
280 Morrison Law Firm v. Clarion Co., 158 F.R.D. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
281 See e.g., H.C. 1000/92, Bavli v. High Rabbinical Court o f  Jerusalem, 48 (2) P.D. 221, 235-36 
(1994)(Supreme Court o f Israel).
282 See Report o f the ILA Committee, supra note 254, at 23.
283 Laker Airways, 731 F.2d, at 928-29.
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addressed in the constitutive instruments of the two ad hoc tribunals established during 
the 1990’s and in the 1998 Rome Statute.
The statutes of both the ICTY and ICTR have adopted essentially the same formula, 
which prescribes that the international tribunals will exercise concurrent jurisdiction 
with national courts, but will enjoy primacy over them when deemed necessary.284 This 
means that the ad hoc tribunals may order national courts to defer jurisdiction in their 
favour if the domestic proceedings are regarded as inappropriate (i.e., if they 
characterise an international crime as an ordinary crime or are trying to shield the 
accused). Alternatively, deferral can be requested for reason of connexity (i.e., if the 
crime before the national court raises questions of law or fact closely related to 
investigations or proceedings before the international tribunal). As a result of the rule 
of primacy, the ability of the accused person and national prosecution authorities to
'yoc.
engage in forum shopping has been dramatically undercut, while the international 
prosecutor’s ability to influence the identity of the trial forum has correspondingly 
increased.
The bestowing of primacy upon the ad hoc tribunals may be explained in the strong 
interest of the international community in punishing war criminals and in creating an 
effective deterrent against the commission of further atrocities.287 In addition, there 
existed a perception that domestic courts in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda would 
be either unwilling or unable to effectively bring war criminals into justice, or might
^QO
treat the defendants in a hostile and vindictive manner. The primacy accorded to the 
ad hoc tribunals was therefore meant, inter alia, to ensure that suspects would be
284 ICFY Statute, art. 9 (2); ICTR Statute, art. 8(2).
285 Rules o f  Procedure and Evidence o f the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
rule 9, U.N. Doc. IT/323/Rev.lO (1996); Rules o f Procedure and Evidence o f  the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, rule 9, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.1 (1995).
In the few requests for deferral made so far, special reliance had been made upon the appropriateness o f  
trying o f major war criminals before an international forum, and on the deleterious implications o f  
simultaneous proceedings before multiple jurisdictions on the availability o f  evidence and the willingness 
o f witnesses to cooperate with the international prosecution authorities. Case IT-94- 1-D, In re Tadic, I 
ICTY Judicial Reports 3, 19 (1994) (application for deferral); Case IT-95-5-D.T.Ch.II, In re Karadzic, II 
ICTY Judicial Reports (1994-95) 851, 867-69 (1995)(request for deferral); Case IT-95-6-D.T.Ch. I, In re 
Lasva River Valley, II ICTY Judicial Reports (1994-95) 921, 935-37 (1995)(request for deferral); Sean D. 
Murphy “Progress and Jurisprudence o f  the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” 
93 A.J.I.L. (1999) 57, 65.
286 Case IT-94-1-T, P 41, Prosecutor v. Tadic, I ICTY Judicial Reports 63, 95 (1995); Brown, Primacy or 
Complementarity, supra note 274, at 398.
287 Brown, Primacy or Complementarity, supra note 274, at 394.
288 Gallant, supra note 277, at 570; Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel Trachtman “ The Law and Economics o f  
Humanitarian Law Violations in Internal Conflict” 93 A.J.I.L. (1999) 394, 405.
152
brought to a fair trial and not shielded or abused through the conduct of bogus 
proceedings before local courts.289
Another possible justification for primacy has been the anticipation that multiple 
prosecutions would arise out of the conflicts in Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda before 
several national and international courts and tribunals. Consequently, there became a 
need to prevent multiple prosecutions of the same defendants290 and to ensure
9Q1 •uniformity in prosecution and sentencing policy. The concentration of a large number _ 
of related trials in one jurisdiction would reduce the risks of inconsistencies between 
various proceedings, which might give rise to serious fairness and judicial credibility 
issues.
In sum, it is arguable that the prominent nature of international tribunals, representing 
the collective stance of the international community against war crimes, and their 
guarantees of procedural fairness and impartiality have made them more appropriate 
fora to try war criminals. This view is supported by the fact that, unlike other 
international courts and tribunals, both the ICTY and the ICTR have been created by the 
UN Security Council, without the formal agreement of the relevant governments, whose 
nationals may face prosecution. This unique jurisdictional setting, which derogates from 
the traditional ‘state consent as a basis for jurisdiction’ paradigm, further underlines the 
importance attributed by the international community to the law-enforcing role of the ad 
hoc tribunals. The Statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals have thus adopted what is 
essentially a ‘most-appropriate forum selection’ rule, which upholds the predominance 
of the international tribunals over their domestic counterparts (when it is deemed 
necessary by the international prosecutors).
A different jurisdictional approach than the one adopted by the ad hoc tribunals has 
been selected with regard to the prospective ICC. According to the Rome Statute, the 
jurisdiction of the Court will only be complementary to that of national courts and the 
ICC will normally defer jurisdiction in their favour, except in circumstances, where 
the ICC is convinced that domestic courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute bona
289 Tadic (1995), 35 I.L.M. at 52.
290 Brown, Primacy or Complementarity, supra note 274, at 398.
291 Id. at 408.
292 ICC Statute, art. 1, 17 .
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fide.29j Consequently, it can be observed that the ICC Statute reflects a different view on 
the appropriateness o f international criminal proceedings than the one taken by the two 
ad hoc tribunals. While their constitutive instruments advocate the superiority of 
international proceedings, the Rome Statute seems to support the proposition that 
national courts are normally the most appropriate fora to prosecute war criminals and 
that the ICC should be activated only when no credible domestic alternative exists.294 
This divergence o f opinion can be explained in part through reference to the particular 
circumstances in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (lack of functioning domestic 
courts and special need for deterrence), which might not be present in future cases. In 
any event, the legal regime adopted by the ICC Statute signifies yet another indication 
of the will of the international community to reduce the parties' ability to engage in 
forum selection and to direct proceedings to the most appropriate forum.
Outside the sphere o f international criminal law, perhaps the most widespread rule 
governing jurisdictional interaction between international and domestic judicial organs, 
affecting inter alia the ability to engage in forum selection, has been the exhaustion of 
domestic (or local) remedies rule.297 According to this rule, international proceedings 
brought before international courts and tribunals by natural or legal persons or by states 
acting on their behalf296 must follow the conclusion of the domestic proceedings.297 This 
is because disputes ought not to be unnecessarily transformed into the international 
level,298 and due to the fact that domestic courts are generally better situated to
293 Report o f the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment o f an International Criminal Court, U.N. 
GAOR, 5 1st Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 154, U.N. Doc. A/21/22 (1996).
2 4 See Brown, Primacy or Complementarity, supra note 274, at 424, 426-27, 433; Patricia A. McKeon 
“An International Criminal Court: Balancing the Principle o f Sovereignty against the Demands for 
International Justice” 12 St. John's J. Legal Comment. (1997) 535, 555. Brown argues convincingly that 
no a priori determination can be made concerning the appropriateness o f either an international or 
national forum.
295 See e.g., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, 
art. 2, UN GA Res. 2200 A (XXI), GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 (A/6316) 52, UN Doc. A/CONF. 32/4 
[hereinafter ‘Optional Protocol to the ICCPR’]; International Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, 21 Dec. 1965, art. 14(2), UN G.A. Res. 2106A (XX), GAOR, 12th Sess., Supp. 
No. 14 (A/6014) 47, UN Doc. A/CONF. 32/4 [hereinafter ‘CERD’]; CAT, art. 22(5)(b); Convention for 
the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 Nov. 1950, art. 35(1), E.T.S. 5, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ‘European HR Convention’]; American Convention on Human Rights, 22 Nov. 
1969, art. 46(a), O.A.S. T.S. 36, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, Doc. 21, Rev. 6 (1979), 9 I.L.M. 
(1970) 673 [hereinafter ‘I/A HR Convention’]; African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 27 June 
1981, art. 56(5), O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. (1982) 58 [hereinafter ‘AHR Charter’].
296 See e.g., ICCPR, art. 41(l)(c); CERD, art. 11(3); CAT, art. 21(1X 0; European HR Convention, art. 
35(1); I/A HR Convention, art. 46(a); AHR Charter, art. 50. Traditionally, exhaustion o f domestic 
remedies has always been one o f  the conditions for the application of diplomatic protection . Interhandel 
(U.S. v. Switzerland), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 27.
297Ambatielos (Greece v. U.K.), 23 I.L.R. 306, 334 (1956); Brownlie, Principles o f  In t’l Law, supra note 
14, at 499-500.998
Shaw, supra note 24, at 567.
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adjudicate disputes involving private parties.299 However, there may be circumstances in 
which domestic proceedings would be deemed inappropriate, and the exhaustion of 
local remedies, as a result, inapplicable.300 Hence, this rule can also be described as a 
'more appropriate forum' provision, limiting forum selection on behalf of the parties by 
directing litigation, at least initially, to the more appropriate judicial body.
B. Observations on the introduction of anti-forum shopping rules into 
international law
There already have been several instances where parties to international disputes seem 
to have engaged in forum shopping. This was made possible due to the overlap between
- j n  i
the jurisdictions of different courts and tribunals, and because most of constitutive 
instruments of the various judicial and quasi-judicial bodies do not preclude dispute
'lfyy
settlement before other bodies.
In similarity to domestic and cross-boundary foreign shoppers, international forum 
shoppers may take into account a variety of considerations. These may include 
‘shopping’ for applicable legal standards which are in the party’s best interest (e.g., 
selection between the human rights definitions under the European HR Convention and 
the ICCPR), the most appropriate procedure (e.g., selection between the NAFTA 
one-tiered panel system and the WTO two-tiered machinery), the most hospitable 
judges (e.g., selection between the diversely composed ICJ and a regional tribunal 
comprised of judges from the same region) and weighing the balance of conveniences to 
the parties (e.g., selection between a nearby regional procedure and a far away global 
procedure).303 Illustrative of the considerations applied by forum shoppers has been the 
classical choice between reference of disputes to international arbitration or permanent 
courts.304
299 See e.g., Murray v. United Kingdom , 300 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30 (1994); Brownlie, Principles o f  
In t’l Law, supra note 14, at 497.
300 This is for example the case where domestic proceedings are unduly prolonged or cannot provide an 
adequate remedy. Shaw, supra note 24, at 567-68.
301 Heifer, supra note 20, at 302.
302 See e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 Dec. 1992, art. 2005 (1), 32 I.L.M. (1993) 289 
and 605 [hereinafter ‘NAFTA’]; UNCLOS, art. 280.
303 See e.g., Heifer, supra note 20, at 303-304.
304 Generally speaking, the degree o f influence that parties to litigation may exercise over the organisation 
and operation o f international courts is considerably lower than in arbitration. In contrast, parties to 
arbitration can exert almost total control over the composition o f  the tribunal, its procedures and the 
substantive law to be applied by it. Consequently, arbitration is considered to be more flexible than 
judicial settlement and susceptible o f accommodating the peculiar needs o f  the parties (e.g., mitigation o f  
costs, accessibility to non-state parties, speed, secrecy and special expertise o f  the arbitrators). Abi-Saab, 
ICJ as a World Court, supra note 127, at 7; Boyle, Settlement o f  Disputes, supra note 6, at 312-14;
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However, to date the question of the desirability of international forum shopping was 
hardly ever discussed by international courts and tribunals. Instead, the question was 
addressed to some extent during the negotiations which led to the adoption of some 
jurisdiction-regulating clauses which will be reviewed in Part III of this dissertation. 
However, as will be shown, the history of those clauses does not elucidate any 
overriding policy considerations, which should govern all cases of international forum 
shopping.
The central conclusion which can be drawn from the above discussion on forum 
shopping under domestic law is that it should not be necessarily perceived as a negative 
phenomenon. Indeed, all surveyed jurisdictional interactions tolerate some degree of 
forum shopping. This outcome can be further supported by a variety of international 
policy considerations. The freedom to exercise forum selection is consonant with
'J A C
respect for party autonomy -  a fundamental principle of international law. Forum 
shopping also facilitates the effective enforcement of norms by interested parties 
(typically plaintiffs),306 induces courts and tribunals to compete with each other over 
business by way of improving their procedure and enhances inter-fora discourse (since 
the persistence of jurisdictional overlaps implies that similar questions will eventually
Christine Gray and Benedict Kingsbury, “Inter-State Arbitration since 1945: Overview and Evaluation” in 
Int'l Courts fo r  the 21s‘ Century, supra note 128, at 55, 63-64; P.H. Kooijmans “International Arbitration 
in Historical Perspective: Past and Present” International Arbitration: Past and Prospects (A.H. A. Soons, 
ed. 1990) 23 ,25; Louis B. Sohn “International Arbitration in Historical Perspective: Past and Present” 
International Arbitration, id. at 9, 17.
However, there are clear advantages to the fixed procedure and permanent nature o f  courts. Recourse to 
courts obviates the need to form a compromis, a thing o f  significant practical importance when the dispute 
has already arisen and a detailed arbitration agreement proves to be unattainable. Moreover, courts need 
not be reconstituted anew for each dispute. Hence they mark a more advanced stage o f  institutionalisation 
and offer direct and immediate access to the differing parties (which may be crucial in cases involving 
urgent matters). The constant availability o f  competent courts decreases the 'transaction costs' associated 
with initiating proceedings, in comparison with those associated with the creation o f new ad hoc 
arbitration tribunals. Rosenne, I Law and Practice, supra note 130, at 13. In addition, most international 
courts are financed by IGOs, while arbitral tribunals are mostly funded by the parties to the case (still, 
court proceedings might take longer and be held in a location inconvenient to some or all o f  the parties). 
Brownlie, Principles o f  Int 7 Law, supra note 14, at 58. Furthermore, permanent courts are more likely to 
develop a body o f jurisprudence over time and accumulate experience and prestige.
305 Report to the General Assembly on M odel Rules on Arbitral Procedure, UN Doc. A/3859, [1958] II 
Y.B. Int. L. Comm. 82.
306 This rationale is particularly potent in the human rights sphere where the various enforcement 
mechanisms are clearly aimed at advancing the implementation o f  human rights standards. Maxime E. 
Tardu “The Protocol to the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Inter-American 
System: A Study o f  Co-Existing Petition Procedures” 70 A.J.I.L. (1976) 778, 794; Secretariat 
Memorandum prepared by the Directorate o f Human Rights o f the Council o f Europe, Effects o f  the 
Various International Human Rights Instruments providing a Mechanism fo r  Individual Communications 
on the Machinery o f  Protection established under the European Convention on Human Rights, 1 Feb. 
1985, p. 3, Doc. No. H (85) 3 (some have stressed the advantages o f  having double or even treble 
examination o f human rights complaints).
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be brought before different bodies). In practical terms, the ability to forum shop means 
that potential respondents should strive to conform their conduct to the most stringent 
applicable legal standards in order to comply with the law applied by all competent
'ic\n
international fora.
Nonetheless, while the experience of domestic legal systems suggests that some degree 
of forum selection is harmless, abusive forum shopping tactics designed to submit 
claims to clearly inappropriate fora, out of improper motives, are generally condemned. 
In fact, there are indications of opposition to abusive forum shopping exercised without 
any legitimate object in the practice of most surveyed domestic legal systems. The 
proposition that there should be limits on forum shopping also seems to conform to the 
position taken by the ICJ on the need to coordinate the allocation of national 
jurisdictions.308
A similar balancing act between permissible and impermissible forum shopping can 
also be discerned, albeit with lesser clarity, in international criminal law. While there 
are only a few impediments on the ability of national courts to prosecute criminals, 
some rules limiting forum selection and directing cases to the most appropriate forum, 
can be found in the constitutive instruments of the international criminal tribunals. The 
exhaustion of local remedies rule could also be analysed as a ‘most appropriate forum’ 
rule, restricting the freedom of choice of forum by the parties.
Thus, it could be argued on the basis of the experience of domestic legal systems and of 
international courts and tribunals which have interacted with them, that a line of 
demarcation ought to separate between legitimate and illegitimate forum shopping. This 
line can be drawn mainly on the basis of the appropriateness of the jurisdiction that was 
unilaterally seized in comparison to alternative fora and the legitimacy of the motives 
underlying forum selection. Appropriateness is normally to be gauged in accordance to 
the strengths of the links between the dispute and the forum. However, other criteria, 
such as the effectiveness of the competing judicial bodies (e.g., capacity to handle
307 There might be however rare occasions where jurisdictional overlaps might result in the imposition o f  
conflicting obligations. Heifer, supra note 20, at 357 However, this is really not a problem o f coordinating 
jurisdictions, but rather one o f  coordinating a state’s numerous international obligations.
308 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 105 (Separate 
Opinion o f Judge Fitzmaurice)(“Intemational law ... involves[s] for every State an obligation to exercise 
moderation and restraint as to the extent o f the jurisdiction assumed by its courts in cases having a foreign 
element, and to avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdiction more properly appertaining to, or more 
appropriately exercisable by another state”)(emphasis added).
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complicated litigation) and the need to protect vital interests of the parties (such as 
respect of national sovereignty) and interested third parties, might also come into play. 
Legitimacy of object is normally examined through the principle of good faith and the 
abuse of rights doctrine. At the end of the day, courts should make a policy judgment on 
the fairness and propriety of the litigation advantages that the forum shopper seeks to 
achieve through his or her actions.
It seems that the principal interests which are considered in domestic forum shopping 
situations - i.e., the desire of the applicant party to control the course of litigation, on the 
one hand, and the need to protect the respondent party from being exposed to unduly 
burdensome litigation, on the other hand, as well as other pertinent considerations, such 
as the need to promote the enforcement of norms through litigation, are also prima facie 
applicable to international disputes. Hence, some parallels could be drawn between 
forum shopping involving domestic courts and forum shopping among international 
courts and tribunals, and it looks as if the rule, permitting forum shopping with the 
exception of abusive practices applicable in almost all of the surveyed domestic legal 
systems could also govern the choice between international judicial bodies.
However, certain fundamental differences between domestic and international systems 
of law must be emphasised. First, it would seem that institutional arguments for and 
against forum shopping, which are prevalent in certain domestic legal systems (such as 
the argument that is in the public interest that litigation would take place before courts 
of a specific legal system) should not be overstated under international law. While 
domestic courts normally have an inherent compulsory jurisdiction over certain disputes 
and are entrusted with a duty to enforce the law of a particular polity (sometimes in 
disregard of the wishes of the parties), international courts and tribunals derive their 
legitimacy and competence to a large extent from the consent of the parties. Hence, an 
argument could be sustained that most international adjudication bodies are more akin 
to service-providers than to law-enforcement agencies,309 and cannot assert to have an 
independent interest in hearing a case, in derogation from the cumulative wishes of the 
parties. Moreover since all international courts and tribunals are subject to the same 
normative system and are intended to promote the welfare of the same polity -  the 
international community, there seems to be no imperative, from a systematic point of
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view, that one specific international forum and not the other will exercise jurisdiction 
(whereas in cross-boundary competition cases, national courts might be interested in 
maintaining jurisdiction so to promote their country’s idiosyncratic public policies).
Still, it can be argued that international judicial bodies, established and maintained by 
the international polity (or part thereof) and applying international law, do have a 
special responsibility towards the legal environment in which they operate. As a result, 
they ought to, when construing the norms that govern the respective rights and 
obligations of the disputing parties, also take into account, to some degree, the rights 
and interest of third parties (including the international community as a whole) that
■31 A
might be affected by the outcome of the proceedings. As a result, international 
judicial bodies may consider certain systematic considerations (such as the capabilities 
of the forum, the size of its docket or the costs for the sponsoring institution) when 
determining the propriety of their exercise of jurisdiction. But, again, given the 
consensual nature of international litigation, such consideration should be only 
complementary to those relating to the aggregate welfare of the parties to the 
proceedings.
Second, and more importantly, it is hard, albeit not impossible, to envision mammoth
differences between competing international courts and tribunals in terms of the
respective strength of their links to a dispute and with regard to the convenience or
inconvenience of appearing before them. Unlike cross-boundary competition, where
major inconveniences might be caused to private parties dragged against their will to a
distant and unfamiliar forum, respondent parties to international litigation, normally,
states or IGOs, have the resources to litigate before any international court or tribunal,
in accordance with the applicable law before it (usually, international law). As a result,
the geographical distances between the 'domicile' of the parties and the site of the events
underlying the dispute, on the one hand, and the seat of the forum, on the other hand,
seem to be of a less prohibitive nature in international adjudication than in private
1^1cross-boundary litigation. Furthermore, given the fact that party consent underlies 
participation of international actors in all international judicial or quasi-judicial
309 This assertion does not apply with regard to international courts and tribunals engaged in criminal law 
(or even, arguably, with respect o f those judicial bodies competent to receive non-compliance 
complaints). C. Romano, supra note 160, at 750.
310 See e.g., East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 101 (refusal by the Court to hear a case 
predominantly involving the rights o f  a third country).
3,1 Guruswamy, supra note 159, at 324-25.
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mechanisms, the argument that such proceedings are inherently burdensome loses much 
of its force, since it is unlikely that states or IGOs would agree to expose themselves to 
litigation before highly inconvenient fora.
Nonetheless, circumstances in which litigation before one forum would be clearly more 
appropriate than before another are conceivable even at the international plane. For 
example, an attempt by a state to bring to the ICJ an outstanding regional trade or 
human rights dispute it has with another state subject to the regional regime, in order to 
evade the jurisprudence of a competent regional court or tribunal (e.g., ECJ, NAFTA, 
ECHR, I/A HR Court) might be considered inappropriate forum shopping. This is 
because the regional and specialised bodies are clearly in a better position than the ICJ 
to address the subject matter and the geographical particulars of the dispute. In addition, 
small states might be financially and logistically overwhelmed by proceedings in a 
distant forum, in a foreign language, especially when geographically proximate 
alternative proceedings conducted in the official language of both parties might be
T19 ,  ,  ,available. In these extreme circumstances, limitations on the ability of the applicant to 
forum shop, especially if that party cannot show a legitimate purpose for his or her 
choice, might be justified. Thus, in those exceptional cases, it seems sensible to allow 
international courts and tribunals faced with reprehensible litigation tactics to adopt 
jurisdictional measures to protect the interests of the other parties.
As to the 'race to the courthouse' phenomenon, which might also occur in some 
international adjudicative context (e.g., between standing international courts and 
tribunals such as the ICJ and ITLOS),313 there seems to be general consensus between 
domestic legal systems that rushing to court constitutes an abominable occurrence, 
which should, as a rule, be constrained. Because of the undesirability of settling many 
classes of international disputes by way of adjudication as a first resort (as opposed to a 
negotiated settlement), there are even stronger policy arguments against premature 
adjudication at the international level.
312 For example, this would be the case if  one Andean Community country brought a claim against 
another Andean Community country for breach o f the Cartagena Agreement to the ICJ (whose official 
languages are English and French) and not to the Andean Court o f  Justice in Quito (whose official 
language is Spanish).
313 ‘Races to the courthouse’ cannot take place in international regimes where the roles o f  the applicant 
and respondent parties have been fixed in advance (e.g., in individual petitions to human rights bodies).
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However, domestic jurisdictions, while condemning the practice of 'races to the 
courthouse', have, by and large, applied only sporadic measures against it. While similar 
measures could also be introduced at the international plane (e.g., rules against abusive 
forum shopping) these might not appease international law’s aversion from unnecessary 
litigation and additional measures of protection against frivolous international lawsuits 
should be considered.314
Therefore, it might be wise to introduce into the constitutive instruments of international 
courts and tribunals, whose premature invocation might preclude a prompt and just 
settlement, special measures designed to curb unsavoury races to the courthouse. Such 
measures may include mandatory 'cooling off periods, during which the parties to a 
dispute would be expected to resort to diplomatic methods of dispute settlement, before 
turning to adjudication. In fact, such arrangements have already been incorporated in the 
texts of a number of international dispute settlement instruments, such as the WTO 
DSU, EC Treaty and NAFTA.315
Still, the real scope of the problem of ‘international races to the court house’ should not 
be overstated. So far, there has been only one prominent case where such occurrence 
seemed to have taken place (the EU/Chile Swordfish case), and in light of the out of 
court settlement reached there, it might be argued that the very real prospects of 
adjudication in that case served a useful purpose -  they were a catalyst for compromise.
C. Forum selection agreements
In many cases, disputing parties are able to agree on the identity of the forum to which 
the dispute is to be referred. In international law, such agreements are reached in one of 
three principal methods - ad hoc agreements (compromis), general dispute settlement 
treaties or compromissory clauses found in international treaties. The policy question 
which arises is whether there should be any limits on the freedom of the parties to select 
a forum by way of agreement, even if, objectively speaking, a more appropriate forum 
is available. Again, reference will be made to equivalent situations that have been 
encountered under domestic law (including in cross-boundary contexts).
314 Such aversion is demonstrated by the exhaustion o f local remedies rule, which implies that litigation 
before international courts and tribunals ought to occur as a last resort only.
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In the sphere of commercial law, forum selection agreements are often concluded long 
before disputes arise (e.g., compromissory clauses, inserted in the contract which 
establishes legal relations between the parties) and provide for referral of disputes to 
specific courts, jurisdictions or dispute settlement procedures (e.g., arbitration). Through 
making these agreements, the parties create a climate of greater legal certainty,316 avert, 
in the event of a dispute, litigation over the jurisdiction of the seized forum and mitigate
o i n
the risk of multiple proceedings. The forum mutually selected by the parties may be 
most advantageous to their cumulative interests or may reflect their respective 
bargaining powers and accommodate for the most part the interests of one of the parties 
(perhaps in exchange to other contractual concessions). In any case, there should be a 
strong presumption in favour of upholding the collective free will of the parties as part 
of the general need to enforce contracts {pacta sunt servanda) This conclusion is 
further supported by the procedural efficiency of following choice of forum agreements,
* • OIQthus obviating jurisdictional battles.
Still, despite the clear advantages of adopting a pro-forum selection rule, many courts in 
England and the U.S. had viewed in the past choice of forum agreements excluding 
domestic jurisdiction as unenforceable.320 This was explained by the offensiveness of 
the notion that parties to a contract may oust a competent court of its jurisdiction.321 
Indeed, investing the choice of forum with the parties might conflict with the 
independent interest of a court in hearing a case and promoting the forum's public 
policies. Moreover, it could be argued that giving effect to forum selection clauses 
might lead to a sub-optimal allocation of judicial resources since cases might be referred 
in this manner to overcrowded courts, while alternative fora remain relatively idle.
315 Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlements o f  Disputes, 15 April 1994, art. 
4(3), 33 I.L.M. (1994) 1226 [hereinafter ‘D SU ’]; EC Treaty, art. 227 (ex-article 170); NAFTA, art. 
2008(1).
316 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
317 Bom, supra note 218, at 372-73.
318 Breman v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1972).
319 See e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991); Michael M. Karayanni “The 
Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement o f  Forum Selection Clauses” 34 Duquesne University Law 
Review (1996) 1009, 1010
320 Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1959); Bom, supra note 218, at 
373-74.
321 Breman, 407 U.S., at 9; Bom, supra note 218, at 375. See also Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg 
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 (2nd Cir. 1942); Kahn v. Tazwell, 266 P. 238, 243 (1928). This is still 
the position held by some developing states vis-^-vis exclusive forum selection clauses depriving their 
local courts o f  jurisdiction. Lenenbach, supra note 248, at 285.
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However, in time, the legal doctrine in England and the U.S. has broken away from its 
hostile approach towards forum selection agreements and the present view is that 
domestic and international choice of forum agreements are to be enforced, provided that
• ♦ » 'XO'Xthey are neither unfair nor unreasonable (and that the agreement is explicit and 
valid). Under this Anglo-American standard, only choice of a highly inconvenient 
forum, or one unlikely to provide effective relief, would not be enforced.324 
Additionally, U.S. courts will refrain from enforcing choice of forum agreements that 
contravene a strong domestic public policy.
In practice, the question of enforceability of cross-boundary forum selection agreements 
has been dealt by English and U.S. courts within the theoretical framework of the forum 
non-conveniens doctrine with a strong presumption in favour of upholding the 
agreement of the parties.326 This position has also been embraced by other Common 
Law countries.327 However, most of these countries limit the full application of the
• ► • ♦ • ,3')0presumption to agreements investing the selected forum with exclusive jurisdiction.
In Civil Law countries, the status of forum selection agreements is even stronger. In
- J I A  A l l  A A A
countries such as Germany, Japan, the Netherlands Switzerland and most
322 The "Fehmarn" [1958] 1 All E.R. 333 (C.A.); The Eleftheria [1969] 2 All E.R. 641 (P.); Carnival 
Cruise, 499 U.S. 585; Breman, 407 U.S. at 10; National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 
311,315-16 (1964); Restatement o f  the Law, 2nd, Conflict o f  Laws § 80. In a few American states the old 
rule o f  non-enforceability o f choice o f forum agreements still prevails with regard to agreements between 
two American parties. Bom, supra note 218, at 378-79.
323 New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Starbag Bau AG  [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 361, 371 (C.A.).
324 Breman, 407 U.S. at 17-18; Bom, supra note 218, at 406-08.
325 Breman, 407 U.S. at 15. Public policy should generally be based on explicit legislation. W.R. Grace & 
Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757,766 (1983); Bom, supra note 218, at 415-17. With regard to choice 
o f  forum agreements selecting a particular Federal court, U.S. courts have adopted a slightly different 
view, according to which the existence o f the agreement is merely one o f  the factors to be balanced under 
the Federal forum non-conveniens clause. 28 U.S.C. § 1404; Plum Tree Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754 
(1973).
326 Fawcett, supra note 249, at 47-48, 57.
327 Huddart Parker Ltd. v. The "Mill Hill", 81 C.L.R. 502 (1950)(Austl.); Compagnie des Messageries 
Maritimes v. Wilson, 94 C.L.R. 577 (1954)(Austl.); Oceanic Sun Line, 165 C.L.R. at 224; Civ. App.
25/63, Oneon Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Moshe, 17 P.D. 646 (1963)(Supreme Court o f Israel); P. App., 30/82 
Multi-lock Inc. v. Rav-Bariach Ltd., 36 (3) P.D. 272 (1983)(Supreme Court o f  Israel); Apple Computer 
Inc. v. Apple Corp. SA [1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. 598 (New Zealand); The Vishva Aurva [1992] 2 Singapore Law 
Reports 175; Joost Blom “Report on Canada” in Declining Jurisdiction, supra note 249, at 121, 137
328 P. W.A. Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc., 98 D.L.R. (4th) 277 (Alberta Q.B. 
1992); Civ. App. 9/79, Korpol v. Horowitz, 34(1) P.D. 260 (1980)(Supreme Court o f  Israel; Judd Epstein 
“Report on Australia” in Declining Jurisdiction, supra note 249, at 79, 93.
But in England, similar effect is generally given to both exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses. 
Berisford (S&W) Pic. V. New Hampshire Insurance Co. [1990] 2 Q.B. 631; Standard Steamship Owners 
Protection & Indemnity Association (Bermuda Ltd.) v. Gann [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 528 (Q.B.).
329 Z.P.O. § 38 (German Civil Procedure Statute).
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other Civil Law countries333 the existence of a forum selection agreement, of either 
domestic or international character, normally precludes all courts not selected from 
adjudicating the case.334 This clear-cut solution has also been embraced by international 
treaties regulating the interaction between different domestic jurisdictions, such as the 
Brussels Convention.335
However, some exceptions to the pro-choice of forum rule are found even in Civil Law 
countries and in the international conventions that have accepted this rule. Courts 
should, as a rule, only enforce exclusive jurisdiction clauses336 and may decline to 
enforce agreements contrary to strong public policies that mandate adjudication before a 
particular forum. This is especially the case where the terms of the agreement had 
been attained by virtue of inequalities between the respective bargaining powers of the 
parties.338
330 Code o f Civil Procedure, art 25 (Japan); Koniglike Java China Paletvaat Lijnen BV Amsterdam  v. 
Tokyo Marine and Fire Insurance Co., 20 Japanese Annual o f  International Law (1976) 106 (Supreme 
Court, 1975).
331 Harvest Trader, HR, 28 Oct. 1988 [1989] NJ 765 (Netherlands).
332 Statute o f  Private International Law, art. 5(l)(Switzerland).
333 This is also the state o f  the law in Greece, Finland and Japan; Fawcett, supra note 249, at 48; and in 
China; Civil Procedure Law § 244 (China).
334 However, some Civil Law states have adopted a far more restrictive rule. In France, choice o f forum 
agreements involving domestic disputes are unenforceable, unless both parties are merchants. New Code 
o f Civil Procedure, art. 48 (France). However, international forum selection agreement will normally be 
respected. Cie de Signaux et d'Entreprises Electriques (CSEE) v. Soc. Sorelec, Cass, le  civ. [1986] D. 
265, obs. Audit (France). In Italy, forum selection agreements conferring jurisdiction upon a foreign 
court have no validity unless concluded between two foreigners or a foreigner and a non-domiciled Italian 
party. Code o f  Civil Procedure, 1942, art. 2 (Italy). On the other hand, agreements to litigate before an 
Italian court are normally respected. Id. art. 4(1). In some Civil Law countries, courts may decline 
jurisdiction invested with them by a jurisdictional clause. Private International Law Statute, art. 
5(3)(Switzerland); Pistacor, HR, 1 Feb. 1985, NJ 698 JCS, [1989] Netherlands International Law Reports 
59.
335 Brussels Convention, art. 17; Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement o f  Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters, 16 Sept.1988, art. 17,1988 O.J. (L 319) 9 ,2 8  I.L.M. (1988) 620 [hereinafter 
‘Lugano Convention’].
336 Statute o f  Private International Law, art. 5(l)(Switzerland); Goto, 26 Jap. Ann. Int’l L. 122; Harvest 
Trader, [1989] N.J. 765; Schack, supra note 249, at 200. It is also the common view that Article 17 o f  the 
Brussels Convention should be construed so to encompass exclusive jurisdiction clauses only. Fawcett, 
supra note 249, at 51. See also Convention on the Choice o f Court, 25 Nov. 1965, art. 6(1), Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, Recueil des Conventions de la Haye (1970) 96 (not in force). 
But cf. the law in France, which treats all forum selection clauses as exclusive. H£16ne Gaudemet-Tallon 
“Report on France” in Declining Jurisdiction, supra note 249, at 175, 184.
337 See e.g., Z.P.O. § 40; Contract Act, s. 36 (Finland); CSEE [1986] D. 265 (France); Koniglike Java, 20 
Jap. Ann. Int’l L. 106. See also Brussels Convention, art. 17.
338 See e.g., Act No. 1429/1984, art. 4 (l)-(2) [1984] Kodex No. B 327 f f  (Greece)(provisions compelling 
Greek employees to litigate with their employer outside Greece might be invalid); Statute o f Private 
International Law, art. 114 (2)(Switzerland)(consumer may not waive jurisdiction in his domicile or 
habitual residence); Hapimag v. Mona Martenson [1976] A.D. 101 (Sweden)(a clause compelling 
Swedish employee to bring abroad suits against foreign employer, concerning work performed in
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A clear manifestation of the general pro-choice of forum trend can be identified in 
relation to arbitration agreements (a particular category of choice of forum 
agreements).339 While such agreements have also been regarded in the past as 
unenforceable, being an insult to the court system,340 they are nowadays regularly 
enforced and encouraged by courts341 (provided that they are valid and meet certain 
formal requirements, such as being made in writing).342 The enforceability of 
international arbitration agreements is also sanctioned by the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration343 and by several international treaties, the 
most notable of which is the 1958 New York Convention.344
However, as is the case with choice of adjudicative forum, there are also some 
exceptions to the pro-arbitration rule. Certain categories of disputes, of particular 
importance to the forum, are still perceived as non-arbitrable for reasons of public 
policy,345 although the list of such issues is steadily declining.346 Furthermore, in some 
Common Law jurisdictions, courts may exercise their discretion and decide in special
Sweden, is invalid). See also Brussels Convention, art. 12,15, 17 (limitation on validity o f jurisdiction 
clauses in insurance, consumption and employment related disputes) 
m  Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519.
340 Bom, supra note 218, at 993. Other objections to arbitration focused on the lack o f  authority and 
expertise o f  the arbitrators. Tobeyv. County o f  Bristol, 23 Fed. Cas. 1313, 1321-23 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). 
Similarly, under traditional Muslim law, arbitration agreements were not binding. Abdul H. El-Ahdab, 
Arbitration with the Arab Countries (2nd ed., 1999) 24.
341 Arbitration Act 1996, art. 9(4)(England); 9 U.S. § 2, 3 (Federal Arbitration Act); Z.P.O. §§ 91(1), 
1027a. The British Arbitration Act and the U.S. Federal Act govern both domestic and international 
arbitrations. Arbitration Act 1996, art. 2; 9 U.S. § 1.
For the most part, the law in Arab countries also recognises the validity o f  both domestic and 
international arbitration agreements. El-Ahdab, supra note 340, passim.
342 Fawcett, supra note 249, at 61; David St. John Sutton, John Kendall and Judith Gill, Russell on 
Arbitration (21st ed., 1997) 324-333.
343 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 21 June 1985, art. 8(1), UN Doc. 
A/40/17, Annex I, 24 I.L.M. (1985) 1302 [hereinafter ‘UNCITRAL Model Law’]. To date 34 
jurisdictions (including 4 U.S. states) have adopted legislation incorporating the 1985 UN Model Law.
344 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement o f  Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June 1958, art. II (3), 
330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter N ew  York Convention']. To date 121 states have ratified the Convention. 
See also Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 30 Jan. 1975, 14 I.L.M. 
(1975) 336; The Amman Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration, 14 April 1987, art. 27, reprinted 
in El-Ahdab, supra note 340, at 971.
345 New York Convention, art. II (1); UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 1 (1). Gary B. Bom, International 
Commercial Arbitration in the United States (1994) 322-82, 1017-18; Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 
(1953)(dispute relating to the Securities Act, 1933, is non-arbitrable). Other areas o f  U.S. law held to be 
non-arbitrable include patent law and certain labour claims. See also Maureen Williams “Report on 
Argentina” in Declining Jurisdiction, supra note 249, at 71, 75 (in Argentina, only pecuniary matters are 
arbitrable); Civ. App. 591/73, Baschist v. Workers in Rishon Le Zion andZichron Yaacov Vineyards, 28 
(1) P.D. 759, 763 (1974) (Supreme Court o f  Israel)(only financial and business disputes are normally 
considered arbitrable); El-Ahdab, supra note 340, at 66 (in Algeria, certain personal status and public 
order matters are non-arbitrable).
346 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)(antitrust suits, 
involving foreign party, are now arbitrable).
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circumstances not to stay proceedings in favour of agreed-upon arbitration for reasons 
of justice.347
D. Observations on the effects to be given to forum selection agreements under 
international law
The positive attitude towards forum selection and arbitration agreements demonstrated 
by virtually all surveyed legal systems (in both intra- and inter-systematic jurisdictional 
interactions), the texts of international instruments and the writing of scholars, suggests 
that there is broad consensus on the notion that forum selection agreements do not 
constitute a jurisdictional problem. On the contrary, it looks as if parties should be 
encouraged to conclude such agreements, which adequately reflect their interests, and 
do away with litigation over where to litigate. It could even be argued that the 
ubiquitous recognition of forum selection and arbitration agreements349 is indicative of 
the emergence of a general principle of law, providing that agreements on the identity of 
the forum before which disputes should be resolved must be generally respected.
Still, even if no general principle of law can be identified, the rationale supporting 
recognition of forum selection agreement applies even more forcefully in the 
international plane, where consent of the parties is the driving force behind the creation 
of legal arrangements, including jurisdictional arrangements. Another pertinent 
consideration is that institutional factors (i.e., the independent interest of the forum in 
exercising jurisdiction), which might conflict with the wishes of the parties, play a 
relatively minor part in the decisions of international courts and tribunals. Hence, 
international judicial bodies should and do generally give effect, as much as possible, to 
the choice of forum made by the parties. This proposition also means that international 
judicial bodies should, like their domestic counterparts, decline jurisdiction in cases 
brought before them in violation of a valid choice of forum agreement, when it is clear 
that the parties intended to exclude through their agreement the jurisdiction of other 
judicial fora.
347 Arbitration Act, 1908, art. 5 (New Zealand); Arbitration Law, 1968, art. 5 (c)(Israel). This is also the 
law in Australia and Scotland. Fawcett, supra note 249, at 60. In England, courts are nowadays under a 
general duty to stay proceedings in favour o f  arbitration. Arbitration Act 1996, art. 9.
348 Fawcett, supra note 249, at 68.
349 Fawcett, supra note 249, at 69 (“There is even more uniformity o f  approach among States when it 
comes to arbitration agreements”).
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However, there still might be circumstances in which strong policy arguments could be 
invoked against attempts made by the parties to evade the jurisdiction of a particular 
type of international procedure. This may be the case in disputes that involve significant 
interests of third parties or the whole international community, which can only be 
represented through adjudication before a specific forum. For instance, it may be 
argued that future deep seabed mining disputes between parties to UNCLOS should be 
litigated only before the sea-bed dispute settlement chamber of ITLOS and not through 
bilateral arbitration (even if the parties wish so), because of the third-party implications 
of any settlement between the disputing parties.350 In the same vein, it had been argued 
that even had there been no explicit clause to this effect, disputes between EC states 
concerning EC law (and, necessarily, broad Community interests) should only be
•  ^S1addressed by the competent judicial authorities of the European Community.
2. Regulation o f  jurisdictional problems associated with multiple 
proceedings
Perhaps the most serious problem associated with the availability of multiple fora is the 
potential for multiple litigation. The ability to pursue a single claim before several 
jurisdictions at the same time, or to engage in 'piecemeal litigation' of a single dispute 
before different tribunals, either simultaneously or in consecutive order, raises 
significant objections.352 Such duplicative practices draw heavily on scarce judicial 
resources,353 carry the risk of legal havoc, which might be caused by inconsistent 
decisions,354 and place an undue burden on some or all of the parties due to increased
- i f f
litigation expenses and reduced legal certainty. In response to these concerns, 
virtually all domestic legal systems have developed some variation of the lis alibi 
pendens and res judicata rules, designed to reduce the occurrence of multiple 
proceedings.
350 Cf. Arbitral Aw ard o f  31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), 1991 I.C.J. 53, 121 (joint dissenting 
opinion o f Judges Mawdsley and Ranjeva); Robert Y. Jennings “The Role o f  the International Court o f  
Justice in the Development o f  International Protection Law” 1 Review o f  European Community and 
International Environmental Law  (1992) 240, 241-47. W. Michael Reisman “The Supervisory 
Jurisdiction o f the International Court o f Justice: International Arbitration and International Adjudication” 
258 Recueil des cours (1996) 9, 52-53.
351 See infra Chapter 5, at p. 224.
352 Colorado River Water Conservation District v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976); Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hosp. V. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19 (1983).
353 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 725 F. Supp. 317 (S.D. Miss. 1989).
354 Davidson v. Exxon Corp. 778 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. La. 1991); Hooker, 960 F. Supp. 1283.
355 South Carolina [1985] 2 All E.R. at 1052.
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However, it should be emphasised that the objections to multiple proceedings pertain to 
truly competing proceedings and do not encompass merely related proceedings. If two 
sets of proceedings involve different parties, different fact patterns or different legal 
claims, the arguments against multiplicity lose much of their force. This is because it is 
widely accepted that every party to a dispute has the right to have his or her day in 
court356 and that the claimant may freely decide on the particulars of the claim (on what 
grounds to sue, when to file the complaint, who to name as the respondent and what 
remedies to request), including which competent court to seize (as long as the claimant 
exercises his or her rights in a non-abusive manner). Thus, an overly broad multiple 
litigation bar might place exorbitant limitations on this fundamental expression of party 
autonomy.357
In appreciation of these concerns, the preclusion rules commonly found in domestic 
systems of law (lis alibi pendens and res judicata) condition their application on a high 
degree of similarity between the competing multiple claims and real competition can 
only take place between proceedings involving the same parties and raising the same 
issues.359 Still, many national and international instruments deem it desirable (yet 
usually not obligatory) that related, though not identical, proceedings, should also be 
consolidated into one judicial forum (the principle of connexity).360
A. Parallel proceedings
This following segment will focus on one particular manifestation of multiple 
proceedings, namely, parallel proceedings, whereas the next segment is to address the
356 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62 (1989); Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798
(1996); R. Jason Richards “Richards v. Jefferson County: The Supreme Court Stems the Crimson Tide o f  
Res Judicata” 38 Santa Clara Law Review 691, 699-700 (1998).
357 Richards, 517 U.S. at 711-12, 729-30, 797.
358 The established exceptions to the application o f the res judicata rule between the same parties under 
domestic U.S. law are privity and adequate representation o f  interests. Burns v. Unemployment 
Compensation Board o f  Review, 65 A.2d 445 (1945); Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 265 N.E.2d 739, 743
(1970); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas International Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1977).
359 See e.g., SaifA li v. Sydney Mitchell & Co. [1978] 3 All ER 1033, 1045 (H.L); Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments 
§514.
360 Rules o f  the Supreme Court, Order 15, rule 1, 2(2), 4 (England); New Code o f  Civil Procedure, art.
101 (France); Code o f Civil Procedure, art. 31 (Greece); Mirjam Freudenthal and Frans van der Velden 
“Report on the Netherlands” in Declining Jurisdiction, supra note 249, at 321, 337 (Dutch courts will 
normally refuse jurisdiction in the face o f related proceedings pending before a foreign court); Williams, 
supra note 345, at 75 (connexity is covered under Argentinean law by the doctrine o f litispendencia).
See also Brussels Convention, art. 22; Convention on the Enforcement o f  Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (Italy-France), 3 June 1930, art. 19, 153 L.N.T.S. 135; Report o f the ILA 
Committee, supra note 254, at 7 ,23-24.
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question of finality of judgments. As already had been established, there have been, to 
date, only a few cases where international proceedings were pending simultaneously 
before more than one international forum. Further, even those international courts and 
tribunals that have encountered the phenomenon have offered only limited discussion of 
the theoretical dimensions of the subject. As a result, one must refer again to 
jurisdictional competition within domestic legal systems and to other interactions 
involving domestic courts, in attempt to extrapolate considerations, which could also be 
applied in the international context.
The co-existence of two or more simultaneous proceedings before different fora places 
an unusually heavy burden on the parties to litigation, which are required to maintain 
two legal teams or shuttle between two or more tribunals.361 It also entails the 
investment of unnecessarily duplicative judicial time and resources by courts and 
tribunals that are faced with similar (if not identical) tasks and yet are unable to rely on 
the work of each other. This problem of judicial efficiency might be further exacerbated 
due to the introduction of jurisdictional motions designed to determine which of the 
competing fora should rightfully adjudicate the dispute and by the risk that the 
concurrence of actions will induce parties to race towards judgment, in the hope that 
once a judgment before one tribunal is entered, the other judicial fora will recognise and 
enforce it. Such a race might also involve unsavoury attempts by one or more of the 
parties to stall proceedings before what they deem to be the less hospitable forum.
Thus, the possibility of parallel proceedings may radically increase the costs of the legal 
process and offer apt room for manipulating it.364 Finally, it should be reiterated that 
parallel proceedings might result in inconsistent judgments,365 and some have suggested 
that this is the raison d’etre of the rule against litispendence.366
In Common Law countries, courts may address related actions via the forum non-conveniens doctrine and 
limit thereby oppressive legal tactics not covered by the traditional lis alibi pendens rule. Fawcett, supra 
note 249, at 43.
361 The "Abidin Dover" [1984] A.C. at 411-12; E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Diamond Shamrock 
Corp., 522 F. Supp. 588 (D.C. Del. 1981); Fawcett, supra note 249, at 28.
362 Louise E. Teitz “Taking Multiple Bites o f  the Apple: A  Proposal to Resolve Conflicts o f Jurisdiction 
and Multiple Proceedings” 25 Int’l Lawyer (1992) 21 ,31.
363 The "Abidin Dover" [1984] A.C. at 423; Du Pont (E.I.) de Nemours & Co. v. Agnew & Kerr [1987] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 585, 589 (C.A.); China Trade and Development Corp. v. M V Choong Yong, 837 F.2d. 33, 39 
(2 Cir. 1987)(Bright J. dissenting).
364 Teitz, supra note 362, at 29.
365 Case 144/86, Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG  v. Palumbo [1987] E.C.R. 4861, 4874; Overseas Union 
Insurance Ltd. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co. [1992] 2 W.L.R. 586 (ECJ).
366 Certain German Interests, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 9-1, at 83 [Discours Prononc6 par M. Kaufmann 
(Allemagne)](“La raison d’etre de l ’exception de litispendance est que l’on veut eviter deux sentences 
diffSrentes ayant l ’autorit^ de la chose jugee en ce qui conceme la meme objet”); Report o f  the ILA 
Committee, supra note 254, at 6.
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I. Parallel proceedings under domestic law
There is little support in the literature and case law in favour of multiple proceedings 
per se (as a legitimate manifestation of party autonomy), and most domestic legal 
systems do not appreciate being seized while the same dispute is pending elsewhere 
(except where the first-in-time set of proceedings is clearly inappropriate). However, 
from an institutional point of view, it has sometimes been submitted that domestic fora 
have an independent right to exercise jurisdiction on matters falling under their 
prescriptive powers, even if parallel proceedings would ensue from such exercise of 
authority.367 This argument resonates with similar arguments introduced earlier against 
the parties' ability to select a forum (unilaterally or by way of agreement), and oust 
thereby a competent court out of jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, most of the surveyed domestic legal systems, coming from both Common 
and Civil Law legal systems, apply the lis alibi pendens rule that provides that domestic 
courts cannot accept jurisdiction over a case already pending before another court in the 
same legal system (with the partial exception of the U.S., where parallel proceedings 
pending before the state and federal legal systems are generally permissible). This is a 
strong indication of the almost universal opposition to the phenomenon of parallel 
litigation, when occurring in the intra-systematic context.
However, with regard to cross-boundary parallel litigation (i.e., pendency of cases 
before courts of different countries), the attitude of domestic legal systems, particularly, 
in Common Law systems, has been more ambivalent, reflecting what seems to be a 
more flexible jurisdiction-regulating standard. This is because the idea that courts in one 
state must not exercise their jurisdiction by reason of legal proceedings taking place 
before another jurisdiction has been perceived by some as incompatible with notions of 
state sovereignty and independence.370
367 Laker Airways, 731 F. 2d at 927.
368 Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 49(2) (England); New Code o f Civil Procedure, art. 100 (France); Code o f  
Civil Procedure, art. 231 (Japan); Code o f Civil Procedure, art. 222 (Greece); Z.P.O. § 261(3); Herzog, 
Civil Procedure in France, supra note 183, at 437; Harold Koch and Franck Diedrich, Civil Procedure in 
Germany (1998) 70; Williams, supra note 345, at 74 (in Argentina there exists a defence o f  
litispendencia, barring parallel litigation).
369 There is no bar against parallel proceedings before a U.S. state and a Federal court, but in 'exceptional 
circumstances' only. Colorado River, 424 U.S. 817. However, it could be argued that State-Federal 
competition is more akin to inter- than to intra-systematic competition. Indeed, parallel proceedings 
between Federal courts and between state courts are precluded by virtue o f  lis alibi pendens rules. Landis 
v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936); Am. Jur. 2d., Courts § 91.
370 Donnedieu de Vabres “Le conflict des lois de competence judiciare dans les actions personnelles” 26 
Recueil des cours (1929) 261.
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Still, a large number of different legal systems employ one or more of the following 
remedies against cross-boundary parallel proceedings: (1) decline of jurisdiction by the 
domestic forum (not necessarily through application of the lis alibi pendens rule); (2) 
issuing of anti-suit injunctions against the foreign forum; or (3) refusal to recognise and 
enforce foreign judgment procured through parallel proceedings. However, these
• 071measures are, as a rule, discretionary, and sometimes, of a very exceptional nature.
In Common Law countries, courts generally deal with the problem of cross-boundary 
parallel litigation primarily on a case-to-case basis within the legal framework of the 
forum non-conveniens doctrine.372 The existence of another set of proceedings in 
another jurisdiction, with its implications for party convenience and judicial efficiency, 
constitutes but one of the factors that ought to be considered by the seized court. In 
some cases, special importance has been attributed to the order in which proceedings 
were initiated and to the respective stage of progress of the competing procedure in
0 7 * 7
determining whether to dismiss one set of parallel proceedings. Moreover, the fact
that the same party initiated both sets of parallel proceedings might also be a decisive 
factor in dismissing the case.374 Hence it could be asserted that while Common Law
371 The dominant approach in the U.S. has been one that permits parallel cross-boundary proceedings to 
continue. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 928. Some Japanese courts have also allowed the pendency o f  
cross-boundary claims and refused to exercise their discretion to stay proceedings. Dogauchi, supra note 
268, at 311.
372 The "Abidin Dover" [1984] A.C. 398; Du Pont (E.I.) [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 585; CanastrandIndustries 
Ltd. v. The 'Lara S' [1992] 3 F.C. 398 (T.D.)(Canada); Sentry Corp. v. Peat M arwick Mitchell & Co., 95 
Aust. L. Rep. (1990) 11, 36 (Austl.); McConnell Dowell [1988] N.Z.L.R. at 275-78 (New Zealand);
Steven Goldstein “Report on Israel” in Declining Jurisdiction, supra note 249, at 259, 261. In some cases 
the application o f the doctrine has been grounded in statutory law. Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings 
Act 1973, s. 5 (b), Schedule 1, par. 9 (l)(b)(England); Transnational Causes o f  Action (Product Liability) 
Act 1997, s. 4(3)(Dominica).
In the U.S., the lis alibi pendens rule, applicable in competition between Federal courts, has also been 
subsequently described as closely related or a particular subset o f  the forum non-conveniens doctrine. 
Restatement (Second) Conflict o f  Laws § 84 comment e (1971); Bom, supra note 218, at 461. In 
cross-boundary cases, U.S. Federal courts have been split on whether to apply an expansive or restrictive 
discretionary standard. Neuchatel Swiss General Ins. Co. v. Lufthansa Airlines, 925 F. 2d 1193, 1195 (9th 
Cir. 1991); Continental Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank, 543 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
An analogous rule, considering lis pendens as one o f multiple factors to be weighed in deciding whether 
to decline jurisdiction can be found some Civil Law systems. See Civil Code, art. 3137 (Quebec); Miniera 
di Fragne, Cass, le  Civ., 20 Oct. 1987 [1987] IV J.C.P. 400 (France). Greenline Shipping Co. Ltd. v. 
California First Bank, 28 Jap. Ann. Int’l L. (1985) 243.
373 Cleveland Museum o f  Art v. Capricorn Art [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 166; McConnell Dowell [1988] 
N.Z.L.R. at 275-78; Ronar, Inc. v. Wallace, 649 F. Supp. 310, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)("comity counsels that 
priority generally goes to the suit first filed”). In one Japanese case, the Court decided not to decline 
jurisdiction, citing the fact that the foreign parallel proceedings were still in a preliminary stage.
Miyakoshi Machine Tools Co. Ltd. v. Gould Inc., Hanrei Jiho No. 1348 (Tokyo District Court, 1989), 
described in Dogauchi, supra note 268, at 313-14.
374 Australian Commercial Research & Development Ltd. v. ANZ McCaughan Merchant Bank [1989] 3 
All E.R. 65 (plaintiff cannot proceed in both fora).
171
courts seem to be displeased with cross-boundary parallel litigation, they have not 
embraced a comprehensive bar against the phenomenon and there could be 
circumstances in which the existence of parallel proceedings will be tolerated. One case, 
in which the High Court of New Zealand has reached the conclusion that, as a matter of 
discretion, the balance of considerations support a stay of proceedings simultaneously
'in c
pending before an ICSID tribunal suggests that the approach of common law courts 
vis-a-vis international courts and tribunals might be generally similar to that evidenced 
towards foreign courts.
In most Civil Law countries, though not in all of them, the risk of cross-boundary 
parallel litigation has been addressed mainly through statutory lis alibi pendens rules, 
ordering courts to decline jurisdiction if foreign proceedings are already pending on the 
same matter, between the same parties (usually, on condition that the foreign 
proceedings may lead to a recognisable judgment).376 This 'first-seized' rule377 has also 
been incorporated into the Brussels Judgments Convention378 and other international 
instruments regulating division of jurisdictions between different national courts379 or 
between international and national fora.380 Such strict jurisdiction-regulating rule 
guarantees expeditious resort to adjudication, and mitigates the mischievous
375 Attorney General v. M obil Oil NZ Ltd. [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 6 4 9 ,4  ICSID Rep. 117 (1987)(New  
Zealand). For criticism, see Schreuer, supra note 99, at 183.
376 Z.P.O. § 261(3); Private International Law Statute, art. 9(l)(Switzerland). This also seems to be the 
law in Argentina, Greece and Sweden. Fawcett, supra note 249, at 31-32.
A glaring exception to application o f  the lis alibi pendens rule in cross-boundary parallel litigation cases 
can be found in Italy, where the law explicitly rejects the application o f  the rule. Code o f Civil Procedure, 
art. 3 (Italy). See also Marc Fallon “Report on Belgium” in Declining Jurisdiction, supra note 249, at 99, 
109 (in Belgium, there is no statutory rule o f  lis alibi pendens in international cases).
Some Common Law jurisdictions have also excluded lis alibi pendens measures in some international 
jurisdictional competition cases relating to specific legal areas. Divorce Act, Ch. 3, s. 3 (2), Revised 
Statutes o f  Canada 1985, Ch. 3 (2nd Supp.); Admiralty Act 1973, s. 6 (2)-(3)(New Zealand).
377 It must be realised that ascertaining the exact time in which a court is deemed seized is a very sensitive 
issue. According to the ECJ this matter is to be decided in accordance with the domestic law o f  each 
forum state. Case 129/83, Zelger v. Salinitri [1984] E.C.R. 2398. See also Fawcett, supra note 249, at 
32-34.
378 Brussels Convention, art. 21.
379 See Convention (Italy-France), supra note 360, art. 19; Convention regarding the Recognition and 
Enforcement o f  Judicial Decisions (Italy-Switzerland), 3 Jan. 1933, art. 8, 142 L.N.T.S. 17; Convention 
concerning the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement o f  Judicial Decisions, Arbitral Awards and 
Authentic Acts in Civil and Commercial Matters (Belgium-Germany), 30 June 1958, art. 15, 387 
U.N.T.S. 245; Convention concerning the Recognition and Enforcement o f  Judicial Decisions and 
Arbitral Awards (Belgium-Switzerland), 29 April 1959, art. 10,443 U.N.T.S. 35; Convention concerning 
the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement o f  Judicial Decisions and other Enforceable Instruments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters (Belgium-Italy), 6 April 1962, art. 14,490 U.N.T.S. 317; Convention 
concerning the Recognition and Enforcement o f  Judicial Decisions in Civil and Commercial Matters, o f  
Judicial Settlements and o f Notarial Acts (Italy-Austria), 16 Nov. 1971, art. 12, 1388 U.N.T.S. 277.
380 See Declaration o f the Government o f the Democratic and Popular Republic o f Algeria Concerning the 
Settlement o f  Claims by the Government o f the United States o f  America and the Government o f the 
Islamic Republic o f Iran, 19 Jan. 1981, art. VII (2), 1 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 10,20 I.L.M. (1981) 230.
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consequences of multiple adjudication. However, this mechanical solution might be 
viewed as unjust in particular circumstances, and increase the incentives for ‘racing to 
court’.
The main alternative to declining jurisdiction in cross-boundary parallel litigation has 
been to instruct parties to withdraw from the competing procedure - i.e., issuance of 
anti-suit injunction. However, even jurisdictions that employ anti-suit injunctions or 
anti-anti-suit injunctions (directing the parties not to seek an anti-suit injunction in 
another court) such as England,382the U.S.383 and other Common Law countries,384 
acknowledge that such measures are problematic. This is because anti-suit injunctions 
constitute clear interference with the legal process of other jurisdictions and carry a 
certain degree of offence and mistrust towards the competing courts. Hence, they might 
be considered to be incompatible with notions of international comity.385 It has also 
been conceded that competing tribunals might resort to similar measures, thereby giving
”jo /:
rise to a devastating 'injunctions battle'. Consequently, anti-suit injunctions were only 
rarely issued in cross-boundary parallel litigation cases.
381 Lenenbach, supra note 248, at 298..
382 In England, courts may issue anti-suit injunctions as part o f their authority to protect their jurisdiction 
against both domestic and cross-boundary competition. Bushby v. Munday, 56 E.R. 908 (1821). However, 
in cases o f cross-boundary parallel litigation, injunctions will only be issued in exceptional circumstances 
where England constitutes the natural forum for the lawsuit, the continuation o f  duplicative proceedings 
would be, on a balance, vexatious or oppressive, and the result would not be unjust for the plaintiff in the 
competing procedure (i.e., not deprive him or her o f  a legitimate advantage). Smith Klein & French Labs 
Ltd. v. Bloch [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, 738, 744 (C.A.); M idland Bank pic. v. Laker Airways Ltd. [1986] 1 
All E.R. 526, 526 (C.A.); Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak [1987] 3 All E.R. 
510, 522 (P.C.). Nevertheless, English courts have been more ready to issue injunctions, where the 
foreign proceedings had been submitted in breach o f  a contractual arrangement. Continental Bank v. 
Aeakos Compania Naviera [1994] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 505, 516 (C.A.); The Angelic Grace [1994] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 87, 168 (C.A); Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritime S.A. v. Pagnan S.p.A., [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 87, 
96 (C.A.).
383 In the U.S., all courts have accepted the proposition that anti-suit injunctions should be issued only 
sparingly. However, difference o f opinions has emerged with regard to the standard that should govern 
anti-suit injunction requests. Some courts have asserted the right to issue an injunction only when 
necessary to protect their jurisdiction or prevent evasion from important public policies o f  the forum. 
Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927-31; China Trade, 837 F.2d at 35-36; Gau Shan Co. v. Banker's Trust Co., 
956 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992). Still, some other courts have advocated a more flexible approach, taking 
into account the balance o f  convenience to the parties and the local forum's policies. Seattle Totems 
Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1981); American Home 
Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. o f  Ireland, 603 F. Supp. 636, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) Bom, supra note 
218, at 477; Richard W. Raushenbush, “Antisuit Injunctions and International Comity” 71 Va. L. (1985) 
1039, 1049-50.
384 See e.g., National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd. v. Sentry Corp., 87 Aust. L.Rep.539 (1989); Amchem 
Products, 102 D.L.R. 118, 120-21; Djoni Widjaja v. Bank o f America National Trust and Savings 
Association [1993] S.L.R. 678 (Singapore). See also Pan American World Airways v. Andrews, 1992 
S.L.T. 268 (Scotland).
385 Amchem Products, 102 D.L.R. at 106, 125; Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 934. Fawcett, supra note 249, 
at 62; Lenenbach, supra note 248, at 265,293-94; Teitz, supra note 362, at 36.
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In contrast with Common Law countries, Civil Law jurisdictions do not, as a rule, 
attempt to restrain foreign proceedings by way of injunctions.387 Nonetheless, there is 
some theoretical support to the view that courts may issue anti-suit injunctions in
'JQO
application of Civil Law doctrines such as abus de droit, especially when parallel
OOQ
proceedings are brought in violation of a contractual arrangement.
A third method aimed at producing a disincentive for parallel litigation is the adoption 
of rules blocking enforcement of foreign judgments procured through parallel 
proceedings. Although, only a few legal systems have explicitly adopted this 
alternative,390 most judgment recognition instruments do bar the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments that are inconsistent with final domestic judgments. This 
means that a party that conducts foreign litigation in parallel to domestic proceedings 
might not be able to enforce the foreign judgment in the domestic forum’s territory.
B. Observations on the introduction of rules regulating parallel proceedings to 
international law
The theory and practice of domestic legal systems on the issue of parallel litigation 
leads to the inevitable conclusion that parallel proceedings ought to be considered a 
negative phenomenon.392 Indeed, the case law and the literature hardly reveal any 
theoretical support for parallel proceedings, except in those rare instances where there is 
a strong public policy in maintaining jurisdiction notwithstanding the deleterious 
consequences of parallel litigation. Another situation, where it might be proper not to 
invoke the lis alibi pendens rule, might be where the initiation of the first-in-time 
proceedings had been manifestly abusive.
Nonetheless, it is possible to ascertain that all surveyed states (with the partial exception 
of the U.S.) view parallel litigation, when arising between courts of the same legal
386 Gau Shan, 926 F.2d at 1355.
387 Gaudemet-Tallon, supra note 336, at 186-87; Schack, supra note 249, at 203. But C f Johns-Manville 
Corp. v. Dominion o f  Canada General Insurance Co. [1991] Recueils de jurisprudence de Quebec 616 
(C.A.)(a Quebec court, applying Civil Law, has issued an injunction against California proceedings).
388 Dogauchi, supra note 268, at 318 (Japanese law may in theory support anti-suit injunctions); 
Lenenbach, supra note 248, at 297-301 (section 826 o f  the German Civil Code -wilful conduct contrary to 
public policy, provides a proper basis for anti-suit injunctions in cases where initiation o f  foreign parallel 
proceedings may be deemed as an unconscionable act).
89 Lenenbach, supra note 248, at 287, 290.
390 See e.g., Foreign Judgments Enforcement Law, 1958, art. 6(a)(4)-(5)(Israel); Code o f  Civil Procedure, 
no. 6, art. 797(1) (Italy).
391 See infra, at n. 428.
392 Fawcett, supra note 249, at 67.
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system as an intolerable litigation tactic and apply rules to abate the situation. It 
therefore seems possible to contend that the lis alibi pendens rule, when applied to 
intra-systematic jurisdictional conflicts, meets the conditions for being treated as a 
general principle of law. However, with respect to cross-boundary interaction many 
courts, particularly from Common Law countries, have demonstrated a considerably 
more flexible approach and have sometimes tolerated parallel proceedings. Hence, no 
common standards seem to have emerged vis-a-vis inter-systematic parallel proceedings 
(although most courts do apply discretionary measures designed to mitigate abusive 
parallel litigation).
Given the uncertainties surrounding the systematic features of international courts and 
tribunals, it is far from clear whether the general principle of lis alibi pendens applicable 
to intra-systematic cases should govern the relations between international fora. Yet, it 
looks as if the principal policy arguments against parallel litigation within the same 
legal system (inconvenience to the parties, judicial economy, race to judgment and the 
risk of inconsistent judgments) could also apply in the international sphere.
Furthermore, there seem to be unique additional reasons why international courts and 
tribunals should be protected from parallel proceedings.
While most, though not all, international parties might be better situated than private 
parties to meet the costs of duplicative international litigation, multiple proceedings 
might put an unnecessary strain on the already under-funded budgets of most 
international courts and tribunals, and are thus undesirable from a systematic point of 
view.394 Additionally, given the notorious problems of compliance with international 
norms, in general, and judgments, in particular, the adverse consequences of conflicting 
judgments might be more serious in the international sphere than under domestic legal 
systems, where third party resolution of the conflict at the enforcement stage may be 
obtainable.395 One must also recall than conflicting judgments might introduce 
confusion over the state of the law396 and undermine the normative coherence of the
393 Fawcett, supra note 249, at 68.
394 See e.g., Chorzow Factory, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 8, at 43 (Dissenting Opinion o f Judge 
Ehrlich)(there is a presumption in favour o f diminishing the amount o f  litigation).
395 See e.g., Omnium de traitement et de Valorisation v. Hilmarton, Judgment o f  10 June 1997, 22 
Yearbook o f  International Commercial Arbitration (1997) 696 (Cour de Cassation)(determination which 
of two conflicting arbitral awards should be given effect).
396 William E. Beckett “Les questions d'interet g£n6ral au point de vue juridique dans la jurisprudence de 
la Cour permanente de justice intemationale” 39 Recueil des cours (1932) 131,265.
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international legal system, in a manner akin to the effects of conflicting judgements 
rendered within the same domestic legal system.
It should be further noted the advantages of inter-fora cross-fertilisation, which can be 
cited in support of successive litigation before different fora, are largely irrelevant in 
cases of parallel litigation. This is because each of the competing fora cannot, as a rule, 
have before it the views of the other forum on the substance of the dispute during the 
concurrent pendency of the proceedings. Finally, unlike national courts involved in 
cross-boundary parallel litigation, where institutional factors (i.e., the forum’s 
independent interests in retaining jurisdiction) may override the need to curb multiple 
proceedings, international courts and tribunals, whose jurisdiction is consent-based, 
have less of an incentive to retain jurisdiction against the wishes of one or more of the 
parties. All of these considerations strongly support the introduction of lis alibi pendens 
type jurisdiction-regulating norm into international law in order to prevent parallel 
adjudication cases.
However, here too, it might be considered proper to carve out exceptions to the lis alibi 
pendens rule in order to accommodate fears that it might be exploited. For instance, if 
the invocation of the first-in-time tribunal had been made in an abusive manner (e.g., in 
breach of an agreement to litigate elsewhere) it should not to be granted precedence. 
Similarly, where third states or the entire international community have a paramount 
interest that specific matters would be addressed by a specific forum to the exclusivity 
of all other courts and tribunals, it might be wise to allow adjudication before that more 
appropriate forum to continue despite the fact that proceedings concerning the same 
dispute are already pending before another forum.
While application of the doctrine of connexity might also be desirable from a systematic 
point of view (and is supported to some extent by the Rules of Procedure of the ad hoc
O Q Q
International Criminal Tribunals), it has not been applied as a mandatory doctrine by 
many domestic legal systems. This might be explained by reason of the considerable 
affront to the autonomy of the litigating parties that compulsory consolidation of 
proceedings might represent. It should be noted that autonomy of the parties is a 
particularly important value in international adjudication, given the fact that many
397 Heifer, supra note 20, at 365-66.
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parties to litigation are sovereign states, and restrictions upon their freedom of action 
ought to be imposed only with great care.399 As a result, there hardly seems any legal or 
public policy basis for the introduction of the connexity doctrine into international 
law400
C. Finality of proceedings
The last difficulty arising from multiplicity of competent fora involves the question of 
finality of judicial proceedings. Unless regulated, it is not impossible to envision that, 
following final pronouncement on the dispute by an international court or tribunal, the 
losing party might try to re-litigate the same matter before another international forum.
The implications of such scenario are far reaching. The ability to reopen settled issues 
exposes the party which had prevailed in the first case to major inconveniences,401 and 
draws heavily on deficient judicial resources.402 More importantly, the co-existence of 
multiple and potentially inconsistent judgments undermines legal certainty and puts in 
question the authority of judicial bodies and the effectiveness and credibility of the 
entire dispute settlement machinery of the international legal system.403 If parties can 
repeatedly challenge final decisions of competent tribunals, the dispute might remain 
simmering indefinitely404 and the parties will have no incentive to comply with any 
judgment rendered.405
On the other hand, it has been pointed out that finality of judgments might lead to 
perpetuating judicial errors and that it may bar the path to truth and justice.406 Hence, a 
choice must be made between two conflicting values - finality, with its implications for 
party convenience and systematic efficiency, credibility and procedural fairness, and the
398 ICTY Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, supra note 285, rule 9; ICTR Rules o f  Procedure and 
Evidence, supra note 285, rule 9.
399 S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser A.) No. 10, at 18; Shaw, supra note 24, at 150.
400 Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser A.) No. 10, at 48 (dissenting opinion o f Judge Weiss)(" [Connexity] is 
completely foreign to international relations ... [it] is a rule o f internal convenience applicable in those 
States which have included it in their codes o f procedure; it is ineffective outside their frontiers").
401 E.g., the need to preserve evidence for an indefinite period o f  time. Elihu Hamon “Res Judicata and 
Identity o f  Actions - Law and Rationale” 1 Israel L. Rev. (1966) 539, 545; Allen D. Vestal “Rationale o f  
Preclusion” 9 St. Lou. U.L.J. (1964) 29, 34.
402 Federated Department Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981).
403 Andrews, supra note 240, at 511 (1994); Raz, supra note 34, at 216; Hamon, supra note 401, at 545.
404 Ferrer v. Arden, 77 E.R. 263. 266 (1599).
405 See also Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917); Baldwin v. Iowa State 
Travelling Men's Association, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931); Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).
406 Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. 352, 363-64 (1859); Hamon, supra note 401, at 542; Nina Zaltzman Res 
Judicata in Civil Proceedings (1991) 4 (in Hebrew).
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interests of justice, as reflected in the constant search for truth and the proper legal 
outcome.
I. Finality under domestic law
In domestic legal systems, it is well established that, on the balance, the interests of 
finality must usually prevail.407 This can be explained, in part, by the weakness of the 
justice rationale - there is no certainty that the second-in-time forum (or any subsequent 
forum) will reach a more just decision than the first-in-time tribunal on the merits of the 
dispute. As a result, municipal legal systems have adopted the res judicata (or judgment 
estoppel/preclusion) rule in order to guarantee finality of proceedings.408
According to the res judicata rule, once a dispute had been settled by one competent 
tribunal (and all avenues of appeal have been exhausted), the parties are bound by the 
final judgment in their relations vis-a-vis each other and may not re-litigate the same 
issues before another tribunal.409 Some have also contended that the doctrine of finality 
requires the consolidation of all legal claims pertaining to the same matter before one 
judicial forum, although there is no consensus on the topic.410 In any event, it is clear 
that the res judicata rule stems from deeply embedded notions that it is in society's best 
interest that there should be an end to litigation411 and that nobody should be harassed 
(or disturbed) twice in the same matter.412 This rule also promotes a climate of greater 
legal certainty, protects the authority of courts, saves judicial resources and conforms to 
traditional notions of fairness.
The res judicata rule, which was originally applied in relation to identical claims, has 
been subsequently extended in practice to the collateral (or issue) estoppel rule, which 
bars the re-litigation of specific issues determined by a competent court or tribunal. In 
other words, the collateral estoppel rule prevents parties from challenging specific
407 R v. Secretary o f  State fo r  the Environment [1983] 3 All E.R. 358, 365; State R. v. Harrington Middle 
Quarter (Inhabitants) [1855] E.R. 288, 293 (C.A.); Federal Department Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 
398-99 (1981); Medina v. Chase Manhattan Bank L td , 737 F.2d 140, 143-44 (1984).
408 Sambasivianm  v. Public Prosecutor, Federation o f  Malaya [1950] A.C. 458, 479 (P.C.); .Allen D. 
Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion (1969) V17-19.
409 Cromwell v. County o f  Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1877); Restatement (Second) o f  Judgements § 27 (1982).
410 See e.g., G. Richard Shell “Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects o f  Commercial Arbitration”
35 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. (1988) 623, 640-41.
411 The Ampthill Peerage Case [1977] A.C. 547, 575-76 (opinion o f  Lord Simon o f  Glaisdale); C.A. 
440/70, Ganem v. Ganem, 26 (2) P.D. 829, 838 (Supreme Court o f Israel); Restatement (Second) Conflict 
of Laws §98, comment b (1971); Zaltzman, supra note 406, at 14.
412 C.A. 718/75, Amram v. Scornik, 31 (1) P.D. 29, 35 (Supreme Court o f  Israel): Andrews, supra note 
240, at 503.
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judicial findings, even in the context of subsequent proceedings on a different subject 
matter.413 This, in turn, enables judicial bodies to save valuable judicial time and rely on 
the work of previous courts and tribunals that have reviewed the same question 414 
However, estoppel is normally granted on condition that the parties have had an 
adequate opportunity to raise their arguments before the first-seized tribunal 415
The res judicata rule is today found in all domestic systems of law in respect of local 
judgments and has a preclusive effect upon subsequent domestic litigation.416 Similar 
rules, albeit of slightly less absolute nature,417 govern the status of domestic arbitral 
awards. Such awards may be challenged before courts (typically on much narrower 
basis than ordinary appeals),418 but once recognised (sometimes through award 
confirmation proceedings) they bar subsequent claims. Hence, in terms of finality, the 
status of a final arbitral award is now generally equated to that of a local court's 
judgment and most disputes settled by awards cannot be re-litigated.419 As has been 
suggested above, one may draw an analogy between the rules governing the relations 
among domestic courts of law and arbitration and the rules that ought to regulate 
relations among the various international courts and tribunals. This is because in both
413 Arnold  v. National Westminster Bank p ic  [1991] 2 A.C. 93, 105; Restatement (Second) Judgments §§ 
18-19(1980).
414 Shell, supra note 410, at 626. In the U.S. and Canada, the doctrine o f  res judicata  is sometimes 
extended upon this rationale to third parties, who may use adverse findings reached in cases to which they 
were not parties in their litigation with parties to these earlier cases (i.e., non-mutual offensive estoppel). 
Andrews, supra note 240, at 511-12.
4,5 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980).
416 Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 49(2)(England); Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, s. 34 
(England). A legal action brought in violation o f  the res judicata  principle is to be deemed an abuse o f  
process, and the courts are expected to strike it out. Rules o f  the Supreme Court, Order 18, rule 11 
(l)(England); Andrews, supra note 240, at 259. See also, for example, U.S. Constitution, art. IV, §1; Code 
Civil § 1351 (France); Harold Koch and Franck Diedrich, Civil Procedure in Germany (1998) 70.
417 Some domestic arbitration awards do not bar subsequent litigation. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974)(arbitration proceedings are deemed inadequate to resolve disputes over Federally
guaranteed rights). The reasons for this are lack o f  authority o f  the arbitrators to issue certain remedies 
and procedural inequities (informality o f  proceedings, methods o f  gathering o f  evidence and insufficient
record and reasoning). Susan Hurt “Res Judicata Effects o f  State Agency Decisions in Title VII Actions” 
70 Cornell L. Rev. (1985) 695, 700.
418 Traditionally, courts in most Civil Law countries have had limited control over the merits o f an arbitral 
award and could only intervene in cases o f procedural irregularity or where public policy has been 
breached. Pieter Sanders “Arbitration” XVI International Encyclopaedia o f  Comparative Law  (Mauro 
Cappelletti, vol. ed., 1996) 34. This is essentially the situation nowadays in most Common Law systems 
as well. Arbitration Act 1996, s. 67-69 (England)(parties may exclude substantive review o f  awards); 9 
U.S.C. § 10. Still there are some recognized exceptions to this rule. Arbitration Act 1979 s. 4 (l)(c )  
(England) (allowing court review o f awards in shipping, insurance and commodity disputes); Wilko v. 
Swan, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (courts may decline to enforce awards containing manifest disregard o f the 
law). There are also some Common Law jurisdictions (e.g., some Canadian Provinces, India and 
Pakistan), which still permit broad substantive review o f arbitration.
419 Arbitration Act 1996, s. 58 (England); 9 U.S.C. § 13; Arbitration Law 1968, art. 23 (Israel); El-Ahdab, 
supra note 385, at 49 (Moslem law recognises the finality o f  arbitral awards); Shell, supra note 410, at 
643-44. For criticism, see id. at 651-52, 660.
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cases the competing fora do not form a coherent judicial structure, but yet operate 
within the same legal universe.
With regard to recognition of foreign judgments, the situation is more complex. 
Recognition and enforcement of such judgments are normally regulated on a reciprocal 
basis through international treaties,420 but in their absence domestic legal standards 
apply. In this latter case, most countries, but certainly not all of them,421 have adopted 
legislation or judge-made law granting recognition to foreign judgments.422 The 
rationale offered for the adoption of pro-recognition rules has been that such practice is 
consistent not only with the traditional justifications for the principle of finality, but also 
with the notion of international comity.423 It would seem that the later notion might also 
support the recognition of judgments of international courts and tribunals.424
However, there is some understandable reluctance on the part of courts to automatically 
abide by the decisions of all foreign courts, since some of them might fall short of local 
perceptions of procedural and substantive justice and may be oblivious to the domestic 
forum’s sensitivities. Further, some have felt that recognition and enforcement of a 
foreign judgment by domestic courts constitutes a form of relinquishment of national 
sovereignty, which merits reciprocal concessions from the foreign state. As a result of 
these misgivings, recognition and enforcement of final foreign judgments have normally 
been subject to certain qualifications (which do not apply with regard to domestic
420 Brussels Convention, art. 25-30. The Brussels Convention, which is applicable in EC states, was 
extended in 1988, following the conclusion o f  the Lugano Convention, into the territory o f EFT A states. 
There are many additional bilateral judgment recognition conventions. See e.g., Convention Providing for 
the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement o f  Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(Canada-U.K.), 24 April 1984, art. Ill, 1988 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 74 (Cmd. 519)
421 See e.g., Sweden and Finland, which do not recognise foreign judgments (unless bound to do so by an 
international treaty). Fawcett, supra note 249, at 67.
422 Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, s. 2 (England); Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act 1982, s. 34 (England); Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 13 Uniform 
Laws Annotated 263 (1980 & 1991 Supp.)(in force in over 20 American states). Z.P.O. § 328; Foreign 
Judgments Enforcement Law, 1958, art. 2, 11 (Israel).
In England, most foreign judgments are recognised and enforced on the basis o f  the Common Law, and 
not in pursuance to statutory law (which has limited application). G odard  v. Gray [1870] Q.B. 139, 
147-50; Henry v. Geoprosco International Ltd  [1976] Q.B. 726, 751. Andrews, supra note 240, at 536. In 
Israel, too, a prevailing party may choose whether to proceed on the basis o f  a statute or the Common 
Law recognition rule. C.A. 221/78, O vadiav. Cohen, 33 (1) P.D. 293 (Supreme Court o f  Israel).
423 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); McClean, Morris: Conflict o f  Laws, supra note 116, at 
104.
424 D allal v. BankM ellat [1986] 1 Q.B. 441, at 461-62 (Hobhouse J.)("... International comity requires 
that the courts o f  England should recognise the validity o f  the decisions o f  [the Iran-U.S Claims 
Tribunal]"); Brownlie, Principles o f ln t’lLaw, supra note 14, at 53-54.
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judgments or awards).425 The most notable of these limitations have been made in 
relation to due process in the foreign proceedings, the validity of the jurisdictional title 
of the foreign court,426 domestic public policy and reciprocity in recognition of 
judgments.427 Some legal systems have also refused to recognise judgments conflicting 
with previously rendered judgments on the same matter.428 However, it is commonly 
held that courts, which had been requested to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment, 
should refuse to re-examine de novo the merits of the case, as a court of appeal would 
have done.429
Similar considerations of judicial economy and procedural fairness towards the parties 
have also warranted the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Under 
the 1958 New York Convention, which is in force for more than 120 countries, awards 
rendered in the territory of signatory states must be given effect in the domestic systems 
of all other contracting states. But again, the obligation to recognise and enforce awards 
is subject to several exceptions.430 This pro-recognition approach, resulting in a bar
425 In the U.S., foreign judgments are normally recognised out o f  notions o f  comity and fairness, subject 
to condition o f  reciprocity. Hilton, 159 U.S. 113; Restatement (Second) Conflict o f  Laws §98, comment b
(1971); Hans Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. (1962) 44. The main exceptions to the recognition rule are lack o f  fairness o f the foreign system of  
law, lack o f  jurisdiction and the 'public policy' exception. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments 
Recognition Act, § 4. In England, foreign judgments are normally recognised subject to qualifications 
such as absence o f fraud, overriding public policy considerations and jurisdiction o f  the foreign court. 
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, s. 4; Administration o f Justice Act 1920, s. 9; 
Andrews, supra note 240, at 536-37; Bom, supra note 218, at 943; D. Cambell International Execution 
Against Debtors - England 5 (1993); McClean, Morris: Conflict o f  Laws, supra note 116, at 107-14. In 
Germany, the Civil Procedure Code prescribes the recognition o f  foreign judgments except where foreign 
courts did not have jurisdiction over the claim, defendant was not properly served with notice, another 
inconsistent judgments exists, recognition would be contrary to fundamental public policy or i f  there is no 
reciprocity. Z.P.O. § 328. A similar legal standard can be found under Japanese law. Japanese Code o f  
Civil Procedure (Minji soshoho) Minsoho § 200.
426 See e.g., H. Batiffol and P. Lagarde, Droit International Prive, (7th ed., 1981-83) para. 720, 726 
(French courts will not recognize a foreign judgment procured under conditions that would not have given 
rise to jurisdiction under French law).
427 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 228.
428 See Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, § 4 (b)(4), 13 Uniform Laws Annotated 263 
(1980 & 1991 Supp); Foreign Judgments Enforcement Law, 1958, art. 6(a)(4)-(5)(Israel); Vervaekev. 
Smith [1983] 1 A.C. 145; Showlagv. Mansour [1994] 2 All E.R. 129 (P.C.); Freudenthal and van der 
Velden, supra note 360, at 338 (In the Netherlands, attempts to recognize and enforce judgments 
irreconcilable with domestic judgments are deemed contrary to public order). The same rule is embodied 
in the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement o f  Decisions Relating to Maintenance 
Obligations to Children, 15 April 1958, 539 U.N.T.S. 29; Brussels Convention, art. 27(3),(5); European 
Convention on State Immunity, 16 May 1972, art. 20(2)(c), E.T.S. 74; Hague Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement o f Decisions Relating to Maintenance Obligations, 2 Oct. 1973, 1021 
U.N.T.S. 209.
429 Ferdinand Wagner v. Laubscher Bros. & Co. [197 0 ]2 Q .B .3 1 3 ,3 1 8 ; Henderson v. Henderson, 6 
Q.B. 288, 298 (1844).
430 New York Convention, art. Ill, V. These include, inter alia, lack o f competence, serious irregularities 
and incompatibility with the public policies o f  the forum where recognition and enforcement is sought.
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against re-litigation, has also been adopted by several other arbitration treaties431 and by 
national arbitration laws432 (including the UNCITRAL Model Law, in force in more 
than 30 jurisdictions) 433
For the sake of competition, one may note that a rule of finality similar to the res 
judicata rule is also found in the criminal law sphere - the non bis in idem principle434 
(also known as the double jeopardy435 or 'autrefois convict or autrefois acqui' rule). 
This principle provides that a person may not be put to criminal trial for an act436 for 
which he or she has already been tried before a competent court, if the previous trial has 
resulted in a verdict (either guilty or not guilty), and if any sentence imposed upon that 
person had been served. This rule is found, with some variations, in virtually all systems 
of law, with regard to domestic judgments,437 and can also be identified in international 
instruments governing multi-jurisdictional criminal prosecution. However, it should 
be observed that some jurisdiction allow exceptions to the rule, both with regard to 
domestic439 and, more commonly, foreign judgments.440 This last state of things
431 See e.g., Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 344, art. 5-6.
432 Such are the laws o f  states such as Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Egypt and Tunisia. Sanders, 
supra note 418, at 33 ,44 .
433 UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 34-35.
434 This Latin maxim means -  “not twice for the same thing”. Black’s  Law Dictionary (7th ed., 1999)
1665.
435 Black’s  Law Dictionary (7th ed., 1999) 506.
436 There is some confusion as to whether the non bis in idem rule covers similar offences or similar facts. 
In the first case, the rule only has narrow application since prosecution o f  the same act or omission under 
a different head o f charge is permissible. However, it seems that most (but not all) legal systems have 
opted for the ‘similar facts’ test, at least in respect o f domestic criminal judgments. Christine van den 
Wyngaert and Guy Stessens “The International Non Bis In Idem Principle: Resolving some o f  the 
Unanswered Questions” 48 I.C.L.Q. (1999) 779, 788-90. Still, it should be noted that the language used 
by the relevant human rights instruments points towards the ‘offence’ test. ICCPR, art 14 (7); European 
HR Convention, protocol 7, art. 4 (1 ); I/A HR Convention, art. 8 (4). But see, Gradinger v. Austria, Eur. 
Ct. H.R., (ser. A), No. 328, par. 55 (application o f  the ‘same conduct’ test); Van den Wyngaert and 
Stessens, supra, at 791-92.
437 Van den Wyngaert and Stessens, supra note 436, at 780. In fact, more than 50 national constitutions 
prohibit double jeopardy or non bis in idem. Cherif Bassiouni “Human Rights in the Context o f  Criminal 
Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections And Equivalent Protections in National 
Constitutions” 3 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. (1993) 235, 289. See e.g., U.S. Constitution, amend V ; . 
Extradition Act 1989, s. 6(3)(England); Extradition Law, 1954, art. 8 (Israel); Wemyss v. Hopkins [1875] 
L.R. 10; 11 (2) H alsbury’s Laws o f  England 817 (4th ed., 1990 reissue).
438 Convention applying the Schengen Agreement o f 14 June 1985 on the Gradual Abolition o f  Checks at 
Common Borders, 19 June 1990, art. 54, 30 I.L.M. (1991) 84 [hereinafter ‘Schengen Convention’]; 
European Extradition Convention, art. 9; UN Model Extradition Treaty, art. 3 (d)-(e); American 
Extradition Convention, art. 4(1).
See also ICCPR, art 14 (7); European HR Convention, protocol 7, art. 4 (1); I/A HR Conv., art. 8 
(4)(covering acquittals only); ICTY Statute, art. 10; ICTR Statute, art. 9; ICC Statute, art. 20.
An analogous rule has also been applied by the ECJ with respect to the quasi-prosecutorial powers o f the 
Commission to investigate alleged violations o f  the EC competition law. Case 7/72, Boehringer 
Mannheim v Commission [1972] E.C.R. 1281, 1294; Joined Cases T-305-07, 313-16, 318, 325, 328-29 
and 335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij N V v. Commission, [1999] E.C.R. 11-931, 975.
439 In the U.S., the principle o f double jeopardy does not fully apply between state and Federal courts.
U.S. v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 227 (1922); U.S. v. Bartkus, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); U.S. v. Wheeler, Arizona, 435
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conforms to the general attitude of some states towards inter-systematic jurisdictional 
interaction, as reflected in rules on recognition of foreign judgments and awards in 
commercial matters.441
D. Observations on finality in international law
Review of the positions of domestic legal systems and the balance of considerations 
applied by them leads to the conclusion that there is wide acceptance of the idea that 
judgments should be considered final and not open to subsequent contest (outside the 
appellate process). The consensus in national courts over the finality of domestic 
judgments seems to be indicative of the existence of a general principle of law to that 
effect.442 However, again, with respect to inter-systematic interaction, 
jurisdiction-regulation is less stringent, and a more flexible version of the finality 
principle applies in most jurisdictions.
Notwithstanding the precise systematic categorisation of international courts and 
tribunals (which can perhaps be best equated to the status of final domestic arbitral 
awards), there are strong policy arguments in favour of incorporating the res judicata 
rule into international law. In fact, the same factors that have supported the introduction 
of the finality doctrine into the various facets of domestic law provide even greater 
support to its adoption in the relations between international courts and tribunals.
Parties to international proceedings have, like their domestic counterparts, a legitimate 
interest in being able to rely on final judgments and not being exposed to endless
U.S. 313 (1978); 22 C.J.S. § 258. However, as was already observed with relation to parallel proceedings, 
the relations between U.S. state and Federal courts do not fully comport to the intra-systematic model.
440 See e.g., Code o f  Criminal Procedure, art. 65 (Austria); Chua Han M ow  v. U.S., 730 F.2d 1308 (1984); 
Van den Wyngaert and Stessens, supra note 436, at 781 n. 9, 783, 789-90. But cf. Penal Code, art. 68 
(Netherlands); Preliminary Title to Criminal Procedure Code, art. 13 (Belgium)(«o« bis in idem effect to 
foreign judgments pertaining to offences committed outside Belgium); 11 (1) H alsbury’s Laws o f  
England (4 ed., 1990) 473.
It further seems that most international human rights treaties embracing the non bid  in idem principle 
were not designed to prohibit successive prosecution in multiple national jurisdictions. Van den Wyngaert 
and Stessens, supra note 436, at 781.
441 Still, in most situations where domestic courts would put a suspect on trial despite the fact that he or 
she had been tried abroad, they will consider any foreign sentence already imposed upon the suspect as a 
mitigating factor in the decision on sentencing. Criminal Law, 1977, art. 14 (b)(3)(Israel); Schengen 
Convention, art. 56; Feller, supra note 275, at 265; Van den Wyngaert and Stessens, supra note 436, at 
793.
442 Bin Cheng, General Principles o f  Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (1987) 
336-39.
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litigation.443 International courts and tribunals, faced with rapidly growing dockets, 
must also enjoy the benefits of a rule which enables them not to re-open settled matters. 
However, the most appealing argument in favour of adopting a rule of finality in 
international law goes to the issue of legal certainty. Since strong enforcement 
mechanisms are absent from international law, parties to international disputes might 
not have an incentive to carry out judgments without a res judicata rule. Instead, they 
might attempt to refer the settled dispute to another dispute settlement forum, in the 
hope that a more favourable outcome would emerge. This, in turn, might introduce 
conflicting judgments, entailing a disruptive effect on the normative coherence of 
international law.444 It might also undermine the authority and credibility of judicial 
bodies, since their decisions will in effect lose their binding nature.445
Hence, the need for a rule of preclusion seems to be a real necessity in international law, 
without which the system would be handicapped, in the long run. Given these policy 
arguments, it is not surprising that the res judicata rule is a well-established principle of 
international law, reaffirmed in numerous legal decisions446 and in the writing of legal 
experts 447 However, as will be explained in the Part III of this study, international law 
has introduced certain exceptions to the principle of finality covering mainly cases in 
which the first set of proceedings was somehow faulty and, therefore, unworthy of 
recognition.
I. The finality principle in human rights proceedings
While there is a general consensus over the need to apply the principle of finality in 
international law, it was suggested that human rights proceedings brought by individual 
petitioners should be exempted from the application of the res judicata rule, given the
443 Note, “A Comparative and Critical Assessment o f  Estoppel in International Law”, 50 U. Miami L. 
Rev. (1996)369 ,399 .
444 Cf. Theodor Meron, Human Rights Law Making in the United Nations (1986) 236.
445 So far, the question has most vividly arisen with respect o f  the possibility to institute human rights 
proceedings before the HRC after proceedings before the Strasbourg bodies have been concluded. See 
e.g., Marc-Andre Eissen “The European Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights: Problems o f Coexistence” 22 Buff. L. Rev. (1972) 181 189; Arthur .H. 
Robertson “The United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on 
Human Rights” 43 B.Y.I.L. (1968-69) 21,46; Report on the Protection o f  Human Rights in the United 
Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, European Parliament Doc. 3773 (1976) at para. 19.
446 See infra Chapter 6, at pp. 259-60.
447 See e.g., Cheng, supra note 442, at 336-39; Shaw, supra note 24, at 80; Philippe Couvreur “The 
Effectiveness o f the International Court o f Justice in the Peaceful Settlement o f  International Disputes” 
The International Court o f  Justice: It's Future Role after Fifty Years (A.S. Muller, D. Raic and J.M. 
Thuranszky, eds., 1997) 83, 100-05
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unique characteristics of the parties to disputes in that area of international law.448 
According to one American scholar, Laurence Heifer, the overarching raison d'etre of 
human rights compliance monitoring bodies -  the improvement of human conditions 
and the inferior status of private human rights litigants when compared to state parties to 
litigation (who have greater resources at their disposal and more experience 
accumulated in repeated participation in litigation), justify granting individuals 
maximum procedural opportunities 449 Heifer also maintained that the differences in the 
scope of protection offered by the various treaty regimes and the discrepancies in the 
authoritative nature of their decisions also support carving out an exception to the 
principle of finality. Finally, he argued that successive applications before different 
judicial or quasi-judicial bodies may encourage jurisprudential interaction between 
human rights courts and tribunals which could increase the coherence of international 
human rights law.450 As a result, he has advocated reform of some existing preclusion 
regimes and supported entrusting courts and tribunals with discretion to decide 
successive applications on a case-to-case basis 451
While there are some merits to Heifer’s positions, it seems that his conclusion that the 
rule of finality should be excluded from the human rights sphere altogether is 
misplaced. The interests of the individual in having a ‘second day in court’ must be 
balanced against the interests of the state not to be dragged to multiple litigation. This is 
especially since alleged human rights violations affecting a large number of individuals 
may already give rise to numerous similar proceedings against the state concerned (if 
brought by different plaintiffs). Overburdening human rights monitoring bodies with 
cases already addressed by alternative jurisdictions might also leave less time and 
resources to address violations which had never litigated before. It is therefore more 
sensible and cost efficient that the admitted inequality between the parties be addressed 
through more hospitable rules of procedure and perhaps legal assistance schemes, than 
through facilitating the repeat performance of the same litigation (probably resulting in 
a similar outcome given the unchanged balance of power between the parties).
448 Heifer, supra note 20, at 346-49.
449 This, according to Heifer, comports with English and American Habeas Corpus traditions, which 
permit repeated applications where fundamental constitutional rights are involved. Ex parte Partington, 
153 Eng. Rep. 284 (Ex. 1845); Sanders v. U.S., 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963).
450 Heifer, supra note 20, at 349-52.
451 Id. at 380, 383-84.
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The coherence argument raised by Heifer is particularly disturbing. It seems that the 
deleterious potential of a rule which promotes diverging results over the same set of 
facts and legal issues on the coherence of international human rights law exceeds by far, 
any indirect advantage attained by greater cross-fertilisation. It is probably more 
sensible to augment the coherence of the international legal system through a rule of 
recognition, giving effect to decisions of judicial bodies in other jurisdictions, rather 
than through a rule that perpetuates the ability to contest settled judgments. In any 
event, the logic behind Heifer’s coherence argument is not reserved to the human rights 
sphere and its adoption would carry far-reaching consequences for other branches of 
international law as well.
Still, it is true that human rights bodies operate under only partially overlapping 
normative bases and they may not, as a rule, address issues which arise under the 
instruments of different human rights regimes. In this context, Heifer’s proposed test of 
the impossibility of vindicating the plaintiffs right before the first-seized tribunal as a 
criterion for permissibility of parallel or successive applications seems reasonable. 452 
However, it would have been perhaps more accurate to hold that multiple proceedings 
based on the same factual basis, but raising different legal questions, that the first-seized 
jurisdiction could not have addressed, are not in direct competition with one another - 
an idea which is supported by the case law of the HRC.453 In addition, there does not 
seem to be a bar in place against re-litigating petitions with different factual bases, 
especially where the scope of competence of the first-in-time tribunal did not permit the 
admissibility or legal relevance of the said facts.454
Finally, given the differences in the binding nature of the decisions of various human 
rights courts and tribunals, it should be recognised that quasi-judicial procedures cannot 
create a ‘real’ res judicata effect vis-a-vis another procedure, because they do not 
produce binding decisions in the first place. However, in reality, decisions of 
quasi-judicial bodies are treated very much like international judgments. Indeed, several 
treaty provisions found in the constitutive instruments of international courts and 
tribunals (applying judicial or quasi judicial procedures) confer upon the decisions of 
the quasi-judicial human rights procedures a preclusive effect.455
452 Id. at 369-70.
453 See supra Chapter 1, at pp. 37-38.
454 Heifer, supra note 20, at 377-78.
455 European HR Convention, art 35; AHR Charter, art. 56(7); CAT, art 22(5)(a).
186
3. Interim conclusions
Discussion of the theoretical underpinning and practical application of various 
jurisdiction-regulating rules, in the context of competition involving domestic courts, 
enables one to draw some conclusions regarding the suitability of introducing similar 
rules into international law. However, such analogy must take into account the precise 
nature of the inter-fora interactions that the various competition-regulating rules govern 
(intra-systematic or inter-systematic), in light of the observations offered in the previous 
Chapter on the systematic nature of international law. Unique policy considerations 
found in international law might also influence the judgment on whether rules 
developed under domestic law should be transformed into the international level.
With regard to the issue of forum selection, there seem to be little justification in 
intervening in the parties’ ability to engage in most types of forum shopping. It has been 
demonstrated that many domestic systems of law tolerate some level of forum shopping, 
in regard to both intra and inter-systematic jurisdictional competition, in both civil law 
and criminal law disputes. Hence, it would seem that forum shopping, despite its 
pejorative sound and potential for manipulation, is not an inherently negative 
phenomenon. On the contrary, freedom of choice of forum is consonant with notions of 
party autonomy, and with the need to encourage recourse to litigation, as a way to 
uphold the rule of law. Since both interests are of special importance to the international 
legal system, it would seem reasonable to expect that international law too would permit 
forum shopping. The same rationales of party autonomy and promotion of pacific 
dispute settlement apply with even greater force in respect to forum selection 
agreements, which all domestic systems of law seem to generally recognise. In fact, it 
was suggested that the recognition of the parties’ right to jointly select a forum had 
become a general principle of law.
However, three exceptions ought to be carved out of the proposed pro-international 
forum shopping rule. First, there might be situations in which special policy 
considerations would justify retention of jurisdiction in a particular forum despites the 
wishes of the applicant, or even both the applicant and the respondent. This is for 
example the case where a dispute has arisen under the law of a ‘self-contained’ regime. 
Courts and tribunals outside the specific regime would be arguably unsuitable to settle
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such disputes and to adequately take into account the systematic interests of the 
implicated sub-system (including its need for inner-coherence).
A second exception to the pro-forum shopping stance is the unique phenomenon of a 
‘race to the courthouse’. It is feared that where each of the disputing parties wants to 
influence forum selection by being the first to seize a competent judicial body, cases 
would be unnecessarily rushed to adjudication before more appropriate diplomatic 
avenues had been exhausted. Although domestic courts do not directly address this 
problem, it has been suggested that as a matter of desirable public policy, the 
constitutive instruments of international courts and tribunals ought to introduce 
measures such as mandatory ‘cooling off periods during which diplomatic methods of 
dispute settlement should be attempted.
The third, and perhaps most important exception to the pro-forum shopping rule is the 
case of abusive forum shopping. It looks as if all of the surveyed domestic legal systems 
apply certain jurisdictional rules or at least have the capacity to apply general principles 
of law designed to curb abusive forum shopping practices (particularly, on the 
inter-systematic level), such as the forum non-conveniens and abus de droit principles. 
Further, a line of demarcation between legitimate and illegitimate forum shopping has 
been drawn by domestic legal systems in light of the appropriateness of the jurisdiction 
that was unilaterally seized, in comparison to alternative fora, and the legitimacy of the 
applicant’s motives. Additional support to this notion can be found in the restrictions 
upon the parties’ freedom to choose to litigate before an inappropriate forum found in 
the constitutive instruments of international criminal courts and tribunals (jurisdictional 
primacy or complementarity) and in international law’s exhaustion of local remedies 
rule.
Although international courts and tribunals whose jurisdiction had been accepted by 
international actors should enjoy a presumption in favour of their appropriateness, there 
might be circumstances in which litigation before one forum would be clearly more 
appropriate than before the other (e.g., referral of dispute to a court or tribunal in 
violation of an exclusive jurisdiction clause). It would seem that the abus de droit 
principle, which, as will be shown below, constitutes a general principle of international 
law, could apply to circumscribe forum shopping which creates ‘oppressive and 
vexatious’ results and serves no legitimate purpose.
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Parallels between domestic and international courts and tribunals could also be drawn 
with regard to rules that govern multiple proceedings. At the domestic level, it seems 
that while intra-systematic competition is strictly regulated, there is greater degree of 
tolerance towards inter-systematic multiple litigation. The first type of interaction is 
almost uniformly addressed through lis alibi pendens and res judicata rules. In fact, 
these rules seem to have graduated into general principles of law, at least to the extent 
that they apply vis-a-vis intra-systematic jurisdictional competition. At the same time, 
more flexible rules govern cross-boundary multiple proceedings.
It would seem that strong policy considerations support the conclusion that international 
courts and tribunals should apply the intra-systematic model of jurisdictional regulation 
in cases of multiple proceedings. This is because the main challenge presented by 
multiplicity of proceedings -  conflicting judgments, undermines the systematic 
normative coherence of international law in a manner similar to its effect on the 
coherence of domestic legal systems.
It is perhaps educating to observe that domestic arbitral tribunals, which are not part of 
the domestic court system, but apply, as a rule, the same legal norms as courts (thus, 
they can be viewed as subject to same system of legal norms), are also subject to a strict 
jurisdictional regime. Given the considerable pressures against the coherence of the 
international legal system, and given the similarities between the jurisdictional and 
structural relations existing amongst domestic courts and arbitral tribunals and amongst 




The Regulation of Competition between Jurisdictions of International 
Courts and Tribunals: Lex Lata and LexFerenda
Chapter Five:
Existing competition-regulating jurisdictional provisions in international
instruments
In previous Chapters, it was demonstrated that there are significant overlaps between 
the jurisdictions of international courts and tribunals and that such overlaps have already 
resulted in forum shopping and in a few disputes being subjected to multiple 
proceedings. In addition, it was established that jurisdictional competition carries with it 
certain positive and negative consequences. As a result, it has been suggested that the 
negative aspects of jurisdictional competition should, as a rule, be mitigated, taking into 
consideration the current stage of development of international law and the benefits of 
the proliferation of judicial bodies. In this vein, it has been suggested that the current 
level of interaction between existing judicial bodies supports the adoption of lis alibi 
pendens and res judicata doctrines (which are designed to prevent conflicting 
judgments), but does not support strict anti-forum shopping rules (which, inter alia, 
promote constructive inter-fora interaction) or the introduction of a stare decisis rule.
It is now time to examine the existing rules governing jurisdictional competition 
between different international courts and tribunals. This will be a critical examination 
exploring both the strengths and weaknesses of current norms, and suggesting a legal 
construction corresponding to the level of cross-institutional coordination and 
harmonisation regime that should apply at the international level. The discussion will 
encompass not only existing jurisdiction regulating provisions but also areas of 
inter-fora interaction where regulation is absent altogether.
The following survey of positive law will include both the exposition of a number of 
rules found in the constitutive instruments of the different international courts and 
tribunals and the practice of these bodies in applying them. The next Chapter will try to 
identify complementary rules of customary law and applicable general principles of law. 
After analysing lex lata, the third and last Chapter of this Part will concisely examine
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several suggestions for future reform. In other words, it will evaluate both the contents 
of lex ferenda and the desirability and feasibility of introducing it into international law.
1. Forum selection provisions
Several provisions found in the constitutive instruments of different international courts 
and tribunals address the right of parties to a dispute to choose a forum. Additional 
forum selection provisions can be found in other instruments such as general dispute 
settlement treaties, compromissory clauses found in international treaties, instruments of 
ratification of international agreements (including the constitutive instruments of 
judicial bodies), and declarations accepting the jurisdiction of judicial fora.
Generally speaking, there are two modes of regulating forum selection: the introduction 
of an exclusive jurisdiction clause that bars litigation before any forum other than the 
one designated under the jurisdiction-granting instrument, or a non-exclusive 
jurisdiction clause, permitting the parties to engage in forum selection. Further, 
exclusive jurisdiction clauses can be divided into two sub-categories - flexible and 
inflexible provisions, in correspondence to the ability of the parties to derogate, by way 
of agreement, from the jurisdiction of the exclusively designated forum. Finally, some 
unique halfway arrangements allowing limited choice of forum can also be identified.
A. Exclusive jurisdiction provisions 
I. Inflexible provisions
Regional economic integration regimes
The archetype inflexible exclusive jurisdiction clause is found in article 292 (ex-article 
219) of the EC Treaty. At the time when the Treaty of Rome was concluded the six 
founding members of the Community were parties, or contemplated becoming parties, 
to several international agreements which provided for referral of disputes to judicial 
bodies such as the ICJ, the ECHR or arbitration tribunals.1 The drafters felt that referral
1 See e.g., General Act for the Settlement o f International Disputes, 26 Sept. 1928, 93 L.N.T.S. 344; 
Revised General Act for the Settlement o f International Disputes, 28 April 1949, 912 U.N.T.S. 101 (one 
or both o f these instruments were signed by all o f  the founding countries o f  the EEC except Germany) 
Convention for the Protection o f  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 Nov. 1950, E.T.S. 5, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221 hereinafter ‘European HR Convention’](signed by all 6 founding countries).
Shortly after the conclusion o f  the Treaty o f  Rome several other treaties containing compulsory dispute 
settlement provisions, some o f  which negotiated in parallel to the EC Treaties, were concluded. See e.g., 
the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement o f Disputes, 29 April 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 243 
(signed by all 6 founding EEC states, and ratified by one o f them); Treaty instituting the Benelux 
Economic Union, 3 Feb. 1958, 381 U.N.T.S. 165 [hereinafter ‘Benelux Treaty’]; Optional Protocol o f
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of disputes concerning the operation of the Community and the interpretation of its 
constitutive instruments to ‘external’ judicial institutions would be counter-productive. 
This is because the latter bodies might not be sufficiently familiar with Community law 
and might not accord due weight to the broader interests of the Community, especially 
since they lack the special procedures available before the ECJ (e.g., involvement of the 
EC Commission in the litigation).2 In addition, it was feared that the possibility of 
recourse to external judicial bodies might result in non-uniform application of 
Community law, thus detracting from its effectiveness.3 To curtail these concerns, the 
drafters concluded article 292, which provides that:
"Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein."
Identical language can also be found in Euratom Treaty4 and similar language is found 
in the ECSC Treaty.5 Exclusive jurisdiction provisions, drafted along similar lines to 
article 292 of the EC Treaty were also adopted by the Andean Community and the 
Central American Integration System, protecting the jurisdiction of their respective 
Courts of Justice,6 and by the Benelux Economic Union, granting exclusive jurisdiction
Signature to the Conventions on the Law o f  the Sea Concerning the Compulsory Settlement o f  Disputes, 
29 April 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 172 (3 founding countries have ratified this Protocol).
2 The EC Commission has been indeed viewed as the ‘guardian’ o f  the broader Community interests.
Koen Lenaerts “Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution - The Case o f  the European Union” 21 
Fordham Int'l L.J. (1998) 746, 762.
3 Peter E. Herzog “Article 219” 5 The Law o f  the European Community - A Commentary (Dennis 
Campbell, ed., 35th ed., 1998) 6-170.1; Dennis Campbell “Preliminary Observations on Article 219”, id. 
at 6-169.
4 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, 25 March 1957, art. 193, 298 U.N.T.S. 
167 [hereinafter 'Euratom Treaty'].
5 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 20 Apr. 1951, art. 87,261 U.N.T.S. 140 
[hereinafter ‘ECSC Treaty’]. Article 87 reads: "The High Contracting Parties undertake not to avail 
themselves o f  any treaties, conventions or declarations made between them for the purpose o f  submitting 
a dispute concerning the interpretation or application o f this Treaty to any method o f  settlement other than 
those provided for therein." Unlike Article 219 o f the EC Treaty, Article 87 o f the ECSC Treaty does not 
seem to encompass recourse to dispute settlement procedures, which are not treaty-based (e.g., ad  hoc 
arbitration). Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3., as 
revised in 10 Nov. 1997, 1997 O.J. (C340) 173 [herein forth and hereinafter ‘EC Treaty’]; Herzog, supra 
note 3, at 6-170.2.
6 Treaty Creating the Court o f  Justice o f  the Cartagena Agreement, 28 May 1979, art. 42, 18 I.L.M.
(1979) 1203 as revised by the Protocol Modifying the Treaty Creating the Court o f  Justice o f  the 
Cartagena Agreement, 10 March 1996, available at < http://www.comunidadandina.org/english/ andean/ 
ande_trie2.htm> (last visited on 24 June 2000)("The member states shall not submit any controversy 
which may arise from the application o f  the norms which comprise the judicial structure o f  the Cartagena 
Agreement to any court. Arbitration system or any other procedure not contemplated by this Treaty..."); 
Protocol o f Tegucigalpa o f  Reforms to the Charter o f the Organization o f  the Central American States, 13 
Dec. 1991, art. 35, available at < http://www.ccj.org.ni/doc_base/normjurd/prottegu.htm>. However, the 
CCJ Statute also addresses its interaction with the I/A HRC, excluding from the jurisdiction o f the CCJ
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to its independent dispute settlement procedures (with the exception of disputes also 
falling under the jurisdiction of the ECJ).7
These exclusive jurisdiction arrangements can be best explained through reference to 
the self-contained nature of regional economic integration regimes.8 Regimes 
constituted as sophisticated legal arrangements with ambitious common goals cannot 
allow external bodies with little understanding of the regime’s nature and complexities, 
and lacking genuine commitment to its success, to ‘meddle’ with their affairs by way of 
interpreting and applying their norms. Indeed, courts and tribunals operating within 
such sub-systems perform a dual role. Like other judicial bodies, they settle specific 
disputes. But they are also entrusted with the unique task of serving as engines of 
regional integration, contributing through judicial pronouncements to the achievement 
of the regime’s goals. Naturally, external bodies are ill equipped to perform the second 
of the two functions. Finally, interference by external courts and tribunals might have a 
disruptive effect over the smooth operation of the regional legal entity. The EC (and to 
slightly lesser extent, the other regional integration frameworks as well) has viewed 
itself as a new sub-system of international law,9 with its own internal coherent 
normative and institutional structures. Referral of questions of regional law to external 
judicial institutions could result in inconsistent legal approaches and, eventually, in a 
break down of the sub-system's coherence.
However, it should be noted that not all economic integration regimes have adopted 
exclusive jurisdiction arrangements. For example, the EFTA and CIS Economic Courts 
are not subject to any forum selection provision. This variance in the level of 
jurisdictional regulation conforms, more or less, to the notion that some of economic 
integration regimes are characterised by greater independence than the others.10
any issue that falls under the jurisdiction o f the latter body. Agreement on the Statute o f  the Central 
American Court o f  Justice, 10 Dec. 1992, art. 25, translated in 34 I.L.M. (1995) 921.
7 Benelux Treaty, art. 51 (l)(“The High Contracting Parties shall undertake not to settle the category o f  
disputes referred to in Article 41 [i.e., disputes over the application o f  the Benelux Treaty and related 
agreements] in any way not covered in the present Treaty”).
8 See Jean-Pierre Queneudec “Article 95” La Charte Des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article 
(Jean Pierre Cot and Alain Pellet, eds., 1985) 1280.
9 This sub-system has been described by the ECJ as a new legal order. See Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 10 
E.C.R. 585, 593 (1964); Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 
12.
10 Opinion 1/91, Draft Agreement Relating to the Creation o f  the EEA, [1991] E.C.R. 1-6079, 6102 .
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The ECJ had the opportunity of applying article 292 (at the time, still article 219) in one 
prominent case, which involved a proposal to create a joint EC-EFTA court as part of 
the planned EEA. That court (referred to as the EEA Court) would have addressed 
questions relating to the EEA Agreements and could have been utilised inter alia by the 
Community (represented by the Commission) and, in appropriate cases, also by EC 
member states (in addition or in lieu of the Community). The ECJ held that the latter 
proposed arrangement would confer upon the EEA Court the power to determine 
whether the proper party before it is the Commission or the EC member states. This, in 
turn, would necessarily require a ruling on the allocation of powers between the 
Community and its member states, which is exclusively a matter of Community law. 
Hence, referral of such a question to the EEA court would be in breach of article 292.11 
In addition, the empowerment of the EEA Court to interpret EEA law, which is largely 
identical to EC law, was also deemed incompatible with the role of the ECJ in the 
Community as the ultimate judge on EC law.12 For these and other reasons, the ECJ 
held that the proposed agreement was in conflict with EC law.
Finally, it may be observed that the scope of article 292 is limited to matters falling 
under the EC Treaties. No parallel provision had been introduced with regard to 
adjudication of disputes concerning other EU pillars (over which the ECJ only has 
limited jurisdiction).13
The WTO
Another, less absolute, exclusive-jurisdiction arrangement can be found in the DSU, 
annexed to the WTO Agreement. Article 23 of the DSU provides that -
"1) When members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or 
impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of 
any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules 
of procedures of this Understanding.
2) In such cases, Members shall:
(i) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have 
been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered
11 Draft EEA Agreement, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-6105. See also Opinion 1/76, Draft Agreement establishing a 
European Laying-up Fund fo r  Inland Waterway Vessels, [1977] E.C.R. 741 (the establishment o f  a joint 
institution between the EC and Switzerlandinvested with judicial powers is incompatible with the scheme 
of Community unity).
12 Draft EEA Agreement, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-6107.
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agreem ent has been im peded, except through recou rse to  d ispu te  se ttlem en t in 
accordan ce  w ith  the ru les a n d  p ro ced u res o f  this U nderstan din g  . . ." (em phasis added).
At first sight, the language used in article 23 (the term ‘shall’ and the prohibition against 
utilisation of alternative procedures) appears to indicate an inflexible exclusive 
jurisdiction regime, barring referral of cases arising under the GATT/WTO legal system 
to any outside judicial forum.14 Indeed, the exclusive nature of article 23.1 has recently 
been confirmed by a WTO panel.15 However, several caveats to this proposition should 
be noted.
First, it should be realised that the DSU permits disputing parties to agree to settle their 
dispute by way of arbitration - i.e., outside the ordinary structure of WTO dispute 
settlement institutions (but still subject to control by the DSB).16 Hence, the DSU itself 
allows for some measure of flexibility in forum selection. Second, the language used in 
article 23.2 is somewhat ambiguous since it only bars ‘determinations ’ by external 
dispute settlement procedures concerning breach of GATT law, loss of benefits 
thereunder or defeat of its object. The article does not explicitly close off the possibility 
of referring disputes over the interpretation of the GATT/WTO agreements to external 
courts and tribunals (the same observation is valid under article 23.1, as well, since it 
only seems to address violation-related disputes).17 Third, it is not clear whether dispute 
settlement under regional trade arrangements involving the application of provisions 
which provide for identical trade benefits to these granted under the GATT and its 
related agreement, are precluded. On the contrary, it is at least arguable that the
13 Herzog, supra note 3, at 6-170.5.
14 John Jackson The World Trading System (2nd ed., 1997) 124; Raj Bhala “The Myth about Stare Decisis 
and International Trade” 14 American University International Law Review (1999) 845, 901.
15 U.S. -  Sections 301-310 o f  the Trade Act o f 1974, WTO DOC. WT/DS152/R (1999), at p. 313 (Panel 
Report), available at <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/wtdsl52r.doc> (last visited on 8 Nov. 
2000)(article 23.1 is an ‘exclusive jurisdiction clause’).
16 Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlements o f  Disputes, Annex 2 to the 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, art. 25.1, 33 I.L.M. (1994) 1144 
[hereinafter ‘D SU ’]. The article suggests that arbitration may be invoked in respect o f  "certain disputes 
that concern issues that are clearly define by both parties." The thought behind this arrangement had been 
that some simple disputes would be more amenable to arbitration than to the more cumbersome Panel 
proceedings. GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/W/6 (1987), at para. 2 (Discussion Paper prepared by the US 
Delegation to the Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement). In reality, principal considerations 
influencing the choice o f arbitration are expected to be objection to intervention by third parties, greater 
control over the composition o f  the tribunal and lack o f  appeal. Tullio Treves “Recent Trends in the 
Settlement o f  International Disputes” I Bancaja Euromediterranean Courses o f  International Law (1997) 
395,409. The parties may also resort to diplomatic forms o f  dispute settlement (good offices, conciliation 
and mediation), in lieu or in parallel to panel proceedings. DSU, art. 5.
17 Cf. The Factory at Chorzow  (Germany v. Poland), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 8, at 24-25 (claim for 
indemnity).
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language of article 23.2 would not bar recourse to alternative procedures if the
• * 1 8determinations were formally adopted in the context of a different legal regime, as
long as it is accepted that they could not produce a res judicata effect under 
GATT/WTO law. Finally, according to article 1.2 of the DSU, specific 
dispute-settlement rules found in the covered agreements override the provisions of the 
DSU. As a result, it would seem that specific jurisdiction-regulating clauses, such as 
article 11 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPSM Agreement), providing for non-exclusive jurisdiction of the GATT/WTO 
dispute settlement machinery should prevail.19
All these factors strongly suggest that the exclusive nature of the jurisdiction of the DSB 
under the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system is far from watertight and that its 
ratione materiae reach is rather limited. This is not too surprising given the fact that the 
parties to the negotiations of the WTO Agreement were more concerned with the 
possibility of precluding unilateral determinations by member states that GATT law had 
been breached (especially, the U.S.), then with barring determinations by competing 
international procedures.20
It should also be observed that article 23 does not conclusively solve the problem of 
normative competition within the GATT framework itself. The GATT system is 
comprised of several agreements, addressing different, but partly overlapping issues. 
Hence, a single dispute may involve rights and obligations under more than one GATT 
related treaty. Before 1994, this could have led to recourse to more than one dispute 
settlement mechanism, since each treaty had its own independent dispute settlement 
bodies and procedures. While the WTO agreement has solved the problem of 
institutional competition by authorising the DSB to address all disputes under the
18 See e.g., Case C-53/96, Hermes International v. FHTM arketing Choice BV, [1998] E.C.R. 1-3603 
(interpretation o f  article 50 o f  TRIPS by the ECJ).
19 Agreement on the Application o f Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 15 April 1994, art. 11(3), 
Annex 1A to WTO Agreement, available at <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf>
(last visited on 8 Nov. 2000)(“Nothing in this Agreement shall impair the rights o f  Members under other 
international agreements, including the right to resort to the good offices or dispute settlement 
mechanisms o f other international organizations or established under any international agreement”). It has 
also be argued that the a specific dispute settlement clause found in the TRIPS Agreement, which does 
not exclude referral o f cases to non-WTO procedures such as WIPO arbitration, can perhaps be construed 
to override the proscription o f  article 23 o f the WTO Agreement. Agreement establishing the World 
Trade Organisation, 15 April 1994, 33 I.L.M. (1994) 1263 [herein forth and hereinafter ‘WTO 
Agreement’]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects o f  Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, art.
64, 33 I.L.M. (1994) 1197 [hereinafter ‘TRIPS’]; Treves, Recent Trends, supra note 16, at 420.
20 Raj Bhala and Kevin Kennedy, World Trade Law  (1998) 43; Terence P. Stewart (ed.), II The GATT 
Uruguay R ound—A Negotiating History (1986-1992) (1993) 2777.
196
iIIIII
various GATT related agreements, there still remains the question of competition over 
! the application of different substantive and procedural rules found in the different
91 •relevant agreements. Further, competition may take place between various post-award 
proceedings designed to assess the suitability of measures taken by the parties to the
99dispute to implement DSB reports.
Why is it the drafters of the WTO have opted for an exclusive jurisdiction clause and 
why is it that so many exceptions to the principle of exclusivity can be found? It looks 
as if the WTO system shares some of the features of the regional integration systems. It 
is a complex legal arrangement that has regarded itself for some time as 
‘self-contained’.23 It also shares with regional bodies a general aim of trade 
liberalisation and removal of trade barriers, an area of the law that particularly values 
legal certainty. Obviously, application of GATT/WTO law by an external judicial body, 
such as the ICJ, might prove to be extremely demanding, and could disturb the 
satisfactory operation of the regime.
However, unlike its regional counterparts, the WTO has only modest ambitions of 
integrating the economies of its member states and it never attempted to bring into life a 
new polity. Hence, the value of jurisprudential coherence in global trade relations is 
important, but not as crucial as it is for the regional sub-systems. Moreover, there is 
growing acknowledgement within the WTO that given the links between trade and other 
aspects of international relations it should not purport to create a watertight closed legal 
sub-system “in clinical isolation” from general international law24 (a fact underscored 
by the use of norms originating from general international law in the work of the 
WTO).25
Another indication of the modest integrative ambitions of the WTO is found in the lack 
of common WTO organs responsible for representing the organisation’s broader 
interests (comparable to the EC Commission). Instead, the protection of the rights and
21 Article 1.2 o f  the DSU prescribes that in case o f conflicts between several sets o f  specific rules, the 
parties should agree which procedures apply. If they cannot agree, the decision will be taken by the 
Chairman o f  the DSB (after consulting with the parties).
22 See discussion o f  the Bananas litigation in supra Chapter 2, at pp. 60-61.
23 See supra Chapter 3, at pp. 110-12. See also Pieter. J. Kuyper “The Law o f  the GATT as a Special Field 
o f International Law: Ignorance, Further Refinement or Self-Contained System o f International Law” 
XXV Neth. Y.B. Int’l Law (1994) 227, 251-52.
24 U.S. - Standard fo r  Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline and Like Products o f  National Origin, 35
I.L.M. (1996) 603, 629 (AB Report).
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interests of state parties is left in their hands. In the same vein, adjudication before the 
Panel system (or arbitration) may be initiated only in non-compliance cases -  that is, 
when practical difficulties arise, and not in respect to abstract questions of 
interpretation, which would have been beneficial from a legal harmonisation point of 
view. These signs of limited efforts to harmonise WTO law help to explain the relative 
flexibility of the regime’s jurisdiction-regulating rules.
The European Social Charter
The only inflexible exclusive jurisdiction clause that can be found outside the field of 
international economic relations is the Appendix to Part III of the European Social 
Charter, which reads that:
"It is understood that the Charter contains legal obligations o f  an international character, the 
application o f  w hich is subm itted so le ly  to the supervision provided for in Part IV thereof."
This means that claims based upon economic and social rights that are protected by the 
Charter can only be raised before the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR), 
utilising the Collective Complaints Mechanism (or in the context of the contracting 
parties’ reporting obligations). Again, as was submitted above in relation to the 
GATT/WTO, it seems that the language of the text cannot bar individuals or states from 
raising similar claims before other bodies, if relying on obligations originating in other 
instruments (e.g., ILO Conventions or the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights). A contrary construction of the text would implicitly introduce 
substantial limitations on the other procedures, modifying the extent of the obligations 
of the parties thereto, without first securing the agreement of all other parties to these 
treaties. It would also be inconsistent with the view that parties to human rights 
instruments should seek to constantly improve the level of enforcement of human rights 
standards, and not foreclose existing avenues of supervision over state compliance.27
Still, the arrangement found in the Social Charter does not comport with any of the 
rationales proposed so far for the introduction of exclusive jurisdiction clauses. The 
regime is hardly complex and it is not part of a closely structured polity that prizes legal
25 DSU, art. 3,2.
26 Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, 23 May 1969, art. 34, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
‘Vienna Convention’]
27 Laurence R. Heifer “Forum Shopping for Human Rights” 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. (1999) 285, 346-49.
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harmony. Rather, it seems that the main reason for selecting an exclusivity clause was 
the desire of the parties to the Social Charter to minimise their exposure to enforcement 
of the obligations undertaken in the Charter. The exclusive nature of the compliance 
procedures under the Charter (which until 1998 did not involve any judicial or 
quasi-judicial features) was therefore probably designed to facilitate accession to this 
instrument, without placing ratifying states at the risk of being dragged against their will 
to adjudication over the implementation of the Charter before existing international 
courts or tribunals.
It is perplexing why no provision had been made that would have allowed parties to a 
dispute over the interpretation and application of the Social Charter to refer it by way of 
agreement to an external dispute settlement procedure. There does not seem to be any 
broad ‘community’ interest which would justify such inflexibility and it can be argued 
that the selected jurisdictional regime unnecessarily violates the freedom of choice of 
procedure by the parties. Indeed, such inflexible provision is not found even in the 
context of the European HR Convention, which preceded the Social Charter and 
represents a more intrusive European human rights regime. Hence, it would be probably 
correct to consider the inflexibility of the Social Charter as an oversight and to interpret 
the exclusivity regime under the Social Charter really as a flexible one. Thus, if states 
agree to waive their right to be shielded from litigation before external dispute 
settlement procedures, there is no reason to preclude them from doing so. Arguably, in 
this situation, the latter in time agreement to litigate should override the text of the 
earlier human rights instruments.
II. Flexible provisions
European Convention on Human Rights
Another model of an exclusive jurisdiction clause is found in article 55 (ex-article 62) of 
the European HR Convention. Unlike article 292 of the EC Treaty, which was drafted a 
few years later, article 55 explicitly acknowledges that the parties may, by way of 
agreement, decide to waive the jurisdiction of the ECHR and opt for dispute settlement 
before another forum. Thus, this more flexible exclusivity clause represents a shift 
towards greater freedom of action to the parties, at the expense of the interest in having 
disputes settled within the relevant sub-system.
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Article 55 of the European Convention reads as follows:
"The H igh Contracting Parties agree that excep t by  sp e c ia l a greem en t , they shall not avail 
them selves o f  treaties, conventions or declarations in force betw een  them  for the purpose o f  
submitting, by w ay o f  petition, a dispute arising out o f  the application o f  this C onvention to a 
m eans o f  settlem ent other than those provided for in this Convention." (em phasis added)
The precise scope of this provision is unclear. It does seem that the rights and 
obligations enumerated in the Convention cannot be invoked in litigation between two 
member states before an external forum, unless specific agreement has been reached to 
that effect (and it is questionable whether general acceptance of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of a body such as the HRC or the ICJ can qualify as a ‘special agreement’). 
At the same time, it is not clear to what extent can such states invoke before other fora 
rights and obligations protected by other international instruments (such as the ICCPR), 
or even customary international law, which are similar in substance to those found 
under the European HR Convention.
This precise question was confronted by a Committee of Experts, appointed by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to investigate the relations between 
the European Convention and the 1966 UN Covenants. However, the experts could 
not reach agreement on the exact scope of article 55 (at the time -  article 62), and 
specifically, on whether two proceedings involving similar rights originating from
90different legal sources should be considered in direct competition with each other. 
Notwithstanding the small number of inter-state disputes referred to human rights 
monitoring mechanisms, the debate has, of course, considerable implications for the 
present study. The adoption of an overly narrow and technical definition of 
jurisdictional competition, as advocated by some Council of Europe experts, would 
have rendered most conventional and customary jurisdiction-regulating rules obsolete. 
This is because identical norms found in different instruments (or in treaty and 
customary law) would not be deemed capable of creating competing disputes. Such 
interpretation would fail to tackle the realities of concurrent jurisdiction, where many
28 Report o f the Committee o f  Experts to the Committee o f Ministers o f the Council o f  Europe, Problems 
arising from  the Co-existence o f  the United Nations Covenants on Human Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights — Part I: Problems arising from  the Co-existence o f  the Two Systems o f  
Control provided fo r  by the European Convention and by the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
29 Feb. 1968, Doc. No. CM (68) 39.
29 Report o f the Committee o f  Experts, id. at 4.
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international obligations are often multi-sourced. Thus, the alternative view, which 
views rights of similar substance found in different international instruments as 
competing with each other might be preferable, in light of the general rules of 
international law governing multiple proceedings elaborated in this study. Still, it needs 
to be ascertained whether or not the European HR Convention had intended to block 
such competing procedures.
Although the experts could not agree on the exact meaning of the exclusive jurisdiction 
clause, they nonetheless recommended that states should, as a matter of desirable 
policy, seek to utilise in cases of jurisdictional overlap the enforcement procedures of 
the Strasbourg Machinery. The use of alternative procedures should, according to the 
experts, only be sought in disputes with third states not parties to the European
' l  1
Convention or with regard to rights not covered by the European Convention.
While the travaux preparatoires of the Convention shed interesting light on the 
emergence of the exclusive jurisdiction clause, they also fail to remove lingering doubts 
pertaining to its scope of application. Even though the exclusive jurisdiction clause was
' I ' j
absent from the first drafts of the Convention, the need for it became apparent during 
the deliberations on the desirability of establishing a new court of human rights. The 
U.K. delegate objected to the creation of the ECHR and argued that there was a need to 
abate the 'proliferation of organisations' that might lead to jurisdictional overlaps.33 
However, most other delegates strongly supported the creation of a court, arguing that 
adjudication of human rights questions before a European court would be less 
embarrassing than before the ICJ (e.g., on the basis of the optional clause).34 Since 
ruling out all forms of judicial supervision was perceived to seriously weaken the image 
of the convention, a consensus emerged that the problem of conflicting jurisdictions 
should be addressed through excluding human rights disputes from the jurisdiction of
30 See e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U .S.) 1986 I.C.J. 
14, 94-95 (use o f  force is prohibited both by the UN Charter and customary international law).
31 Id. at 5. This policy statement was embraced by the Committee o f  Ministers, which has adopted a 
Resolution to that effect. Committee o f Ministers, Resolution (70)17,15 May 1970, reprinted  in 
Parliamentary Assembly o f  the Council o f Europe, Information Report on the Protection o f  Human Rights 
in the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol and in the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 27 April 1976, Doc. No. 3773, Appendix, pp. 11-12.
32 See Draft European Convention on Human Rights prepared by the European Movement, I Collected  
Edition o f  the 'Travaux Preparatoires' o f  the European Convention on Human Rights (Council o f Europe, 
1975) 296.
33 Conference o f  Senior Officials, 9 June 1950, Doc. CM/WP 4 (50) 3, IV 'Travaux Preparatoires', id. 
124-26.
34 Id. at 126-28.
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alternative procedures and three countries submitted proposed amendments to the draft 
convention to this effect,35 one of which (the Italian proposal) was eventually 
incorporated into the text of the Convention (subject to a minor modification).
Thus, after the decision to establish a new European court had been taken, the main 
argument supporting the introduction of an exclusive jurisdiction clause related to the 
need to prevent possible circumvention of the opting-in nature of the jurisdiction of the 
ECHR. It was feared that unless the matter were to be regulated, states reluctant to 
accept the optional jurisdiction of the ECHR, but subject to the compulsory jurisdiction 
of other international judicial bodies, might be compelled to adjudicate human rights 
disputes arising out of the Convention against their will. This consideration highlights 
another problem associated with multiplicity of judicial bodies -  that the availability of 
a number of amenable jurisdictions might discourage states from accepting new 
substantive obligations which they are loath to submit to judicial review. It thus seems 
that article 55 was drafted mainly with a view of preventing invocation of the 
Convention itself before other judicial bodies and there is no evidence that the drafters 
contemplated blocking adjudication before external judicial or quasi-judicial bodies on 
the basis of human rights obligations undertaken through instruments other than the 
European HR Convention.
It should also be noted that the exclusive jurisdiction clause, as adopted, regulates 
conflict of jurisdiction in inter-state cases. It did not purport to prohibit reliance on the 
Convention before other fora in claims presented by individuals. However, practically 
speaking, such scenario is unlikely since the jurisdictions of all existing human rights 
complaints mechanisms are closely linked to particular human rights instruments and 
one cannot invoke before one human rights body the provisions of instruments
-JO
belonging to other human rights regimes. Further, referral of the same human rights
35Proposed Amendments relating to the problem o f  conflicting jurisdiction, 4 August 1950, Doc. CM I 
(50) 8, V 'Travaux Preparatoires', id. at 72.
36 Meeting o f the Sub-Committee on Human Rights, 7 August 1950, Doc. CM (50) 52; A 1884, V 
'Travaux Preparatoires', id. at 104; Report o f Meeting o f  the Committee o f  Ministers, 5th Sess., point II, 
Id. at 116. Netherlands initially objected to the adopted text and sought to limit the exclusive jurisdiction 
clause to cases involving non-nationals, while allowing for the adjudication o f  disputes involving 
nationals after the Convention’s procedures have been exhausted. However, it withdrew its objection 
eventually.
37 Amendments proposed by the Swedish Delegation, 4 August 1950, Doc. CM I (50) I, A 1862, V 
’Travaux Preparatoires', id. at 58.
38 Exceptions to this can be found with respect o f the UN Human Rights Commission complaint 
mechanism, operating by virtue o f  ECOSOC Resolution 1503, which may receive (through the 
Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection o f Human Rights) communications alleging a consistent
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violations to different human rights mechanisms had been addressed by electa una via 
and other jurisdiction-regulating prohibitions, which will be discussed below.
How can it be explained that, unlike their EC counterparts, the parties to the European 
HR Convention were willing to permit deviation, by way of special agreement, from the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Strasbourg bodies? While the travaux preparatoires offer 
little direct guidance on this issue, one can perhaps draw some pertinent inferences from 
the apparent motives for introducing exclusivity into the Convention. As explained 
before, the drafters of the EHR Convention were less concerned with the need to 
preserve the self-contained nature of the new legal regime, and more worried about 
preserving party autonomy and not compelling states to appear before an international 
judicial body against their will.39 Given this pro-party autonomy rationale, it would have 
been illogical to unduly restrict the freedom of choice of procedure of disputing parties, 
by compelling them to appear before the ECHR. In addition, given the rather 
uncomplicated nature of the European HR Convention and its links to the relatively 
loosely organised Council of Europe, the drafters did not seem to attribute special 
importance to the need to bar ‘outsiders’ from interpreting and applying the Convention. 
While such alternative was considered embarrassing for some states, it was not 
perceived as a serious threat to the systematic well being of the regime.
ICSID
Another example of a flexible exclusive jurisdiction clause, coming from a different 
area of international law, is found in the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and the National of Other States, establishing ICSID. Article 
26 of the Convention provides the following:
pattern o f  gross human rights violations, without limiting its mandate to the terms o f  a particular treaty. 
The future AHR Court would also be able to adjudicate claims based on any human rights instrument. 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment o f  an African Court 
o f Human and Peoples’ Rights, 8 June 1998 art. 7 (copy with author)[hereinafter ‘ACHR Court 
Protocol’].
39 Doc. CM I (50) IA  1862, V 'Travaux Preparatoires', supra note 32, at 58.
One indication o f  the non-self-contained nature o f  the European HR Convention is article 53 (previously, 
art. 60), which is a ‘most favourable treatment’ rule, allowing states to accept more stringent obligations 
than those require by the Convention. Hence, the Convention aims to improve human rights conditions 
even at the price o f  the development o f non-uniform standards between the member states. Evert A. 
Alkema “The Enigmatic No-Pretext Clause: Article 60 o f the European Convention on Human Rights” 
Essays on Human Rights', a collection o f  essays in honour o f  Bert Vierdag (Jan Klabbers and Ren6 
Lefeber, eds., 1998) 41 ,46 .
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"Consent o f  the parties to arbitration under this C onvention shall, unless o th erw ise  sta ted , be 
deem ed consent to  such arbitration to the exclusion  o f  any other rem ed y ..." (em phasis 
added)
While this is perhaps atypical exclusive jurisdiction clause,40 its significance to this 
survey of jurisdictional-regulation is somewhat limited. First, it must be realised that the 
legal arrangement proffered here differs from that found in other reviewed mechanisms. 
Arbitration before ICSID involves a private litigant, and the jurisdiction of the Centre 
depends not only on accession to the Convention by the relevant states (the host state 
and the investor’s state of nationality), but also on a specific agreement to arbitrate a 
dispute before ICSID, entered into by the immediate parties to the dispute. This 
arbitration clause or agreement is normally lex specialis and overrides any general 
dispute settlement arrangement entered by the contracting states (such as declarations 
under the optional clause of the ICJ Statue). Thus, if the parties to the dispute have 
elected to refer it to ICSID, the Centre will normally have exclusive jurisdiction 
regardless of the text of article 26 (provided that all other jurisdictional conditions have 
been met); if a forum other than ICSID had been selected, then its jurisdiction would 
fall under the escape clause of article 26 - a jurisdiction ‘otherwise stated’. In any event, 
the choice of forum of the immediate parties would dictate the identity of the forum.
Furthermore, in contrast with state-to-state disputes, which are often governed by 
multilateral instruments, and, as a result, are often subject to a host of incompatible 
legal instruments containing different dispute settlement clauses, it is quite unlikely that 
parties to a private transaction will enter into contradictory contractual arrangements, 
referring disputes to more than one dispute settlement procedure.41 Rather, the privity of 
the relations between the disputing parties would seem to guarantee that even where 
multiple fora were selected, the parties had established some ordering between them 
(e.g., priority to the first-seized forum).42
40 Christoph Schreuer “Commentary on the ICSID Convention” 12 ICSID Rev., F.I.L.J. (1997) 59,154.
41 Schreuer, id. at 163. An example, where such uncoordinated concurrency has nonetheless occurred is 
the Klockner case in which the parties have concluded a series o f  agreements, referring most disputes to 
ICSID, but providing for one group o f issues, arising under one certain instrument, to be handled by ICC 
arbitration. Klockner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH, v. Cameroon, 2 ICSID Rep. 3, 13-14 (1983).
42 See e.g., ICSID Model Clauses, clause 12 ,4  ICSID Rep. 357 (1993)(permitting forum selection 
between ICSID and alternative fora, but barring litispendence between the competing procedures); North 
American Free Trade Agreement, 17 Dec. 1992, art. 1120, 32 I.L.M. (1993) 289 and 605 [hereinafter 
‘NAFTA’] (providing for selection by the investor party o f ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility or 
UNCITRAL proceedings); Law on Foreign Investment o f 1995, art. 27(Kazakhstan)(investor may 
choose, at his or her discretion, between litigation before the domestic courts o f  Kazakhstan, ICSID,
204
Hence, it is submitted that article 26 is of limited significance. In effect, it merely 
introduces a presumption in favour of the intent of the parties to attribute exclusivity to 
the contractual arbitration clause, and requires clear manifestation of an opposite 
intent.43 It also seems that when concluding article 26 the drafters mainly had in mind 
the relations between ICSID proceedings and national courts (and not other 
international procedures) 44 Indeed, all cases, to date, in which article 26 had been raised 
dealt with the effect of ICISD proceedings on the ability of the parties to pursue 
domestic proceedings on related issues.45
Another arrangement, maybe of greater significant to this study, is found in article 27(1) 
of the ICSID Convention that addresses diplomatic protection. It provides that:
"No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim in 
respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State shall have 
consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such 
other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in 
such a dispute."
ICSID Additional Facility, UNCITRAL, ICC or domestic Kazakh arbitration); Schreuer, supra note 40, at 
159-6.
43 This proposition is strongly supported by the travaux preparatoires o f  the Washington Convention - 
Convention on the Settlement o f  Investment Disputes between States and Nationals o f  Other States, 18 
March 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ‘ICSID Convention’]. Memorandum o f  General Counsel to 
the Committee o f the Whole (A. Broches), 18 Feb. 1963, Doc. No. SID/63-2 reprinted  in II Convention 
on the Settlement o f  Investment Disputes between States and Nationals o f  Other States: Documents 
concerning the Origin and the Formation o f  the Convention (ICSID, 1968) 71, 84; Schreuer, supra note 
40, at 159. See also Comments to First Preliminary Draft o f  a Convention on the Settlement o f  Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals o f  Other States, 9 Aug. 1963, Doc. No. SID/63-15, II Documents 
concerning the Origin o f  ICSID, supra, at 162-63; Report o f  the Executive Directors, 18 March 1965, Id. 
at 1041, 1079-80.
C f, Mike Trading and Transport Ltd. v. R. Pagnan & Fratelli (The "Lisboa") [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
546, 549 (C.A.)(arbitration clauses are similar to exclusive jurisdiction clauses);4 Am. Jur. 2d.,
Alternative Dispute Resolution § 81 (arbitration agreements may, by implication, preclude litigation).
44 Schreuer, supra note 40, at 176.
45 The decisions o f  ICSID tribunals on this question are somewhat contradictory, In Atlantic Triton Co. v. 
Guinea, it was held that a request for provisional measures submitted to a domestic court after ICSID 
proceedings were initiated cannot be considered a violation o f  the ICSID Convention, by virtue o f  the 
legal uncertainty o f  the relations between the two procedures. Atlantic Triton Co. v. Guinea, 3 ICSID 
Rep. 13, 35 (1983), However, another tribunal has subsequently held that an attempt to enforce an arbitral 
award issued by a private arbitration institution (AAA) relating to an issue adjudicated between the same 
parties before ICISD is incompatible with article 26 o f  the Convention. Marine International Nominees 
Establishment (MINE) v. Guinea, 4 ICSID Rep. 54, 68-69 (1988). At the same time, several domestic 
courts have invoked article 26 in support o f  their refusal to entertain motions related to proceedings 
submitted to ICSID arbitration. Guinea v. Marine International Nominees Establishment (MINE), 
Judgment o f 27 Sept. 1985, 4 ICSID Rep. 32, 33-34 (Belgium, Court o f First Instance); Guinea v. Marine 
International Nominees Establishment (MINE), Judgment o f  4 Dec. 1985, 4 ICSID Rep. 35 ,40  
(Switzerland, Tribunal F6d6ral); Guinea v. Atlantic Triton Co., Judgment o f  18 Nov. 1986, 3 ICSID Rep. 
7, 11 (France, Cour de cassation).
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In this article, the Convention bars inter-state adjudication over disputes that the parties 
have agreed to submit to ICSID, and regards the right of claim of the individual as 
exhaustive.46 One should note that article 27 was drafted as an inflexible exclusive 
jurisdiction clause, not permitting derogation therefrom, even upon agreement of the 
parties. A draft ‘saving clause’, which was intended to preserve the right of a 
contracting state to bring inter-state claims for breach of international investment 
agreements other than the ICSID Convention, in parallel to the right of the individual 
investor to pursue proceedings before ICSID,47 had been removed from the final version 
of the Convention.48 This provides strong indication of the intent of the drafters to 
strengthen the exclusivity of the ICSID regime as the only forum for settling investment 
disputes, and to prevent thereby the rendering of conflicting judgments 49 In the same 
vein, it would seem unreasonable to utilise article 64 to the ICSID Convention - a 
compromissory clause permitting the referral of disputes over the interpretation and 
ICSID Convention to the ICJ, to circumvent article 27, in order to bring before the ICJ a 
specific investment dispute that could have been brought to ICSID arbitration.50
It is interesting to observe that some of the legal experts involved in the drafting of the 
Convention were under the opinion that article 27 is superfluous since international law 
supposedly bars the invocation of dispute settlement proceedings other than ICSID once 
its jurisdiction had been accepted by the parties.51 Nevertheless, there seems to be no
46 The purpose o f this was to “remove disputes from the realm o f  diplomacy and bring them back to the 
realm o f law.” Consultative Meeting o f Legal Experts, Summary Record o f  Proceedings, 16-20 Dec.
1963, Doc. No. Z7, II Documents concerning the Origin o f  ICSID, supra note 43, at 236, 273 [statement 
by A. Broches (Chairman o f the Meeting)]. Another goal was to protect the host state from being exposed 
to “the risk o f  multiple claims”; Consultative Meeting o f Legal Experts, Summary Record o f  Proceedings, 
3-7 Feb. 1964, Doc. No. Z8, id. at 298, 348 [statement by A. Broches (Chairman o f  the Meeting)]; 
Schreuer, supra note 40, at 210. This arrangement marks a shift from the traditional rule o f  diplomatic 
protection, according to which the claims o f  the individual and his or her state o f  nationality are o f  a 
qualitatively different nature. The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Britain), 1924 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No. 2 at 12.
47 First Preliminary Draft o f  a Convention on the Settlement o f  Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals o f  Other States, 9 Aug. 1963, sec. 17(2), Doc. No. SID/63-15, II Documents concerning the 
Origin o f  ICSID, supra note 43, at 133, 163. The draft provision was subject to severe criticism by legal 
experts that reviewed it, on grounds that it might result in inconsistent judgments o f  different international 
tribunals. Id. at 236 ,274 ,298 , 349, 367,434.
48 Chairman’s Report on Issues raised and Suggestion made with respect to the Preliminary Draft o f  a 
Convention on the Settlement o f Investment Disputes between States and Nationals o f  Other States, 9 
July 1964, Doc. No. Z11, II Documents concerning the Origin o f  ICSID, supra note 43, at 557,576-77.
49 Schreuer, supra note 40, at 212.
50 Report o f  the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement o f  Investment Disputes between 
States and National o f  Other States, 1965, 18 March 1965, 1 ICSID Rep. 23, 33; Schreuer, supra note 40, 
at 215.
51 Consultative Meeting o f Legal Experts, Summary Record o f  Proceedings, 3-7 Feb. 1964, Doc. No. Z8, 
II Documents concerning the Origin o f  ICSID, supra note 43, at 298, 348-49; Schreuer, supra note 40, at 
214. But see, Antonio R. Parra “Provisions on the Settlement o f  Investment Disputes in Modem
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reason which would impede two states involved in an investment dispute with both 
inter-state and state-individual features to conclude a new agreement to adjudicate the 
dispute before any non- ICSID procedure, without abdicating the rights of the private 
investor to seize ICSID. Such an agreement would probably qualify as lex posteriori 
and lex specialis and may supersede the general rule of article 27.
B . Non-exclusive iurisdiction provisions
I. Parallel jurisdictions
The ICJ
At the other end of the spectrum of jurisdiction-regulating provisions are clauses 
permitting uninhibited forum selection. The competence of courts or tribunals governed 
by such provisions is merely supplementary to that of existing jurisdictions. The 
paradigm non-exclusive jurisdiction clause is article 95 of the UN Charter, which 
addresses the effect of the creation of the ICJ on the freedom of states to pursue other 
dispute settlement procedures. It reads:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from entrusting 
the solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in 
existence or which may be concluded in the future."
This provision, which was influenced by the text of article 13(3) of the League of 
Nations Covenant,54 article 1 of the old PCIJ Statute55 and article 29 of the 1928 
General Act,56 is consistent with the decision adopted by the drafters of the 1945 San 
Francisco Conference not to endow the ICJ with compulsory jurisdiction and with
Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment”, 12 ICSID 
Rev., F.I.L.J. (1997) 287, 337, 353.
52 However, there is no practice on the matter, Schreuer, supra note 40, at 208.
53 Consultative Meeting o f  Legal Experts, Summary Record o f  Proceedings, 17-22 Feb. 1964, Doc. No. 
Z9, II Documents concerning the Origin o f  ICSID, supra note 43, at 367, 432; Schreuer, supra note 40, at 
212 .
54 Covenant o f the League o f  Nations, 17 June 1919, art. 13(3), 1 L.N.T.S. 7 [hereinafter ‘League o f  
Nations Covenant’)](“For the consideration o f  [disputes suitable amenable to legal settlement], the court 
to which the case is referred shall be the [PCIJ]... or any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute 
or stipulated in any convention existing between them”).
55 Statute o f  the Permanent Court o f  International Justice, 16 Dec. 1920, art. 1, 6 L.N.T.S. 390 (“... This 
Court shall be in addition to the Court o f Arbitration organised by the Conventions o f  the Hague o f  1899 
and 1907, and to their special Tribunals o f Arbitration to which States are always at liberty to submit their 
disputes for settlements).
56 General Act for the Settlement o f  International Disputes, 26 Sept. 1928, 93 L.N.T.S. 344. See 
Qu6neudec, supra note 8, at 1279-80.
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article 33 of the UN Charter that preserves states’ freedom of choice of dispute 
settlement procedures.57
However, it must be emphasised that article 95 and other Charter provisions do not 
subject the jurisdiction of the Court to that of its competitors. States may become 
amenable in parallel to the jurisdiction of the ICJ and other adjudicative procedures, and 
may freely select what forum to seize. This, in turn, raises the possibility of 
jurisdictional competition, in general, and forum shopping, in particular.
To minimise their exposure to jurisdictional competition, many of the states which have 
submitted declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, in pursuance 
to article 36(2) of the Statute, have complemented this regime of jurisdictional 
concurrency with a proviso prescribing that the jurisdiction of the ICJ over them will be 
of a residual nature. For example, the declaration of acceptance on the part of the 
Belgium (which is characteristic of declarations of this kind), provides that:
"... the Belgian Government [recognises] as compulsory ip so  fa c to  and without special 
agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice, in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute of the 
Court, in legal disputes arising after 13 July 1948 concerning situations or facts subsequent 
to that date, excep t th ose in re g a rd  to  w h ich  the p a r tie s  have a g re e d  o r  m ay agree  to  have  
recou rse  to  an other m eth od  o f  p a c ific  se ttlem ent"  (emphasis added).58
The combined effect of article 95 and such reservation is that the ICJ can be utilised 
against a reserving state as a last resort only.
It would seem that declarations of the type offered by Belgium denote certain qualms 
concerning the suitability of the Court to address all international disputes (e.g., 
complicated trade issues). By giving preference to the specific dispute settlement
57 This provision was absent from the Dumberton Oaks draft UN charter and was introduced at a later 
stage following a proposed amendment to the ICJ Statute submitted by Venezuela. Proposed Drafts o f  
Art. 1,37 Submitted by the Delegation o f  Venezuela, Doc. 2 8 2 IV/1/22, 14 May 1945, 13 U.N.C.I.O. 
Doc. 468 (1945). The relevant sub-committee entrusted primarily with addressing the transition between 
the ICJ and the PCIJ has recommended the introduction o f  the Venezuelan proposal, subject to a few  
minor drafting changes, into the Charter itself. 13 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. at 196-97. The recommendation was 
subsequently adopted unanimously by the 4th drafting Commission o f  the Conference.
58 Declaration o f the Government o f  the Belgium under article 36(2) o f the ICJ Statute, 302 U.N.T.S. 251 
(1958). Similar declarations were also made by more than half o f  the states that submitted declarations 
under the optional clause.
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arrangements (which pursuant to the language of many declarations, though not all of 
them,59 may or may not be of a binding character), the declaring countries seem to 
insinuate that they consider non-ICJ procedures to be usually better equipped to 
accommodate their needs and concerns. One can also presume that preservation of the 
preferential status of alternative mechanisms was designed to respect the terms of 
pre-existing exclusive jurisdiction regimes in which the declaring states had already 
participated.
UN human rights bodies
Another prototype of a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, preserving the co-existence of 
parallel jurisdictions, is found in several human rights treaties concluded under the 
auspices of the UN. For example, article 44 of the ICCPR60 provides the following:
"The provisions for the implementation of the present Convention shall apply without 
prejudice to the procedures prescribed in the field of human rights by or under the 
constituent instruments of, or conventions of the United Nations and of the specialized 
agencies, and shall not prevent the State Parties to the present convention from having 
recourse to other procedures for settling a dispute in accordance with general or special 
international agreements in force between them".
Similar language can be found in article 16 of CERD, adopted a few months earlier,61 
and in the not yet in force Migrant Workers Convention (MWC).62As a result, parties to
59 Some o f the declarations o f  acceptance o f  the Court’s jurisdiction have limited the ratione materiae 
scope o f  their ‘residual jurisdiction’ reservation to matters amenable to the jurisdiction o f  competing 
courts or tribunals. For discussion, see Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Reservations in Unilateral Declarations 
Accepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction o f  the International Court o f  Justice (1995) 104.
60 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, art. 28, UN GA Res. 2200 A (XXI), 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 (A/6316) 52, UN Doc. A/CONF. 32/4 [hereinafter ‘ICCPR’].
61 International Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f  Racial Discrimination, 21 Dec. 1965, art. 
16, UN G.A. Res. 2106A (XX), GAOR, 12th Sess., Supp. No. 14 (A/6014) 47, UN Doc. A/CONF. 32/4 
[hereinafter ‘CERD’]("The provisions o f this Convention concerning the settlement o f  disputes or 
complaints shall be applied without prejudice to other procedures for settling disputes or complaints in the 
field o f  discrimination laid down in the constituent instruments of, or conventions adopted by, the United 
Nations and its specialized agencies, and shall not prevent the State Parties from having recourse to other 
procedures for settling a dispute in accordance with general or special international agreements in force 
between them"). It should be noted that there are slight differences between the texts o f  CERD and the 
ICCPR. Most notably, the ICCPR speaks generally of'implementation' measures (which arguably include 
the system o f reports) while CERD refers only to 'settlement o f  disputes or complaints'.
62 International Convention on the Protection o f  the Rights o f All Migrant Workers and Members o f  their 
Families, 18 Dec. 1990, art. 78, G.A. res. 45/158, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 262, U.N. 
Doc. A/45/49 (1990)[hereinafter ‘MWC’](“The provisions o f  article 76 [governing inter-state complaints] 
shall be applied without prejudice to any procedures for settling disputes or complaints in the field 
covered by the present Convention laid down in the constituent instruments of, or in conventions adopted 
by, the United Nations and the specialized agencies and shall not prevent the States Parties from having
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disputes falling under the inter-state jurisdiction of the HRC may choose whether to 
bring the case to it, to a competent regional human rights procedure, or, in cases of 
racial discrimination, also to CERD.
It may be observed that the choice of forum clauses of the ICCPR, CERD and MWC 
also explicitly cover individual complaints, unlike their European HR Convention 
counterpart. However, this has little significance in practice, since the lack of regulation 
of the matter under the European HR Convention implies that there is no bar against 
individuals (or groups of individuals) bringing human rights complaints before the 
competent body of their choice.
Why is it that these three human rights procedures have adopted a non-exclusive 
jurisdiction clause, whereas the European mechanism had opted for exclusive 
jurisdiction? It would seem that part of the answer to the question is found in the 
chronology of events. The European HR Convention and the Social Charter were 
concluded before the universal UN treaties. Since the latter were open for signature 
inter alia to European states that had participated in the pre-existing regional 
mechanisms, the adoption of an exclusivity regime would have put these states in an 
intolerable position (i.e., being subject to conflicting exclusive jurisdiction provisions). 
That would, most probably, have resulted in their opting out of the universal 
conventions. It could also be argued that the fears raised during the negotiations 
preceding the European HR Convention, that states might sue each other before the ICJ 
for human rights violations, were not perceived as a serious threat by the mid 1960’s -  
the time of conclusion of the ICCPR and CERD. An additional reason may be that the 
universal treaties were not regarded as a part of a political integration process (while the 
European instruments were concluded within the ‘integrative’ framework of the Council
recourse to any procedures for settling a dispute in accordance with international agreements in force 
between them”).
63 Remarkably, during the drafting o f CERD there was only limited discussion o f  the text o f  article 16. 
However, relations between competing procedures were addressed during discussions on the text o f  
article 15 (dealing with petitions from Trust and N on-Self Governing territories). Some delegates 
expressed the view that the introduction o f  new procedures with respect to such territories is redundant 
since it duplicates the work o f  the UN bodies supervising the same situation; U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 20th 
Sess., 1363rd mtg. at 434-35, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1363 (1965)(statements by delegates o f  the UK and 
Nigeria). However, other delegates felt that such problems are o f  minor importance and could, in any 
event, be solved through cooperation between the CERD Committee and the existing mechanisms; id. at 
435 (statements by delegates o f  India and Yugoslavia); U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 20th Sess., 1364th mtg. at 
439, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1364 (1965)(statement by delegate o f  Italy). The end result, reflects a 
compromise which enables the Committee to exercise simultaneous power o f review over petitions 
submitted to the competent UN bodies with respect to Trust and N on-Self Governing territories. CERD,
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of Europe), and that, as a result, there was no real incentive to create a full or partial 
‘self-contained’ regime. Finally, if one were to take seriously the idea that the UN 
conventions were intended to promote the observance of human rights as much as 
possible,64 then it is understandable that the drafters had opted for non-preclusion of 
alternative remedies. This is because, the more remedial ‘safety nets’ are available to 
victims of human rights violations, the greater is the likelihood that the overarching goal 
of the human rights movement -  the advancement of human conditions, would be 
achieved.65
It is interesting to note that other regional and universal human rights treaties that 
employ supervisory machinery - the Inter-American, African and Torture Conventions 
and the CEDAW Protocol, do not contain any choice of forum clauses, thus opting de 
facto for a non-exclusivity regime. It is not completely clear why these regimes had 
decided to opt for non-exclusivity, but one of the possible explanations could be 
reluctance to undermine the role of pre-existing universal treaties in which many of the 
new treaty regimes’ members have participated. With respect to one more procedure - 
the ILO supervision mechanism, the absence of choice of forum provision is part of a 
general obliviousness towards other procedures, which is manifested by lack of any 
jurisdiction-regulating provisions whatsoever.66 Such lack of coordination can be 
explained, in part, by the fact that the ILO dispute settlement mechanisms are the oldest 
of their kind, created at a time when jurisdictional competition was hardly conceivable.
Non-compliance procedures
An additional non-exclusive jurisdiction clause can be found in the preamble to the 
non-compliance procedure established by the parties to the Montreal Protocol. The 
preamble provides that the new procedure:
art. 15 .the provisions o f  this Convention shall in no way limit the right o f  petition granted to these 
peoples by other international instruments or by the United Nations and its specialized agencies").
64 See Philip Alston “Effective Implementation o f International Instruments on Human Rights, including 
Reporting Obligations under International Instruments on Human Rights” U.N. GAOR, World 
Conference on Human Rights, Prep. Comm., 4th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 5, para. 245, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 157/PC/ 62/Add. 11/Rev. 1 (1993).
65 Theodor Meron “Norm Making and Supervision in International Human Rights: Reflections on 
Institutional Order” 76 A.J.I.L. (1982) 754, 777.
66 See A. A. Cancado Trindade “Co-existence and Co-ordination o f  Mechanisms o f  International 
Protection o f Human Rights” 202 Receuil des cours (1987) 9, 332 n. 1074.
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"... [S]hall apply without prejudice to the operation of the settlement of disputes procedure 
laid down in Article 11 of the Vienna Convention."67
Article 11 includes discretionary reference to negotiation, good offices, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration or the ICJ. It seems that a predominant consideration 
influencing the introduction of a rule of non-exclusivity was the need of the drafters of 
the Procedure to appease some of the state parties to the Vienna Ozone Convention who 
were reluctant to waive the right to utilise more ‘conservative’ dispute settlement 
procedures.69
A slightly different formulation had been incorporated in the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC), which also provides for dispute settlement arrangements under 
general international law, and for specific procedures under the Convention. Article 
XIV, which lists dispute settlement procedures, such as negotiations and consensual 
reference to the ICJ, addresses in subsection 6 the relations between these dispute 
settlement mechanisms and the Convention’s Verification Procedure (article IX):
“This Article is without prejudice to Article IX or to the provisions on measures to redress a 
situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions”.
It would thus seem that the drafters of the CWC were mostly interested in protecting the 
special procedures under the Convention, whose permanent availability and 
effectiveness played an important part in securing the parties agreement to renounce
70Chemical weapons. Further, it seems reasonable to hold that the CWC procedures 
could be utilised in all circumstances (even when ordinary dispute settlement
71proceedings have been pursued). Hence, article XIV seems to represents a 
non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, which operates, at the same time, as a non-preclusive 
clause, preventing the exclusion of the Verification Procedure by the mere invocation of
67 Report o f the 4 th Meeting o f  the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, Annex IV, 25 Nov. 1992, UN Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15 (1992).
68 The Vienna Convention for the Protection o f  the Ozone Layer, 22 March 1985, art. 11, 2 6 1.L.M.
(1987)1516.
69 The preamble was absent from the original version o f the Non-Compliance Procedure, adopted in the 
Second Meeting o f the Parties, London 1990, and was added at the specific request o f  two delegates to 
the Third Meeting o f  the Parties, Nairobi, 1991. Report o f  the 3rd Meeting o f  the Parties to the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 21 June 1991, para. 34, UN Doc. 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.3/11 (1991).
70 Walter Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention (1994) 232.
212
an alternative procedure. In contrast, it is questionable whether a state party to the 
Montreal Protocol can initiate inter-state proceedings under the Non-Compliance 
Procedure in parallel to more traditional methods of dispute settlement for the same 
dispute.
Other non-exclusive jurisdictions
In some cases, the non-exclusive nature of the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal must be 
inferred from other provisions of the relevant constitutive instrument. For instance, 
article 40 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) 
provides that:
"Nothing in this A greem ent shall be construed to effect the ex isting  rights and obligations o f  
the parties under other international environm ental agreem ents, including conservation  
agreem ents, to w hich  such Parties are party."
This text would seem to apply both to the substantive and procedural rights and 
obligations of the parties under the NAAEC. In other words, it could be read as 
permitting parties to choose whether to bring claims against other parties for breach of 
environmental standards under the dispute settlement mechanisms of the NAAEC or 
other environmental dispute settlement mechanisms (e.g., the Montreal non-compliance
mechanism). It would seem that this provision also protects the right of parties to bring
11environmental cases (with trade implications) to NAFTA.
Finally, it can be noted that the UN Claims Commission on Iraq, which enjoys 
overlapping jurisdiction with domestic courts, also operates under an implicit
• 71non-exclusive jurisdictional regime. This proposition is underlined by the fact that the 
Governing Council of the Commission has adopted special provisions designed to
71 Krutzsch and Trapp, id. at 233; Eric P.J. Myjer “The Settlement o f Disputes under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention and the Case o f  the Confidentiality Commission” The Convention on the 
Prohibition and Elimination o f  Chemical Weapons (Daniel Bardonnet, ed., 1997) 537, 546.
72 It is interesting to note that the CEC Council may refer a dispute submitted to it to a more appropriate 
arrangement (arguably, NAFTA in trade related matters). North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation, 14 Sept. 1993, art. 23(5), 32 I.L.M. (1993) 1480 [hereinafter ‘NAAEC’].
73 Norbert Wtthler “The United Nations Compensation Commission: A New Contribution to the Process 
o f  International Claims Resolution” 2 Journal o f  International Economic Law (1999) 249,259-60.
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An important, and yet a different non-exclusive jurisdiction provision from those 
discussed so far, is article 282 of UNCLOS, which reads as follows:
"If the state parties w hich  are parties to  a dispute concerning the interpretation or application  
o f  this C onvention have agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral agreem ent or 
otherw ise, that such dispute shall, at the request o f  any party to  the dispute, be submitted to a 
procedure that entails a binding decision , that procedure shall apply in lieu  o f  the procedures 
provided in this part, unless the parties to the dispute otherw ise agree."
This article differs from article 95 of the UN Charter and other non-exclusivity regimes 
to the extent that it does not merely permit jurisdictional co-existence, but transforms 
UNCLOS dispute settlement procedures into residual adjudicative mechanisms, which 
can be seized only if -  a) no other binding procedure is available; or b) the parties have 
so agreed. This provision represents a clear choice of the drafters of the Convention to 
protect the disputing parties’ freedom of choice of procedure. Indeed, the travaux 
preparatoires to UNCLOS suggest that article 292 of the EC treaty (at that time - article 
219) was cited by some delegates as a desirable model for UNCLOS, but the opposite 
view, which envisioned an ancillary role for the Convention’s procedures, ultimately 
prevailed.75
The preservation, to a considerable degree, of the freedom of the parties to engage in 
dispute settlement outside UNCLOS, the multiple-choice configuration of forum 
selection under UNCLOS itself (the so-called 'Montreaux Compromise1, permitting state 
parties to select one or more compulsory dispute settlement procedures from a menu of 
four alternatives) and the preparatory works strongly indicate that the drafters of the 
Convention wanted to achieve compulsory dispute settlement, on the one hand, but were
74 Governing Council Decision 13,25 Sept. 1992, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1992/13, available at < http://www. 
unog.ch/uncc/decision/dec_13.pdf > (last visited on 3 Sept. 2000)(UN Compensation Commission) 
[hereinafter ‘UNCC Governing Council Dec. 13’].
75 See Third United Nations Conference on the Law o f the Sea, 4th Sess., V  Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law o f  the Sea -  Official Records (United Nations, 1976) 18, 37; Myron H. Nordquist 
et al. (eds.), 5 United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea 1982: A Commentary (1988) 25-26.
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willing to allow state parties to maintain flexibility in the choice of means of settlement, 
on the other hand.76 Flexibility was thus perceived as a necessary price for getting the
77consent of all state parties to the compulsory nature of dispute settlement.
Furthermore, once it became clear that there would be no agreement on a single 
adjudication forum under UNCLOS, it made little sense to insist on entrusting the 
Convention's procedures with exclusive jurisdiction (since the goal of uniform 
application of the Convention could not have been attainted anyway).
However, it should be noted that article 282 gives priority only to dispute settlement 
procedures entailing a binding decision. Thus, an existing agreement to refer a question 
subject to the jurisdiction of UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies to negotiation or 
conciliation cannot normally serve as a bar against invoking the UNCLOS procedures.
7ftStill, in a recent decision in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, an arbitral tribunal has
70construed article 281 of UNCLOS broadly * and held that an agreement to refer a 
specific type of disputes to diplomatic methods of dispute settlement could be viewed as 
an implicit agreement to exclude the application of Part XV to UNCLOS.80 In the view 
of the present writer, the expansive approach taken by the arbitral decision towards what 
constitutes an excluding agreement has the potential of seriously eroding one of the 
main achievements of UNCLOS -  the introduction of mandatory and binding dispute
ft 1settlement procedures. It also seems that the willingness of the tribunal to attribute 
exclusiveness to agreements to resort to diplomatic methods of dispute settlement
76 UNCLOS, 4th Sess., V UNCLOS- Off. Rec., supra note 75, at 8; Nordquist, V UNCLOS Commentary, 
supra note 75, at 6,20; A.O. Adede, The System fo r  Settlement o f  Disputes under the UN Convention on 
the Law o f  the Sea (1987) 242ff; Alan E. Boyle “Settlement o f  Disputes Relating to the Law o f the Sea 
and the Environment” International Justice (Kalliopi Koufa, ed., 1997) 299, 321.
77 John G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (3rd ed., 1998) 195; Robert Y. Jennings “A New  
Look at the Place o f the Adjudication in International Relations today” 1 Collected Writings (1984)(1998  
reprint) 450,460; Treves, Recent Trends, supra note 16, at 407-08.
78 Southern Bluefin Tuna (Australia and N ew Zealand v. Japan), Award o f  4 Aug. 2000 (Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility)(arbitration panel), available at <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/bluefmtuna/ 
award080400.pdf> (last visited on 12 August 2000).
79 Article 281(1) provides that: “If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application o f  this Convention have agreed to seek settlement o f the dispute by a 
peaceful means o f their own choice, the procedures provided for in this part apply only where no 
settlement has been reached by recourse to such means and the agreement between the parties does not 
exclude any further procedure”. United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea, 10 Dec. 1982, art. 
187,287, 290, 292, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. (1982) 1261 [hereinafter ‘UNCLOS’].
80 Such interpretation is arguable inconsistent with the Commentary to UNCLOS, which provides that 
non-UNCLOS procedures would be exclusive only if  the parties so ‘specify’. Nordquist, V UNCLOS 
Commentary, supra note 75, at 23.
81 Southern Bluefin Tuna arbitration, at para. 19-23 (Separate Opinion o f  Justice Keith), available at < 
http:// www.worldbank. org/icsid/bluefintuna/opinion.pdf> (last visited on 12 August 2000). See also 
Nordquist, V UNCLOS Commentary, supra note 75, at 9-10.
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renders meaningless the proviso in article 282, which permits derogation from 
UNCLOS procedures only if there had been an agreement of the parties to utilise a 
procedure that entails a binding decision.
In any event, one of the significant consequences of the residual nature of article 282 is 
that it limits the ability of disputing parties to exercise unilateral forum shopping or to 
engage in multiple proceedings before UNCLOS and non-UNCLOS fora. Cases which 
are amenable to the parallel jurisdiction of UNCLOS judicial bodies and other 
international courts or tribunals (whose procedure entails binding decisions) should be 
submitted, as a rule, only to the latter bodies. If a case were to be unilaterally brought 
before a UNCLOS court or tribunal in breach of this jurisdictional order of precedence, 
the judicial body seized would be obliged, upon request by any of the parties, to decline 
jurisdiction and refer the case to a competing forum.
There are, however, two caveats to the proposition that UNCLOS precludes forum 
shopping. First, the parties to a dispute may agree to authorise ITLOS or another 
UNCLOS judicial body to exercise jurisdiction in derogation from the terms of article 
282 (in line with the proviso -  “unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree”). 
Therefore, collective forum shopping may still take place. Second, if the jurisdiction of 
the alternative forum is also based on UNCLOS, there can be no application of article 
282. In these circumstances, in which more than one UNCLOS judicial body is 
available (e.g., if both parties have selected more than one dispute settlement procedure 
under the ‘choice of procedure’ clause), the party initiating adjudication may forum 
shop between the alternative fora. In theory, the two parties could even initiate parallel 
proceedings before different courts or tribunals. However, in practice, given the modest 
number of parties that have so far announced their choice under article 287 and the even 
smaller number of those that have selected more than one procedure (to date, only 12 
countries), it is quite unlikely that two or more judicial bodies would be competent to 
address a dispute by virtue of UNCLOS in the near future.
A delicate interpretative question pertaining to the text of article 282 relates to the place 
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ over states that have made declarations under
82 Tullio Treves “Conflicts between the International Tribunal for the Law o f the Sea and the International 
Ccurt o f Justice” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 809, 811.
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the optional clause [article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute] in the general scheme of things 
under UNCLOS. This question could arise under two possible scenarios.
First, a respondent party to dispute settlement proceedings initiated independently of 
UNCLOS (e.g., arbitration in pursuance to a bilateral dispute settlement treaty), but 
concerning a question falling under UNCLOS, might attempt to transfer the case to the 
ICJ, relying upon the last segment of article 282 (“the parties ... otherwise agree”). 
Although this contention might seem at first sight to be quite farfetched, a rather 
elaborated legal construction might sustain the argument (though, barely). At the outset 
it must be shown that UNCLOS prevails over the competing jurisdiction-creating 
instrument (e.g., if it is lex specialis and lex posteriori). Then it could be argued that 
mutual acceptance by the parties to the dispute of the optional clause of the ICJ - one of 
the designated fora under article 287 of UNCLOS, constitutes an agreement reached 
'otherwise' to utilise a UNCLOS procedure. Under the final sentence of article 282 such 
‘agreement’, which was reached outside UNCLOS (as would have been, for instance, an 
ad hoc agreement to resort to ITLOS), could override the normal rule according 
primacy to non-UNCLOS proceedings. Interestingly enough, this rather odd reading of 
article 282 finds some support in the travaux preparatoires to UNCLOS.83
However, there are a few problems with this interpretation. In the first place, it is 
questionable whether collective acceptance of the optional clause should be regarded as 
a jurisdiction-conferring 'agreement'. Because of the general nature of optional clause 
declarations it is dubious whether specific intent to preclude the invocation of 
non-UNCLOS procedures can be attributed to states that have submitted such 
declarations (sometimes even before UNCLOS was concluded). In other words, it 
seems purely fictional to regard the intersecting declarations of acceptance as a specific 
‘agreement’ to deviate from the default residual regime of article 282.
Additionally, it is rather unreasonable to construe UNCLOS as if it had intended to 
establish jurisdictional ranking between competing dispute settlement procedures 
operating independently of part XV of UNCLOS. ICJ proceedings based on any basis 
other than article 287’s choice of procedure regime are in fact a non-UNCLOS 
procedure, as are proceedings before an arbitral panel, by virtue of a general arbitration
83 Nordquist, V UNCLOS Commentary, supra note 75, at 26-27 (the term ‘otherwise’ in article 282 was 
selected so to encompass the jurisdiction o f  the ICJ under the optional clause).
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agreement. It makes little sense to construe UNCLOS as if it meant to change the 
equilibrium between non-UNCLOS-based proceedings and to accord precedence to ICJ 
proceedings at the expense of arbitration (which is also one of the possible procedures 
under article 287). Actually, one could argue that the arbitration agreement and not the 
optional clause declarations ought to be regarded as the agreement to conduct 
proceedings ‘otherwise’. Hence, there is illogical circularity in the proposition that 
UNCLOS purported to regulate non-UNCLOS procedures and it would be more 
sensible to address the competition between them under general international law, as if 
UNCLOS had not existed.85
Finally, it would seem that the last sentence of article 282 merely authorises UNCLOS 
judicial bodies to exercise jurisdiction where the parties have so agreed. It does not 
explicitly preclude litigation before alternative fora. Therefore, if judicial bodies outside 
UNCLOS are unilaterally invoked, the general rules of international law that govern 
conflict of jurisdictions, expounded later on in this study, should apply. In other wTords, 
it can be maintained that article 282 grants a residual status to UNCLOS procedures in 
the normal course of things, but once it is shown that the parties have opted for a 
UNCLOS based procedure in deviation from the residual principle, there is little, if any 
guidance in the text of UNCLOS on which forum is to enjoy priority. Thus, even if the 
ICJ would be willing to assume jurisdiction by virtue of article 282, despite the earlier 
initiation of proceedings before an arbitral tribunal, there is no guarantee that the 
arbitrators would be willing to halt the proceedings
The second interpretative question relating to the ICJ optional clause might arise with 
regard to proceedings initiated under UNCLOS before a judicial body other than the ICJ 
(i.e., ITLOS, arbitration or special arbitration). It is feasible, that the parties to the case 
will also be parties to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, and that the respondent 
party would try to rely upon article 282 and invoke the jurisdiction of the ICJ in order to 
preclude the jurisdiction of the seized forum. In other words, it can be proffered that
84 Shabtai Rosenne, II The Law and Practice o f  the International Court o f  Justice (1997) 830-31.
85 This conclusion could be supported by the decision o f  the PCIJ in the jurisdictional stage o f  the 
Electricity Company o f  Sofia and Bulgaria case. The Electricity Company o f  Sofia and Bulgaria (Bulgaria 
v. Belgium), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 77 (Preliminary Objections). In that case, the respondent state 
(Belgium) attempted to invoke the residual jurisdiction reservation to its optional clause declaration and 
argue that no optional clause jurisdiction can be established since the parties have concluded a specific 
treaty conferring upon the Court consensual jurisdiction over some o f  issues. The Court has held that the 
purpose o f the latter treaty could not have been to limit recourse to adjudication and that an artificial 
construction o f its jurisdiction-conferring instruments should be avoided.. Id. at 76.
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acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ might qualify as an ‘external’ 
agreement to resort to a non-UNCLOS dispute settlement procedure, which under 
article 282, should override the ordinary choice of procedure clause.
At the same time, the ICJ is one of the four adjudicative alternatives listed in article 287 
and it is not obvious that its competence should prevail over that of other competent 
fora selected in pursuance to article 287. Under this view, resort to ICJ on the basis of 
ihe optional clause can be regarded as a choice of procedure technique equivalent to 
selection under article 287 (it is indeed conceivable that parties to the ICJ compulsory 
jurisdiction system would deem an additional declaration of acceptance of its 
jurisdiction under UNCLOS to be redundant). Therefore, it can be contended that in 
similarity with other instances in which both parties have selected more than one 
common procedure, the applicant party ought to decide which of the available 
competent fora to seize.
So far, at least one commentator (and now also an ITLOS judge) has expressed the view 
that a respondent party to a case before ITLOS brought under the jurisdictional 
provisions of UNCLOS may insist that the ICJ be utilised in lieu of ITLOS, by virtue of 
optional clause declarations made by all parties to the dispute. In a recent case before 
ITLOS where this procedural argument could have been made, the respondent state 
chose not to invoke it.87 Hence, it seems that the question is still an open matter, which 
waits to be resolved in the future. While the text and history of Part XV to UNCLOS 
seems to support the invocation of optional clause 'agreements’ under article 282, such 
interpretation is hardly warranted as a matter of desirable judicial policy inter alia 
because of the current heavy caseload of the ICJ and the light docket of ITLOS. A 
request to transfer a case from ITLOS to the ICJ may therefore be tactically motivated, 
as part of an attempt to delay proceedings, and could perhaps in extreme cases be 
regarded as abusive.
86 Treves, Conflicts between ITLOS and the ICJ, supra note 82, at 812; Tullio Treves “The Jurisdiction o f  
the International Tribunal for the Law o f the Sea” 37 Ind. J. Int. L. (1997) 396, 407-08, 416-17.
87 The case in question is Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (Australia v. Japan; New Zealand v. Japan), Order 
of 27 August 1999 (ITLOS), available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/Order-tuna34.htm> (last 
visited on 10 Oct. 2000). Since all o f the disputing states have submitted declarations under the ICJ 
optional clause, the respondent state (Japan) could have insisted that the case be brought before that 
forum in lieu o f  arbitration (and through that try to divest ITLOS o f  jurisdiction to issue provisional 
measures). The situation had been further complicated by the fact that all three countries have appended 
to their declarations under the optional clause residual jurisdiction reservations. The ensuing challenge 
would have been whether UNCLOS, providing for arbitration also as a residual method o f dispute
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In any event, the interpretation adopted by the relevant judicial bodies on the interaction 
between article 282 and the ICJ optional clause should strive to be consistent and treat 
in all cases mutual declarations under article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute either as a 
legitimate exercise of choice of procedure under article 287 (which means that they 
cannot enjoy primacy over other UNCLOS and non-UNCLOS procedures) or as 
‘external’ agreements (which enjoys precedence under article 282 only over UNCLOS 
procedures).88
A final observation with relation to jurisdictional competition involving UNCLOS 
bodies is that although article 282, as all other articles found in Section 1 to Part XV of 
UNCLOS, ought to apply prima facie, by virtue of article 285 of UNCLOS, vis-a-vis 
disputes arising under Part XI of UNCLOS (sea-bed related disputes),89 some authors 
have argued that the language of article 282 suggests that it does not encompass 
competition with the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber. This is because article 282 refers only 
to competition with procedures provided for in Part XV to UNCLOS.90 However, this 
seems to be a rather minor point. Not only does the dormancy of the Sea-Bed Chamber 
transforms the issue into a purely academic one, it also looks as if, in most cases, the 
same result, provided in article 282 (according preference to a specific agreement of the 
parties to resort to a non-UNCLOS procedure), could be achieved through application 
of general rules of international law.91
Other residual arrangements
Residual jurisdiction arrangements can be found in some other international 
instruments. For example, ECOSOC Resolution 1503, establishing the complaints 
mechanism of the UN Human Rights Commission (utilising the Sub-Commission for 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights), states that complaints alleging human 
rights violation will not be investigated if:
settlement, could be considered as an agreed-upon alternative procedure to the ICJ. In any event, Japan 
did not attempt to transfer the case to the ICJ.
88 Another interesting question is whether a state that has accepted the optional clause o f  the ICJ and a 
state which has selected the ICJ under article 287 should be deemed as parties which have selected the 
same procedure. Treves, The Jurisdiction o f ITLOS, supra note 86, at 417.
89 Article 285 o f  UNCLOS reads: “This Section applies to any dispute which pursuant to Part XI, section
5, is to be settled in accordance with procedures provided for in this P art.
90 Treves, Conflicts between ITLOS and the ICJ, supra note 82, at 812; Merrills, supra note 77, at 172 n.
6 .
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. the State concerned wishes to submit to other procedures in accordance with general or 
special international agreements to which it is a party”.92
In addition, some dispute settlement provisions found in international treaties referring 
all or some classes of disputes to the jurisdiction of a particular judicial body contain a 
stipulation that priority should be given to other dispute settlement mechanisms that the 
parties may have agreed to empower.
C. Middle ground approaches -  limited choice of forum
NAFTA
Beside exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction provisions, one can also identify hybrid 
arrangements allowing for limited forum selection by the parties. The most notable of 
these regimes is found under NAFTA, which contains a sophisticated 
jurisdiction-regulating clause providing for a unique mixture of flexibility and rigidity.
The drafters of NAFTA were aware of the possibility that trade-related disputes 
between the three member states could give rise to concomitant proceedings under 
NAFTA and the GATT/WTO. This is because all three NAFTA members are also 
parties to the WTO and given the fact that many NAFTA provisions were modelled 
after GATT Provisions.94 Consequently, the NAFTA Agreement attempted to 
coordinate between the jurisdictions of the two competing procedures and Article 2005
91 See Nordquist, V UNCLOS Commentary, supra note 75, at 36.
92 ECOSOC Resolution 1503 (XLVIII), para. 6(b)(ii), 48 U.N. ESCOR (No. 1A) at 8, U.N. Doc. 
E/4832/Add.l (1970). However, it should be noted that the 1503 procedure represents a marriage between 
a quasi-judicial procedure and a general situation investigation mechanism and has not been considered 
by other human rights bodies as a competing dispute settlement procedure. See e.g., Comm. 1/1976, A. v. 
S., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 17 (1984).
93 See e.g., European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement o f  Disputes, art. 2 8 (l)(“The practice o f  this 
Convention shall not apply to disputes which the parties agreed or may agree to submit to another 
procedure o f peaceful settlement. Nevertheless, in respect o f disputes falling within the scope o f  Article 1, 
the High Contracting Parties shall refrain from invoking as between themselves agreements which do not 
provide for a procedure entailing binding decisions”). See also CERD, art. 22 (authorising the ICJ to 
adjudicate disputes, unless the parties agree to pursue other form o f settlement); Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities o f  the United Nations, 13 Feb. 1946, sec. 30. 1 U.N.T.S. 16 ("all differences 
arising out o f  the interpretation or application o f the present convention shall be referred to the 
International Court o f  Justice, unless in any case it is agreed by the parties to have recourse to another 
mode o f settlement”).
94 Although NAFTA to the GATT 1947 and not to the WTO or GATT 1994, it seems to be the common 
view that the WTO structures have replaced for the purposes o f  NAFTA the old GATT framework. 
Gabrielle Marceau “The Dispute Settlement Rules o f the North American Free Trade Agreement: a 
Thematic Comparison with the Dispute Settlement Rules o f the World Trade Organization” International 
Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System  (Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, ed., 1997) 489, 535. 
See also Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S. Origin Agricultural Products (U.S. v. Canada),
Report o f  2 Dec. 1996, para. 166 (NAFTA Chapter 20 Panel), available at 
<http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/images/pdfrcb95010e.pdf> (last visited on 15 Sept. 2000).
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provides that the complaining party to a dispute falling both under the jurisdiction of 
NAFTA and the GATT can choose where to litigate it. However, upon selection, the 
chosen forum is accorded exclusive jurisdiction.95 In the distinct case that two NAFTA 
parties are interested in bringing a similar claim against the third member state they 
must seek to agree on the identity of the forum beforehand (and in case of persistent 
disagreement, NAFTA should normally be selected).96 Hence, NAFTA clearly permits 
plaintiffs to forum shop but limits the ‘shopping’ alternatives to two alternative fora 
only.
It should be noted, that certain disputes concerning the environment, conservation, 
health and safety are subject to a special arrangement. In these cases, the respondent 
state may insist that the dispute will be adjudicated before NAFTA dispute settlement 
bodies. The applicant is then prevented from seizing the GATT procedure and must 
withdraw from GATT proceedings, if already initiated.97 Thus, article 2005 of the 
NAFTA represents a delicate balance between party autonomy in forum selection, on 
the one hand, and the protection of vital areas in which the regional organisation has 
particularly strong interests in having its norms applied, on the other hand.
It should also be mentioned that NAFTA adopted another limited choice of forum 
scheme with regard to private investment disputes.98 Private investors from one NAFTA 
state investing in another NAFTA state may bring unilaterally their investment dispute 
with the host state either to ICSID (or the ICSID Additional Facility) or to arbitration in 
accordance with the UNCITRAL Rules. In doing so, they waive their rights to pursue 
the same matter before any dispute settlement procedure operating under domestic 
law.99
Other limited choice arrangements
Limited choice of forum arrangements can also be found in several other instruments, 
including some general dispute settlement treaties, providing for choice between several 
international disputes procedures.100 In most cases, choice under those instruments must
95 NAFTA, art. 2005(6).
96 NAFTA, art. 2005(2).
97 NAFTA, art. 2005(3)-(5).
98 NAFTA, art. 1120.
99 NAFTA, art. 1121.
100 See Revised General Act, art. 17; American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, 30 April 1948, art. XXXII, 
449 U.N.T.S. 83 (Pact o f Bogota); Optional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions on the Law o f the Sea,
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be exercised by the two parties, acting in unison, but some compromissory clauses 
allow for the unilateral exercise of choice.101
Finally, one should refer to the unique arrangement that has been introduced by the 
CSCE/OSCE Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration, which established the OSCE 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration.102 Article 19(l)(a) of the Convention provides 
that the Court will not have jurisdiction:
"If the parties to the dispute have accepted in advance the exclusive jurisdiction of a 
jurisdictional body other than a Tribunal in accordance with this Convention, which has 
jurisdiction to decide, with binding force, on the dispute submitted to it, or if the parties 
thereto have agreed to seek to settle the dispute exclusively by other means."
The jurisdiction of the Court therefore is residual, but only if the alternative forum 
enjoys exclusive jurisdiction. In practical terms, this would mean that the Court could 
not address inter-state disputes subject to the jurisdiction of the ECJ or the ECHR, but 
could, normally, address questions which might also fall under the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ, the universal human rights bodies or ITLOS. However, it should be noted that 
some of the parties to the OSCE Convention have appended reservations, conditioning 
their acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction in that priority be given to competing dispute 
settlement procedures agreed upon in an ad hoc manner.
art. II; Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, art. 66(a) (all instruments provide for a choice between 
arbitration and the ICJ, the latter being the residual mechanism). An essentially similar arrangement can 
be found in certain compromissory clauses, which invest competence with the ICJ if  the parties fail to 
agree upon terms o f  arbitration. See Convention on the Elimination o f  all Forms o f  Discrimination against 
Women, 18 Dec. 1979 art. 29, G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. 
A/34/46; CAT, art. 30. Another trade-related regime where limited choice o f  forum is permitted is the 
Organisation for the Harmonisation o f  Corporate Law in Africa. According to article 21 o f the 
Organisation’s constitutive treaty, the disputing parties have discretion whether to take the case to 
arbitration or adjudication. Treaty Establishing the Organization for the Harmonization o f  Corporate Law 
in Africa 17 Oct. 1993, 4 Journal Officiel de l'OHADA (1997), available at 
<http://www.cm.refer.org/eco/ecohada/ohadaO.htm> (last visited on 16 Sept. 2000).
101 See e.g., European Energy Charter, 12 Dec. 1994, art. 26, 34 I.L.M. (1994) 373 (choice between 
pre-agreed forum, domestic courts and ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitration).
102 Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE, 15 Dec. 1992, 32 I.L.M. (1993) 557.
103 Lucius Caflisch “The OSCE Court o f Conciliation and Arbitration: Necessary or Redundant?” 9 
A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1995) 23, 25-26.
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A comparable ‘lack of exclusivity’ provision can also be found in the Declaration of 
Algiers, establishing the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, albeit with respect to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the domestic Iranian courts.104
D. Implied division of iurisdictions
Beside explicit jurisdiction-regulating clauses governing access to international courts 
and tribunals, it has been sometimes suggested that the very nature of certain treaty 
regimes would justify, by way of implication, a regime of exclusivity. The most typical 
candidates for this construction are the so-called 'self-contained' regimes -  treaty created 
sub-systems that embrace a full set of secondary rules and enforcement mechanisms.105
It could be argued that through the establishment of closed regimes of highly complex 
nature the parties have demonstrated their intent to refer disputes relating to the 
operation of the regime exclusively, or at least primarily, to the regime's own dispute 
settlement bodies.106 Some support to this view can be found in the commentary on the 
EC Treaty, which suggested that even had article 292 (ex-article 219) not existed, the 
ECJ could have deduced its existence from the general scheme of EC law.107 
Furthermore, as will be shown below, there is some support in the case law that specific 
dispute settlement procedures (which the ‘self-contained’ regimes are arguably a 
prototype of) ought to enjoy jurisdictional precedence over general dispute settlement 
procedures.
It would seem that this proposition could be employed with respect to regional 
economic integration mechanisms whose constitutive instruments do not explicitly 
address the possibility of invoking their provisions before judicial bodies operating 
outside the sub-system. These include the EFTA Court, COMESA Court and the 
Economic Court of the CIS. Indeed, it has been argued with regard to the latter body 
that the clause referring to the Court disputes under the CIS Economic Union Treaty
104 Declaration o f  the Government o f  the Democratic and Popular Republic o f  Algeria Concerning the 
Settlement o f Claims by the Government o f the United States o f  America and the Government o f  the 
Islamic Republic o f  Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, art. 11(1), 1 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep.10, 20 I.L.M. (1981)230  
[hereinafter ‘Declaration on Settlement o f  Claims’]. In its practice, the Tribunal has construed the 
exclusive jurisdiction exception narrowly. Case 6, Gibbs and Hill, Inc. v. Iran Power Generation and  
transmission Co., 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 236 (1982); Case 51, Halliburton Co. v. Doreen/IMCO , 1 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 242 (1982).
105 Bruno Simma “Self-Contained Regimes” XVI Neth. Y.B. Int’l Law (1985) 111, 117; C/T William 
Riphagen “Second Report on the Content, Forms and Degrees o f  International Responsibility”, U.N. Doc 
A/CN.4/344 (1981), 1981 (II) Y.B. Int. L. Comm. Part 1, p. 79.
106 Simma, supra note 105, at 113.
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(which is roughly comparable to the EC Treaty)108 should be construed as an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause.109 However, given the scarcity of the case law on the subject, the 
suggestion that exclusive adjudicative competence is an implied condition in every 
regional integration regimes cannot be said to represent the current state of the law. This 
is especially the case, since some regimes such as NAFTA and Benelux do offer parties 
a right, albeit limited, to access outside procedures.110 It is nevertheless plausible to hold 
that the closed nature of the regime might create a prima facie presumption in favour of 
exclusiveness. As a result, the burden to prove intent to preserve choice of forum should 
shift to the party arguing for the jurisdiction of an external judicial body.
2. Multiple proceedings
There are three principal methods through which jurisdiction-regulating clauses found 
in the constitutive instruments of international courts and tribunals address the problem 
of multiple proceedings. These three methods correspond to the well-known legal 
doctrines of lis alibi pendens, res judicata and electa una via. The first two rules are of 
restricted temporal and substantive scope. A lis alibi pendens provision bars multiple 
proceedings only during the pendency of the first-in-time set of proceedings. After 
proceedings had been exhausted the rule does not prohibit initiation of new proceedings. 
The res judicata rule serves as a bar against adjudication only after the first proceedings 
were concluded and a valid judgment issued. Hence, the application of each of the first 
two rules excludes the application of the other, and they cannot be applied 
simultaneously. The electa una via rule has, by contrast, a wider potential for 
application since it may inhibit multiple proceedings from the very moment in which 
the first proceedings were initiated and onwards - encompassing both parallel and 
subsequent proceedings. It therefore combines the effect of the lis alibi pendens and res 
judicata rules. However, the electa una via, which is essentially a rule of estoppel, is
107 Herzog, supra note 3, at 6-170.5.
108 The Commonwealth o f  Independent States Treaty on Creation o f  an Economic Union, 24 Sept. 1993, 
art. 31(1), 34 I.L.M. (1995) 1298. Article 31(1) o f the Treaty provides: "[t]he contracting parties pledge to 
resolve their disputes in respect to interpretation and implementation o f the present Treaty by means of 
negotiations or through the Economic Court o f the Commonwealth o f  Independent States."
109 Gennady M. Danilenko “The Economic Court o f the Commonwealth o f  Independent States” 31 
N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 893, 900. Danilenko acknowledges that another clause - article 31(4), 
permits recourse to other international judicial bodies if  the disputing parties fail to resolve their dispute 
through the Economic Court.. However, in practice, the Court has construed article 31(4) to apply only 
with regard to disputes that cannot be submitted to the Economic Court. Opinion no. C-l/19-96, 9 Vestnik 
Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatssi [Bulletin o f the Supreme Arbitration Court o f  the 
Russian Federation] (1997) 86 (in Russian), cited  in Danilenko, supra, at 901.
110 NAFTA, art. 2005 (optional access to GATT); Benelux Treaty, art. 50 (right to enforce Arbitral 
judgments before the ICJ).
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designed to bar only multiple litigation initiated by the same applicant, and not multiple 
claims brought by different claimants (although not all regimes insist upon this 
condition).
In general, the number of jurisdiction-regulating norms addressing multiple proceedings 
is quite small. This can be explained, in part, by the fact that such provisions are 
redundant for international courts and tribunals entrusted with exclusive jurisdiction 
(such as the ECJ or the ECHR). The exclusivity of the jurisdiction bars the parties from 
referring matters falling under the courts and tribunal’s exclusive competence to any 
other international judicial body, at any time, regardless of whether proceedings have 
been initiated before the proper forum or of the procedural stage reached in these 
proceedings. Hence, there is need for regulation of parallel jurisdiction only in respect 
of jurisdictions susceptible to forum shopping. In addition, it often did not occur to the 
drafters of the constitutive instrument of veteran judicial bodies, created before the 
institutional proliferation of the 1980’s and 1990’s, that another permanent judicial body 
with overlapping jurisdiction might be created in the future. This explains why the 
architects of courts and tribunals such as the ICJ and ICSID did not feel the need to 
regulate the jurisdictional relations between them and other judicial bodies. Finally, the 
absence to date of any ‘high profile’ jurisdictional clash has made the question of the 
overlapping powers of international courts and tribunals mostly an academic curiosity. 
Hence, negotiations over such a difficult issue during the already arduous task of 
creating new judicial bodies might have been considered a futile and inefficient time 
and resource consuming exercise, which could be skipped over.
A. Electa una via
Most electa una via provisions can be found in human rights instruments that bar resort 
to dispute settlement mechanisms once another procedure had been invoked - regardless 
of the stage reached in the proceedings before the competing forum. The relative 
propensity to use jurisdiction-regulating measures in human rights regimes can be 
explained, in part, by the similarity of the obligations under the various treaties, which 
casts doubts over the utility of resorting to multiple proceedings, and through the 
unwillingness of state parties to human rights instruments to be compelled to respond to 
the same specific allegations before more than one forum. However, the most 
significant factors have probably been the relatively large number of bodies operating in 
this area with palpable jurisdictional overlaps and the wish of the drafters of the
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instruments to reduce the risk of inconsistent decisions on human rights issues, which 
might adversely affect the authority and legitimacy of the involved courts and tribunals.
European Convention on Human Rights and other human rights regimes 
Again, the prototype provision can be found in the 1950 European HR Convention. 
Article 35(2)[ex-article 27(1)] provides that:
"The Court shall not deal w ith  any application subm itted under A rticle 34  [i.e ., individual 
application] that -
a) ...
b) is substantially the sam e as a matter that has already been exam ined by the Court or 
has already been submitted to another procedure o f  international investigation or 
settlem ent and contains no relevant new  information." (em phasis added)
This provision was introduced into the text of the Convention following a British 
proposal,111 which was directed at curbing overlaps between the jurisdictions of 
different international institutions. In variation from the original proposal, which only 
addressed multiple proceedings before different judicial bodies, the drafting 
sub-committee decided to expand the rule, so as to encompass also parallel and 
repetitive recourse by the same applicant to the Strasbourg institutions.
To date, there have been only a few cases in which the electa una via clause had been 
invoked with respect to competing international courts and tribunals.112 However, in one 
case before the EHR Comm’n it was held that a new legal claim, different from a 
previous legal claim which had been submitted to it in the past, was still the ‘same 
matter’ if the plaintiff could have raised the second claim in the first set of
113proceedings. This suggests a broad construction of what constitutes a competing 
claim for the purposes of applying the electa una via clause, although one could perhaps 
attribute this expansive approach to the greater willingness of international courts and 
tribunals to curb successive applications to the same body (where no normative and 
procedural differences that might justify multiple proceedings exist). At the same time, 
the European Comm’n, like its UN and regional counterparts, has adopted a narrow test
111 Amendments Proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation, August 4th, 1950, Doc. CM I (50) 6, V 
‘ Travanx Preparatories supra note 32, at 66.
112 See supra Chapter 2, at pp. 74., n. 177.
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as to what procedures are capable of generating jurisdictional competition (e.g., 
excluding fact finding bodies and NGO sponsored proceedings).114
Additional electa una via clauses governing jurisdictional concurrency in the area of 
human rights are found in the 1984 CAT,115 the new Optional Protocol to CEDAW116 
and in the not-yet in force MWC.117 In all cases the text closely resembles the electa 
una via provision found in the European HR Convention.
Other electa una via clauses
Another example of an electa una via rule, coming from a different area of international 
law, is article 2005 of NAFTA (which was already mentioned before). This article 
enables applicant parties to choose whether to bring their claims before NAFTA or 
GATT dispute settlement mechanism. However, once choice has been made, the 
selected forum enjoys exclusive jurisdiction and the other one is permanently barred. 
Similarly, under the CSCE/OSCE Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration, the 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration is to be deprived of jurisdiction if the same case 
has previously been submitted to a competent court or tribunal (or in conciliation, to
1 1 Q
another conciliation-type procedure).
A slightly different rule, prescribing only the effects of adjudication before a seized 
forum on the jurisdictions of other courts and tribunals (and not the reverse -  the effect 
of adjudication before alternative fora on the jurisdiction of the second-in-time seized 
body) is found under the Algiers Declaration, establishing the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal. Once a claim had been referred to the Tribunal, it is excluded from the
113 Ajinaja v. U.K., App. No. 13365/87, 55 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 294 ,296  (1988).
114 See supra Chapter 2, at pp. 76 n. 187, 188.
115 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 
Dec. 1984, art. 22(5), G.A. Res. 39/46. 39 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 51), UN Doc. A/39/51, at 197 (1984),
23 I.L.M. (1984) 1027 [hereinafter ‘CAT’](“The Committee shall not consider any communications from 
an individual... unless it has ascertained that: (a) The same matter has not been, and is not being, 
examined under another procedure o f international investigation or settlement”).
116 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination o f  All Forms o f  Discrimination Against 
Women, art. 4(2)(I), UN Doc. E/CN.6/1998/WG/L.2 (1998), 39 I.L.M. (2000) 281 (“The Committee shall 
declare a communication inadmissible where: (a) The same matter has already been examined by the 
Committee or has been or is being examined under another procedure o f  international investigation or 
settlement”).
117 MWC, art. 77(3) (“ The Committee shall not consider any communication from an individual under 
the present article unless it has ascertained that: (a) The same matter has not been, and is not being, 
examined under another procedure o f international investigation or settlement”).
118 CSCE/OSCE Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration, art. 19(l)(a), 19(3). In cases submitted to 
conciliation, the Conciliation Commission will stay proceedings and give priority to judicial proceedings 
initiated between the parties even if  they commenced after Conciliation had begun. Id. at art. 19(2).
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jurisdiction of the "courts of Iran or of the United States, or o f any other court" 
(emphasis added).119 At least in one case, the Tribunal has held that the term 'any other
• 190court' does not cover arbitration tribunals.
Electa una via reservations
Reservations submitted by states acceding to the jurisdiction of judicial or quasi-judicial 
fora, whose constitutive instruments failed to introduce an electa una via arrangement, 
could serve as an alternative source of the rule. Indeed, some 20 states parties to the 
ICCPR (most of them also subject to the jurisdiction of the ECHR), have stipulated 
upon ratifying the Optional Protocol (which contains only a lis alibi pendens clause), 
that the HRC shall be deprived of jurisdiction over complaints which had been 
previously addressed by another dispute settlement procedure. Most of these 
reservations were prompted by a recommendation of a Committee of Experts appointed 
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,121 which was not interested in 
having the decisions of the ECHR challenged, as if by way of appeal, before another 
judicial instance, thereby weakening the authority of the former and opening the way for 
embarrassingly inconsistent findings.122 The HRC has explicitly accepted the legitimacy 
of the said reservations in a General Comment, where it held that the reservations are 
compatible with the object and purpose of the Optional Protocol, to the extent that 
another form of international supervision over the human rights practices of the 
reserving states is available.123 Consequently, the HRC enforced electa una via 
reservations in a number of cases and refused to admit applications previously 
submitted to alternative judicial or quasi-judicial mechanisms.124 Similar reservations 
were also attached to 7 declarations accepting the authority of the CERD Committee to 
review individual communications.
Initially, the HRC had adopted an expansive interpretation of electa una via reservations 
and did not consider disparities between the scope of protection afforded by the ICCPR 
and regional conventions to warrant hearing of communications previously brought
119 Declaration on Settlement o f  Claims, art. VII (2).
120 Case 333, Flour Corp. v. Iran, 11 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 296 ,297  (1986) (Interim Award); D allal v. 
B a n k M e lla t[m 6 ] 1 Q.B. 441.
121 Report o f the Committee o f Experts, Co-existence o f  Systems o f  Control, supra note 28, at 4, 7-11.
122 P.R. Ghandhi, The Human Rights Committee and the Right o f  Individual Communication - Law and 
Practice (1988) 229; Heifer, supra note 27, at 344-45.
123 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24 (52), para. 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6 
(1994).
124 See supra Chapter 2, at p. 72, n. 169.
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before a regional procedure. However, more recent case law suggests that where an 
alternative procedure had rejected the complaint as inadmissible ratione materiae, the 
HRC may still decide to address it because of differences in the scope of protected
1 9 (\rights under the relevant instruments. Further, unlike the EHR Comm’n, the HRC has 
not attributed weight to the fact that the new and separate claim could have been raised 
in the first set of proceedings.127 Finally, the Committee has adopted the position that 
only substantive examination of the same case by the alternative judicial or 
quasi-judicial procedure will bar review by the HRC.128 Hence, one might be able to 
observe in the HRC case law gradual erosion of the electa una via defence, which is 
arguably motivated by the wish to offer human rights protections where other 
procedures have been unable or unwilling to do so. This trend generally conforms to the 
strict standards employed by the HRC in lis alibi pendens cases, which have led to a 
limited application of the rule.
Electa una via reservations have also been submitted by some of the states that have 
made declarations in pursuance to the optional clause of the ICJ Statute, excluding from 
the jurisdiction of the Court disputes in respect of which other judicial proceedings have 
been initiated -  regardless of whether these proceedings are pending or have been 
concluded.129 However, these declarations have tended to limit their scope of 
application to situations where the party attempting to seize the jurisdiction of the ICJ 
had not made an optional clause declaration at the date when the first set of proceedings 
were initiated. Indeed, acceptance of the optional clause after a dispute had already been
125 Comm. 168/1984, V.O v. Norway, UN GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. 40, at 232 ,234  (Report o f the HRC, 
1984). For criticism, see Ghandhi, supra note 122, at 231.
126 Comm. 44/1990, Casanovas v. France, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. 40, at 131, 133-34 (Report o f  
the HRC, 1994); Manfred Nowak, A Commentary on the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1993) 702.
127 Comm. 452/1991, Glaziou v. France, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. 40(11), at 250, at para. 7.2 (Report 
of the HRC, 1994); Comm. 584/1994, Valentijn v. France, 51st Sess, Supp. 40(11), at 253, at para. 5.4 
(Report o f the HRC, 1996). One explanation for the differences in approach is that the European HR 
Comm’n addressed successive applications to the same mechanism#, whereas the HRC has dealt with the 
invocation o f different treaty regimes. See also Heifer, supra note 27, at 381-82.
128 See Comm. 158/1983, O.F. v. Norway, UN GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. 40, at 204,211 (Report o f the 
HRC, 1985); Casanovas, supra note 126, at 133-34.
129 See e.g., Declaration o f the Government o f Malta under article 36(2) o f  the ICJ Statute, 580 U.N.T.S. 
205 (1966): "[the Court shall have compulsory jurisdiction over disputes other than] ... disputes in 
respect o f which arbitral or judicial proceedings are taking, or have taken place with any State which, at 
the date o f the commencement o f  the proceedings, had not itself accepted the compulsory jurisdiction o f  
the International Court o f Justice.” Similar declarations were also made by Mauritius and the UK.
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submitted to adjudication, designed to drag the respondent state to the ICJ and subject it, 
against its will, to multiple proceedings, might well be viewed as abusive.
Finally, several commentators have expressed the view that forum selection provisions
found in bilateral and multilateral investment treaties and domestic foreign investment
laws, where the investor is often granted a right to choose between various dispute
111 •settlement procedures - e.g., ICISD, UNCITRAL or domestic courts, constitute in 
effect electa una via provisions. This is because the language of these agreements 
implicitly suggests that choice of one mechanism ought to exclude the application of all
119other available mechanisms.
B. Lis alibi pendens
The Optional Protocol to the ICCPR
There are only a few explicit lis alibi pendens provisions in the constitutive instruments 
of international courts and tribunals. The most notable of them is article 5(2) of the 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which provides:
"The Com m ittee shall not consider any com m unication from  an individual unless it has 
ascertained that (a) the sam e matter is not being exam ined under another procedure o f  
international investigation or settlement".
Unlike article 35(2) of the EHR Convention that bars any form of multiple litigation, the
111Optional Protocol only precludes parallel proceedings and it does not prohibit
130 However, the ICJ has stated on several occasions that acceptance o f  the optional clause for the sole 
purpose o f bringing a specific case is permissible. Right o f  Passage (Portugal v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 125, 
142 (Preliminary Objections); Legality o f  Use o f  Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Order o f  2 June 1999 
(forthcoming in 1999 I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures).
131 See e.g., U.S Model Bilateral Investment Agreement, art. VI, available in Stephen Zamora & Ronald 
A. Brand (eds.), 1 Basic Documents o f  International Economic Law  (1990) 655; NAFTA, art. 1120; 
European Energy Charter, supra note 101, art. 26(4); Law on Foreign Investment o f  1995, art. 27 
(Kazakhstan). See also Parra, supra note 51, 325, 328-30; Schreuer, supra note 40, at 171.
132 Pamela B. Gann “The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program” 21 Stan. J. Int’l L. (1985) 373, 
437-38; K. Scot Gudgeon “Arbitration Provisions o f U.S. Bilateral Investment Disputes” International 
Investment Disputes: Avoidance and Settlement (Seymor J. Rubin and Richard W. Nelson, eds., 1985) 41, 
51; Parra, supra note 51, at 334, 351-52; Schreuer, supra note 40, at 171; Jose Luis Siqueiros “Bilateral 
Treaties on the Reciprocal Protection o f Foreign Investment” 24 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. (1994) 255,265-66.
133 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, UN GA 
Res. 2200 A (XXI), GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 (A/6316) 52, UN Doc. A/CONF. 32/4 [hereinafter 
‘Optional Protocol to the ICCPR’]. It is interesting to note that the Spanish text o f article 5(2)(a) implies 
that it precludes reexamination o f disputes that had not been examined before by other international courts 
tribunals. However, the Committee, in line with the travaux preparatoires o f  the Optional Protocol, has 
opted to rely upon the other languages, which provide for a lis alibi pendens rule. Ghandhi, supra note 
122, at 222.
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application to the HRC after the same issue had been settled by a different human rights 
mechanism.
There was little discussion during the drafting of the Optional Protocol over the scope 
and precise meaning of the provision. This can be explained, in part, by the fact that the 
Protocol was discussed under strict time limits and since similar issues were discussed 
at some length with relation to inter-state complaints. The only serious reservation that 
was raised during the drafting stage pertained to the silence of the text on the question 
of whether the Committee may hear a case if parallel proceedings had been pending for 
an unreasonably long period of time.134 This matter was not adequately clarified during 
the deliberations on the text of the Protocol, but it was subsequently suggested that the 
Committee should not refuse jurisdiction in these circumstances.135
As explained in Part 1 of the study, the Committee has tended to strictly construe both 
elements of the lis albi pendens clause. The term ‘same matter’ has been read as 
referring to "identical parties, to the complaints advanced and facts adduced in 
support".137 As a result, cases submitted to alternative procedures by unrelated third
11Qparties were not held to constitute the same matter. In a subsequent General 
Comment, the HRC elaborated the meaning of what is the ‘same complaint’ and held
1 'XQthat it implies identical ‘legal rights’ and ‘subject-matter’. Discrepancies in the scope 
of protection afforded by the ICCPR and competing instruments might imply that there 
exists a difference in the subject matter of the two claims.140 These decisions have lead 
one commentator to assert that piecemeal litigation -  the breaking up of claims into 
different legal grounds, or into numerous applications focusing on different fact 
patterns, before different procedures, is not precluded by the Optional Protocol. This is 
despite the notion that as a matter of judicial policy it would be wise to permit such a
134 See e.g., U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 21 Sess., 1441 mtg. at 382-83, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1441 
(1966)[statement o f Mrs. Afnan (Iran)]
135 Opinion o f the United Nations Legal Counsel, 1977-78 Yearbook o f the Human Rights Committee 
130; Nowak, supra note 126, at 699; Ghandhi, supra note 122, at 235.
136 See also Ghandhi, supra note 122, at 227; Nowak, supra note 126, at 698.
137 VO. v. Norway, supra note 125, at 235.
138 See supra Chapter 2, at pp. 73, n. 173.
139 HRC General Comment 24, supra note 123, at para. 14.
140 See Heifer, supra note 27, at 315-19. The Directorate o f  Human Rights o f  the Council o f  Europe has 
expressed concerns that such decisions by the HRC might undermine the electa una via  reservations 
introduced by many o f  its member states and limit them to situations where the competing provisions are 
completely identical. Secretariat Memorandum prepared by the Directorate o f  Human Rights o f the 
Council o f  Europe, Effects o f  the Various International Human Rights Instruments providing a 
Mechanism fo r  Individual Communications on the Machinery o f  Protection established under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 1 Feb. 1985, p. 12, Doc. No. H (85) 3.
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practice only when the first-seized tribunal is unable to protect all of the plaintiffs 
rights.141 Finally, the Committee has construed the term 'another procedure of 
international investigation or settlement' so as to exclude general studies of human 
rights situations (undertaken by the UN Human Rights Commission and various 
reporting mechanisms) and investigation by NGOs.142
The drafting process of article 44 of the ICCPR, which affirmed the non-exclusive 
nature of the jurisdiction of the HRC over inter-state cases, is of particular interest to 
this study despite its practical irrelevancy (to date, there had been no inter-state cases 
before the HRC). The negotiating parties had considered introducing into the Covenant 
electa una via or lis pendens provisions, but had eventually decided to leave the matter 
unregulated. Hence, the lack of regulation of multiple inter-state proceedings had been 
deliberate, and is therefore instructive.
During the drafting of the Covenant, some of the delegates (mostly from Western 
European countries), expressed concern at the possibility that the same inter-states 
disputes would be simultaneously brought before various international human rights 
bodies. To prevent this, they proposed an electa una via rule -  that the HRC would have 
no jurisdiction once a matter had been referred to any other implementation 
mechanism.143 The representatives of Denmark and France, even suggested that 
whenever a dispute arises between two parties to more than one human rights 
instrument, the matter should be referred to the most detailed and comprehensive of the 
available procedures.144
The proposed draft was severely criticised by many delegates, mostly from developing 
and Communist countries, which considered it to undercut the authority and relevance 
of the HRC and seriously restricting the access thereto (even in situations where the 
alternative mechanisms had been proven to be useless).145 It was also argued that the 
more remedies there are in the area of human rights, the better it is.146 An attempt by the 
sponsors to limit the scope of the proposal to lis pendens situations (and to enable the
141 Heifer, supra note 27, at 367, 370.
142 See supra Chapter 2, at pp. 73-74, n. 175, 176.
143 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1399 (1966).
144 U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 21 Sess., 1432 mtg. at 322-23, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1432 (1966)[statements 
made by Mr. Fink (Denmark) and Mr. Paolini (France)].
145 Nowak, supra note 126, at 696.
146 See e.g., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1432, at 324-25 [statement made by Mr. Hoveyda (Iran)].
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HRC to receive cases if the alternative mechanism had dealt with them unsuccessfully) 
also met strong resistance,147 and the proposal was withdrawn altogether. An alternative 
approach, proposing to endow the HRC with exclusive jurisdiction, along the lines of 
article 55 of the European Human Rights Convention (at the time, article 62), was also 
not adopted.148 The text that was finally adopted preserved the right of states to select 
any dispute settlement mechanism of their choice, regardless of the existence of parallel 
or previous proceedings elsewhere. This outcome, which does not accord precedence to 
either the UN or regional procedures, nor restricts multiple inter-state proceedings, can 
be explained by the optional nature of the dispute settlement provisions of the 
Covenant149 and the corresponding need to secure the cooperation of two opposing 
groups of countries - countries that supported the primacy of the new universal 
mechanism and countries which had greater confidence in the regional arrangements.
Other lis alibi pendens provisions in human rights instruments 
In the past, the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human Rights also 
contained a lis alibi pendens clause drafted along the same lines of article 5(2) of the 
Optional Protocol.150 However, due to the questionable legality of such clause, which 
had the effect of adding a substantive ground for inadmissibility not found in the 
African Charter,151 it was withdrawn from the new version of the Rules of Procedure.152 
Still, the new Protocol on the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights provides that the Court will not be able to render advisory opinions if the 
Commission concurrently deals with a similar request.
Another lis alibi pendens arrangement is found in ECOSOC Resolution 1503, 
establishing a mechanism to review human rights situations. Paragraph 6(b)(ii) provides
147 See Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1432, at 325 [statements made by Mr. Beeby (New Zealand), Mrs. Afiian (Iraq), 
Mr. Hoveyda (Iran) and Mr. Komyenko (Ukraine)].
148 U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 21 Sess., 1434 mtg. at 333, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1434 (1966)[statement 
made by Mrs. Afnan (Iraq)].
149 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1434, at 334 [statement made by Mr. Nygesse (Congo)].
150 Rules o f Procedure o f  the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 13 Feb. 1988, art.
114(3)(f), available at <http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/PROCRULE.htm> (last visited on 15 Sept. 
2000)(“[the Commission shall ensure]:... [t]hat the same issue is not already being considered by another 
international investigating or settlement body . . .”).
151 Fatsah Ouguergouz, Le Charte africaine des droits de I ’homme et despeuples  (1993) 337-38; Rachel 
Murray “Decisions o f  the African Commission on Individual Communications under the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights” 46 I.C.L.Q. (1997) 412,425 n. 99
152 Rules o f Procedure o f the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 6 Oct. 1996, available 
at <http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/rules.htm> (last visited on 15 Sept. 2000).
153 ACHR Court Protocol, art. 4.
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that petitions alleging the existence of a situation in which human rights are consistently 
grossly violated will be admissible only if:
“The situation does not relate to a matter w hich  is bein g  d e a lt w ith  under o th er p ro ced u res  
prescribed in the constituent instruments of, or conventions adopted by, the United Nations 
and the specialized agencies, or in regional conventions ...” (emphasis added)
A similar clause has also been introduced into the yet not in force MWC,154 the draft 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights155 and 
the rules of procedure of CERD (although there are some doubts as to the legality of 
that rule).156
Lis alibi pendens clauses outside the human rights area
Outside the human rights sphere, one can find a litispendence clause relating to overlap 
between international and other judicial or administrative proceedings (of either national 
or international nature) in the quasi-judicial mechanism operating under the NAAEC.157 
This clause has been applied in a recent case to block parallel proceedings before the 
CEC Secretariat and NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration panel. It is perhaps significant to 
note that the CEC Secretariat adopted there a rather broad construction of what 
constitute the ‘same matter’ and held that it suffices that the same legal arguments have 
been made in the two competing claims, notwithstanding the different object of the two 
proceedings.159 It also virtually ignored the fact that one of the parties to the NAAEC
154 MWC, art. 77(3)(a).
155 Draft Protocol for the Consideration o f Communications concerning Non-Compliance with the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 3(3)(b), Annual Report o f  the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on its 14th and 15 Sess., 1 Jan 1997, Annex IV, UN  
Doc. E/1997/22, E/C. 12/1996/6, available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/MasterFrameView/ 
dd78df3399d002e8802564c30056ccaf?0pendocument> (last visited on 16 Sept. 2000).
156 CERD Rules o f Procedure, Rule 84(1 )(g), UN Doc. CERD/C/3 5/Rev. 3 (1989)(the Secretary General 
is authorised to inquire whether the same matter is being examined by another human rights procedure). 
However, the legality o f  such provision in the absence o f explicit authorisation in the Convention itself 
has been questioned. Theodor Meron, Human Rights Law Making in the United Nations (1986) 222.
157 NAAEC, art. 14(3)(a)(“[the state complained against will inform the CEC Secretariat whether] the 
matter is the subject o f  a pending judicial or administrative proceeding, in which case the Secretariat shall 
proceed no further;”].
158 Methanex Corp. v. U.S., Determination o f  30 June 2000, Doc. A14/SEM/99-001/06/14(3)(CEC  
Secretariat), available at <http://www.cec.org/files/english/99001dis.pdf >(last visited on 29 July 2000).
159 While the NAAEC proceedings revolved around alleged inadequacies in the enforcement o f  
Californian environmental standards relating to the protection o f  water facilities from underground gas 
storage tanks, the NAFTA proceedings were concerned with the decision o f  the Californian authorities to 
ban the use o f  gas products which the applicant company had imported. The CEC Secretariat based its 
decision that the two proceedings involve the same matter, on the fact that one o f the specific claims 
made in the context o f the NAFTA proceedings had been that the Californian authorities should have 
resorted to stricter enforcement o f  environmental standards concerning the storage o f  unhealthy gas 
products rather than outlaw its use.
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proceedings was not party to the NAFTA proceedings.160 In light of this, it seems fair to 
observe that that the CEC Secretariat, in contrast with the HRC, seem to have opted for 
an expansive interpretation of its lis alibi pendens clause.
Another example, relevant to the relations between domestic and international courts 
and tribunals can be found in the work of the UN Compensation Commission. It has 
been the normal practice of the Commission to suspend proceedings upon notification 
of the existence of parallel proceedings, until the concurrent proceedings have been 
completed.161
The ECJ constitutive instruments do not contain a lis alibi pendens clause, since the 
jurisdiction of that court is exclusive. However, the ECJ Statute contains an interesting 
lis pendens provision, which regulates the relations between the Court’s two instances -  
the ECJ and CFI. Article 47(3) of the Statute provides that:
"Where the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance are seized of cases in which the
same relief is sought, the same issue of interpretation is raised or the validity of the same act
is called in question, the Court of First Instance may, after hearing the parties, stay the
proceedings before it until such time as the Court of Justice shall have delivered judgment.
Where applications are made for the same act to be declared void, the Court of First Instance
may also decline jurisdiction in order that the Court of Justice may rule on such applications.
In the cases referred to in this subparagraph, the Court of Justice may also decide to stay the
proceedings before it; in that event, the proceedings before the Court of First Instance shall
162continue" (emphasis added).
This provision was invoked in a few cases which were simultaneously pending before
1 fk'X •  • •the two judicial institutions, and priority was generally given to decisions of the ECJ
160 NESTE Inc. (a Canadian firm) had filed a complaint under the NAAEC that had been consolidated 
with Methanex’s compliant. Since the text o f  article 14(3)(a) o f the NAAEC only requires that the two 
parallel proceedings involve the same matter, the CEC Secretariat did not seem to attribute any 
significance to the fact that the two proceedings do not involve the same sets o f  parties.
161 Wuhler, supra note 73, at 260.
162 Protocol on the Statute o f  the Court o f Justice o f the European Economic Community, 17 April 1957, 
298 U.N.T.S. 147 [as amended by Council Decision 88/591, 1989 O.J. (C 215) 1][hereinafter ‘EC 
Statute’]; Similar language is also found in Protocol on the Code o f  the Court o f  Justice o f the European 
Coal and Steel Community, 18 April 1951, art. 47(3), 261 U.N.T.S. 247; and in the Protocol on the 
Statute o f  the Court o f Justice o f  the European Atomic Energy Community, 17 April 1957, art. 48(3), 298 
U.N.T.S. 256.
163 See e.g., Case T-42/91 Koninklijke P T T N ederlandN V v. Commission. [1991] E.C.R. 11-273; Case 
T-88/94, Societe Commerciale de Potasses et de I ’Azote v. Commission) [ 1995] E.C.R. 11-221; Case
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on whether or not to assume jurisdiction.164 However at least in one case the President 
of the CFI refused to suspend an application for interim relief in a case pending 
concurrently before the ECJ.165
As will be argued below, this discretionary rule of comity, authorising stay of 
proceedings or dismissal of claim, if similar issues are pending before another judicial 
instance (notwithstanding possible differences in the identity of the parties) might serve 
as a model for other forms of judicial interaction.166
C. The principle of finality
As indicated above, exclusive jurisdiction clauses found in the constitutive instruments 
of international courts and tribunals also bar attempts to engage in successive litigation 
of disputes before excluded fora. The same result is also achieved by electa una via 
provisions. As a result, res judicata provisions are needed, if at all, only when the 
first-in-time forum did not have exclusive jurisdiction (or where one exclusive 
jurisdiction competes against another exclusive jurisdiction) and in the absence of an 
electa una via clause. Further, as will be shown below, unlike other discussed rules 
which are of controversial status, the res judicata rule has long been considered an 
established principle of international law. Hence, in some cases, drafters of constitutive 
instrument of international courts or tribunals might have considered the inclusion of an 
explicit res judicata rule as superfluous.
As a result, only a few res judicata provisions can be found in jurisdiction-conferring 
international instruments.167 Perhaps the clearest example is found in the CSCE/OSCE 
Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration, which prescribes that the Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration shall not have jurisdiction if a competent court or tribunal 
had previously decided the same case.168
T-488/93, Hanseatische Industrie-Beteiligungen GmbHv. Commission [1995] E.C.R. 11-469; Case 
T-490/93, Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG  v. Commission [1995] E.C.R. 11-477.
164 L. Neville Brown and Tom Kennedy, The Court o f  Justice o f  the European Communities (4th ed.,
1994) 88.
165 Case T-76/96R, The National Farm er’s Union v. Commission [1996] E.C.R. 11-815, at para. 31-35.
166 C f  Treaty concerning the Establishment and the Statute o f a Benelux Court o f  Justice, 31 March 1965, 
art. 10 (3), 924 U.N.T.S. 1 (“ ... [The Court] may stay its own judgment until the jurisdiction before which 
the dispute has been brought takes a decision in the matter”).
167 There have been, however, occasional proposals to incorporate res judicata  provisions in additional 
treaty regimes. See e.g., Consultative Meeting o f Legal Experts, Summary Record o f  Proceedings, 17-22 
Feb. 1964, Doc. No. Z9, Documents concerning the Origin o f  ICSID, supra note 43, at 367, 435 
[statement by Mr. Rodocanachi (France)].
168 CSCE/OSCE Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration, art. 19(l)(a).
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Regional human rights arrangements
Another provision precluding successive litigation, which is of wider potential scope 
than the traditional res judicata rule, is found in the Inter-American Human Rights 
Convention. The drafters of the Convention, obviously inspired by article 35(2) 
[ex-article 27(1)] of the European HR Convention, have adopted article 47(d), which 
prescribes that a petition, or communication is to be considered inadmissible if it is:
"... [Substantially the same as one previously studied by the Commission or by another 
international organization."
The travaux preparatoires of the Convention clearly show that the drafters were 
actually concerned with the need to avoid 'double jurisdiction'.169
Despite the influence of the European Convention on the text of the American 
Convention, there are three significant differences between the languages of the two 
instruments. First, the temporal application of the Inter-American rule seems to be 
narrower and to encompass only applications which have already been studied (in other 
words, no longer pending before the competing forum), while the preclusive effect of 
the European electa una via provision starts the minute the competing application was 
submitted. As a result, article 47(d) is more akin to a res judicata rule than to an electa 
una via rule, although, unlike traditional rules of finality, the term ‘studied’ used in the 
Inter-American Convention is broader than the term ‘settled’ which denotes a final 
judgment.
Second, article 35 of the European Convention covers only individual petitions and not 
inter-state cases, whereas the American Convention's finality clause encompasses both 
types of proceedings. However, this is a purely technical difference. It was unnecessary 
to include petitions submitted by states under the scope of article 35, since states have 
already been precluded from engaging in multiple litigation, by virtue of the exclusive 
jurisdiction clause - article 55 of the European HR Convention (which has no 
counterpart under the American Convention).
169 Minutes o f the 4th Sess. O f Committee II, Nov. 14, 1969, Doc. 47, Corr. 2 (1970), reprinted in Thomas 
Buergenthal and Robert E. Norris (eds.), 2 Human Rights: The Inter-American System (1982) 193.
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A final, and potentially more important difference pertains to the nature of the parallel 
proceedings. The term 'studied .. .by another international organization' employed by 
the American Convention is of wider potential applicability than the term 'submitted to 
another procedure o f international investigation or settlement' used in the European HR 
Convention. As a result, it could have led to employment of the Inter-American rule of 
preclusion to procedures engaged in the general study of human rights conditions (e.g., 
discussions by the UN Human Rights Commission), which the Strasbourg bodies (and 
the HRC) never considered as capable of generating jurisdictional competition. 
However, the case law of the Inter-American human rights system shows that the term 
''studied’ was narrowly construed, so to encompass only proceedings of a judicial or 
quasi-judicial nature,170 in conformity with the practice of the EHR Commission on the 
matter.
An implied res judicata provision is also found in article 56(7) of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples' Rights, which bars the admissibility of communication from 
'other sources' (e.g., private parties) if they deal with:
"... [C]ases which have been settled by these States involved in accordance with the 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or the Charter of the Organization of African 
Unity or the provisions of the present Charter."
This provision also seems to be wider in its scope of application than a traditional res 
judicata clause, since it seems to bar litigants who were not parties to a settlement 
(which might arise, for instance, out of an inter-state complaint), from raising
171essentially the same matter before the African Commission. An almost identically 
phrased clause is found in UNESCO’s Executive Board Decision 104, which 
established a complaint procedure (generally similar to that operating under ECOSOC 
Resolution 1503) in matters falling under the jurisdiction of UNESCO.172
Other finality clauses
There are few other contexts where international courts and tribunals have manifested 
adherence to the rule of finality. The ICJ must apply the res judicata rule when
170 See supra Chapter 2, at p. 76 n. 186.
171 But see, Ouguergouz, supra note 151, at 336.
172 Executive Board o f UNESCO, Decision 104 EX/3.3, 28 April 1978, available at <http://www.unesco. 
org/general/eng/legal/hrights/text.htral>.
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exercising jurisdiction on the basis of the optional clause with respect to Japan that has 
made an explicit reservation to this effect in its declaration of acceptance of the Court’s
1 71compulsory jurisdiction. Further, the UN Compensation Commission must also 
deduct, from any sum it awards, monetary compensation afforded to the same applicant 
for the same claim by a domestic court or tribunal, thereby giving the latter’s decision a 
limited res judicata effect.174
For the sake of completion, it should also be acknowledged that most of the constitutive 
instrument of international courts and tribunals contain a finality clause prescribing that
1 7^their judgments or awards should be deemed 'final and binding'. Such language may 
be regarded as an agreement by the parties that any second-in-time judicial body ought 
to refrain from re-opening a dispute finally settled by a court or tribunal with binding 
power.176
3. Interim conclusions
This survey and analysis of jurisdiction-regulating provisions found in the constitutive 
instruments of international courts and tribunals and other dispute settlement treaties or 
clauses, reveals a largely disorganised picture. Inter-fora jurisdictional interaction is 
only partly regulated and even where regulated, the rules of regulation are often of an 
inconclusive nature and there is too little established practice that can provide 
sufficiently precise guidance on how to address jurisdictional competition. Furthermore, 
different courts and tribunals have adopted different jurisdictional solutions and even 
when similar solutions were applied, their compatibility with each other has been
173 See Declaration o f the Government o f Japan under article 36(2) o f  the ICJ Statute, 312 U.N.T.S 155 
(1958)("... Japan recognizes as compulsory ipso facto  and without special agreement, in relation to any 
other State accepting the same obligation and on condition o f  reciprocity, the jurisdiction o f  the 
International Court o f  Justice, over all disputes which arise on and after the date o f  the present declaration 
with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the same date and which are not settled by other means o f  
peaceful settlem ent... ")(emphasis added).
174 UNCC Governing Body Decision 13, at para. 3(b).
175 See e.g., Charter o f  the United Nations, art. 94, XV U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 355 [hereinafter ‘UN Charter’]; 
Statute o f  the International Court o f  Justice, 26 June 1945, art. 60, XV U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 355 [here in forth 
and hereinafter ‘ICJ Statute’]; 1899; The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement o f International 
Disputes, 29 July 1899, art 54 in The Hague Conventions and Declarations o f 1899 and 1907 (James 
Brown Scott, ed., 2nd ed., 1915) 41 [hereinafter ‘1899 Hague Convention’]; The Hague Convention for 
the Pacific Settlement o f International Disputes, 18 Oct. 1907, art. 81 in The Hague Conventions, id. at 41 
[hereinafter ‘1907 Hague Convention’]. Hague Convention, art. 54; UNCLOS, art. 256; European HR 
Convention, art. 44, 46(1); American HR Convention, art. 67; ICSID Convention, art. 53 (1); Rules o f  
Procedure o f the Court o f Justice o f  the European Communities, art. 65, 1974 O.J. (L350) 1, as revised in 
1991 O.J. (L I76) 7; Governing Body Decision 10, art. 40(4), 26 June 1992, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1992/10, 
available at <http://www.unog.ch/ uncc/decision/dec_10.pdf > (last visited on 3 Sept. 2000)(UN  
Compensation Commission).
176 See Report o f the Committee o f Experts, Co-existence o f  Systems o f  Control, supra note 28, at 4.
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generally neglected (e.g., it is not clear how to reconcile between two exclusive 
jurisdiction clauses). The ensuing conclusion is that treaty law does not satisfactorily 
address the potential complications that might arise out of jurisdictional competition and 
that other sources of positive law -  custom and general principles, must also be 
consulted.
Still, can any principles be deduced from the existing jurisdiction-regulating 
arrangements? As to the question of forum selection, it would seem that the answer is a 
resounding no. Clearly, there exist a variety of choice of forum regimes ranging from 
inflexible exclusive jurisdiction provisions (e.g., article 292 of the EC Treaty) to 
residual jurisdiction provisions (e.g., article 282 of UNCLOS). However, there seems to 
be no consistent logic behind the selection of every type of jurisdictional regime. While, 
generally speaking, regional economic integration tend to ‘close ranks’ and prohibit 
referral of disputes arising under their respective sub-systems to external courts and 
tribunals there are judicial bodies that constitute an exception to this trend and refrain 
from regulating forum shopping, or allow for some degree of permissible forum 
shopping. Given this diversity of legal solutions, one can assert that although complex 
and idiosyncratic regimes, such as the regional trade regimes do probably need 
exclusive (or almost exclusive) jurisdiction, it is not clear whether a principle of 
exclusivity can be read in as an implied provision inherent to those regimes.
In the human rights area the situation is even more diverse. Whereas the ECHR enjoys 
exclusive jurisdiction in inter-state cases, other human rights body, on the regional and 
universal level were endowed with non-exclusive competence. The situation of other 
courts and tribunals is also haphazard. The WTO and ICSID enjoy exclusive 
jurisdiction in varying degrees of flexibility, the ICJ and ITLOS have non-exclusive 
jurisdiction (the first -  parallel, and the latter residual jurisdiction) and the OSCE Court 
of Conciliation and Arbitration operates under a unique regime of residual jurisdiction 
vis-a-vis exclusive procedures.
The review of the drafting process of most of these procedures reveals that choices of 
jurisdiction regimes were made not only out of legal considerations derived from the 
nature of the regime, but also, perhaps to a larger degree, from pragmatic considerations 
pertaining to the particularities of each negotiation (e.g., need to appease potential 
ratifying states through preserving their right to choose a procedure). The chronology in
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which courts and tribunals were created also played a part in the decision whether to 
exclude reference to other judicial bodies (it had generally been easier to invest courts 
and tribunals created when no major competition existed with exclusive jurisdiction).
In sum, it is impossible to deduce an overarching principle that should govern choice of 
procedure in each and every case and there does not seem to be a ‘common law’ in this 
specific issue.177 As a result, one can claim that no uniform international standard 
prohibiting or condoning forum shopping has so far emerged. In practical terms this 
means that positive international law leave ample room for parties to international 
disputes to forum shop.
This conclusion seems to comport with the current level of development of the 
international judicial ‘system’. Since courts and tribunals operate independently of each 
other and often apply norms derived from different legal sources, strict allocation of 
competences would perhaps unduly restrict party autonomy and might perpetuate 
certain legal outcomes. Such a rule would clearly be inauspicious for those international 
actors unsatisfied with the current state of international adjudication. Further, a strict 
rule would undercut cross-fertilisation between different courts and tribunals, a process 
that serves as a vehicle for the development and harmonisation of international law. It 
thus seems that under the current state of the law, limited choice of forum in some areas 
of international adjudication (especially, in regional integration mechanisms) and broad 
choice of forum in all other areas represent what the law should be, for the time being, 
and it looks as if the current lack of comprehensive regulation of the forum selection is 
not a serious problem, if any at all.
The second question addressed in this Chapter has been that of the jurisdictional 
regulation of multiple proceedings. Here the situation is somewhat different than that 
found with respect to forum selection. First, there are far fewer jurisdictional provisions 
addressing the problem. Many international courts and tribunals do not address the issue 
at all (e.g., ICJ, ITLOS, WTO and the regional integration bodies) and most of the 
discussion on the subject is found in the human rights area, where the threat of multiple 
litigation is by far the most serious (especially since jurisdiction over individual 
applications tends not to be of an exclusive nature and given the propensity of
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individuals to litigate). Second, unlike the diverse picture seen in ‘choice of forum’ 
arrangements, the jurisdiction-regulating provisions are by large compatible with other 
(although they are characterised by varying levels of strictness). In a nutshell, they all 
seek to curb multiple litigation by prohibiting parallel proceedings, subsequent 
proceedings or both. This arrangement clearly falls in line with the policy to improve 
coordination between international courts and tribunals advocated in the previous Part 
of the study and to prevent the emergence of inconsistent judicial decisions. The referral 
of the same dispute to different adjudication procedures raises a host of serious practical 
and doctrinal issues and should be avoided as much as possible.
However, while it can be said that in the area of human rights a general principle 
according to which courts and tribunals should seek to mitigate multiple adjudication 
can be identified (inter alia through application of lis alibi pendens or res judicata
1 78rules), the scarcity of lex scripta in other areas of the law makes it impossible to 
expand the said principle, by virtue of existing treaty law, to the status of an established 
principle of international law. This, again, highlights the systematic deficiency of the 
international judiciary. The absence of clear and common jurisdiction-regulating rules 
perpetuates jurisdictional competition, which might lead to conflicting judgments and to 
further disharmonising of international law.
Still, solutions to the problems associated with jurisdictional competition may be found 
in legal sources other than treaty law. As a result, one should examine the practice of 
international courts and tribunals and assess whether other sources -  customary law or 
general principles of law, may support the introduction of multiple 
jurisdiction-regulation rules. Such examination is the topic of the next Chapter of this 
study.
177 Cf. de Merode v. World Bank, World Bank Administrative Tribunal Reports, Decision No. 1, at para. 
28 (1981); Elihu Lauterpacht “The Development o f  the Law of International Oraganizations by the 
Decisions o f  International Tribunals” 152 Recueil des cours (1976) 377, 402.
178 Since the electa una via principle has not been adopted by some procedures (most notably, the HRC), 
it cannot assume the status o f a general principle in the area o f human rights law. However, arrangements 




General jurisdiction-regulating principles, derived from sources other than 
treaties, as applied by international courts and tribunals
The previous Chapter examined a variety of existing jurisdiction-regulating treaty 
provisions and reviewed the manner of their application by international courts and 
tribunals. However, there have also been some instances in which judicial bodies have 
applied jurisdiction-regulating norms derived from sources of international law, other 
than treaty law. These occasions normally involved situations where the constitutive 
instruments of the competing tribunals failed to address the question of jurisdictional 
overlap or where norms of general international law were applied to complement 
existing conventional provisions. Given the limited and inconclusive nature of 
conventional jurisdiction regulating provisions, the precedents discussed below are of 
considerable importance. They have the potential of being applied in all dispute 
settlement procedures either as default rules, in the absence of explicit regulation, or as 
sources of inspiration for the interpretation of jurisdiction-regulating treaty provisions, 
in accordance with article 31 (3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.179
The first section of this Chapter will address the application of traditional 
jurisdiction-regulating rules by international courts and tribunals. These are choice of 
forum principles and the rules of lis alibi pendens and res judicata. Since the electa una
• • 1 snvia rule (which is found in some human rights instruments) does not find any 
meaningful support in the international jurisprudence (in the absence of explicit treaty 
language),181 it will not be discussed here. The second section will examine the 
possibility of applying general legal doctrines to situations involving jurisdictional 
competition. These doctrines include the theory of abuse of rights, the principle of 
comity and some principles governing conflicting treaty obligations.
179 Philippe Sands “Treaty, Custom and the Cross-Fertilization o f International Law” [1998] 1 Yale 
Human Rights and Development Law Journal 85, 102.
180 See e.g., European HR Convention, art. 35(2)[ex-article 27(1)]; CAT, art. 22(5); MWC, art. 77(3).
181 See Dan Ciobanu “Litispendence between the International Court o f  Justice and the Political Organs o f  
the United Nations” 1 The Future o f  the International Court o f  Justice (Leo Gross, ed. 1976) 209, 231-32.
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1. Application o f  traditional jurisdiction-regulating rules
A. Forum selection principles
I. The PCIJprecedents
The question whether any limitations should be placed upon the right of international 
actors to engage in forum selection between alternative competent judicial bodies has 
only rarely been considered by international courts or tribunals. Still, a few such cases, 
in which the question did arise, were heard before the PCIJ. Given the fact that none of 
the instruments governing the activities of the PCIJ specifically addressed forum 
selection, and since the PCIJ refrained from discussing whether conditions for the 
emergence of an international custom have been met, it would seem that the PCIJ 
decisions had been founded on what it perceived to be inherent powers of an 
international court of general jurisdiction, or, alternatively, on general principles of law.
The first PCIJ case where the allocation of jurisdictions between the Court and a 
different international dispute settlement procedure had been examined, was the 
Mavrommatis case, which involved a claim brought by Greece on behalf of one of its 
citizens whose concession was infringed by Great Britain, the mandatory power in 
Palestine.182 One of the issues that were discussed had been the effect of a specific 
dispute settlement arrangement under a Protocol to the Treaty of Lausanne on the 
Court’s jurisdiction over one of the heads of claim. In particular, the question was 
whether the jurisdiction of the PCIJ, based upon a general compromissory clause found 
in the Mandate for Palestine, should give way to the special procedure of the Protocol, 
which provided that valuation of indemnities due to concession holders would be 
calculated by special experts.
The Court held that the Protocol constituted lex specialis and lex posteriori, and that, as 
a result, its terms should override those of the Mandate, to the extent that the two 
instruments are incompatible.183 While the Court found no basis to attribute to the 
parties an intent to exclude, across the board, the Court’s general jurisdiction under the 
Mandate, it held that such exclusion may be implied with relation to specific matters 
which had been referred under the Protocol to special procedures:
However, the underlying rationale o f the electa una via  rule finds some support in the PCIJ case law on 
the binding nature o f  exclusive jurisdiction agreements. See infra, at p. 248.
182 The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. G.B.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2.
183 Mavrommatis, id. at 31.
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“In so far as the Protocol established in Article 5 a special jurisdiction for the assessment of 
indemnities, this special jurisdiction - provided that it operates under the conditions laid 
down -  excludes as regards these matters the general jurisdiction given to the Court in 
disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Mandate.”184
Still, despite the acknowledgement of the implied limitation on its jurisdiction, the 
Court held that it has competence over the disputed head of claim. This was because the 
specific question referred to the Court by the parties had been of a preliminary nature, 
and could not have been presented before the alternative procedure.
A second case in which similar issues have arisen was the Chorzow Factory case,186 
decided a few years after the Mavrommatis case. The case involved a German claim for 
indemnity against confiscation in Poland of property belonging to German companies, 
and the question was whether the Court should decline jurisdiction in favour of the 
Germano-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal or the Upper Silesian Arbitration Tribunal, 
which were competent to review the legality of takings of property, in pursuance to 
claims presented by private German litigants. Poland argued, inter alia, that the Court 
should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction because the two arbitral bodies had been 
designated as specific procedures for recovering indemnities, which ought, in 
accordance with the Mavrommatis holding, exclude the general jurisdiction of the 
Court.187 Germany countered this with the argument that the contracting states never 
intended that the creation of arbitral tribunals for private party claims would exclude the 
jurisdiction of the PCIJ in inter-state cases.
While the case had really been one involving a lis alibi pendens claim and not just an 
ordinary forum selection one (a related private claim was pending before the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal during proceedings before the PCIJ), the reasoning offered by the 
Court concentrated on the broad topic of the division of competencies between 
competing fora. In rejecting the Polish motion the Court held that:
184 Mavrommatis, id. at 32.
185 Mavrommatis, id. at 32.
186 The Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Poland), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (claim for indemnity) 
(jurisdiction).
187 Chorzow Factory, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 13-1, at 26-27 [Discours de M. Sobolewski (Pologne)].
188 Chorzow Factory, id. at 69 [Discours de Dr. Kaufmann (Allemagne)].
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"[T]he Court, when it has to define its jurisdiction in relation to that o f  another tribunal, 
cannot allow  its ow n com petency to g ive w ay unless confronted w ith a clause w hich it 
considers sufficiently clear to prevent the possib ility  o f  a negative con flict o f  jurisdiction  
involving the danger o f  a denial o f  ju stice ."189
In the circumstances of the case, the Court was of the opinion that Germany could not 
obtain adequate remedies through recourse to any alternative forum, and, that, as a 
result, it would be impossible to attribute to the parties intent to designate the arbitral 
tribunals as exclusive jurisdictions.
It should be noted that although the two cases can be distinguished from each other 
(Greece was exercising diplomatic protection in Mavrommatis, while Germany seemed 
to be claiming its own independent rights in the Chorzow Factory), it looks as if the 
language used by the PCIJ in the Chorzow Factory case revealed greater reluctance on 
the part of the Court to decline jurisdiction. This can be perhaps explained by the fact 
that, as will be shown below, the Court had in the meantime ruled that Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunals are not part of the international legal order, and that, consequently, they do 
not represent a genuine jurisdictional alternative to the PCIJ.190
The third PCIJ decision, which is the leading authority on the issue of the right to forum 
selection, has been rendered in the Rights o f Minorities case. Although the case dealt 
with competition between a judicial and a political organ, the language and logic of the 
Court’s judgment would seem to apply to any case of jurisdictional competition.
This time the respondent state - Poland, objected to the Court's jurisdiction on grounds 
that that the relevant treaty between the parties had granted primary jurisdiction over the 
dispute to the Council of the League of Nations.191 This provision constituted, according 
to Poland, manifestation of the will of the parties not to submit the dispute to judicial 
settlement in situations where a political alternative was available.
The Court rejected the Polish position and held that the treaty and the subsequent 
conduct of the parties had conferred consent-based jurisdiction upon the PCIJ. The
189 Chorzow Factory, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 30.
190 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6, at 
20 (jurisdiction).
191 Rights o f  Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools)(Gennsuiy v. Poland), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) 
No. 14-11, at 60-61 [Discours de M. Mrozowski (Pologne)].
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Court has further added the following seminal statement, addressing the circumstances 
under which the Court would decline consent-based jurisdiction:
"This principle [o f  consent as su fficient basis o f  jurisdiction] on ly  b ecom es inoperative in 
those exceptional cases in w hich  the dispute w hich States m ight desire to refer to the Court 
w ould  fall within the exclusive ju r isd ic tio n  re serv ed  to  som e o th er a u th o rity" (em phasis  
added).192
This means that the court will normally exercise jurisdiction, unless a competing forum 
had been invested with exclusive jurisdiction. Applying this standard, the Court held 
that the Council of the League had not been explicitly designated as an exclusive forum 
and that such exclusivity could not be easily presumed given the significant differences 
in the nature of the two competing procedures.193 The Court also commented that in 
light of the disorganised division of labour between different international jurisdictions, 
overlaps in jurisdiction might occur from time to time, and that, unlike their municipal 
counterparts, international courts confronted with such concurrency should not ex 
officio consider whether the case before them properly belongs to another forum.194 
Another contention raised by Poland, that the Court is barred from hearing the case by 
virtue of a Resolution adopted by the Council of the League,195 was also rejected by the 
PCIJ, by reason of the inconclusive nature of the Resolution.
Analysis of the three PCIJ cases on forum selection may lead to the following 
conclusions. According to the PCIJ, international judicial bodies invested with 
competence over a certain dispute may decline jurisdiction in favour of other 
international courts or tribunals only if three conditions are met: (a) it is sufficiently 
clear that an alternative forum enjoys jurisdiction over the same dispute; (b) the 
alternative forum has been designated as an exclusive forum (either explicitly or 
implicitly); and (c) one of the parties had objected to retaining the proceedings before 
the first-seized forum. All three conditions seem to amount to a presumption in favour
192 Rights o f  Minorities, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 15. at 23.
193 Rights o f  Minorities, id. at 23 (“ ...the jurisdiction possessed by the Council o f  the League o f  Nations 
[to hear individual and collective petitions under a certain minorities treaty] is entirely distinct from, and 
in no respect restricts, the Court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes between States”). But c f  
South-West Africa (Ethipia v. S.A.; Liberia v. S.A.), 1962 I.C.J. 319, 345 (Preliminary Objections) 
(although the disputes before the Court and the General Assembly may be regarded as different disputes -  
‘the questions at issue are identical’).
194 Rights o f  Minorities, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 15. at 23
195 Rights o f  Minorities, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 14-11, at 61, 78 [Discours de M. Mrozowski (Pologne)]; 
id. at 218-219 (Contre-M6moire du Gouvemement Polonais).
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of retention of jurisdiction by the seized forum. It would also seem reasonable to deduce 
from the PCIJ case law that the greater the difference between the nature of the 
competing procedures is, the less inclined a seized forum would be to attribute to the 
parties an implicit intent to opt for exclusivity. Indeed, subsequent case law of the PCIJ 
and the ICJ supports the proposition that courts or tribunals are reluctant to decline 
jurisdiction in situations of competition with ‘non-equal’ bodies (e.g., when one 
amenable dispute settlement procedure is judicial and the other political or when two 
judicial bodies operate in different legal orders).196
However, a word of caution should be added. First, the PCIJ cases are rather old 
‘precedents’, which might be re-examined in light of changed circumstances and 
modem perceptions on the role of adjudication in dispute settlement (e.g., the view that 
some dispute are better addressed through non-contentious procedures). It also seems 
that the three decisions are not authoritative on the matter of international jurisdictional 
competition, since all of the cases did not involve genuine competition between 
international judicial bodies (the body of experts under the Lausanne Protocol were to 
perform appraisal work and not a judicial task; the Germano-Polish arbitral tribunals 
essentially applied domestic law and did not belong to the international legal order; and 
the Council of the League was a political organ). Furthermore, the holdings in the 
Chorzow Factory and the Mavrommatis case seem to have been made in obiter dicta. 
Consequently, contemporary international courts and tribunals might not feel bound to 
apply the forum selection rules pronounced by the PCIJ. This might be particularly the 
case with courts and tribunals other than the PCIJ/ICJ that are subject to unique 
jurisdictional regimes designed to promote a specific set of policies, which might justify 
retention of their jurisdiction even when faced with what might seem to be a competing 
exclusive jurisdiction clause.197
196 Interpretation o f  the Statute o f  Memel Territory (U.K. v. Lithuania), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 47, at 
248-49 (since proceedings before the Court and the Council o f  the League were quite different, a‘unity o f  
proceedings’ principle, according to which all dispute settlement proceedings should be handled by one 
institution only (a principle similar to the connexity rule), cannot be presumed, unless it had been shown 
that the parties clearly intended to introduce it); Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1984 I.C.J. at 
434-35 (although the Charter granted the Security Council prim ary  responsibility in international peace 
and security matters, it was not granted exclusive responsibility, and the Court may exercise jurisdiction). 
But c f  Anglo-Iranian Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93, 116, 134 (Jurisdiction)(Dissenting Opinion o f  
Judge Alvarez)(in cases o f  threat to world peace the Security Council may assume exclusive jurisdiction 
over the dispute).
197 C f  Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework 
o f  the Guarantees o f  the Due Process o f  Law, Opinion o f 1 Oct. 1999, par. 54-64 available at < http:// 
corteidhoea.nu.or.cr/ci/ PUBLICAT/SERIES_A/A_16_ING.HTM>(last visited on 20 June 2000)(the 
interest o f  parties to the American human rights system in seeking legal guidance justifies exercise o f the 
Court’s advisory jurisdiction despite the pendency o f  related proceedings before the ICJ).
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II. The Klockner case
Indeed, one ICSID case -  Klockner v. Cameroon, supports the contention that courts 
operating under specific treaty regimes might not always respect choice of forum 
agreements concluded by the parties. In this case, the arbitral tribunal refrained from 
giving effect to an arbitration clause referring certain investment disputes to ICC 
arbitration, in derogation from an earlier-in-time agreement between the parties that
• 1 Qfireferred all investment-related questions to ICSID. Although the Tribunal supported 
its decision to ignore the specific clause in its inconclusive language (which did not 
explicitly preclude the jurisdiction of ICSID) and on the principle of estoppel, it seems 
as if it was principally guided by general policy considerations. The relevant policy 
embraced by the Tribunal was that the parties should not be easily deprived from the 
protections afforded by ICSID to their rights and interests, and that they should be 
spared from being compelled to engage in ‘piecemeal litigation’ of their reciprocal legal 
claims.199
This somewhat controversial decision (one of the arbitrators dissented;200 and the ad hoc 
review Committee expressed some doubts over its soundness201), finds some support, 
however, in the dicta of the PCIJ in the Electricity Company o f Sofia case, where the 
Court suggested that there should be a presumption that new jurisdictional arrangements 
were not designed to restrict pre-existing ones.202 Still, it stands in marked contrast to 
the Mavrommatis judgment, where a specific later-in-time jurisdictional agreement was
198 Klockner Industrie-Analgen GmbHv. Cameroon, 2 ICSID Rep. 3, 13-14, 17-18 (1983).
199 Annulment Decision o f  the A d  Hoc Committee on the Arbitration Between Klockner Industrie-Analgen 
GmbHv. Cameroon, 2 ICSID Rep. 95, 115 (1985)(Decision on Annulment); Schreuer, supra note 40, at 
166. Cf. Case ARB/94/2, Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Albania, Decision o f 24 Sept. 1996, para. 192, available at 
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ cases/ T-decide.pdf> (last visited on 21 July 2000) (Decision on 
Jurisdiction) at para. 192 (“it is more plausible to the Tribunal to interpret the legislative intention o f  Art.
9 to the effect that after the coming into force o f  the 1993 law the submission o f  a foreign investment 
dispute to ICSID arbitration should cover also disputes that started earlier, rather than both the investor 
and Albania having possibly to engage in two parallel arbitration procedures, under the UNCITRAL 
Rules [in accordance with the law which was in force before 1993] and under the ICSID Rules, regarding 
the same investment”).
200 Klockner, 2 ICSID Rep. at 92-93.
201 Klockner, 2 ICSID Rep. at 115 (Decision on Annulment).
202 Electricity Co. o f  Sofia, 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 77, at 76 (“ ... the multiplicity o f  agreements 
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction is evidence that the contracting Parties intended to open up new 
ways o f access to the Court rather than to close old ways or to allow them to cancel each other out with 
the ultimate result that no jurisdiction would remain ... There is, however, no justification for holding that 
in [concluding additional jurisdictional agreements, the parties] intended to weaken the obligations which 
they had previously entered into with a similar purpose . . .”).
250
909deemed to exclude a general jurisdiction-conferring instrument. Further, unlike the 
PCIJ Germano-Polish judgments, which could be distinguished from Mavrommatis on 
the basis that they did not involve genuine jurisdictional competition, the competing 
cases in Klockner involved the same parties, same issues and tribunals of the same legal 
order. Thus, the Klockner case can be regarded as supportive of the view that 
idiosyncratic policies of specific international regimes might override the application of 
‘ordinary’ international law governing forum selection.
I ll The Southern Bluefin Tuna case
Adding to the confusion in this field of law is a recent arbitration award rendered in the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna case, where an arbitral tribunal resorted to a line of reasoning 
somewhat similar to that adopted by the PCIJ in the Mavrommatis case (without 
specifically relying thereupon),204 and declined jurisdiction in favour of a more specific 
dispute settlement arrangement. The case involved a dispute over fishing practices 
between Australia and New Zealand, on the one hand, and Japan, on the other hand, and 
was referred to an arbitration tribunal constituted in pursuance to article 287 of 
UNCLOS. Japan, however, objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, arguing that 
dispute should not be addressed under UNLCOS, but rather in pursuance to specific 
dispute settlement procedure provisions (of a diplomatic nature) found in a regional 
fisheries agreement in force between the parties. The tribunal, by majority of four to 
one, accepted the Japanese position and held that, by virtue of article 281, one should 
construe the specific dispute settlement arrangements found in the regional agreement 
as an implicit agreement to override the general dispute settlement provisions of 
UNCLOS. This is notwithstanding the fact that the specific agreement, concluded 
long after the text of UNCLOS had been finalised (but before its entry of force) did not 
explicitly exclude the application of Part XV to UNCLOS.
Thus, unlike their counterparts in Klockner, the arbitrators in the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
case have refused to apply an interpretative presumption in favour of the intent of the
203 However, a subsequent ICSID tribunal had affirmed, in dicta, that a specific arbitration agreement 
between disputing parties would normally override a bilateral jurisdiction-conferring treaty, and that such 
a bilateral treaty would override a multilateral jurisdiction-conferring treaty. Southern Pacific Properties 
(Middle East) L td  v. Egypt, 3 ICSID Rep. 131, 149-50 (1988).
204 Japan -  the respondent party, did rely upon the Mavrommatis case. Southern Bluefin Tuna (Australia 
and N ew Zealand v. Japan), Memorial on Jurisdiction by Japan, 11 Feb. 2000, para. 122, available on < 
http://www.worldbank. org/icsid/bluefmtuna/memorialonjurisdictionofjapan.PDF> (last visited on 12 
August 2000).
205 Southern Bluefin Tuna, supra note 78, at para. 56-59.
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parties to preserve procedural protections under a general treaty regime (i.e., UNCLOS). 
In fact, it seems that the arbitral tribunal felt more obliged to uphold what it viewed to 
be the real ‘meeting of minds’ of the parties than to promote the overarching goals of 
the UNCLOS treaty, which include mandatory dispute settlement of almost all maritime 
disputes.206
It could be maintained that the Southern Bluefin Tuna decision has far-reaching 
implications. It resulted in the dismissal of the tribunal’s entire jurisdiction over the 
case, despite significant differences in the scope of obligations of the parties under the 
competing instruments, to which the tribunal had alluded.207 Although the tribunal 
explained its decision through the artificiality of maintaining that there exist separate 
disputes under the two instruments,208 one might wonder in light of decisions of the 
HRC209 and other international tribunals210 on competition involving the application of 
legal standards originating from different sources of law, whether this reasoning is 
persuasive. This is particularly because unambiguous adoption of the tribunal’s line of 
reasoning might result in denial of jurisdiction in many cases where a parallel, but not 
identical, more specific legal regime is available (e.g., in cases of competition between 
the WTO and regional trade arrangements).
Further, while the tribunal may be right in holding that there were no indications that the 
parties have intended to refer to the compulsory jurisdiction of UNCLOS judicial bodies 
disputes over their new sets of rights and obligations under the regional fisheries 
agreement, there was equally no indication that the parties have intended to exclude 
through the conclusion of an additional agreement, designed to increase and not 
decrease the normative density of their relations, judicial review of their pre-existing 
general rights and obligations under UNCLOS.211
206 Southern Bluefin Tuna, supra note 78, Separate Opinion by Justice Keith, at para. 19, 22; Boyle, supra 
note 76, at 305; Jennings, New Look at Adjudication, supra note 77, at 460; Nordquist, V UNCLOS 
Commentary, supra note 75, at 5 ,9-10 .
207 Southern Bluefin Tuna, supra note 78, at para. 52.
208 Id. at para. 54.
209 See Casanovas, supra note 126, at para. 5.1; HRC General Comment 24, supra note 123, at para. 14.
210 Cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 19861.C.J. at 93-94 (a reservation precluding the application 
o f the UN Charter does not preclude the application o f  the same standards, as enshrined in custom). 
Applying this method o f  reasoning to the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, it is the position o f  the present 
author that the tribunal could have held that the regional fisheries agreement bars reliance upon it before 
external judicial bodies, there is nothing to preclude such bodies from applying the more or less parallel 
standards introduced in UNCLOS.
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Finally, the outcome of the Southern Bluefin Tuna case is particularly troubling since 
the ‘specific’ procedures that blocked adjudication before UNCLOS judicial bodies 
were consent-based methods of dispute settlement (which are applicable in any 
international dispute, even in the absence of an agreement) that have previously failed to 
resolve the dispute at hand. Thus, it is doubtful whether the Klockner approach of 
reluctance to attribute to the parties willingness to waive significant procedural 
guarantees (applied in Klockner with regard to competition between two adjudicative 
mechanisms, and controlling a fortiori competition between judicial and non-judicial 
procedures!), would not have been more appropriate. This proposition also finds support 
in the PCIJ case law on the non-preclusive effect of jurisdictional agreements referring 
disputes to political settlement upon the jurisdiction of judicial bodies. Finally, it was 
already shown that the decision might be viewed as incompatible with the spirit and 
language of article 281-282 of UNCLOS.212
In sum, it looks as if the case law on allocation of jurisdiction between competing 
international courts and tribunals is too sporadic and inconsistent to enable one to draw 
definitive conclusions of general applicability, the exception being the willingness of 
international courts and tribunals to decline jurisdiction when faced with an explicit 
exclusive jurisdiction clause (which seems to be supported by all surveyed cases). Other 
than that, in the absence of clear guidance on the issue, it is possible to assert that 
traditional forum-selection rules found in domestic legal systems (e.g., forum non 
conveniens) have not been incorporated into the practice of international courts and 
tribunals. Still, other general principles of law, which shall be reviewed below (e.g., 
abuse of right and comity), might offer some relevant norms, which could help to 
address forum shopping between international judicial bodies
B. Parallel proceedings
I  The PCIJ cases
The question of litispendence has also been addressed only seldom by international 
courts and tribunals and the most notable allusion to it is found in a cursory remark 
made by the PCIJ in its decision on jurisdiction in the Certain German Interests case. In 
that case, Germany brought proceedings before the Court against Poland on account of 
acts taken by the latter which amounted in Germany’s view to illegal taking of property
211 However, technically speaking, the regional fisheries agreement, is an earlier-in-time agreement, since
it entered into force before UNCLOS.
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owned by German citizens. At the same time, a similar dispute over essentially the same 
facts was pending before the Germano-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. Consequently, 
Poland had objected to the jurisdiction of the Court on grounds of litispendence. In 
response, the German government had argued that there had been no precedent for 
applying the litispendence rule in international law,213 and that in any case the 
traditional conditions for the application of the rule, as established under domestic law - 
same parties, same nature of dispute and same object of proceedings, had not been met 
in the case. This is because the proceedings against Poland before the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal were brought by individual litigants and not by the German state, and because 
the two sets of proceedings had been based on different sources of law (the arbitration 
concerned alleged violation of private law rights, while the PCIJ proceedings involved 
the interpretation of an international treaty).214
The Court did not deem it necessary to make a general ruling on the applicability of 
litispendence in international law. Rather, it accepted the German position that even if, 
arguendo, the doctrine were to be relied upon, the conditions for its application had not 
been satisfied since the competing cases involved different parties and different legal
I c #
issues. The Court also expressed the view that the apparent differences between the 
nature of the Mixed Tribunal, which had operated in the sphere of domestic private law, 
and the PCIJ, which had operated in the international plane, could not create genuine
91jurisdictional competition. As will be discussed below, this last holding is of 
particular significance to the present study since it renders all courts and tribunals 
operating under a legal basis other than international law incapable of entering into 
genuine jurisdictional competition with courts and tribunals operating under 
international law proper.
212 See supra Chapter 5, at pp. 215-16.
213 Certain German Interests, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 9-1, at 82 [Discours de M. Kaufmann 
(Allemagne)](“Je ne veux pas discuter ici le point de savoir si et dans quel sens Vexceptio litis pendens 
est admissible en droit international. Je n’ai d’ailleurs trouv6 dans la doctrine aucun passage qui traite ce 
probleme”).
214 Certain German Interests, id. at 82-83 [Discours de M. Kaufmann (Allemagne)].
215 Certain German Interests, id. at 19-20.
216 This decision seems to fall in line with the aforementioned Rights o f  Minorities case, where it was held 
that differences in nature between competing procedures would create a presumption against 
jurisdictional deference by a competent forum. Rights o f  Minorities, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 12, at 23. 
C f Anglo-Iranian Oil, 1951 I.C.J. 89, 97 (Interim Measures)(Dissenting Opinion o f  Judges Winiarski and 
Pasha)("these [Mixed Arbitral] Tribunals, as joint organs o f the two States, differ both as to their 
character and as to their procedure from an international tribunal ... and there is nothing to be learned 
from their precedents.").
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In the Chorzdw Factory case, which introduced a similar set of facts to the Certain 
German Interests case, the Court dismissed the Polish objections to jurisdiction without
91 7invoking the lis alibi pendens rule. Instead it alluded to the principle of estoppel by 
conduct as a bar against the Polish position. Still, the Court observed that the different 
remedies available at each of the two competing judicial bodies, indicated lack of 
genuine jurisdictional overlap. In other words, it seems that the Court was of the view 
that even had the lis alibi pendens rule been applicable, in principle, one or more of the 
conditions for its application (most notably - the ‘same object’) had not been fulfilled.
Despite the Court’s willingness to examine the conditions for the application of the 
litispendence rule, the PCIJ (and the ICJ) have so far refrained from issuing a definite 
ruling on whether international law recognises this rule. Thus, the case law does not 
support nor repudiate the application of the lis alibi pendens rule in the relations 
between international courts and tribunals. This stands in contrast to the attitude towards 
the theory of connexity (i.e., that related proceedings should be joined before one 
tribunal), which was held to be inapplicable in international law by one of the judges of
7 1Q •the PCIJ, and to the clear practice supporting the inapplicability of the litispendence 
rule in the relations between the PCIJ/ICJ, on one hand, and the political organs of the
7 7 0League of Nations or the UN, on the other hand.
II. Jurisprudence o f other international courts and tribunals 
The jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals other than the ICJ/PCIJ 
concerning the application of the lis alibi pendens rule in the absence of explicit treaty 
language shows some reluctance to recognise the rule. In a recent case, a question of 
interpretation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations had arisen in two sets of
217 Chorzdw Factory, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 13-1, at 154-55 (Exception Pr&iminaire du Gouvemement 
Polonais); id. at 50 [Discours de M. Politis (Pologne)].
218 Chorzdw Factory, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 31-32. The Court also hinted that the parties in the 
two competing proceedings could not be regarded as the same. Id. at 26.
219 S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 48 (Dissenting Opinion o f  Judge Weiss). 
But see, Holiday Inns S. A., Occidental Petroleum Corporation et al v. Government o f  M orocco, 
(unpublished report), discussed in Schreuer, supra note 40, at 172-73,179 (the general unity o f the 
investment operation justifies the consolidating o f  all related claims before the ICSID tribunal).
220 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran) 1980 I.C.J. 3, 22 (“Whereas 
Article 12 o f the Charter expressly forbids the General Assembly to make any recommendation with 
regard to a dispute or situation while the Security Council is exercising its functions in respect o f that 
dispute or situation, no such restriction is placed on the functioning o f  the Court”); M ilitary and 
Paramilitary Activities, 1984 I.C.J. at 435 (“The Council has functions o f  a political nature assigned to it, 
whereas the Court exercises purely judicial functions. Both organs can therefore perform their separate 
but complementary functions with respect to the same events”). Jurisdictional concurrency was also 
permitted in the Aegean Sea dispute - Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey) 1976 I.C.J. 3 
(Interim Measures); SC Res. 395, UN SCOR 31st Sess., 1953d mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32 (1976).
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separate proceedings pending before the ICJ221 and was also referred for advisory 
opinion to the I/A CHR by Mexico (which was not party to any of the ICJ proceedings). 
The U.S. urged the I/A CHR to refrain from heating the case, inter alia because of the 
pendency of parallel proceedings before the ICJ. Although the traditional conditions for 
application of the lis alibi pendens rule had clearly not been met (most obviously, lack 
of identity of parties) the Court did not allude to this in its decision to hear the case. 
Instead, it held that the parties to the I/A HR Convention have a ‘general interest’ that 
the Court will exercise its advisory functions and provide advice to state parties 
participating in the regime. This general interest cannot be restrained, according to the 
Court, by parallel contentious proceedings before the ICJ.222 This line of reasoning 
would suggest that even had the lis alibi pendens rule been applicable, it ought to be 
balanced against the interests of the parties to the dispute and the overarching goals of 
the treaty regimes under which the competing judicial bodies operate.
In a few other cases, international courts and tribunals have rejected attempts to rely 
upon the lis alibi pendens rule in relation to proceedings conducted concurrently with 
domestic judicial fora. In several inter-war cases decided by international mixed arbitral 
tribunals, it was held that the lis alibi pendens rule could not preclude concurrent
U 'X  . .1 • *proceedings before judicial bodies of different 'quality'. Thus, it can be maintained, in 
light of these cases and the dicta found in the Certain German Interests and other PCIJ 
cases, that there is ample support in the international jurisprudence to the proposition 
that the lis alibi pendens rule should not preclude parallel proceedings before tribunals 
of different legal orders.224
This last proposition finds some additional support in a recent ITLOS case concerning 
the prompt release of a vessel. In the Camouco case,225 France, the respondent, has
221 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Provisional
Measures); Le Grand  (Germany v. U.S.), Provisional Measures Order, 3 March 1999, available at < 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/ igusframe.htm> (last visited on 1 Nov. 2000).
222 Right to Consular Assistance, supra note 197, at para. 54-65.
223 Caire (France) v. Mexico, 5 R.I.A.A. 516, 523-25 (1929); The Santa Rosa Mining Co. (Ltd.)(U.K.) v. 
Mexico, 5 R.I.A.A. 252, 252 (1931). Two other such cases are Backer v. Philippopli (Bulgarian-Belgian 
Mixed Arbitral Commission) and Battus v. Bulgaria (Franco-Bulgarian Mixed Arbitral Commission), 
both surveyed in Jackson H. Ralston, The Law and Procedure o f  International Tribunals (1936) 24-26. 
Further, the PCIJ in Certain German Interest specifically stated that it could also not be deemed to be in 
competition with a Polish domestic tribunal. Certain German Interests, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6, at 20.
224 Giorgos T6nekid6s ‘L’exception de litispendance devant las organismes intemationaux’ XXXVI 
Revue gen6rale de Droit international public (3rd Ser., 1929) 502, 505-06; Mohieddien Mabrouk, Les 
Exceptions De Procedure Devant Les Juridictions Internationales (1966) 88.
225 ‘Camouco ’ (Panama v. France), Judgment o f  7 Feb. 2000, par. 57-58, available at <http://www. 
un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/JudgmentCamouco.htm> (last visited on 10 Oct. 2000).
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invoked the lis alibi pendens rule and asked the Tribunal to decline jurisdiction on 
account of proceedings designed to release the same vessel that were already pending 
before domestic French courts.226 The Tribunal rejected the French motion and held that 
it would be illogical to construe the relevant provisions of UNCLOS in a manner which 
would condition the ability of the Tribunal to issue effective remedies on the state of 
proceedings before national courts.
While the outcome of the case can serve as a reaffirmation of the principle that judicial 
bodies belonging to different legal orders cannot be deemed to compete with each other, 
the reasoning offered by the Tribunal suggests that the decisive factor in the decision 
was the interpretation of the strict time limits under article 292 of UNCLOS as an 
implicit bar against the application of the litispendence rule.
III. The Pyramids case
Another situation in which the relations between parallel proceedings before 
international and national judicial bodies had been reviewed was during proceedings 
before an ICSID arbitral tribunal. In SPP v. Egypt (the ‘Pyramids case’), a motion 
requesting the tribunal to decline jurisdiction by reason of the pendency of domestic 
proceedings was rejected. Furthermore, the tribunal explicitly stated that it does not 
consider itself bound by a rule of litispendence:
"When the jurisdictions of two unrelated and independent tribunals extend to the same 
dispute, there is no rule of international law which prevent either tribunal from exercising 
jurisdiction."227
Since the case involved competition between an international tribunal and a domestic 
court, the decision to reject the litispendence objection seems to be consistent with 
earlier case law on the matter. However, there is nothing in the dicta of the tribunal to 
indicate that the tribunal limited its view to that particular category of jurisdictional 
competition only, and it could be cited in support of the view that international law does 
not recognise the lis alibi pendens rule at all.
226 See ‘Cam ouco’, verbatim record o f 27 Jan. 2000 [pleadings by Mr. Dobbel (France)], available at 
<http://www. un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/PVOO_lE.htm> (last visited on 10 Oct. 2000).
221 Southern Pacific, 3 ICSID Rep. at 129.
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It is interesting to note that an earlier ICSID Tribunal, which confronted a similar 
motion, in analogous circumstances to the Pyramids case, has not ruled out the potential 
applicability of the lis alibi pendens rule, but simply expressed the view that in the 
specific circumstances of the case before it the conditions for the rule’s application were 
not met.228 Furthermore, a 1993 ICSID Model Clause prepared for use in arbitration 
agreements has explicitly embraced the lis alibi pendens rule in the relations between 
ICSID and other alternative proceedings.229
Finally, it should be noted that the ECJ has applied on a few occasions a lis pendens rule 
(without reliance on any treaty language), with the purpose of precluding attempts to 
bring multiple proceedings before the ECJ. However, one might argue that these 
cases are of limited relevance to the present study since they do not deal with 
competition between different courts or tribunals, but rather with regulation of the 
conduct of a single dispute before a single judicial body. In these circumstances 
special considerations of judicial economy and preservation of a high level of 
harmonisation within the specific legal sub-system may support a stricter rule against 
multiple proceedings.
In sum, it looks as if existing case law on the question of lis alibi pendens is also too 
scarce and non-definitive to establish the existence of such a general rule or principle in 
international law, in the relations between two international courts and tribunals.232 
Nonetheless, as was demonstrated in the previous Chapter, one can make a plausible 
case that lis alibi pendens may qualify as a general principle of law, recognised by most 
legal systems, at least with respect to intra-systematic jurisdictional competition. It is 
therefore arguable that given the strong policy arguments in favour of a rule mitigating 
parallel litigation, including the need to avoid the risk of conflicting judgments over the
228 Benvenuti and Bonfat Sri. v. Congo, 1 ICSID Rep. 330, 340 (1980).
229 ICSID Model Clauses, clause 12, 4 ICSID Rep. 357 (1993).
230 See e.g., Cases 172, 226/83, Hoogovens Groep v. Commission [1985] E.C.R. 2843, 2846; Cases 
358/85, 51/86, France v. Parliament [1988] E.C.R. 4846,4849-50.
231 K.P.E. Lasok, The European Court o f  Justice -Practice and Procedure (2nd ed., 1994) 218-19.
232 See Ciobanu supra note 181, at 219, 225. The absence o f a clear doctrine governing the matter was 
also noted by a 1929 Franco-Mexican Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, which had reviewed in obiter dicta the 
question o f  parallel proceedings between two international judicial bodies. Caire, 5 R.I.A.A. at 523 (“La 
pratique intemationale en a fait d6j& une experience assez fr^quente, qui forcera la doctrine de droit des 
gens k lui ffayer un chemin au travers de la foret encore vierge de ce domaine inexplorde du droit 
international”).
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same dispute, international courts and tribunals should apply the lis alibi pendens 
rule.233
While it is not clear whether the lis alibi pendens rule governs the relations between 
international judicial bodies, there does seem to be support for the proposition that no 
litispendence can take place in the relations between international courts and tribunals, 
on the one hand, and courts and tribunals that do not belong to the international legal 
order proper.234 This might imply that courts and tribunals that typically apply a body of 
law other than international law (e.g., ICSID, NAFTA Chapter 19 binational tribunals 
and the International Chamber of Commerce) cannot compete with ordinary 
international judicial bodies applying, as a rule, international law. Such conclusion 
conforms to the observation that one of the principal justifications for the application of 
jurisdiction-regulating rules in cases of jurisdictional competition is the promotion of 
systematic coherence on the normative level and the avoidance of conflicting 
judgments. Inconsistent decisions of different judicial bodies, grounded upon different 
legal bases do not represent a significant threat to the integrity of international law, and 
it is therefore not critical to prevent them, from a systematic point of view (although the 
balance of conveniences of the parties might still support some regulation of concurrent 
proceedings). In contrast, it looks as if competition involving international courts and 
tribunals coming from different international sub-systems should be viewed as 
competition between courts coming from the same legal (normative) order, with regard 
to which the litispendence rule ought to apply.
C. Res judicata
7. The legal status o f the rule
Res judicata (or the principle of finality) has long been considered a well-established 
rule of international law. The legally binding nature of the rule can be attributed to 
the centuries old practice of attributing a ‘final and binding’ effect to arbitral awards and 
other international judicial decisions and to the practice of recognising the validity of 
judgments as manifested in numerous international instruments, including the
233 For support, see Megalos A. Caloyanni “L'organisation de la Cour permanente de justice et son 
avenir” 38 Receueil des cours (1931) 651, 685.
234 Salvatore Messina “Les tribunaux mixtes et les rapports interjuridictionnels en Egypte” 52 Receuil des 
cours (1932) 363,470-71; George Schwarzenberger, 1 International Law  (3rd ed., 1957) 142.
235 Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Canada) 3 R.I.A.A. 1907 (1941); Commentaire sur le Projet de Convention sur 
la Procedure Arbitrale adopte p a r la Commission du Droit International a sa cinquieme session (ONU 
Secretariat, 1955) 106; Schreuer, supra note 40, at 166-67.
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constitutive instruments of most major international courts or tribunals. Furthermore, 
one can identify a general tendency on the part of states to comply with judicial 
decisions (which has sometimes been described as a 'culture of compliance'),237 or at 
least not to openly challenge them.238 The existence of such widespread practice and 
concomitant sense of legal obligation has been noted in the writing of jurists239 and in a 
number of judicial decisions.240 All of these are strong indications that the two 
conditions required for conferring the status of an international custom upon the res 
judicata rule -  extensive and consistent practice241 and opinio juris, have been satisfied.
An alternative approach, advocated by some notable jurists, for establishing the legally 
binding status of the res judicata rule has been to characterise it as a general principle of 
law.242 In fact, this possibility had been mentioned by the drafters of the PCIJ Statute, 
who gave the res judicata rule as an example of what may constitute a 'general principle 
of law', under article 38 of the PCIJ Statute.243 The review of national laws undertaken 
in the previous Part of this study confirms the ubiquitous nature of the principle of 
finality. Each of the surveyed legal systems applies the res judicata rule vis-a-vis 
judgments and arbitral awards rendered within the same system. In any event, either by
236 See supra note 175.
237 Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values (1995) 49-51.
238 There have been however a few notable instances o f non-compliance. Stephen M. Schwebel 
“Relations Between the International Court o f Justice and the United Nations” Justice in International 
Law (1994) 14, 18.
239 See e.g., Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (4th ed. 1997) 80; Philippe Couvreur “The 
Effectiveness o f the International Court o f  Justice in the Peaceful Settlement o f  International Disputes” 
The International Court o f  Justice: I t ’s Future Role after Fifty Years (A.S. Muller, D. Raic and J.M. 
Thur&nszky eds. 1997) 83, 100-05.
240 The principle o f  finality had been reaffirmed by several decisions o f  the World Court. Societe 
Commerciale de Belgique (Belgium v. Greece), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 78, at 174; Polish Postal 
Service in Danzig, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser B.) No. 11, at 30; Interpretation o f  Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 
concerning the case o f  the Factory at Chorzdw  (Germany v. Poland), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 11, at 21; 
Factory at Chorzdw , 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 75 (Merits)(dissenting opinion o f  Judge Ehrlich). 
Similar commitment to the principle o f finality can be found in numerous arbitration awards. Trail 
Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A., at 1950; Orinoco Steamship Co. (U.S. v. Venezuela), 11 R.I.A.A. 227, 239 (1910); 
Compagnie Generate de I'Orenoque (France v. Venezuela), 10 R.I.A.A. 184, 276 (1905); Pius Fund (U.S. 
v. Mexico), 9 R.I.A.A. 11, 12 (1902).
Additional support to the res judicata  rule is found in the case law o f  the European Court o f  Justice. 
C-281/89, Italy v. Commission [1991] E.C.R. 1-347, 363; Joined Cases 79 and 82/63, Reynier v. 
Commission [1964] E.C.R. 259, 266.
241 Oscar Schachter International Law in Theory and Practice (1991) 12.
242 Effect o f  Awards o f  the UN Administrative Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 53; Chorzdw Factory, 1927 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13, at 27 (Interpretation)(dissenting opinion o f  Judge Anzilotti)("It appears to me that 
if  there be a case in which it is legitimate to have recourse, in the absence o f  conventions and custom, to 
'the general principles o f  law as recognized by civilized nations' ... that case is assuredly the [case o f res 
judicata]', Amco Asia, Pan American Development Ltd. v. Indonesia, 1 ICSID Rep. 543, 549 
(1988)(Resubmitted case); Bin Cheng General Principles o f  Law as A pplied by International Courts and 
Tribunals 336 (1987).
243 Minutes o f  the Proceedings o f  the Advisory Committee o f  Jurists, with Annexes (League o f Nations, 
1920)335.
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virtue of custom or general principle of law, the res judicata rule should be regarded as 
a binding rule of law.
II. Exceptions to the principle o f finality
However, it is also well accepted that the principle of res judicata is not absolute and 
that there are instances in which a case decided by a court or tribunal can be reopened 
by the same or another judicial body. Bin Cheng in his seminal treatise on General 
Principles o f Law listed seven potential grounds for annulling, revising or setting aside 
a judgment of an international court or tribunal.244 These are: lack of competence, 
violation of the rule that no one should judge its own cause, violation of the right to be 
heard, fraud and corruption on the part of the tribunal, fraud on the part of the parties (or 
their witnesses),245 manifest and essential error246 and fresh evidence 247 Of these 
grounds, the sixth - manifest and essential error seems to be most controversial in legal 
writing and case law, since unlike the other grounds, which primarily address 
procedural defects, it pertains to the merits of the judgment and amounts to a de facto 
right of appeal 248 The lack of consensus as to the ability to reopen a judgment on the 
ground of material error of fact or law is reflected in the conspicuous absence of this 
stipulation from the lists of grounds for revision or setting aside of judgments found in 
the constitutive instruments of some international courts and tribunals.249 Therefore, it 
would seem fair to argue that the sixth ground has failed to assume the level of 
consistency of practice and wide acceptability required in order to qualify as a 
customary norm of law, which constitutes an exception to the already established 
principle of finality. It is also apparent that under municipal law it is generally 
impossible to challenge the merits of an erroneous final judgment of a competent 
domestic court (except by way of an appeal) and that, similarly, most jurisdictions do
244 Cheng, supra note 242, at 357-72; Commentaire sur le Projet de Procedure Arbitrate, supra note 235, 
at 107-11.
245 Leigh Valley Railroad Co. v. Germany, 8 R.I.A.A. 160, 190 (1933).
246 Drier v. Germany, 8 R.I.A.A. 127, 157-58 (1935); Leigh Valley, 8 R.I.A.A. at 188; Trail Smelter, 3 
R.I.A.A., at 1957.
247 M oore (U.S. v. Mexico) (1871), in John B. Moore, 2 History and D igest o f  International Arbitrations 
to which the U.S. has been a Party  (1898) 1357.
Revision o f  judgments on the grounds o f the discovery o f  a new fact, unknown to the judicial body and to 
the party seeking revision at the time o f judgment, is provided for in the constitutive instruments o f  most 
international courts and tribunals (usually, on condition that no negligence on the part o f  the party seeking 
revision has taken place). See e.g.. ICJ Statute, art. 61; 1899 Hague Convention, art. 55; 1907 Hague 
Convention, art. 83; ICSID Convention, art. 51(1); EC Statute, art. 41; Rome Statute o f  the International 
Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, art. 84(1), UN Doc. A/Conf. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. (1998) 999 [hereinafter ‘ICC 
Statute’].
248 Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A., at 1957; Commentaire sur le Projet de Procedure Arbitrale, supra note 235, 
at 112.
249 See e.g., NAFTA, art. 1904(13); ICSID Convention, art. 52(1).
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not permit the review of alleged errors of fact or law found in foreign judgments or 
arbitral awards, of either domestic or foreign origin.250 As a result, it can hardly be 
argued that recourse to substantive review of judicial errors can be viewed as a general 
principle of law
III. Case law o f the PCIJ and the ICJ
So far, the most prominent attempts to reopen disputes settled by one judicial body in 
proceedings initiated before another judicial or quasi-judicial forum cases have been 
three cases submitted to the ICJ and the PCIJ for judicial review. In effect, the Court 
was asked in these cases to re-litigate disputes already settled by arbitration As a result 
these cases can be viewed, to a certain extent, as jurisdictional-competition cases.
In the Societe Belgique case, the PCIJ had been confronted with an attempt by Belgium 
to enforce an arbitral award rendered in favour of a Belgian corporation against Greece. 
Greece did not challenge the validity of the award but merely claimed that the award 
should be considered as part of its foreign debt (which could be paid over a prolonged 
period of time). The Court commented that the arbitration clause between the Greek 
government and the Belgian company, in which the parties undertook that the award 
would be 'final and without appeal', bars the Court from reviewing it. As a result it may 
neither confirm nor annul the award, in part or in whole, under its existing mandate 
(which derives from a general agreement between Belgium and Greece to refer all of 
their differences to the PCIJ). In other words, the Court had seemed to favour the 
view that explicit authorisation is required in order to reopen a decision which enjoys a 
res judicata status in light of specific contractual language. .
In his Hague Lectures, Prof. Michael Reisman was critical of part of the Court’s 
decision and expressed the view that the Court was unjustified in rejecting the Greek 
position that it may seek postponement in the execution of the award, on grounds that it 
is inconsistent with the res judicata force of the award. Indeed, the conflict over the
250 It is perhaps instructive that the 1958 New York Convention does not include substantive mistakes as a 
ground for refusal to recognise and enforce arbitral awards. Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June 1958, art. V, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [here in forth and 
hereinafter ‘New York Convention’]. See also Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement o f  
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, art. 29, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, 29 I.L.M. 
(1990) 1413 [hereinafter ‘Brussels Convention’].
251 Societe Belgique, 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A /B )N o. 78, at 174.
252 See W. Michael Reisman “ The Supervisory Jurisdiction o f  the International Court o f  Justice: 
International Arbitration and International Adjudication” 258 Recueil des Cours (1996) 9, 244-5.
253 Societe Belgique, 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 78, at 176; Reisman, supra note 252, at 247, 251-52.
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method of execution of the award could have been regarded as a novel and distinct 
issue, separable from the dispute that had been the subject of the arbitration 
proceedings.
The first time the ICJ was directly confronted with an attempt to re-litigate a case 
already settled by arbitration had been in the King o f Spain case,254 which involved a 
challenge by Nicaragua to the validity of an arbitral award that had been rendered in 
favour of Honduras more than 50 years earlier. The Court rejected the challenge and 
held that Nicaragua was barred in the circumstances of the case from challenging an 
award whose validity it had recognised on several occasions.
However, the Court also held, in obiter dicta, that even if there had not been estoppel by 
conduct, it would still have confirmed the award. According to the Court, since the 
award is not subject to an appeal it may not “pronounce on whether the arbitrator’s 
decision was right or wrong”. Still, the Court held that it could decide whether the 
award was null and void and has consequently engaged in examination of the 
Nicaraguan claims that the arbitrator overstepped its authority and that there was an 
essential error in the award. Both contentions were rejected by the Court for lack of 
merit.
How can the position of the ICJ in the King o f Spain case be explained in light of the 
Societe Belgique precedent, in which the PCIJ had seemed to rule out the possibility of 
review of final awards? One possible explanation is the specific language used in the 
compromis between Nicaragua and Honduras, which authorised the Court to adjudicate
9^ 7the parties’ 'disagreement with respect of the arbitral award'. Such wording could 
suggest a waiver of some of the res judicata effects of the award. Another possible 
explanation is that the Societe Belgique case, where no challenge against the validity of 
the award had been raised, cannot be regarded as a persuasive authority against the 
power of the Court to engage in supervision of arbitral decisions.
254 Arbitral Award made by the King o f  Spain on 23 December 1906 (Honduras v. Nicaragua), 1960 I.C.J. 
192.
255 King o f  Spain, id. at 213.
256 King o f  Spain, id. at 214. The Court also held that: "[t]he appraisal o f  the probative value o f  documents 
and evidence appertained to the discretionary power o f the arbitrator and is not open to question." id. at 
215-16.
257 King o f  Spain, 1960 (I) I.C.J. Pleadings 28-29 (Annex 3)(Application instituting proceedings). But see 
Reisman, supra note 252, at 272 (argues that the compromis was too vague to constitute specific 
authorisation).
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In any event, one should perhaps emphasise that the King o f Spain Court has embraced 
a non-intrusive approach towards the award - acting as a court of cassation and not as a 
court of appeal de novo. This means that substantial parts of the arbitral process and the 
final award had been insulated altogether from judicial review. Even when the Court 
had engaged in review of alleged grounds for nullity of the award it refrained from 
examining the arbitrator’s discretion. This standard of review has rendered the Court’s 
perceived willingness to examine whether the award reveals an ‘essential error’ into a 
largely meaningless gesture.
Prof. Reisman criticised the decision of the Court for failing to attribute sufficient res 
judicata weight to the award.258 In his view, the Court should have refrained from 
re-examining challenges to the validity of the award, which had already been rejected 
by the arbitrator.259 While Reisman seems to be right, in principle, since the res judicata 
rule can certainly encompass decisions on jurisdiction, there is no reason to believe 
that the parties to arbitration cannot authorise the Court (or any other judicial body) to 
re-examine the validity of the award. As a result, if one were to construe the compromis 
in the King o f Spain as specific authorisation to reopen a final award, the Court’s 
approach would seem justified. Under these conditions, the standard of review adopted 
by the Court seems to carefully balance between the need to respect the agreement of 
the parties to submit to it differences concerning the validity of the award and the 
principle of finality.
The 1989 Arbitral Award case is perhaps the most important of the Court’s decisions
on the question of successive proceedings. In that case, the jurisdiction of the ICJ to 
hear a challenge on the validity of the arbitral award was based on Article 36(2) of the 
Statute. Still, the Court held that it may re-examine the award since the dispute before
258 Reisman, supra note 252, at 285.
259 Reisman, supra note 252, at 281-82. According to Reisman, the Court should not have reviewed this 
question anew, but should have given decisive weight to the fact that the award settled this issue (though 
he concedes that this was an issue extrinsic to the award itself). Id. at 283.
260 Cheng, supra note 242, at 353.
261 Arbitral Aw ard o f  31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), 1991 I.C.J. 53
262 The fact that Guinea-Bissau - the applicant state, has made the optional clause declaration only 16 days 
before presenting the claim underlines the potential for abuse o f  the principle o f  finality if  the Court were 
to adopt an excessively intrusive approach. Interestingly enough, Senegal could have, but failed to object 
to the Court's jurisdiction on the basis o f  its 1985 optional clause declaration that excluded from the 
jurisdiction o f  the Court disputes "in regard to which the parties have agreed to have recourse to some 
other method of settlement." Declaration o f Senegal under article 36(2) o f  the ICJ Statute, 1984-85 I.C.J.
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it - a dispute over the validity of the award, raised a separate issue from the original 
dispute referred to arbitration - a maritime delimitation dispute.
Although the decision can be explained, in part, by the fact that the respondent state 
(Senegal) did not explicitly contest its jurisdiction to review the validity of the award,264 
the reasoning employed by the Court would seem to be of wide applicability, so as to 
enable it to review future challenges to any settled judicial decision, even without 
specific waiver of the effects of the res judicata rule (provided that the Court enjoys 
compulsory jurisdiction over the parties). As a result, one can assert that the 1989 
Arbitral Award case has in effect reversed the dicta of the PCIJ in the Societe Belgique 
case.
On the question of the proper standard of judicial review, the ICJ adopted an approach 
generally similar to the one taken in the King o f Spain case. The Court refused to 
explore a challenge made by Guinea-Bissau against the interpretation adopted by the 
arbitral tribunal to its powers under the arbitration compromis, and noted that it is 
cannot review de novo the decision of the arbitrators;
"By proceeding in that way the Court would be treating the request as an appeal and not as a 
recours en nullite. The Court could not act in that way in the present case. It has simply to 
ascertain whether by rendering the disputed Award the Tribunal acted in manifest breach of 
the competence conferred on it by the Arbitration Agreement, either by deciding in excess 
of, or by failing to exercise, its jurisdiction."265.
It should be noted that some of the judges in the case appended to the judgment separate 
or dissenting opinions indicating willingness to engage in a more intrusive review of the 
arbitral award.266
Y.B. 93-94 (1985). Arguably, this electa una via  reservation could block adjudication o f  the merits o f  the 
dispute before the ICJ by virtue o f  the prior resort to arbitration.
263 1989 Arbitral Award, 1991 I.C.J. at 62.
264 1989 Arbitral Award, 1991 I.C.J. at 80 (declaration by Judge Mbaye).
265 1989 Arbitral Award, 1991 I.C.J. at 69.
266 1989 Arbitral Award, 1991 I.C.J. at 77 (Declaration by Judge Tarassov); id. at 92 (Separate Opinion o f  
Judge Lachs); id. at 106, 112-13 (Separate Opinion by Judge Shahabuddeen)(advocating a potentially 
more intrusive standard o f  review o f decisions concerning the arbitral tribunal’s competence -  a showing 
o f a compelling, clear and substantial error, as opposed to the standard set by the majority - manifest 
breach o f competence); id. at 120, 124 (Joint Dissenting Opinion by Judges Aguilar Mawdsley and 
Ranjeva); id. at 131 (Dissenting Opinion o f  Judge Weeramantry). Reisman points out that two other
265
The case law of the ICJ/PCIJ on the relationship between the court and arbitral awards 
is important to the present study. It establishes the proposition that an agreement to 
settle a dispute in a final and binding manner by way of arbitration will be respected, as 
a rule, by another tribunal. Indeed, the Court has regarded itself unable to re-adjudicate 
the merits of a case previously settled by way of arbitration (in the absence of specific 
authorisation by the parties). While the Court has tended to be show greater willingness 
to exercise jurisdiction in disputes over the validity of the award (which it now views as 
separate from the underlying conflict), it has construed its position as that of a court of 
cassation entrusted with limited powers of review, and not as an appellate instance with 
power to review the merits of the dispute de novo. This outcome strongly endorses an 
international rule of res judicata, which prescribes that international courts tribunals 
must give legal effect to decisions of other international tribunal. However, as 
mentioned above, this rule has a few exceptions and a competent court or tribunal may 
review some alleged grounds for invalidity of a ‘final’ decision, provided that it will 
apply a non-intrusive standard of review.
In a similar manner, it is conceivable, on the basis of the 1989 Arbitral Award ruling, 
that the ICJ would be willing to review the regularity of conduct of proceedings 
conducted in parallel to ICJ proceedings, even while they are still pending before the 
competing forum (e.g., a legal challenge against the competing forum’s decision to 
exercise jurisdiction). Such a request for review of an interim decision, would qualify 
under the 1989 Arbitral Award as a question separate from the substantive dispute 
referred to arbitration, and thus not barred by rules designed to abate multiple litigation 
of the ‘same matter’. Still, as a matter of judicial economy and comity, it is arguable 
that this proposed procedural path is extremely undesirable.268
IV Case law o f other international courts and tribunals
There have been only a few other cases in which permanent international courts and 
tribunals other than the ICJ have addressed the issue of finality of decisions of 
competing judicial bodies. In one case, the EHR Comm’n reviewed a complaint that 
Article 6 of the European HR Convention (the right to due process) had been violated
majority judges also resorted, in effect, to appellate-style examination o f the award. Reisman, supra note 
252, at 355-56.
267 Cf. Case 589/1994, Tomlin v, Jamaica, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/589/1994, at Para. 6.3 (Report o f the 
HRC, 1996) (power o f  review o f  the Committee over domestic courts should be strictly construed).
268 For instance, interlocutory motions might be unnecessary if  one o f the parties has prevailed on the 
merits before another judicial forum.
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by the EC Commission, after the same claim was dismissed by the ECJ. Instead of 
invoking article 35(2) [ex article 27(1 )(b)] of the European HR Convention (the electa 
una via clause), the Commission held that it does not have ratione materiae jurisdiction 
to examine the complaint after it had been addressed by the ECJ.269 According to the 
Commission, acceptance on the part of the institutions of the EC of the standards of the 
European HR Convention implied that the ECJ has assumed the role of supervising the 
observance of these rights in cases subject to its jurisdiction. Thus, states may execute 
judgments of the ECJ, without examining their conformity with the Convention 270 This 
decision could mean that the Commission was of the opinion that through agreement to 
authorise the ECJ to review compliance with human rights standards, the EC member 
states have intended to invest ECJ judgments concerning human rights issues with a res 
judicata effect, which would bar their review on the merits by human rights
771mechanisms.
In another case, the ECHR held that a state party owes damages to a private party for 
delays in implementing domestic and ECJ judgments.272 This seems to reflect 
recognition by the ECHR of the res judicata effect of relevant ECJ judgments. Still, it is 
interesting to note that one of the judges, in a dissenting opinion, protested the 
conferring of res judicata status to the ECJ judgment, arguing that differences in the 
nature of the ECJ and the ECHR, in the legal basis of their decisions and defects in the 
merits of the ECJ judgment, should have prevented reliance thereupon.273 However, the 
findings in Part II of the present study do justify treating the ECJ and the ECHR as 
courts belonging to the same legal system, and thus capable of producing res judicata 
effects vis-a-vis each other.
In contrast, in the Pyramids case, an ICSID tribunal refused to adopt findings of fact 
reached by ICC arbitration in earlier litigation of the same dispute. Although this 
decision can be justified in light of the fact that the ICC award had been nullified by the 
domestic courts of the situs, the reasoning employed by the tribunal were that the ICSID 
rules of procedure require tribunals to make their own findings of fact and law.274 Taken
269 Melchers & Co. v. Germany, App. 13258/87, 1990 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 138 (EHR Comm’n).
270 Melchers, id. at 145-46.
271 Although, technically speaking, the two sets o f  proceedings did not involve the same parties, one 
might argue that the interests o f  Germany and the EC Commission were essentially the same.
272 Hornsby v. Greece, 24 E.H.R.R. 250 (1997).
273 Hornsby (Just Satisfaction), 1998 (II) Eur. Ct. H.R. 727, 738 (Dissenting Opinion o f  Judge Valticos; 
joined by Judges Pettiti and Morenilla).
274 Southern Pacific, 3 ICSID Rep. at 162-63.
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to its full logical extent, this rationale might imply that ICSID tribunals are barred from 
applying the res judicata rule. Such an illogical outcome is clearly inconsistent with 
earlier ICSID case law, which has clearly shown willingness to apply the res judicata 
rule (vis-a-vis another ICSID award rendered in an earlier stage of the proceedings).275
With regard to the scope of the res judicata rule, the case law of the ECJ demonstrates a 
particularly broad conception of what constitute successive claims. Thus, in a number of 
decisions, the Court has applied rules of preclusion in order to block re-litigation of 
settled issues,276 even in situations which are not traditionally covered by the res 
judicata rule -  such as related proceedings (which do not strictly involve the ‘same 
matter’) and declarations of invalidity of EC measures in annulment cases, which have 
erga omnes effect and bind unrelated third parties (thus, deviating from the ‘same 
parties’ standard).278 However, as was the case before, these precedents are of limited 
utility for the present work since they involve successive applications to the same 
judicial body (where consideration of legal economy, not found in litigation before 
different bodies with different jurisdictional structure, support that parties raise all of 
their related claims in one set of proceedings).
Further, there are other examples suggesting a more restrictive approach. For example, 
an ICSID tribunal, which was confronted with a situation where an ICSID ad hoc 
Committee has previously annulled an ICSID award rendered in an earlier stage of the 
same proceedings, accorded limited res judicata effect to the decision of the Committee 
(recognising the nullification of the first award, but refusing to follow the reasoning 
adopted by the Committee during re-litigation). However, the position of the 
second-in-time ICSID arbitral tribunal could perhaps be explained by the unique 
position of ad hoc Committees in the institutional framework of ICSID -  they act as
275 Amco Asia, 1 ICSID Rep. at 548-49, 552.
276 Lasok, supra note 231, at 138-39.
277 Where a party has tried to resubmit to the Court a claim previously rejected by it, through dressing it 
up in a different form (e.g., an action for damages instead o f  action for annulment), the Court, if  it 
deemed the new set o f  proceedings to amount to a disguised attempt to circumvent a binding decision, 
applied a discretionary connexity rule. See Case 59/65, Schreckenberg v. Euratom Commission [1966] 
E.C.R. 543, 550; Lasok, supra note 231, at 219-220. The connexity rule has also been applied by the ECJ 
to block parallel related claims and claims which have been designed to circumvent a peremptory rule o f  
admissibility (such as time-limits). Lasok, supra, at 214-15.
278 Lasok, supra note 231, at 220. At the same time, a finding o f validity o f  a challenged measure does not 
bind third parties.
279 Amco Asia, 1 ICSID Rep. at 543.
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courts of cassation and not as courts of appeal. Hence, the merits of their judgments 
are of different nature than those of ordinary judicial fora.
In sum, there is little doubt as to the validity of the res judicata rule in international law 
and the rule of finality should generally apply to the relations between different 
international courts and tribunals. However, in practice, the application of the principle 
of finality by international courts and tribunals has been sporadic and somewhat 
inconsistent. Consequently, it is not utterly clear what is the precise preclusive nature of 
decisions rendered by one competent forum on matters brought before competing 
judicial bodies (e.g., what level of review is permissible? which aspects of a decision
981can be re-opened?). In contrast, it seems well established that the decisions of 
domestic courts cannot constitute res judicata vis-a-vis international courts and
9 89tribunals that belong to a different legal order.
The proven existence of an international law rule of res judicata means that it can be 
applied by international courts and tribunals even in the absence of express treaty 
language. This is unless the relevant constitutive instruments body indicate clear intent 
to negate the application of the rule. Thus, for instance, it could be argued that the HRC, 
which is precluded under the ICCPR Optional Protocol only from reviewing 
communications pending simultaneously before other international courts or tribunals, 
should nevertheless apply the res judicata rule in relation to findings of fact and law 
made by competing binding procedures. According to this view, it is plausible that 
article 5(2)(a) of the Optional Protocol (the lis alibi pendens clause) did not create a 
negative arrangement as to the application of the res judicata rule, but rather failed to 
address the question of finality. Hence, the res judicata rule may be relied upon in order
280 Amco Asia, 1 ICSID Rep. at 552.
281 The position o f  the WTO Dispute Settlement system on the scope and effect o f  the principle o f  finality 
is still unclear. John Jackson The World Trading System (2nd ed., 1997) 126; Raj Bhala “The Myth about 
Stare Decisis and International Trade” 14 American University International Law Review (1999) 845, 
878; William J. Davey “The WTO/GATT World Trading System: An Overview” I Handbook o f  
WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement (Pierre Pescatore ed. 1997) 20 (though not formally binding upon future, 
DSB reports will in effect constitute stable precedents); Emst-Ulrich Petersmann “International Trade 
Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System 1948-1996: An Introduction” International Trade 
Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (Emst-Ulrich Petersmann ed. 1997) 5, 84.
282 Certain German Interests, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6, at 20; Amco Asia, 1 ICSID Rep. 389 ,460
(1983)(Jurisdiction)(“ ... an international arbitral tribunal enjoys the right to evaluate and examine [the 
legal position o f the parties] without accepting any res judicata  effect o f a national court”); Ian Brownlie, 
Principles o f  Public International Law (5th ed., 1998) 52; Ciobanu, supra note 199, at 229; Henry 
Donnedieu de Vabres “Le conflit des lois de competence judiciaire dans les actions personnelles” 26 
Recueil des cours (1929) 261. The separate existence o f  domestic and international legal proceedings is 
also confirmed by the exhaustion o f local remedies rule, which permits international courts and tribunals 
to reopen cases already decided by their domestic counterparts.
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to fill this lacuna. Although this outcome can be supported by policy arguments peculiar 
to the field of human rights,283 the practice of the HRC has not followed this course, and 
no rule of preclusion had been applied with regard to previously settled matters.284 
While this position might comport with the original intent of the drafters of the 
ICCPR,285 it seems to ignore the interpretative rule according to which international 
agreements should be read in line with the parties’ other obligations under international 
law286(which include the principle of finality).
Of course, the principle of finality could only be applied in relation to final and binding 
decisions - namely, decisions rendered by full-fledged judicial bodies (e.g., European or 
Inter-American Human Rights Courts). Recommendations of quasi-judicial bodies (e.g., 
HRC and the African Human Rights Comm’n), can only be given due consideration. 
This is because to hold otherwise without explicit authorisation would give non-binding 
recommendations a binding effect, against the wishes of the parties to the relevant 
constitutive instruments.
2. Other potentially applicable general rules and principles o f  
international law
Besides specific rules such as lis alibi pendens or res judicata, developed to address 
some of the particular problems associated with jurisdictional competition, general 
principles of international law may also assist in formulating the law governing 
situations of conflicting jurisdictions. Although such principles have only rarely been 
applied by international courts and tribunals with relation to jurisdictional questions, it 
is submitted that they have potential applicability in these circumstances, which may be 
deduced from the manner in which they have been applied in other areas of international 
law.
283 It could be maintained that in the field o f  human rights there is special need to strengthen the authority 
o f  the various human rights judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. Scott Davidson “The Procedure and 
Practice o f  the Human Rights Committee under the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights” 4 Canterbury L. Rev. (1991) 337, 348. There also seems to be in that area 
o f  law a problem o f judicial economy on a unique scale, given the overburdening o f  existing procedures.
284 See supra Chapter 2, at pp. 271-72.
285 The travaux preparatoires o f  the ICCPR show that proposals to introduce stricter jurisdictional 
regulating standards (including a res judicata  rule) had been explicitly rejected. See supra Chapter 5, at 
pp. 233-34.
286 Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties, 23 May 1969, art. 3 l(3)(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [here in 
forth and hereinafter ‘Vienna Convention’].
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A. The theory of abuse of rights
Perhaps the general principle most relevant to the present study is the ‘abuse of right’ 
doctrine (abus de droit), which had originated in civil law countries287 but can also be 
found today in many common law jurisdictions. The doctrine has been relied upon on
n o n  'ionseveral occasions by the PCIJ and the ICJ and has been affirmed by numerous
9Q1arbitration proceedings. It was also listed by Bin Cheng as one of the general 
principles of law recognised and applied by international courts and tribunals, which 
may derive from the bona fide principle.292
Still, there are some lingering doubts on the accuracy of the assertion that the theory 
reflects a general principle of law. At least one major legal system -  English law, had in 
the past explicitly repudiated the doctrine en bloc. However, even English law has 
long accepted the idea that abuse of rights should be proscribed in specific situations, 
including the exercise of rights in the framework of the legal process.294 Therefore, one 
can assert, for the purposes of the present thesis, that all main systems apply or, at least
287 New Civil Code (NBW), art. 1-2 (Netherlands); Civil Code, art. 2 (Switzerland); Civil Code, art. 1071 
(Argentina); Cour d'appel, Colmar, May 2, 1985, D.P. II 1856, at 9 (France); Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, 
Arbitration with the Arab Countries (2nd ed., 1999) 573 (Moslem law forbids any abuse o f  right); 
Alexander Reus “Judicial Discretion: A Comparative View o f  the Doctrine o f Forum Non Conveniens in 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany” 16 Loy. L.A. IntT & Comp. L.J. (1994) 455, 
498-99. In addition, the principle o f good faith has been embraced by the laws o f many other countries. 
See e.g., B.G.B. §. 242 (Germany); Contract Law (General Part), 1973, art. 12 (Israel); Civil Code, art. 18 
(Turkey). See generally, Saul Litvinoff “Good Faith” 71 Tul. L. Rev. (1997) 1645.
288 Joseph M. Perillo “Abuse o f Right: A Pervasive Legal Concept” 27 Pacific Law Review (1995) 37.
289 Certain German Interests 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 30; Free Zones o f  Upper Savoy and the 
D istrict o f  Gex (France/ Switzerland) 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46, at 167; Oscar Chinn 
(U.K./Belgium), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63, at 86.
290 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4 ,4 6  (Individual Opinion o f  Judge Alvarez)(“ ... 
condemnation o f the misuse o f a right should be transported into international law”); Competence o f  the 
General Assembly fo r  the Admission o f  a State to the UN, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 15 (Dissenting Opinion o f Judge 
Alvarez)("it is necessary to-day to find a place for [the concept o f  abuse o f  right in international law]"); 
Fisheries (U.K./Norway) 1951 I.C.J. 116, 142. But see, Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway) 
1957 I.C.J. 9 ,9 4  (Dissenting Opinion o f  Judge Read)(“practically speaking, it is, I think, impossible for 
an international tribunal to examine a dispute between two sovereign States on the basis o f  either good 
faith or o f  abuse o f law”).
291 See e.g., Fur Sea Seal Arbitration (G.B./U.S.)(1892) in Moore, 1 History and D igest o f  International 
Arbitrations (1898) 755, 889-90.
292 Cheng, supra note 242, at 121; U.S. -  Import Prohibition o f  Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 38 
I.L.M. (1999) 118, 165 (Report o f the Appellate Body, 1998)(“The chapeau o f  Article XX is, in fact, but 
one expression o f the principle o f good faith. This principle, at once a general principle o f law and a 
general principle o f international law, controls the exercise o f  rights by states. One application o f  this 
general principle, the application widely known as the doctrine o f  abus de droit, prohibits the abusive 
exercise o f a state's rights . . .”).
293 M ayor o f  Bradford v. Pickles [1895] A.C. 587, 601; Allen v. Flood [m % \  A.C. 1, 46; W.V.H. Rogers 
et al, On Tort (1984) 49.
294 See Civil Procedure Rules, Rule 3.4 (2)(b)(England); The Atlantic Star [1973] 2 All E.R. 175, 183 
(H.L., Opinion o f  Lord Morris o f Borth-Y-Gest). Two relevant torts under English law are abuse o f  
process and malicious persecution. Grainger v. Hill, 132 E. R. 769 (1838). See also Lonrho Pic  v. Fayed  
(No. 5) [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1489, 1502 (C.A.); Dallal [1986] 1 Q.B. at 452.
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are willing to recognise some kind of ‘abuse of right’ rule in relation to the exercise of 
rights during adjudication.
In addition, there is repeated reference in international treaties and case law to the abuse 
of right doctrine, most notably in articles 294 and 300 of UNCLOS (the first of the two 
articles explicitly authorises a competent court or tribunal to dismiss abusive 
proceedings), and in the constitutive instruments of some major human rights complaint 
procedures.295 One can also find ample support for the wide-acceptability of the 
overarching principle of good faith, from which the abuse of right theory has been 
developed (the most conspicuous of these authorities can be found in article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).296 These indications lend an alternative 
basis of support to the binding status of the abuse of right theory in international law.297 
Given the extensive practice of international bodies and the near consensus in the 
writing of jurists on the matter, the theory can probably be viewed as part and parcel of 
customary international law or as a general principle of law.
According to the abuse of right theory, right-holders must exercise their rights, while 
taking into account the rights and interests of those affected by their conduct. Hence, it 
is generally accepted that a right cannot be exercised (a) in a malicious manner, with the
295 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, art. 3; CAT, art. 22(2); ECHR, art. 35(3)[ex-article 27(2)].
296 The principle o f good faith has been reaffirmed by UN Charter, art. 2(2); Declaration on Principles o f  
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the 
Charter o f  the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 
121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970); Final Act o f  the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 1 
Aug. 1975, 14 I.L.M. (1975) 1292.
There is also ample support for the principle in the case law o f  the ICJ - Nuclear Tests (Australia v. 
France), 1974 I.C.J. 253,268; Legality o f  the Threat or Use o f  Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226,264; 
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 324 (Preliminary 
Objections)(Dissenting Opinion o f  Judge Oda)(“For Nauru to bring a claim now can only lead one to 
doubt its good faith”). One can also fmd reference to the principle o f good faith and estoppel in 
GATT/WTO law: Measures Affecting Imports o f  Softwood Lumber from  Canada (Canada v. U.S.),
GATT B.I.S.D. (40th Supp.) at 358, 480-86 (1993); U.S. -S ec tio n s 301-310 o f  the Trade Act o f 1974, 
WTO DOC. WT/DS152/R (1999), at p. 319 (Panel Report). See also the relevant case law o f the 
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: Case 56 Amoco International Finance Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 
189,233 (1987); Case 39, Philipps Petroleum Co. v. Iran, 21 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 79, 155 (1989); Case 
43, Oil Fields o f  Texas, Inc. v. Iran, 1 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 347, 376 (1982)(Concurring Opinion o f  
Mosk); Case A/2, Iran v. U.S., 1 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 101, 109 (1982)(Dissenting Opinion o f  Kashani, 
Shafeiei & Enayat); Case 7, Tippets et al v. TAMSEFTA, 6 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 219, 270
(1984)(Comments by Shafeiei); Case 33, Sea-LandServices Inc. v. Iran, 6 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 149, 
209-16 (1984)(Dissenting and Concurring Opinion o f  Holtzman). And see also Lord McNair, The Law o f  
Treaties (1961)(1998 reprint) 550, 764; Shaw, supra note 239, at 81-82 (good faith is perhaps the most 
important general principle o f international law).
297 See e.g., Wolfgang Friedmann “General Course in Public International Law” 127 Receuil des cours 
(1969) 37, 153. But see, Adolfo M. De La Muela “Les Principes Directeurs des Regies de Competence 
Territoriale des Tribunaux Internes en Mati6re de Litiges Comportant un element International” 135 
Recueil des cours (1973) 1, 39-40.
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sole intent of causing injury to another; (b) in a 'fictitious' way - for a purpose utterly 
different than that for which the right was originally granted; or (c) in an wholly 
unreasonable manner- causing harm disproportionate to the right holder’s interests.
In addition, several precedents have established that one set of rights cannot be 
exercised in disregard of other sets of rights and obligations.299 Therefore, the theory 
calls for a proper balance to be struck between states' rights and obligations.300 
Similarly, in cases involving discretionary exercise of rights, support can be found to
O A 1
the proposition that such discretion must be exercised in a good faith manner, that is, 
in a way which is not arbitrary and does not entail undue hardship for other parties.
I. Application o f the abuse o f rights theory to forum selection and multiple proceedings 
Since unilateral resort to adjudication most certainly constitutes an exercise of right, it 
would seem that the abuse of right doctrine should govern its operation. In cases of 
jurisdictional competition, the abuse of right doctrine, if applicable, would not permit 
referral of disputes to an international forum in violation of a binding instrument 
mandating that the case be adjudicated before a different forum (e.g., an exclusive or 
residual jurisdiction clause). Exercise of the right to initiate proceedings in breach of 
treaty obligations should therefore be considered abusive, and jurisdiction under these 
circumstances ought to be declined. This conclusion conforms to the dicta of the PCIJ 
in the Rights o f Minorities case, which suggests that the Court’ should decline
298 Cheng, supra note 242, at 121-23. See U.S. - Standardfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 
and Like Products o f  National Origin, 35 I.L.M. (1996) 603, 626 (Report o f  the AB)(“... while the 
exceptions o f Article XX may be invoked as a matter o f  legal right, they should not be so applied as to 
frustrate or defeat the legal obligations o f  the holder o f the right under the substantive rules o f the General 
Agreement. If those exceptions are not to be abused or misused, in other words, the measures falling 
within the particular exceptions must be applied reasonably, with due regard both to the legal duties o f  
the party claiming the exception and the legal rights o f the other parties concemed”)(emphasis added).
299 Reformulated Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. at 626; Import o f  Shrimp, 38 I.L.M. at 626; North Atlantic Coast 
Fisheries (G.B./U.S.), 1 Hague Court Reports 141, 169-71 (1910); Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A., at 1965. C f  
Convention on the High Seas, 29 Apr. 1958, art. 2, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
300 Cheng, supra note 242, at 130-32.
301 Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. at 141-42; Rights o f Nationals o f  the United States o f  America in Morocco 
(France v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176,212; Admission to the UN, 1950 I.C.J. at 15 (Dissenting Opinion o f  
Judge Alvarez). It had been argued that even the decision to invoke what is clearly a self-judging 
provision must be exercised in good faith. Antonio Perez "WTO and UN Law: Institutional Comity in 
National Security" 23 Yale J. Int’l L. (1998) 301, 332.
302 Conditions o f  Admission o f  a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 o f  Charter), 
1947-48 I.C.J. 57, 80 (Separate opinion o f Judge Azevedo); Cheng, supra note 242, at 133.
303 Cf. Marine International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Guinea, 4  ICSID Rep. 45, 51 (1986) 
(Supervisory Authority o f  the Office des Poursuites o f Geneva)(“In resorting to ICSID arbitration 
proceedings, MINE waived the ability to request provisional measures against the Republic o f  Guinea in 
Switzerland. Therefore, MINE is committing a manifest abuse o f  the law in invoking these ICSID 
proceedings to attempt to obtain the maintenance o f an attachment. . .”).
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jurisdiction once faced with a competing exclusive jurisdiction clause, and with the 
language of the Southern Bluefin Tuna arbitral tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction, which 
suggests that proceedings brought in breach of an implicit exclusive jurisdictional 
clause might, in some circumstances, be regarded as abusive.304
Where no exclusive or residual jurisdiction clause has been breached, a more complex 
application of the doctrine might be required. If one perceives adjudication before a 
specific forum and not before other competent courts or tribunals to be excessively 
burdensome, without there being a legitimate interest justifying litigation before the 
selected forum, insistence by the applicant upon his or her unilateral choice of forum 
might be regarded as wholly unreasonable and therefore - an abuse of right. A situation 
where such balance of interests might clearly be in place is when the same case is 
pending or has already been decided by another tribunal.305 In these circumstances, 
compelling the respondent party to litigate the same matter before another court or 
tribunal would certainly cause significant hardship. At the same time, the applicant does 
not seem to have a legitimate interest in multiple adjudication since he or she could 
already have their 'day in court'. In other words, the abuse of rights doctrine can serve as 
an additional justification for the adoption of lis alibi pendens and res judicata (and 
electa una via) rules, and perhaps even support a liberal construction of their scope of 
application, so to encompass closely related multiple proceedings, which are extremely 
onerous for one party and of little relative utility to the other party.
Finally, there is the need to confront difficult cases where it could be argued that a 
certain forum is more suitable to address certain disputes than the other. The question is 
whether the abuse of rights theory should justify the introduction of a forum 
non-conveniens doctrine to international law? While adjudication before an 
inconvenient forum (e.g., unduly distant or expensive) could be regarded as burdensome 
for an unwilling respondent, there seem to be mitigating factors that probably negate the 
application of the theory to most forum shopping situations. First, the fact that a
304 Southern Bluefin Tuna, supra note 78, at 105-06 (still, no such abuse had been found in the 
circumstances o f the case).
305 Trevor C. Hartley “Antisuit Injunctions and the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention” 49 
I.C.L.Q. (2000) 166, 167.
306 The experience o f English courts in this context is instructive. There is consistent case law that has 
applied the doctrine o f abuse o f process to closely related proceedings, not encompassed by the res 
judicata  rule. Greenhalgh v. M allard [1947] 2 All E.R. 255, 259 (C.A.)(Evershed L.J.); Yat Tung 
Investment Co. Ltd. v. Dao Heng Bank Ltd. [1975] A.C. 581, 590 (Lord Kilbrandon); D allal [1986] 1 
Q.B. at 452 (Hobhouse J.).
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respondent party has at some stage accepted the jurisdiction of the seized forum raises 
serious doubts on whether adjudication there is in fact excessively burdensome. In other 
words, the respondent might be estopped by virtue of acceptance of the forum’s 
jurisdiction from arguing that it is exceptionally inconvenient. Second, it could be 
reasonably argued that the applicant has a legitimate interest in pursuing litigation 
where he or she may enjoy procedural, tactical or other advantages. Third, most 
international actors have greater capabilities than ordinary private litigants to conduct 
even ‘inconvenient’ litigation. Nonetheless, where it can be shown that the discretion of 
the applicant in selecting a forum has been exercised in arbitrary or malicious manner - 
e.g., with the sole purpose of causing undue hardship to the respondent, the abuse of 
right doctrine should probably enable the seized court or tribunal to decline jurisdiction.
Needless to say, the abuse of rights theory should also apply in respect of litigation 
tactics exercised by the respondent party to litigation. Where such a party objects to 
jurisdiction conflicting jurisdiction cases in a malicious or fictitious manner, or if the 
respondent argues that another forum is more appropriate after it had previously 
declined to resort to it, the theory would support dismissal of such objections to 
jurisdiction. This is also the case when the objection is inconsistent with a valid treaty, 
conferring jurisdiction upon the seized forum.
B. Comity
Another general legal principle, which might be applicable in cases of jurisdictional 
competition, is the principle of comity applied to judicial matters.307 According to this 
principle, which is found in the domestic conflict of laws norms of many countries
■JAO
(mostly from common law systems), courts in one jurisdiction should show respect 
and demonstrate a degree of deference to the laws of other jurisdictions, including to the 
decisions of judicial bodies operating in these jurisdictions. For instance, comity might 
justify recognition of foreign judgments even in the absence of a formal judgment 
recognition treaty and may support reliance upon foreign court decisions as evidence of
307 However, it should be noted that the term ‘comity’ had been used in various different contexts -  
including as a synonym to public or private international law. Brownlie, Principles o f  Int 7 Law, supra 
note 282, at 29.
308 Hilton v, Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); The “Abidin D over” [1984] A.C. 398 ,412 (Lord 
Diplock); Dallal [1986] 1 Q.B. at 461-62. But see Joined Cases 89, 104, 116, 117 and 125-129/85, 
Ahlstrom Osakeytid v. Commission [1988] E.C.R. 5193, 5244; Markus Lenenbach “Antisuit Injunctions 
in England, Germany and the United States: Their Treatment Under European Civil Procedure and the 
Hague Convention” 20 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. (1998) 257, 295.
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the law of their respective jurisdiction.309 The same principle may also warrant other 
manifestations of courtesy towards foreign judicial bodies engaged in adjudicating 
issues also pending before domestic courts. Indeed, it had been invoked in multiple
i nproceedings situations to justify restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction and in the
T1 1issuance of extraterritorial remedies, in order to minimise jurisdictional conflicts.
There does not seem to be a compelling reason to restrict the application of the principle 
of comity to jurisdictional interactions involving domestic courts only. On the contrary, 
the same consideration supporting the application of the doctrine that can be found in 
the domestic level (e.g., courtesy, reciprocity, need to coordinate multiple proceedings 
and reluctance to facilitate evasion from applicable legal standards), apply, perhaps with 
greater force, in the international sphere, where courts and tribunals function under a 
common legal umbrella. Indeed, there have been a number of situations in which the
i n
doctrine was relied upon directly or indirectly by international institutions, or at least 
its invocation was considered or advocated.313 Principles of deference by international 
bodies to the jurisdiction of other bodies (including national courts) have also 
introduced into some international agreements.314
I. Application o f comity to jurisdictional conflicts
Comity should arguably be acknowledged as a positive device in the promotion of the 
systematic nature of international law. It encourages greater inter-institutional harmony
-i 1 r
and creates a disincentive to exploit the availability of multiple fora. Further, the 
principle can be said to create a framework for jurisdictional interaction that will enable 
courts and tribunals to apply rules originating in other judicial institutions.316 This, in 
turn, will encourage cross-fertilisation and may result in increased legitimacy of
309 See e.g., Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64; Ramsay v. Boeing Co., 432 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970); Michael D. 
Ramsey “Escaping ‘International Comity’” 83 Iowa L. Rev. (1998) 893, 901-02.
3,0 See e.g., Brussels Convention, art. 22.
311 This is reflected in reluctance on the part o f  courts to issue anti-suit injunctions. Laker Airways Ltd. v. 
Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 934 (1984); Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation 
Board), 102 D.L.R. (4th) 96, 125 (Supreme Court o f Canada, 1993). Further, some common law courts 
have used the same rationale to defer jurisdiction where a foreign court has already been seized. Ronar, 
Inc. v. Wallace, 649 F. Supp. 310, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
312 See e.g., infra note 320 (review o f relations between UN political and legal organs).
313 See e.g., Perez, supra note 301, at 364-65.
314 E.g., In the GATT Anti-dumping Code, GATT/WTO Panels are instructed to accord deference to 
determinations issued by national administrative agencies, where such measures comport with one o f  the 
permissible interpretations o f  the Code. Agreement on Implementation o f Article VI o f  the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 15 April 1994, art. 17(6)(i), available at < http://www.wto.org/english/ 
docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.pdf > (last visited on 15 Nov. 2000).
3,5 Meron, Norm Making, supra note 65, at 775; Perez, supra note 301, at 372..
international judgments (through utilising the authority of other international courts and 
tribunals),317 and in the application of the 'best available rule', reflecting not merely the 
narrow interests of the parties and the law-applying regime at hand, but also those of the
110
international community at large. For example, a trade tribunal addressing a trade and 
human rights issue would arguably be better off if it could take into consideration 
relevant decisions of human rights bodies on the same matter, and if it could, for this 
purpose, stay proceedings until parallel proceedings already pending before the 
competing human rights body are brought into completion. Similarly, a court or tribunal 
exercising discretionary jurisdiction (e.g., the ICJ in the exercise of its advisory 
functions) might be justified in deciding to defer jurisdiction in favour of another 
judicial body, which is better situated to address the particular dispute at hand and to
-11Q
take into consideration the various rights and interests of the parties before it.
However, while a rule of comity is certainly desirable, it is far from clear whether such 
rule can be regarded as part of existing international law. There is far too little relevant 
judicial practice and not enough international agreements to enable one to treat the 
principle as amply supported by customary or treaty law. Even in the relations between 
the ICJ and the political organs of the UN, where some indications of inter-institutional 
comity exist,320 the practice has been inconsistent,321 and it is not clear whether any
316 Cheng, supra note 242, at 341-42.
317 Laurence R. Heifer and Anne-Marie Slaughter “Toward a Theoiy o f  Effective Supranational 
Adjudication” 107 Yale L.J. (1997) 273, 323, 325-26.
318 Perez, supra note 301, at 364.
319 E.g., in cases involving private interests, it would be sensible if  the ICJ would defer jurisdiction in 
favour o f  a forum which enables private litigants to appear before it. See Perez, supra note 301, at 376.
In the recent I/A HRC Consular Assistance case, the U.S. had argued that the I/A HRC should have 
exercised comity towards the ICJ, which was better situated to interpret the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, a general and not a human rights treaty. Consular Assistance, supra note 197, 
(excerpts from U.S Brief o f  1 June 1998).
320 The political organs o f the League o f  Nations have refused on a few occasions (sometimes after 
seeking the advice o f a commission o f  jurists), to entertain questions which were pending before 
international judicial bodies. 5 League o f  Nations O.J. No. 4, at 524-25 (1924)(the Council should not 
interfere with a dispute pending before another judicial body or another jurisdiction that was accepted by 
the parties); 8 League o f Nations O.J. No. 10, at 1145 (1927)(the Council should not interfere with a 
dispute pending before the Greco-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal); Ciobanu, supra note 199, at 221; 
T6n6kid6s, supra note 224, at 506-22. There have also been a few occasions in which the Security 
Council was inclined not to address matters while pending before the Court. U.N. SCOR, 6th Sess., 561st 
mtg., at 17 (195 l)(the representative o f  India said during the debate over the Anglo-Iranian crisis that “it 
may not, therefore, be wise or proper for us to pronounce on this question while the same question is sub 
judice before the ICJ”); Rosenne, 1 ICJ Law & Practice, supra note 84, at 155.
This practice can be indicative o f  the political bodies’ support o f  an international sub ju dice  rule, or at 
least o f  a rule o f  institutional comity (i.e., discretionary denial or suspension o f  jurisdiction. Ciobanu, 
supra note 199, at 222; Leo Gross “The International Court o f  Justice and the United Nations” Essays on 
International Law and Organization (1984) 845, 852-53; Ten6kid&s, supra, at 526-27.
In the same vein, there have also been a few indications o f comity exercised by the ICJ towards the 
Security Council. Legal Consequences fo r  States o f  the Continued Presence o f  South Africa in Namibia
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general rule can be deduced (and even so, it is far from certain whether it could apply by 
way of analogy to the relations between different judicial bodies). There are also serious 
problems with incorporating the rule as a general principle of law under article 38(l)(c) 
of the ICJ Statute. For example, some countries do not exercise comity towards foreign 
judgments and refuse to grant them any effect at all in the absence of a judgments 
recognition convention.322 Similarly, while some countries exercise comity towards 
foreign judicial proceedings, most legal systems do not prohibit the conduct of 
cross-boundary parallel proceedings. Therefore, even if one can show that there is 
ubiquitous acceptance of some notion of comity by all legal systems (e.g., according 
some consideration to foreign decisions), such common notion seems to be 
weak-natured and cannot provide a comprehensive solution, or even a significant 
remedy, to the problem of conflicting jurisdictions.
II. The Pyramids case
So far there has only been one major case where the doctrine of comity has been 
explicitly invoked by an international tribunal. In Southern Pacific v. Egypt (the 
‘Pyramids case’), an ICSID tribunal was seized with a dispute while related proceedings 
were already pending before the French Court of Cassation. The arbitral tribunal held 
that international tribunals have an inherent power to exercise comity towards other 
tribunals engaged in parallel proceedings and suspended the proceedings:
"When the jurisdictions of two unrelated and independent tribunals extend to the same 
dispute ... in the interest of international judicial order, either of the tribunals may, in its
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 12,22-23 (the ICJ 
considered itself bound with the SC characterisation o f  the situation); Aegean Sea, 1976 I.C.J. at 13 (the 
involvement o f  the Security Council has prompted the Court to refrain from issuing provisional measures, 
in implicit deference to the Council); Questions o f  Interpretation and Application o f  the 1971 Montreal 
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.) 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Provisional 
Measures); Questions o f  Interpretation and Application o f  the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from  the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.) 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Provisional Measures)[in both cases the 
Court gave effect to Security Council Resolution 748 (1992)].
321 The PCIJ has been typically disinclined to stay proceedings by reason o f  comity towards the political 
organs o f  the League o f Nations. This can perhaps be explained by text o f  the League’s Covenant, which 
may be read as negating the invocation o f  political organs while judicial proceedings are pending (but not 
vice versa). League o f Nations Covenant, art. 15(1); T6n6kid6s, supra note 224, at 513.
There have also been some instance in which UN political organs have refused to exercise comity 
vis-^-vis the ICJ. E.g., the refusal o f  the UNGA in 1960 to adjourn discussion on the question o f South 
West Africa, despite a sub judice  petition made by South Africa; the issuance o f  Resolution 748 (1992) 
by the SC while proceedings in the Lockerbie case were pending. See Rosenne, I ICJ Law & Practice, 
supra note 84, at 151-53; Ciobanu, supra note 199, at 223-24.
322 See e.g., Sweden and Finland. J.J. Fawcett “General Report” Declining Jurisdiction in Private 
International Law (J.J. Fawcett ed. 1995) 1, 67.
278
discretion and as a matter of comity, decide to stay the exercise of its jurisdiction pending a 
decision by the other tribunal"(emphasis added).323
The decision to suspend proceedings rather than to decline jurisdiction altogether 
resonates well with an observation made earlier by the tribunal, according to which one 
of the problems of parallel proceedings might be that both competing fora would end up 
declining jurisdictions, leaving the applicant without effective remedy (‘negative 
conflict of jurisdictions’).324 Further, it is dubious whether the tribunal could have 
refused to exercise jurisdiction, despite the agreement of the parties to invest ICSID 
with jurisdiction over the dispute, solely on the basis of the doctrine of comity.
At a subsequent stage of the proceedings, after the Court of Cassation had issued its 
decision (refusing to enforce a previous ICC award rendered between the same parties, 
by reason of lack of jurisdiction), Egypt argued that the ICSID tribunal should also 
decline jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the French Court decision. In response, 
the tribunal stated that it could not construe that decision as a bar against its exercise of 
jurisdiction since that would be inconsistent with the ICSID Convention, which 
provides that the tribunal should be the ultimate judge of its own competence.325 
However it conceded that "it should give due consideration to the pronouncements of 
other courts and tribunals which involve the same parties and subject matter as the 
present dispute" (emphasis added). In any event, the tribunal did not find the merits 
of the decision of the French Court of Cassation to be inconsistent with its assumption 
of jurisdiction over the case.
While the need to accord due consideration to the domestic court decision has not been 
explained by the tribunal, it would seem that the same comity rationale that supported 
the decision in the first jurisdictional phase also supported the decision reached in the 
second stage of the proceedings. In fact, the purpose of staying the proceedings was to 
enable the tribunal to consider the position of the domestic court after it had been 
rendered. Hence, the two decisions seem to be compatible with each other.
323 Southern Pacific, 3 ICSID Rep. at 129.
324 Southern Pacific, id. at 129. C f Chorzow Factory, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 30.
325 ICSID Convention, art. 41(1).
326 Southern Pacific, 3 ICSID Rep. at 144. C f Amco Asia, 1 ICSID Rep. at 460 (“ ... the judgment o f a 
national court can be accepted as one o f the many factors which have to be considered by the arbitral 
tribunal”).
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Although the Pyramids case has dealt with competition between international and 
domestic tribunals, the ICSID tribunal has adopted a general line of reasoning -  alluding 
to the need to preserve the international legal order, which would seem to apply, a 
fortiori, in cases involving jurisdictional conflicts between international judicial bodies. 
Further, the legal ground on which the tribunal has based the application of the doctrine 
of comity -  the inherent powers of a judicial body, could enable other courts and 
tribunals, at least those entrusted with some discretion on the manner and timetable in 
which proceedings are to be conducted, to adopt the same doctrine. At the same 
time, it is questionable whether courts and tribunals operating under strict procedures 
and deadlines such as the panels of the WTO DSB could exercise comity in a similar 
manner, since they appear to lack sufficient discretion to stay proceedings.329
I ll  Exercise o f comity by other international courts and tribunals 
One can find evidence of implicit application of comity considerations in other 
decisions of international bodies as well. In the Melchers case,330 the EHR Comm’n 
held that the law applied by EC institutions contains sufficient human rights protections, 
and that as a result, the exercise of powers by the EC Commission, which is checked by 
the ECJ, is shielded from review by the Strasbourg bodies. This vote of confidence as to 
the ability of the EC to protect human rights can be considered an exercise of comity by 
the Commission towards the ECJ (especially since it is questionable whether the 
conditions for regarding the ECJ judgment as res judicata have been met).
In fact, every instance in which one court or tribunal relies on the decisions of other 
judicial or quasi-judicial bodies can be regarded as a grant of ‘due consideration’ to 
such decisions, and therefore extension of some degree of comity. However, in contrast 
to these pro-comity precedents, a request for declining jurisdiction out of comity has 
been implicitly rejected by the I/A CHR in the recent Right to Consular Assistance case, 
where it was held that the legitimate interest of the states participating in the American 
human rights system to seek guidance from the Court justifies exercise of the latter’s
327 See e.g., Rules o f the Court o f  Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE, 1 Feb. 1997, art. 27(7); 
Statute o f the International Tribunal for the Law o f  the Sea, art. 27, Annex VI, UNCLOS; ECJ Rules o f  
Procedure, supra note 175, Rule 31.
328 Cf. the inherent powers o f  tribunals to apply the doctrine o f  non-justiciability. Vera Gowlland-Debbas 
“The Relationship between the International Court o f Justice and the Security Council in the Light o f  the 
Lockerbie Case” 88 A.J.I.L. (1994) 643, 649; Robert Y. Jennings “The International Court o f Justice and 
the Judicial Settlement o f Disputes” 1 Collected Writings (1974)(1998 reprint) 433,438-39.
329 Under the procedure applied by the WTO DSU and NAFTA, arbitral panels must deliver judgments 
within a fixed period o f time. DSU, art. 12.8-12.9, 20.1; NAFTA, art. 2016(2), 2017(1).
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discretionary advisory powers notwithstanding the pendency of proceedings on the 
same question (albeit between different parties) before the ICJ.
In sum, greater exercise of comity by international courts and tribunals might mitigate 
or, at times, even resolve problems of competing jurisdictions. If parallel proceedings 
are already pending, courts and tribunals should be allowed to stay proceedings, and 
where exercise of jurisdiction is discretionary - perhaps even decline jurisdiction, in 
deference to the first-seized or more appropriate jurisdiction (assuming that the most 
appropriate jurisdiction can be identified). In cases where a judgment had been rendered 
by another judicial body, international courts and tribunals should, even if unable to 
apply the res judicata rule (for example, if the conditions - identity of parties and issues, 
are not fully met), give due consideration to first-in-time decision, with a view of 
upholding it, unless faced with strong arguments to the contrary. In all of these 
circumstances, exercise of comity seems to be a desirable course to take, which 
adequately balances between the need for consistency and coherence on the one hand, 
and the duty of international courts and tribunals to exercise their powers in an equitable 
and independent manner, on the other hand. However, desirable as it is, there does 
not seem to be sufficient authority under contemporary international law to require 
international courts and tribunals to employ the doctrine.
C. Conflicting treaty obligations
Another approach to the question of conflicting jurisdictions is to analyse the 
phenomenon in accordance with the law of treaties, as specified in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.334 While the Vienna Convention only regulates 
inter-state treaties, its principal rules are considered also to apply in circumstances 
involving non-state parties. Under the proposed legal edifice, acceptance of a forum’s
330 Melchers, 1990 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 138.
331 Consular Assistance, supra note 197, at par. 54-64.
332 There is clear precedent under domestic law for such an approach. See e.g., D allal [1986] 1 Q.B. at 
455-56,461-62; Ramsey, supra note 309, at 900.
333 Jonathan Chamey "The Impact on the International Legal System o f the Growth o f  International 
Courts and Tribunals" 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 697, 707; Meron, Norm Making, supra note 65, 
at 775.
334 Rosenne, II ICJ Law and Practice, supra note 84, at 531. But see, Meron, Norm Making, supra note 
65, at 758.
335 Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties between States and International Organisations or Between 
International Organisations, 21 March 1986, 25 I.L.M. (1986) 543. The provisions o f  1986 Convention 
were based on the 1969 Vienna Convention. Catherine Brolmann “The 1986 Vienna Convention on the 
Law o f  Treaties: The History o f  Draft Article 36bis” Essays on the Law o f  Treaties (Jan Klabbers and 
Rene Lefeber eds. 1998) 121, 122-23.
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jurisdiction by state or non-state actors should be treated as any other treaty obligation, 
and jurisdictional conflicts - as any other conflicting treaty obligations.
But, before reconciling inconsistent treaty provisions, one must first assert that a 
genuine conflict exists. This will be possible only after all interpretative attempts to 
construe the two or more separate treaty obligations as compatible with each other had 
failed.336
Hence, to the extent that competing jurisdiction-regulating provisions specifically 
address the relations between them, the question of conflict does not arise and the 
express treaty language would prevail.337 This is for example the case where an 
instrument providing for residual jurisdiction 'competes' with an exclusive jurisdiction 
clause, and where competition involves an instrument contains a ‘saving clause’ 
preserving the authority of pre-existing arrangements or an ‘overriding clause’ 
granting preferential status to obligations undertaken thereby.
Similarly, where invocation of one provision does not necessarily imply a breach of the 
other jurisdictional provisions, there is no genuine conflict. This is for instance the case 
when two non-exclusive and non-residual jurisdictional provisions compete. Since 
resort of the parties to non-exclusive arrangements is always discretionary, a choice of 
one particular procedure does not violate the text or spirit of the other non-exclusive 
arrangement. However, in circumstances where non-flexible and flexible jurisdictional 
provisions compete (e.g., exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses), the 
invocation of the non-flexible jurisdictional regime would not necessitate a breach of 
the flexible one, whereas the invocation of the flexible jurisdiction might be inconsistent 
with the non-flexible treaty obligation. In these circumstances, the requirement of 
reconciling treaty obligations would seem to justify granting preference to the first and 
more exacting arrangement.
336 Vienna Convention, art. 3 l(3)(c)(Treaty interpretation shall take into account “any relevant rules o f  
international law applicable in the relations between the parties”); Sands, Treaty, Custom and 
Cross-Fertilization, supra note 179, at 87. This proposition is supported by the travauxpreparatoires o f  
the Vienna Convention. United Nations Conference on the Law o f  Treaties, Official Records, 2nd Sess., 
13th Plenary mtg., 6 May 1969 (1970) p. 56 [statement by Mr. Kearney (U.S.)].
337 Vienna Convention, art. 30(2). See Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2000) 174-77; 
Arthur Watts, The International Law Commission 1949-1998 (1999) 675-76.
338 See e.g., EC Treaty, art. 307 (ex-article 234).
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In cases where true conflicts arise,340 one should try to accommodate them utilising 
traditional rules for settling normative conflicts. The most important of these can be 
found in article 30(3) of the Vienna Convention which provides that where different 
treaties to which the same two or more states are parties contain incompatible 
provisions, the provisions of the treaty concluded later in time shall prevail in the 
relations between these state parties. In other words, where two or more inconsistent 
treaty obligations, containing jurisdiction-regulating clauses, are in force between the 
same parties, the clause that came later into effect in the legal relations between the 
parties should, as a rule, govern.341 This means, for example, that an ad hoc compromis 
to refer a specific dispute after it had arisen to a certain judicial body will generally 
overcome any other earlier-in- time general jurisdiction provision.342 Indeed, the PCIJ in 
the Mawommatis case has reached the conclusion that a specific jurisdiction-conferring 
instrument should override an earlier in time general jurisdiction-conferring 
instrument.343 However, it can also be maintained that unless the language of the later 
instruments suggests otherwise, the parties have intended to create only concurrent 
jurisdictions and that the exclusivity of the later-in time arrangement should not be 
necessarily presumed.344 Thus, it is not clear whether the conclusion of a new 
compromis creates an irreconcilable conflict with a pre-existing jurisdictional regime.
It should also be noted that it is not clear whether article 30(3) intended to negate the 
application of the traditional lex specialis rule,345 in all cases where the specific
339 Article 103 o f the UN Charter, which gives an overriding force to obligations under the Charter, is a 
provision o f  this type. However, it has no bearing upon the jurisdiction o f  the ICJ.
340 C f  the Supreme Court o f  the U.S. has defined a true jurisdictional conflict in very narrow terms so as 
to exclude situations where an act prohibited by one jurisdiction is not compelled by the other. Hartford 
Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993).
341 For example, in the Lockerbie cases, Libya had argued that the Montreal Convention dispute 
settlement provisions are lex specialis and lex posterior with relation to the dispute settlement provisions 
found in the UN Charter. Questions o f  Interpretation and Application o f  the 1971 Montreal Convention 
arising from  the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.) 1998 I.C.J. 9, 18 (Jurisdiction); Questions o f  
Interpretation and Application o f  the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from  the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.) 1998 I.C.J. 115, 123 (Jurisdiction).
342 C f  Rosenne, I ICJ Law and Practice, supra note 84, at 156. For support, see Southern Pacific, 3 
ICSID Rep. at 149-50; Schreuer, supra note 40, at 170.
343 Mavrommatis, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser A) No. 2, at 32. Cf. International Law Commission, Summary 
Records o f  the 421st Meeting [1957] Y.B. Int. L. Comm. 191(statement by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice)(“... if  
two States which were bound by their acceptance o f  the optional clause in the Statute o f  the International 
Court o f  Justice had concluded a special treaty stipulating that disputes on the specific matters dealt with 
in that treaty should be referred to arbitration, it might well be that the latter jurisdiction would prevail”).
344 Klockner v. Cameroon, 2 ICSID Rep. at 13-14, 17-18, 68-70. See also Chorzow Factory, 1927 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No. 8. at 30.
345 Sinclair believes that the failure o f  the Vienna Convention to address this issue should not be 
construed as the abolition o f  the lex specialis rule, which remains “widely supported in doctrine” and can 
be applied as a rule o f interpretation. Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties (2nd ed. 
1984) 96-98.
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jurisdiction clause was concluded before the more general one. However, a reasonable 
reading of the Vienna Convention would suggest that unless intent to preserve the 
validity of the specific and earlier undertaking had been shown, the latter in time 
provision would prevail.346
Nevertheless, it is submitted that law of treaties norms regulating conflicting 
jurisdictional provisions are of limited value to the present study. True conflicts can be 
identified in two principal situations -  when two exclusive jurisdiction clauses compete 
(positive conflict) or when two residual jurisdiction clauses compete (negative conflict). 
But given the scarcity of exclusive and residual jurisdiction arrangements, the number 
of situations in which a conflict between two such arrangements will take place is bound 
to be very limited.347 In almost all other cases, the application of conventional 
provisions could arguably be reconciled with each other. To these jurisdictional 
interactions the Vienna Convention offers little guidance and the parties may, in effect, 
choose which jurisdiction to invoke (with the aforementioned exception of situations 
where the parties must prefer an inflexible jurisdictional clause over a flexible one).
As to the question of multiple proceedings, again, the paucity of treaty language on the 
subject renders the text of the Vienna Convention largely irrelevant. However, it can 
probably be contended that invocation of a jurisdictional clause in the face of a 
co-existing or previous set of proceedings should be regarded as a case of exercise of a 
treaty right in bad faith, in breach of article 26 of the Convention.
3. Interim conclusions
What can one learn from the range of legal principles explored in this Chapter on the 
norms that presently govern jurisdictional competition between different international 
courts and tribunals? The answer to this question can best be presented if one were to 
divide it into three parts, addressing separately choice of forum, parallel proceedings 
and successive litigation.
Choice o f forum
346 This is supported by the travaux preparatoires o f  the Convention. UN Law o f  Treaties Conf, Off. Rec., 
supra note 336, at 253 (1970)[statement made in 91st mtg. o f  the Committee o f  the Whole, 16 April 1969
- by Mr. Yasseen (Chairman o f the Drafting Committee)]. See also McNair, supra note 298, at 218. But 
see, Aust, supra note 337, at 183.
347 Even then, specific ‘saving clauses’, might defuse the conflict and sustain jurisdictional concurrency.
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I . . .
[I
[
I There has not been so far any consistent practice that substantiates a general principle of
law restricting choice of forum by parties to an international dispute in a meaningful 
manner. This proposition is confirmed both by the practice of the PCIJ, which has been 
reluctant to decline jurisdiction unless clear manifestation of an intent to invest 
exclusive jurisdiction with another forum had been shown, and by the absence of a 
general principle of law that can be derived from municipal law, supporting such a 
restrictive effect (as is demonstrated by the widespread resort to forum shopping under 
domestic law). Further, given the legitimacy of forum selection as a manifestation of 
party autonomy, limitations on the power to choose cannot be derived from general 
notions of abuse of right (or good faith) nor comity, since both principles permit 
reliance upon legitimate considerations.
However, there could be certain situations where a specific exercise of choice of forum 
could be deemed illegal. This is arguably the case where proceedings had been initiated 
in breach of a valid jurisdictional arrangement (e.g., one investing exclusive competence 
with a different judicial body). In these circumstances, the act in question would be 
precluded both by the law of treaties and by the international theory of abuse of rights.
As a result, the improperly seized court or tribunal should decline jurisdiction over the
• • •dispute, an outcome supported by general policy considerations of legal certainty and
promoting the goals of the exclusively designated forum.
Similarly, some extremely burdensome litigation tactics, which do not serve a legitimate 
purpose, can be deemed abusive and thus proscribed. However, there is no known 
precedent under international law for finding a specific act of forum shopping to fall 
under this category, and it is quite hard to imagine a case where this ground will be 
applied (except perhaps in the context of multiple proceedings).
Parallel proceedings
The question of parallel proceedings does seem to be regulated only to some extent by 
current international law and there is no sufficient judicial practice to warrant definitive 
conclusions. While judicial bodies, including the ICJ, have not ruled out the existence of 
a lispendens rule, one ICSID tribunal has explicitly rejected this possibility (although it 
did apply a rule of comity instead).
348 Alexandrov, supra note 59, at 104-05.
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However, the assertion that one can find some recognition of the lis alibi pendens rule 
in every domestic law does appear plausible. As a result, this rule may probably qualify 
as a general principle of law. Further, it would also seem that in the absence of strong 
legitimate interests which would justify the invocation of parallel proceedings, such 
conduct might be characterised as an abuse of right and thus prohibited by general 
international law.
Finally, it has been suggested that a principle of inter-institutional comity might be 
emerging, as demonstrated in the practice of several international courts and tribunals. 
The adoption of such a principle in the future might encourage courts and tribunals in 
parallel proceedings situations to use their discretion in order to stay, or even refuse 
jurisdiction in the face of proceedings already invoked before a competing forum.
Successive proceedings
The last, and perhaps most detailed-regulated interaction between proceedings before 
different international courts and tribunals can be found in situations of successive 
proceedings. Here, there is clear case law that suggests that international law recognises 
a binding rule of res judicata precluding the re-litigation of settled disputes. The same 
conclusion may also be supported through application of the abuse of right theory 
(re-litigation serves no legitimate interest and is, at the same time, excessively 
burdensome for the unwilling respondent).
Even where the strict conditions for application of the res judicata rule (same parties, 
same issues) had not met, the principle of comity might, and arguably should, justify 
giving due consideration to the reasoning employed by the first in time jurisdiction, 
with a view of promoting the harmonisation of international law. This might create in 
effect a presumption in favour of issue-estoppel and stare decisis, which may be 
rebutted only upon a showing of strong reasons of justice.
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Chapter Seven: 
Possibilities for future improvement
The last Chapter of the study will concisely survey possible solutions to some of the 
problems that might arise out of jurisdictional competition, in light of the findings 
reached so far on the nature of international law, in general, and the international 
judiciary, in particular. Some of these ideas are modest reforms, which can be 
introduced with relative ease, whereas others challenge the very foundations of 
international law, as we know it. For the sake of brevity, the discussion below will 
mainly concentrate on examining the more ‘realistic’ proposed measures, towards the 
realisation of which this dissertation hopes to contribute, and will only cursorily 
mention more ‘utopian’ alternatives, which will most probably not be executed in the 
foreseeable future.
1. Structural reform
As was already elaborated at some length, international courts and tribunals do not 
constitute at present a real judicial system (i.e., a structured or organised institutional 
order). Consequently, the level of co-ordination and harmonisation found between the 
various existing judicial bodies is minimal and it is conceivable that different courts and 
tribunals might render inconsistent decisions, even in the context of a single dispute.
This state of things might create incentives for parties to exploit jurisdictional 
competition - to engage in abusive forum shopping, to initiate multiple proceedings and 
to try and challenge final judgements. It is submitted that better inter-judicial structures, 
aimed at improving co-ordination and harmonisation between competing fora, will 
remove a principal impetus for exploiting jurisdictional concurrency, which now occurs 
with increased frequency. Arguably, if parties to a dispute will expect that a more or 
less similar outcome would to be reached in all amenable jurisdictions, they will be less 
keen on forum shopping and more inclined to litigate all claims arising out of a single 
international dispute before one forum only.
A. Jurisdictional re-organisation
Structural reforms should thus aim to re-organise the correlative jurisdictional links in 
place between different judicial bodies, with the view of improving their coherence. 
Theoretically speaking, one such possible reform could have been undertaken through 
the introduction of international legislation seeking to redefine the existing jurisdictional
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ambits of judicial bodies, in order to minimise conflicts (e.g., through a general treaty 
according preference to specific or regional jurisdictions over general ones), which will 
be complemented through the enumeration of'conflict of jurisdictions' rules.
An even more ambitious scheme would have created a universal appellate court, similar 
to a national supreme court, and invest it with mandatory jurisdiction.349 Clearly, by 
channelling appeals from different jurisdictions into one central entity, greater 
uniformity could be introduced into the law. The ICJ would obviously be a leading 
candidate to serve as such a global supreme court. This is because it is placed in a 
unique position as the only permanent court of universal and general subject matter 
jurisdiction, and the principal judicial organ of the UN - the leading international 
organisation.350 Further, a claim to the potentially superior status of the ICJ could also 
be supported on the basis of the quality of the Court’s work, its widely representative 
composition,351 its longevity and the de facto acceptance of the Court’s seniority by 
some of its counterpart institutions and by many jurists. However, clearly, the rules 
of procedure of the ICJ, most importantly - its rules of standing, will have to be 
radically changed for it to assume the responsibilities of a truly supreme court.353 
Another dramatic change will be needed in the pace in which the ICJ handles its 
caseload, in order to accommodate new adjudicative business.354
A more modest proposal would invest the ICJ with mandatory universal jurisdiction to 
arbitrate jurisdictional disputes over which competent jurisdiction should hear the merits
349 See e.g., Jennings, The ICJ and Judicial Settlement, supra note 328, at 437. Jennings proposed to 
invest the ICJ with powers to examine appeals on questions o f  law arising from proceedings before 
non-binding procedures, along the lines o f the relations that had existed between the ECHR and the EHR 
Comm’n. He also suggested to channel first instance ICJ cases to Chambers and to authorise the plenary 
Court to sit in appeal over these decisions.
350 Legality o f  Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 345 (Dissenting Opinion o f  Judges Weeramentry)(ICJ is 
at the apex o f international tribunals); Robert Y. Jennings “The Proliferation o f  Adjudicatory Bodies: 
Dangers and Possible Answers” 9 A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1995) 2, 6.
351 However, there is at least one tribunal -  ITLOS, which is even more representative than the ICJ.
352 President o f  the World Court Warns o f  ‘Overlapping Jurisdictions ’ in Proliferation o f  International 
Judicial Bodies, UN Press Release GA/L/3157, 27 Oct. 2000, available at <http://www. pict-pcti.org/ 
news/archive/months2000/october/ICJ.10.27.prolif.html> (last visited on 15 Nov. 2000) (“[the ICJ is] the 
only court with a universal general jurisdiction, and in addition, its age endowed it with special 
authority”); Georges Abi-Saab “Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks” 31 N.Y.U.J. 
Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 919, 929; Rosenne, 3 ICJ Law and Practice, supra note 84, at 1609; Jonathan 
Chamey “Third Party Dispute Settlement and International Law” 36 Colum. J. Transnat. L. 65, 73; 
Shigeru Oda “The International Court o f Justice from the Bench” 244(VII) Recueil des cours (1993) 9, 
145.
353 See e.g., Emst-Ulrich Petersmann “Constitutionalism and International Adjudication: How to 
Constitutionalize the U.N. Dispute Settlement System?” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 753, 787.
354 Jonathan I. Chamey “The Implications o f Expanding International Dispute Settlement Systems: The 
1982 Convention on the Law o f the Sea” 90 A.J.I.L. (1996) 69, 74.
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of a specific dispute. This would put the ICJ in a position similar to that enjoyed by the 
ECJ in relation to disputes arising under the Brussels and Lugano Jurisdiction and 
Judgements Conventions as to which national court should hear a cross-boundary 
dispute.355 Such allocation of jurisdiction powers would arguably improve 
inter-jurisdictional co-ordination and provide practical solutions to many cases of 
inter-fora competition.
The main shortcoming of all these alternatives is that their realisation requires a radical 
change of the present state of international law, which can only be achieved through the 
conclusion of a new international treaty or even a number thereof. At present, the 
prospects of such international legislation are very slim. It is unlikely that states 
would be willing to reopen delicate and laborious agreements on the scope and nature of 
the jurisdiction granted to dispute settlement bodies, nor accept the empowerment of the 
ICJ to hear many cases, which many states have excluded from its compulsory 
jurisdiction for a good reason.
The unhappy fate of the ILC Model Draft on Arbitral Procedure,357 which merely 
sought to strengthen the binding nature of arbitration clauses and introduce limited 
judicial supervision over the arbitral process, is illuminating. The failure of states to 
agree even upon such a modest reform suggests that states might be reluctant to improve 
adjudication mechanisms to the extent that such reform is perceived to hamper their 
freedom of procedural manoeuvring during the dispute resolution process358 and to
i  c q
unduly commit them to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Although nearly half a 
century has passed since then, the still modest rate of acceptance of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of courts and tribunals invested with general jurisdiction (e.g., ICJ and the 
CSCE/OSCE Court of Arbitration), as opposed to the wide acceptance of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of judicial bodies linked to a specific regime (where
355 Protocol on the Interpretation by the Court o f Justice o f  the Convention o f  27 September 1968 on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement o f  Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, 3 June 1971, art. 1, 
1975 O.J. (L204) 28.
356 IC J President Warns o f  Overlapping Jurisdictions, supra note 352 (states do not seem to have the will 
to invest the ICJ with appellate or review jurisdiction); Chamey, 3rd Party Dispute Settlement, supra note 
352, at 71, 74.
357 Model Draft on Arbitral Procedure, U.N. Doc. A/3859, 1958 (II) Y.B. Int. L. Comm. 80-88.
358 Chamey, 3rd Party Dispute Settlement, supra note 352, at 70; Stephen M. Schwebel “The Prospects 
for International Arbitration: Inter-State Disputes” Justice in International Law  (1994) 223,226-27.
359 Schwebel, Prospects for Int’l Arbitration, supra note 358, at 227.
360 Only some 60 o f the 190 parties to the ICJ Statute have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction o f  the 
ICJ. Only 5 out o f 29 state parties have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction o f  the CSCE/OSCE Court in 
arbitration cases.
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compulsory adjudication is deemed an indispensable part of the regime), suggests that 
these policy trends are still in place.
Further, international legislation is an expensive and time-consuming process. It is 
improbable that states would be willing to enter into difficult questions such as the 
relations between various international courts and tribunals (and, as a result, into the 
relations between different international sub-systems) and the reallocation of dispute 
settlement competencies, unless the current situation is perceived to be intolerable. 
Arguably, since no major jurisdictional clash has occurred to date, the international 
community still tolerates jurisdiction competition, by and large.
B. Expansion of the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ
Hence, less dramatic measures need to be explored. Some of the more feasible potential 
reforms, which have been the subject of considerable debate, have sought to augment 
the coordinative and harmonising role of the ICJ, in recognition of its unique position 
under international law, while preserving sufficient procedural flexibility for potential 
litigants.
One possibility contemplated of recent has been to introduce an amendment in the ICJ 
Statute and to open it to litigation involving IGOs as parties to contentious 
consent-based cases, and to increase thereby the Court’s docket and sphere of 
influence.361 Another proposal has been to expand the Court’s advisory jurisdiction so 
as to enable other international courts and tribunals to access it and receive legal
• • ^ AOguidance in the form of advisory opinions. This idea was recently reintroduced by the
361 Two recent proposals, submitted by Guatemala and Costa Rica to the U N  Special Committee on the 
Charter o f  the United Nations, sought to open the jurisdiction o f  the Court to public IGO. Report o f  the 
Special Committee on the Charter o f  the United Nations and on the Strengthening o f  the Role o f  the 
Organization, 52 GAOR Sup. 33, para. 101-116, U.N. Doc. A/52/33 (1997).
362 See e.g., V UNCLOS- Off. Rec., supra note 75, at 38 [summary record o f  statement made Mr. Driss 
(Tunisia)](the new ITLOS should be able to request advisory opinions from the ICJ). Similarly, on a few 
occasions it was offered to allow other international actors to request such opinions with respect o f  some 
or all issues o f  international law. The actors so identified had been:
a) national courts - Pierre-Marie Dupuy “The Danger o f  the Fragmentation or Unification o f  the 
International Legal System and the International Court o f Justice” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 791, 
800-01; Jennings, The ICJ and Judicial Settlement, supra note 328, at 447-48; Jennings, New Look at 
Adjudication, supra note 77, at 464; Petersmann, Constitutionalism and Int’l Adjudication, supra note 
353, at 787; Schwebel, Relations Between the ICJ and the UN, supra note 238, at 18-19; Ignaz 
Seidl-Hohenveldem “Access o f  International Organizations to the International Court o f Justice”, in ICJ 
Future Role After 50 Years, supra note 239, at 189-203; Louis B. Sohn “Broadening the Advisory 
Jurisdiction o f the International Court o f Justice” 77 A.J.I.L. (1983) 124, 126-29; b) the 
Secretary-General o f the UN - Gilbert Guillaume “The Future o f  International Judicial Institutions” 44 
I.C.L.Q. (1995) 848, 853; Stephen M. Schwebel “Authorizing the Secretary-General o f  the UN to 
Request Advisory Opinions o f  the ICJ” Justice in International Law  (1994) 72, 82; and c) individuals -
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outgoing President of the ICJ, Stephen Schwebel in a speech before the UN General 
Assembly.363 It was proposed that such requests may take the form of an appeal (as is 
the case with the ILO Administrative Tribunal) or that of a reference for preliminary 
ruling [along the model of article 234 (ex-article 177) of the EC Treaty].364
Allegedly, this last proposed reform would enable the ICJ to influence substantive 
decisions of other judicial fora and to promote greater harmonisation between the 
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. Moreover, this reform seems to be 
relatively practicable because it necessitates only minor changes in existing law. In 
order for it to materialise, the UN General Assembly should directly authorise the 
concerned judicial bodies to request advisory opinions, or create and authorise a new 
special UN committee to review requests for advisory opinions and forward them, when 
deemed necessary, to the Court.365 In fact, it could be argued that even at present, UN 
judicial bodies such as the two ad hoc Criminal Tribunals could request advisory 
opinions through the Security Council. However, there might be courts and tribunals 
whose statutes, or at least, rules of procedure, will need to be amended in order to 
facilitate referral of requests for advisory opinion to another judicial body. At least with 
regard to ‘self-contained’ judicial bodies such as the ECJ, which might be reluctant to 
give up their independence in favour of review by an outside judicial body, a change of 
their constitutive instruments along these proposed lines seems unrealistic.
Attractive as those proposals may be seen on a theoretical level, it is quite unlikely that 
they will be embraced anywhere in the near future.367 One of the reasons for the recent
Mark W. Janis “Individuals and the International Court” in ICJ Future Role After 50 Years, supra note 
239, at 205, 210-15.
363 Stephen M. Schwebel, Address to the Plenary Session o f  the General Assembly o f  the UN, 26 Oct. 
1999 available at < http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/SPEECHES/iSpeechPresidentGA54 
_19991026.htm >(last visited on 1 Oct. 2000). See also Dupuy, supra note 362, at 800; Guillaume, supra 
note 362, at 862; Jennings, Proliferation o f  Adjudicatory Bodies, supra note 350, at 7.
364 Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 352, at 928. A similar idea was raised by the 
German delegate to UNCLOS who proposed to enable ad  hoc arbitral tribunals operating under Chapter 
XV o f  the Convention to request advisory opinions on questions o f  law from either the ICJ or ITLOS. V 
UNCLOS- Off. Rec., supra note 75, at 12. Aji echo to this idea is found in article 188(2)(b)-(c) which 
permits arbitration tribunals established under Chapter XI o f UNCLOS to request interpretative rulings 
from the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber.
365 Schwebel, Address to the Plenary Session, supra note 363, at para. 19.
A similar arrangement was proposed with relation to the stillborn ITO. Charter for an International Trade 
Organisation, art. 96, United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment - Final A ct and Related  
Documents, 24 March 1948, U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4 (1948).
366 See Draft EEA Agreement, supra note 10, at 6100-05. C f  Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Communities 
to the Convention fo r the Protection o f  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1759 
(holding that the Community does not have competence to accede to the European Human Rights 
Convention).
367 Treves, Recent Trends, supra note 16, at 435.
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proliferation of international courts and tribunals has been the perception that the ICJ is 
ill equipped to address certain categories of disputes and that it is an inhospitable forum 
to some states. Reintroducing the ICJ as a mandatory global jurisdiction in the backdoor 
will therefore raise numerous objections. Furthermore, the anachronistic procedure 
employed by the ICJ makes it inaccessible to important international actors (IGOs and 
private parties) and not a very attractive option in terms of time and cost-efficiency even 
for states subject to its jurisdiction. Finally, the introduction of another onerous 
procedural stage, to what is already considered as an excessively long process, would 
further prolong the duration of international adjudication and might turn it into a wholly 
unattractive avenue. These stark observations are particularly timely given the manifest 
inability of the ICJ to keep up even with its current docket (i.e., the rate of submission
o/'O
of cases to the Court exceeds the rate of judgements). In these circumstances, the
proposal to open up the doors of the Court to a flood of additional cases seems to be 
both impractical and unwise.369
C. The desirability of creating new courts and tribunals
Another structural issue, which ought to be briefly addressed, is the effect of the 
problem of competing jurisdictions on the inclination of the international community to 
create new courts and tribunals. As already observed, little attention has been given 
until now to this potential systematic problem. However, this study has shown that the 
current situation, while advantageous in some aspects, might also generate increasingly 
dangerous inter-jurisdictional tensions with the potential of fragmentising international 
law and undermining its credibility. Hence, the utility of creating more courts and 
tribunals should be carefully balanced against the disruptive systematic effect generated 
thereby. Even where the factors supporting the creation of a new procedure outweigh 
these amassed against it (after considering, inter alia, the alternative of referring 
disputes to a pre-existing forum),371 the drafters of the constitutive instruments of new 
bodies should seek to introduce into these texts jurisdiction-regulating provisions 
designed primarily to prevent multiple adjudication of the same dispute and intended to 
improve, as far as possible, inter-fora co-ordination and harmonisation.
368 Chamey, Implications o f  Expanding Int’l Dispute Settlement, supra note 354, at 74.
369 See Hugh Thirlway “Comment” 9 A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1995) 47, 48.
370 ICJ President Warm o f  Overlapping Jurisdictions, supra note 352; Schwebel, Address to the Plenary 
Session, supra note 363, at para. 20. Indeed, the decision not to create the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber as 
an independent tribunal, but rather to incorporate it in ITLOS, was influenced to some degree by the 
desire to save expenses and to reduce the proliferation o f jurisdictions, with all o f  the entailed 
complexities. V UNCLOS- Off. Rec., supra note 75, at 12.
371 See e.g., Jennings, The ICJ and Judicial Settlement, supra note 328, at 438.
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2. Increased judicial co-operation
Given the vast difficulties in introducing structural reform, a first and perhaps more 
realistic step in addressing the problems arising out of the multiplication of international 
courts and tribunals is to increase the existing level of co-operation between the various 
judicial bodies. Such improvement can take various forms. However, all possible 
methods should aim to encourage increased jurisprudential consistency and strive to 
contribute towards the development of a more coherent 'community of law'. As 
already observed, greater similitude between the prospective decisions of different fora 
(especially in relation to issues that might influence the parties’ choice of forum - e.g., 
scope of state responsibility, binding nature of interim measures, etc.) would remove a 
major incentive for abusive forum shopping, pursuing parallel proceedings and 
challenging final decisions.373
A. Exercise of comity
There are several practical ways through which judicial co-operation and co-ordination 
may be enhanced. One major avenue is for international courts and tribunals to exercise 
comity towards each other. This would mean that international judicial bodies would 
generally defer to pre-existing judicial pronouncements of other international courts and 
tribunals, on disputes pending before the seized forum, unless overriding considerations 
mandate otherwise.374 Thus, adjudicating a case which is pending or already had been 
decided by another international forum, might be viewed as inconsistent with judicial 
propriety,375 even if the strict conditions for the application of the I is alibi pendens and 
res judicata rules have not been met. The same rationale may also warrant procedural 
decisions designed to facilitate such cross-fertilisation (e.g., stay of proceedings until
'•inf.
the concurrent jurisdiction has produced a decision). Discretionary decline of 
jurisdiction should, however, be exercised only when it is obvious that no serious 
injustice has been inflicted upon the parties to litigation (i.e., that they have no 
legitimate interest in multiple proceedings).
372 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986) 243-44.
373 See e.g., Heifer, supra note 27, at 308.
374 See Southern Pacific, 3 ICSID Rep. at 144. Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 352, at 
929.
375 Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 328, at 652. See also Northern Cameroons, 1963 I.C.J. at 29 (“There are 
inherent limitations on the exercise o f  the judicial function which the Court, as a court o f  justice, can 
never ignore”). It is at least arguable that abusive and unjust litigation tactics may fall within these 
‘Inherent limitations’ by which ‘courts o f justice’ are bound.
376 See Southern Pacific, 3 ICSID at 129.
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This notion of collegiate respect can operate not only in the context of a single dispute 
or related questions, but it may also warrant due amount of deference towards the 
jurisprudence developed by judicial bodies in their area of specialty, or under general 
international law, whenever a similar legal issue is brought to litigation before another 
forum (i.e., a relative stare decisis rule). Being a rule of discretion, which can be 
deemed inherent to the proper function of judicial bodies, it can be argued that rule of 
comity could be developed by international courts and tribunals even at present, without 
any formal act of international legislation.
The combination of the exercise of comity with the application of the established 
jurisdiction-regulating rules of I is alibi pendens and res judicata (in cases which meet 
identity of parties and issues requirements) would resolve many of the problems 
associated with overlapping jurisdictions. It would also probably result in more 
consistent decisions, thus taking away many of the incentives for engaging in 
inappropriate litigation tactics.
It must however be realised that the introduction of comity would only improve 
inter-judicial harmonisation, if courts and tribunals with the potential ability to provide 
judicial guidance to their counterparts must construe their role accordingly. Hence, for 
example, the ICJ should perhaps put greater focus on clarifying the legal standards 
applicable in the cases presented before it, even at the expense of accommodating the 
peculiar interests of the immediate parties to the dispute at hand. The tendency of the 
Court in recent years to concentrate on satisfying the needs of the parties before it has 
resulted, according to one notable scholar, in the ‘arbitralisation ’ of international 
adjudication, at the cost of diminishing the traditional law-pronouncing function of the 
judiciary.377 In other words, judicial bodies must live up to their role as de facto 
law-creating agencies in order to serve as effective agents for increased harmonisation 
of international law.
B. Exchange of information
Another, simple, and yet important measure that might improve inter-fora co-ordination 
is for courts and tribunals to engage in regular exchange of information.378 Clearly, only
377 Georges Abi-Saab “The International Court o f Justice as a World Court” Fifty Years o f  the 
International Court o f  Justice (Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice, eds., 1996) 3, 9. See also 
Dupuy, supra note 362, at 806-07.
378 Directorate o f  Human Rights o f  the Council o f  Europe, Effects o f  the Various International Human 
Rights Instruments, supra note 140, at 4; ICJ President Warns o f  Overlapping Jurisdictions, supra note
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awareness to the jurisprudence of competing fora could sustain efforts to seek greater 
judicial harmonisation. The actual transfer of information can be promoted through ad 
hoc mechanisms such as informal meetings between judges and officials from the 
different courts and tribunals, better publicity to the work of the various judicial bodies 
and through academic work aspiring to identify potential discrepancies between the 
decisions of the various judicial bodies.379 It would also be desirable if judges from one 
judicial institution were to be appointed, in due course, to serve in a different
O O A
international court or tribunal. However, such interaction can also be formalised 
through inter-institutional agreements providing for regular or upon-request furnishing 
of information, such as that concluded between the UN and ITLOS.381
3. Better strategic planning on the part o f  states
Another method to mitigate the problems associated with conflicting jurisdiction is for 
states to plan ahead and attempt to improve co-ordination between their various 
procedural obligations to submit to dispute resolution. Besides the previously mentioned 
possibility of introducing treaty provisions to govern jurisdictional competition, states 
may also act unilaterally in the same vein. One such possible course of action has been 
the submission of reservations to instruments of acceptance of jurisdiction, designed to 
create improved jurisdiction-regulating arrangements. Thus, states entering new treaty 
regimes can, with relatively little effort, improve upon the regime’s own jurisdictional 
provisions and insulate themselves from excessively burdensome multiple litigation.
For example, as was noted before, a substantial number of countries have entered 
reservations to the jurisdiction of the HRC under the Optional Protocol, thereby limiting 
their exposure to multiple proceedings.
Additionally, parties to a dispute, acting in unison, can attempt to create rudimentary 
hierarchical structures between international judicial fora. This can be done, for
352 (“Judges must engage in constant inter-judicial dialogue and relations between the courts needed to 
be institutionalized”).
379 Heifer and Slaughter, supra note 317, at 372-73.
380 Meron, Norm Making, supra note 65, at 776; Dean Spielmann “Human Rights case Law in the 
Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts: Conflicts, Inconsistencies and Complementarities” The E U  and 
Human Rights (Philip Alston ed. 1999) 757, 780. There have been some examples o f  this trend: Lord 
McNair had been a judge o f  the ICJ and the ECHR; Prof. George Abi-Saab has served as an ad hoc ICJ 
judge, an ITFY judge and is now a member o f the WTO Appellate Body; Mohamed Shahabuddeen has 
served as an ICJ judge and is now a member o f  the ITFY/ITR Appellate chamber; and Thomas 
Buergenthal has served on the I/A CHR, the HRC and the ICJ.
381 See e.g., Agreement on Cooperation and Relationship Between the United Nations and the 
International Tribunal for the Law o f the Sea, 8 Sept. 1998, G.A. Res. 52/521, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., 
92nd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/521 (1998).
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instance, by way of agreeing in the compromis or the relevant compromissory clause to 
invest a court or tribunal with full-fledged or partial appellate jurisdiction (e.g., appeal 
de novo or power of revision) over decisions of the forum selected to hear the merits of 
the case. Such course of action, which had been taken during the inter-war period with 
respect of some Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, could introduce greater harmonisation 
between the decisions of bodies subject to common judicial controls.
Finally, states and other international actors can also contribute to the promotion of the 
process of cross-fertilisation between international courts and tribunals. Increased 
reliance by parties to international proceedings on decisions rendered by a 
wide-as-possible variety of judicial bodies would minimise the risk that courts and 
tribunals would inadvertently promulgate decisions inconsistent with the earlier case 
law of other fora.
4. Interim conclusions
Although structural reform of the current international judiciary seems to be farfetched, 
particularly from a political point of view, a host of measures could be taken even now 
to improve upon jurisdictional co-ordination and harmonisation and to mitigate some of 
the problems associated with jurisdictional competition.
It has been proposed that international courts and tribunals should adopt the principle of 
comity vis-a-vis each other and pay due consideration to the decisions of their 
counterparts, in general, and in disputes submitted to multiple proceedings, in particular. 
It was also suggested that this principle might justify procedural measures such as stay 
of proceedings in the face of parallel proceedings in order to promote inter-fora 
co-ordination. Another idea was to encourage courts and tribunals to improve their 
formal and informal relations and learn more on each other activities. Finally, it seems 
that states and other international actors may also contribute to greater 
inter-jurisdictional harmony through insistence upon unilateral or common 
jurisdiction-regulating provisions and through consistent reliance on the case law of 
international judicial bodies in litigation before other fora.
382 Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification, supra note 352, at 927-28.
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Conclusions
The sharp increase in the number of international courts and tribunals and the 
coinciding trend towards broader allocation of compulsory jurisdiction, which took 
place in the last decade or so, has brought radical changes in the configuration of the 
world of international dispute settlement. While the increase in the role of international 
courts and tribunals necessarily implies increased resort to adjudication, and as a result, 
greater role for the rule of law in international relations, the uncoordinated creation of 
multiple judicial fora has also generated some potential problems. The present study did 
not profess to ascertain whether the recent developments in the area of international 
dispute settlement have been generally positive or negative,* but rather to examine one 
type of interaction between international courts and tribunals -  coordination between 
their respective jurisdiction, an issue which had recently become of greater practical 
importance
This work has focused upon situations in which the same dispute (i.e., a dispute 
between the same parties and involving the same issues) has become amenable to the 
jurisdiction of more than one international court or tribunal. Such conditions may give 
rise to three principal kinds of jurisdictional interactions -  forum selection (or forum 
shopping), parallel proceedings or successive proceedings. It was the purpose of the 
study to assess the magnitude of the phenomenon, to address its implications, to identify 
the applicable rules of law that may govern it and to propose methods for alleviation of 
some of the problems associated with it.
In the first Part of the work, it was shown that jurisdictional overlaps are possible, 
notwithstanding the absence of a comprehensive obligation to submit to international 
adjudication. Indeed, many courts and tribunals have been invested with concurrent 
jurisdiction over a host of issues and a significant number of parties. Such overlaps have 
been identified, in particular, in the relations between universal judicial bodies invested 
with unlimited subject matter jurisdiction, such as the ICJ, and regional or specialised 
courts and tribunals, such as the human rights or trade liberalisation bodies; in between 
trade liberalisation bodies (e.g., WTO and regional economic integration courts); and in 
between human rights bodies (e.g., the HRC and the regional or specialised human
* For this, see e.g., Tullio Treves “Recent Trends in the Settlement o f  International Disputes” I Bancaja 
Euromediterranean Courses o f International Law (1997) 395, 436.
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rights procedures). It was also demonstrated that in practice there have been several 
dozen instances in which multiple proceedings have actually taken place before more 
than one international judicial or quasi-judicial body. This serves as a strong indication 
of the reality of jurisdictional competition and of the practical justification for the study 
of this phenomenon.
The second Part of the thesis has addressed the merits of mitigating jurisdictional 
competition. It has been shown that although the proliferation of international courts 
and tribunals has positive consequences, the uncoordinated manner in which judicial 
bodies operate might undermine the unity of international law and challenge its 
credibility and legitimacy. Although international courts and tribunals function within a 
single legal system, they do not perform the role of coherence-generating agents, as 
domestic courts generally do, but rather introduce, on occasion, disharmonising tensions 
into international law. These tensions have most serious implication on the perceived 
fairness and effectiveness of the international legal system whenever different courts 
and tribunals reach different outcomes with respect to the same dispute. As a result, it 
has been suggested that, as a matter of desirable policy, international courts and 
tribunals should strive to improve their coordination and harmonisation with each other 
(but take into consideration, at the same time, the requirements of justice).
A survey of the norms applicable within domestic law systems has confirmed the 
conclusion that mitigation of some deleterious aspects of jurisdictional competition 
contributes to the welfare of the legal system. Virtually all systems of law object to 
abusive forum shopping, denounce races to the courthouse, prohibit parallel proceedings 
within the same legal order and recognise the principle of finality of judgments. In fact, 
some of these jurisdictional rules may qualify as general principles of law, incorporated 
into international law under article 38(l)(c) of the ICJ Statute. While less stringent 
standards have been applied to regulate multiple proceedings in cross-boundary 
jurisdictional settings, it has been established that the jurisdictional relations between 
international courts and tribunals, which apply a common body of norms that comprise 
a single normative system, should be influenced to a greater extent by the 
intra-systematic model of interaction. One specific model that could apply in this 
context had been that of the relations between domestic courts and arbitral tribunals, 
which apply the same sets of norms but share only rudimentary institutional links.
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Although jurisdictional competition certainly has considerable systematic implications, 
additional specific policies underlie the adoption of jurisdiction-regulating rules. Thus, 
forum selection (or shopping) could be viewed as a legitimate manifestation of party 
autonomy that contributes to greater utilisation of the judiciary and it is normally 
tolerated by domestic legal systems, both in the intra- and inter-systematic contexts. 
Therefore, it would seem that it ought not be precluded by international law either, 
especially in light of the unique value that international law places on party autonomy 
and on the need to encourage resort to adjudication (unless when it is done in an abusive 
manner). Moreover, the rule favouring the permissibility of forum selection is 
particularly justified if the choice was jointly made by all parties to the dispute. In 
contrast to this, considerations of party convenience and the institutional needs and 
interests of competing courts generally support the introduction of lis alibi pendens  and 
res judicata  rules.
The third Part of the work attempted to identify rules that govern situations of 
jurisdictional conflicts. While a network of treaty obligation is in place, found mainly in 
the constitutive instruments of international courts and tribunals, it looks as if is 
impossible to deduce many general principles there from. While some so-called 
‘self-contained’ regimes apply a rule of exclusivity, other regimes grant parties more 
latitude in forum selection. Similarly, some regimes specifically prohibit parallel and 
successive proceedings (through incorporating lis alibi pendens, electa una via or res 
judicata  clauses), whereas others seem to tolerate some degree of multiple proceedings.
As a result, customary international law and general principles of law must be resorted 
to in order to ascertain what norms govern jurisdictional-competition in the absence of 
treaty norms, or alongside them. It was suggested that the case law of the PCIJ, ICJ and 
other international judicial bodies generally permit forum selection. However, possible 
exceptions may be found in situations where selection has been made in violation of a 
competing dispute settlement clause of an exclusive nature (either explicit, or implicit, 
by virtue of lex specialis or lex posteriori rules of interpretation), or abusive in some 
other way. In these circumstances, the improperly selected forum might have to decline 
jurisdiction. This conclusion seems to be supported to some extent by the laws of 
treaties, which require the reconciliation of concurrently applicable jurisdictional 
provisions and by the abus de droit theory, which probably qualifies as general a 
principle law.
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With regard to parallel proceedings, no coherent principle has emerged from the case 
law. However, it is at least arguable that lis alibi pendens  has become a general 
principle of law, applied by most national legal system, which ought to govern such 
proceedings. In addition, the abus de droit doctrine and considerations of comity may 
also support a prohibition on parallel proceedings. A clearer picture can be identified 
with regard to the res judicata  rule, which seems to be both a rule of customary 
international law and a general principle of law. However, the precise manner of 
application of the principle of finality is still not settled and there are differences 
between the construction offered by different courts and tribunals as to what constitutes 
the ‘same dispute’ and in their willingness to accept exceptions to the res judicata  rule.
Although positive rules of international law do provide some guidance as to the 
regulation of jurisdictional competition, the situation is far from being satisfactory. This 
is because the identified rules govern only some forms of jurisdictional interaction and 
the authoritative status of some of them is questionable. As a result, in light of the 
observations made on the virtues of improving the coordination and harmonisation of 
the international judiciary, it is deemed wise to introduce additional norms and 
structural reforms that may improve upon the present situation. Since redefining the 
jurisdictions of international courts and tribunals, introducing even modest appellate 
structure (e.g., grant of advisory jurisdiction to the ICJ over other international courts 
and tribunals) or adopting a general jurisdiction-regulating treaty, all seem to be 
impractical at present, it has been suggested that other, less ambitious avenues should be 
pursued for the time being.
In this context, three specific measures can be recommended. First, courts and tribunals 
should apply comity vis-a-vis each other. This principle, which has some support in the 
case law but has not assumed the status of an unequivocal principle of international law, 
would call upon judicial bodies to accord due consideration to the decisions of their 
counterparts in the same case, or in related or analogous circumstances. It might also 
justify procedural steps, such as stay of proceedings, even when the traditional 
conditions for the application of jurisdiction-regulating rules such as lis alibi pendens 
and res judicata  have not been met. Second, methods of improving coordination 
between different international courts and tribunal should be sought. These include 
regular exchange of information, periodical meetings of judges and court officials and
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the rotation of judges between different judicial bodies. Finally, the dangers of 
jurisdictional overlap should be remembered each time the international community 
decides upon creating new judicial bodies (instead of referring disputes to existing 
ones). Even when the advantages of establishing a new court of tribunal outweigh the 
disadvantages, it is prudent to regulate in the constitutive instrument of the new forum 
its jurisdictional relations vis-a-vis its counterparts. In the same vein, it is advisable that 
states and other international actors ought to consider their other dispute settlement 
obligations every time they plan to adhere to a new jurisdiction. Where possible, such 
new members ought to consider the unilateral introduction of reservations to their 
instrument of accession with the effect of coordinating between the competing 





Status o f Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No 5
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2 
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 
No. 6 (jurisdiction) and 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7 (Merits)
Polish Postal Service in Danzig, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser B.) No. 11 
S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 10
Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Poland), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (claim for indemnity) 
(jurisdiction) and 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Merits)
Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 concerning the case o f the Factory at Chorzow 
(Germany v. Poland), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13
Rights o f Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools){ Germany v. Poland), 1928 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No. 15
Interpretation o f the Greco-Turkish Agreement of 1 December 1926, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B)
No. 16
The Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District o f Gex (France/Switzerland), 1930 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No. 24 (Second Phase)
Free Zones o f Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (France/ Switzerland) 1932 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 46
Interpretation of the Statute ofMemel Territory (U.K. v. Lithuania), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) 
No. 47
Oscar Chinn (U.K./Belgium), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63 
Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. France), 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 74 
Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Estonia v. Latvia), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 76 
The Electricity Company o f Sofia and Bulgaria (Bulgaria v. Belgium), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) 
No. 77 (Preliminary Objections)
Societe Commerciale de Belgique (Belgium v. Greece), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 78 
ICJ
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4
Conditions o f Admission o f a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of Charter), 
1947-48 I.C.J. 57
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service o f the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174 
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission o f a State to the UN, 1950 I.C.J. 4 
Interpretation o f the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 1950 I.C.J. 65 
(first phase) and 1950 I.C.J. 221 (second phase)
Haya de la Torre (Peru v. Columbia), 1951 I.C.J. 71 
Fisheries (U.K. v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. 116 
Anglo-Iranian Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93
Rights of Nationals of the United States o f America in Morocco (France v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 
176
Ambatielos (Greece v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 10
Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1954 I.C.J. 4
Effect of Awards of the UN Administrative Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. 47
Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway) 1957 I.C.J. 9
302
Right o f Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 125 (Preliminary 
Objection)
Interhandel (U.S. v. Switzerland), 1959 I.C.J. 6
Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Honduras v. Nicaragua),
1960 I.C.J. 192
Temple ofPreah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 1962 I.C.J. 6
South West Africa (Ethipia v. S.A.; Liberia v. S.A.), 1962 I.C.J. 319 and 1966 I.C.J. 6
North Sea Continental Shelf (F.G.R. v. Netherlands; F.G.R. v. Denmark), 1969 I.C.J. 3
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4
Legal Consequences for States o f the Continued Presence o f South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 12
Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Iceland), 1974 I.C.J. 4
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), 1974 I.C.J 253
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), 1978 I.C.J. 3
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3
Continental Shelf v. Libya) 1982 I.C.J. 18
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 
392 (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) and 1986 I.C.J. 14 
Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/ Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554
Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations 
Headquarters Agreement o f 26 June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 12
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), 1992 I.C.J. 351
Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), 1991 I.C.J. 12
Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal) 1991 I.C.J. 53
Questions o f the Interpretation and Application o f the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Provisional Measures) and 1998
I.C.J. 9 (Preliminary Objections)
Questions of the Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from 
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Provisional Measures) and 
1998 I.C.J. 115 (Preliminary Objections)
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), 1992 I.C.J. 240 (Preliminary 
Objections)
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime o f Genocide 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1993 I.C.J. 3 (Provisional Measures) and 1996 I.C.J. 595 
(Preliminary Objections)
Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), 
1993 I.C.J. 38
East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 1995 I.C.J. 90
Examination of the Situation in accordance with Paragraph 63 o f the Court's Judgment o f 20 
December 1974 in the Nuclear Test (New Zealand v. France), 1995 I.C.J. 285 
Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 
Gabgikovo -Nagymaros (Hungary/ Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 3
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Breard)(Paraguay v. U.S), 1998 I.C.J. 248 
(Provisional Measures)
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Judgment of 4 Dec. 1998 (forthcoming in 1998 I.C.J.)
303
LaGrand (Germany v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Provisional Measures) and Judgment of 27 June 
2001 (Forthcoming in 2001 I.C.J.)
Differences Relating to Immunity from Legal Process o f a Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. 62
Legality o f Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Order of 2 June 1999 (forthcoming in 1999 
I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures)
Legality o f Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Canada), Order of 2 June 1999 (Forthcoming in 1999 
I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures)
Legality o f Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. France), Order of 2 June 1999 (Forthcoming in 1999 
I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures)
Legality o f Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Germany), Order of 2 June 1999 (Forthcoming in 1999 
I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures)
Legality o f Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Italy), Order of 2 June 1999 (Forthcoming in 1999 
I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures)
Legality o f Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Netherlands), Order of 2 June 1999 (Forthcoming in 
1999 I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures)
Legality o f Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Portugal), Order of 2 June 1999 (Forthcoming in 1999 
I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures)
Legality o f Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain), Order of 2 June 1999 (Forthcoming in 1999 
I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures)
Legality o f Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.K.), Order of 2 June 1999 (Forthcoming in 1999 
I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures)
Legality o f Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.), Order of 2 June 1999 (Forthcoming in 1999 
I.C.J.)(Provisional Measures)
Arbitration
Moore (U.S. v. Mexico)(1871) in John B. Moore, 2 History and Digest of International 
Arbitrations to which the U.S. has been a Party (1898) 1357
Fur Sea Seal Arbitration (G.B./U.S.)(1892) in John B. Moore, 2 History and Digest of 
International Arbitrations to which the U.S. has been a Party (1898) 755 
Pius Fund (U.S. v. Mexico), 9 R.I.A.A. 11 (1902)
Compagnie Generate de TOrenoque (France v. Venezuela), 10 R.I.A.A. 184 (1905)
Orinoco Steamship Co. (U.S. v. Venezuela), 11 R.I.A.A. 227 (1910)
North Atlantic Coast Fisheries (G.B./U.S.), 1 Hague Court Reports 141 (1910)
China Navigation Co., Ltd. (U.K.) V. U.S. (The ‘Newchwang ’), VI R.I.A.A. 64 (1921)
Caire (France) v. Mexico, 5 R.I.A.A. 516 (1929)
The Santa Rosa Mining Co. (Ltd.)(U.K.) v. Mexico, 5 R.I.A.A. 252 (1931)
Leigh Valley Railroad Co. v. Germany, 8 R.I.A.A. 160 (1933)
Drier v. Germany, 8 R.I.A.A. 127 (1935)
Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1907 (1941)
Ambatielos (Greece v. U.K.), 23 I.L.R. 306 (1956)
Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Case (Rann of Kutch)(lndia. v. Pakistan) 50 I.L.R. 2 (1976) 
Delimitation o f the Continental Shelf {U.K./France), 18 I.L.M. (1979) 397 
Rainbow Warrior (N.Z. v. France), 74 I.L.R. 256 (1987)
Dispute Concerning the TabaArea (Egypt v. Israel), 27 I.L.M. (1988) 1421 
Heathrow Airport User Charges (U.S. v. U.K.), 102 I.L.R. 215 (1992)




Southern Blue Fin Tuna (Australia v. Japan; New Zealand v. Japan), Order of 27 Aug. 1999 
‘Camouco ’ (Panama v. France), Judgment of 7 Feb. 2000
IFTY
Case IT-94-1-D, In re Tadic, I ICTY Judicial Reports 3 (1994)(application for deferral)
Case IT-94-1-T, P 41, Prosecutor v. Tadic, I ICTY Judicial Reports 63 (1995)(Jurisdiction) 
Case IT-94-1-AR72, Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. (1996) 32 (Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction)(Appeals Chamber, 1995)
Case IT-95-5-D.T.Ch.II, In re Karadzic, II ICTY Judicial Reports 851 (1995)(request for 
deferral)
Case IT-95-6-D.T.Ch. I, In re Lasva River Valley, II ICTY Judicial Reports 921 (1995)(request 
for deferral).
Case IT-95-5-R61, Prosecutor v. Karadzic, 108 I.L.R. 86, 133-135 (1996)(Rule 61)
Case IT-94-A-1, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment of 15 July 1999 (Appeals Chamber)
ICSID
Benvenuti and Bonfat Sri v. Congo 1 ICSID Rep. 330 (1980)
AmcoAsia, Pan American Development Ltd. v. Indonesia, 1 ICSID Rep. 389 (1983)
Klockner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH. v. Cameroon, ICSID ARB/81/2), 2 ICSID Rep. 3 (1983) 
Atlantic Triton Co. v. Guinea, 3 ICSID Rep. 13 (1983)
Annulment Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Arbitration Between Klockner 
Industrie-Analgen GmbHv. Cameroon, 2 ICSID Rep. 95 (1985)
Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt, 3 ICSID Rep. 101 (1985)(jurisdiction) 
and 3 ICSID Rep. 131 (1988)
AmcoAsia, Pan American Development Ltd. v. Indonesia, 1 ICSID Rep. 543 
(1988)(Resubmitted case)
Marine International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Guinea, 4 ICSID Rep. 54 (1988) 
Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Albania, Decision of 24 Sept. 1996, Award of 28 April 1999 (ICSID) 
Azinian v. Mexico, Award of 1 Nov. 1999 (ICSID)
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
Case A/2, Iran v. U.S., 1 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 101 (1982)
Case 6, Gibbs and Hill, Inc. v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co., 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. 
Trib. Rep. 236(1982)
Case 51, Halliburton Co. v. Doreen/IMCO, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 242 (1982)
Case 43, Oil Fields of Texas, Inc. v. Iran, 1 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 347 (1982)
Case 28, Reading and Bates Corp. v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 401 (1983)(Interim 
Award)
Case 59, Questech, Inc. v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 96 (1983)(Interim Award) Case 71, 
Grimm v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 78 (1983)
Case 93, Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp. v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 281
(1983)(Interim Award)
Case 338, E. Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 51 (1983)(Interim Award)
Case 370, Watkins-Johnson Co. v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 362 (1983)
Case 480, Touche Ross and Co. v. Iran, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 59 (1983)(Interim Award) 
Case 928, CBA International Development Corp. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 53
(1983)(Interim Award)
Case 157, Esphahanian v. BankofTejarat, 2 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 157 (1984)
305
Case 159, Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp. v. Iran, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 104
(1984)(Interim Award)
Case 375, Bendone-Derossi International v. Iran,  6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 130 (1984)(Interim 
Award) and 18 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 115 (1988)
Case 33, Sea-LandServices Inc. v. Iran, 6 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 149 (1984)
Case 7, Tippets et al v. TAMSEFTA, 6 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 219 (1984)
Case 158, Aeronutronic Services v. Air Force of Iran, 7 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 217
(1984)(Interim Award)
Case 395, Component Builders, Inc. v. Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 216 (1985)(Interim and 
Interlocutory Award)
Case 458, Marks v. Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 291 (1985)(Interlocutory Award)
Case 333, Flour Corp. v. Iran, 11 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 296 (1986)(Interim Award)
Case 129, SEDCO Inc. v. NIOC, 10 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 180 (1987)
Case 56 Amoco International Finance Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 189 (1987)
Case 39, Philipps Petroleum Co. v. Iran, 21 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 79 (1989)
GATT/WTO
Measures Affecting Exports o f Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (U.S. v. Canada), GATT
B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 (1988)
Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada (Canada v. U.S.), 
GATT B.I.S.D. (38th Supp.) at 30 (1991)
Measures Affecting Imports o f Softwood Lumber from Canada (Canada v. U.S.), GATT
B.I.S.D. (40th Supp.) at 358 (1993)
EEC Member States' Import Regimes for Bananas (Columbia et al v. EEC), GATT Doc. 
DS32/R (1993), 1993 GATTPD LEXIS 11
Restrictions on Imports o f Tuna (EC v. U.S.), 16 June 1994, 33 I.L.M. (1994) 839 
EEC- Import Regime for Bananas, 34 I.L.M. (1995) 177 (GATT Panel Report, 1994)
U.S. - Standard for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline and Like Products of National 
Origin, 35 I.L.M. (1996) 603 (Report of the AB)
Japan -  Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R (1996)(Report of the AB) 
Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WTO Doc. WT/DS31/AB/R (1997)(Report 
of the AB)
E.C. - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/R 
(1997)(Panel Report)
E.C. - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS27/AB/R (1997)(Report of the AB)
EC - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f Bananas -  Arbitration under article 
21.3(c) o f the DSU, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/15 (1998)
EC -  Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R (1998)(Report of the AB)
U.S. -  Import Prohibition o f Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 38 I.L.M. (1999) 118 
(Report of the AB, 1998)
EC - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f Bananas - Recourse to Article 21.5 
by the EC, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/RW/EEC (1999)
EC - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f Bananas - Recourse to Article 21.5 
by Ecuador, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/RW/ECU(1999)
EC - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution o f Bananas -  Recourse to Arbitration by 
the EC Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/ARB (1999)
Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS103/AB/R (1999)(Report of the AB)
306
U.S. -  Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WTO DOC. WT/DS152/R (1999)(Panel 
Report),
Mexico-Anti Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Com Syrup (HFCS) from the U.S., WTO 
Doc. WT/DS132/R (2000)(Panel Report)
Canada -  Patent Protection Terms, WTO Doc. WT/DS170/R (2000)(Panel Report)
U.S. -  Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corp. ” , WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/R(2000)(Report 
of the AB)
ECJ
Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Commission [1963] E.C.R. 1
Joined Cases 79 and 82/63, Reynier v. Commission [1964] E.C.R. 259
Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL [1964] E.C.R. 585
Case 90, 91/63, Commission v. Luxembourg [1964] E.C.R. 1217
Case 59/65, Schreckenberg v. Euratom Commission [1966] E.C.R. 543
Case 29/69, Stauder v. Ulm [1969] E.C.R. 419
Case H12, Boehringer Mannheim v Commission [1972] E.C.R. 1281
Opinion 1/76, Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway
vessels, [1977] E.C.R. 741
See e.g., Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena [1978] E.C.R. 1365
Case 21/76, Handelskwekerji G.J. Bier B. V. v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace [1979] E.C.R. 1735 
Case 61/79, Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v. Denkavit italiana Sri. [1980] E.C.R. 
1205
Joined cases 209-215 and 218/78, Heintz van Landewyck S.a.r.i. v. Commission [1980] E.C.R. 
3125
Case 102/81,  Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei 
NordsternAG & Co. KG [1982] E.C.R. 1095 
Case 129/83, Zelger v. Salinitri [1984] E.C.R. 2398
Case 60, 61/84, Cinetheqe SA v. Federation nationale des cinemas frangais [1985] E.C.R. 2605
Cases 172, 226/83, Hoogovens Groep v. Commission [1985] E.C.R. 2843
Case 85/85, Commission v. Belgium [1986] E.C.R. 1149
Case 144/86, Gubisch Maschinenfabrik v Palumbo [1987] E.C.R. 4861
Joined Case 97, 99, 193 and 215/86Asteris v. Commission [1988] E.C.R. 2181
Cases 358/85 and 51/86, France v. Parliament [1988] E.C.R. 4846
Case 236/87, Bergemann v. Bundesanstaltfur arbeit [1988] E.C.R. 5125
Joined Cases 89, 104, 116, 117 and 125-129/85, Ahlstrom Osakeytid v. Commission [1988]
E.C.R. 5193
Case 46/87, Hoechst AG Dow Benelux Metal v. Commission [1989] E.C.R. 2875
Case 5/88, Wachaufv. Bundesamtfiir Emahrung undForstwirtschaft [1989] E.C.R. 2609
Case 374/87, Orkem v. Commission [1989] E.C.R. 3283
Case C-308/87, Grifoni v. Commission [1990] E.C.R. 1-1203
C-281/89 Italy v Commission [1991] E.C.R. 1-347
Case C-41/90, Hofner v. Macrotron GmbH[ 1991] E.C.R. 1-1979
Case 351/89, Overseas Union Insurance Ltd. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co. [1991] E.C.R.
1-3317
Case C-345/89, France v. Stoeckel [1991] E.C.R. 1-4047
Case C-l 59/90, The Society for the Protection o f Unborn Children In Ireland Ltd. v. Grogan 
[1991] E.C.R. 1-4685
Opinion 1/91, Draft Agreement Relating to the Creation of the EEA [1991] E.C.R. 1-6079 
Case T-42/91 Koninklijke PTTNederlandNV v. Commission. [1991] E.C.R. 11-273
307
Case C-228/90, 234/90, 339/90. 353/90, Simba SpA v. Ministero delle Finanze [1992] E.C.R. 
1-3713
Case T-45/90, Speybroukv. European Parliament [1992] E.C.R. 11-33
Case C-158/91, France v. Levy [1993] E.C.R. 1-4287
Case C-13/93, Office National de I ’Emploi v. Minne [1994] E.C.R. 1-371
Case 404/92 P ,*v . Commission [1994] E.C.R. 1-4737
Case C-23/93, TV 10 S.A. v. Commissariaat Voor de Media [1994] E.C.R. 1-4795
Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council [1994] E.C.R. 1-4973
Case C-406/92, The Tatry [1994] E.C.R. 1-5439
Case C-469/93, Administrazione delle finanze dello stato v. Chiquita Italia SpA [1995] E.C.R
I-4533
Case T-88/94, Societe Commerciale de Potasses et de VAzote v. Commission) [1995] E.C.R.
II-221
Case T-488/93, Hanseatische Industrie-Beteiligungen GmbHv. Commission [1995] E.C.R.
11-469
Case T-490/93, Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG v. Commission [1995] E.C.R. 11-477
Case T-12.93, CCE de Vittel v. Commission [1995] E.C.R. 11-1247
Case T-219/95 R, Danielsson v. Commission [1995] E.C.R. 11-3051
Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Communities to the Convention for the Protection o f Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1996] E.C.R. 1-1759
Case C-13/94 P v. S. [1996] E.C.R. 1-2143
Case C-277/95 P Lenz v Commission [1996] E.C.R. 1-6109
Joined cases C-267/95 and C-268/95, Merck & Co. Inc. v. Primecrown Ltd [1996] E.C.R.
1-6285
Case T-76/96R, The National Farmer’s Union v. Commission [1996] E.C.R. 11-815 
Case C-249/96, Grant v. South West Trains Ltd. [1998] E.C.R. 1-621 
Case C-351/96, Drouot Assurances SA v. Consolidated Metallurgical Industries (CMI 
Industrial Sites)[1998] E.C.R. 1-3075
Case C-53/96, Hermes International v. FHTMarketing Choice BV, [1998] E.C.R. 1-3603
Joined Cases T-305-07, 313-16, 318, 325,328-29 and 335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij 
NV  v. Commission [1999] E.C.R. 11-931
Cases C-174, 189/98 P, Netherlands v. Commission, Judgment of 11 Jan 2000 (forthcoming in 
2000 E.C.R.)
FTA/NAFTA
Case CDA-89-1807-01, Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring (U.S. v. 
Canada), Report of 16 Oct. 1989 (FTA Chapter 18 Panel)
Case USA-89-1904-06, Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork (Canada v. U.S.), Report of 28 
Sept. 1990 (FTA binational Panel)
Case USA-92-1904-01, Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (Canada v. U.S.), 
Report of 6 May 1993 (FTA binational Panel)
USA-95-1904-02, Gray Portland Cement and Clinker from Mexico (Mexico v. U.S.), Report of 
13 Sept. 1996, at p.23 (NAFTA binational Panel)
Case CDA-95-2008-01, Tariffs applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural 
Products (U.S. v. Canada), Report of 2 Dec. 1996 (NAFTA Chapter 20 Panel)
Case USA-97-2008-01, U.S. Safeguard Action taken on Broomcorn Brooms from Meixco 
(Mexico v. U.S.), Report of 30 Jan 1998 (NAFTA binational Panel)
308
NAAEC
Methanex Corp. v. U.S., Determination of 30 June 2000, Doc. A14/SEM/99-001/06/14(3)(CEC 
Secretariat)
CCJ
Non-compliance or Violation of SICA Norms (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Decisions of 30 Nov.
1999 and 17 Jan. 2000
Revocation o f laws, administrative and other acts adopted by the Republic of Nicaragua that 
affect and violate the law and operation of SICA (Honduras v. Nicaragua), Decision of 12 Jan.
2000 (Measures of Protection).
CIS Economic Court
Opinion No. 14/95/C-1/7-96, Interpretation of the Agreement on Recognition and Regulation of 
Property Rights, 3 (23) CIS Information Bulletin (1996) 82
Opinion No. 11/95/C-1/4-96, Interpretation of Agreement on Free Trade, 3 (23) CIS 
Information Bulletin (1996) 88
Opinion no. C-l/19-96, 9 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation 
(1997)86
ECHR
Lithgow v. U.K., 8  E.H.R.R. 329 (1986)
Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 14 E.H.R.R. 1 (1991)
Open Door Counselling Ltd v. Ireland, 15 E.H.R.R. 244 (1992)
Funke v. France3 256 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)(1993)
Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)(1994)
Murray v. United Kingdom, 300 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)(1994)
British-American Tobacco Co. Ltd. V. Netherlands, 331 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)(1995)
Loizidou v. Turkey, 20 E.H.R.R. 99, 136 (1995) and 1998 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. VI)
Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 E.H.R.R. 277 (1995)
Agrotexim v. Greece, 21 E.H.R.R. 250 (1996)
Hornsby v. Greece, 24 E.H.R.R. 250 (1997)
Guerra v. Italy, 26 E.H.R.R. 241 (1998)
EHR Comm’n
Donnelly v. U.K., App. No. 5577-5583/72, 16 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. (1973) 212 
CFDT v. Council, App. 8030/77, 13 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 231 (1978)
Xv. Switzerland, App. No. 8878/79, 20 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 240, 245 (1980)
Nv. Sweden, App. No. 10410/83, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 203 (1985)
Council o f Civil Services Unions v. U.K., App. No. 11603/85, 50 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 228,(1987)
Ajinaja v. U.K., App. No. 13365/87, 55 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 294 (1988)
Brinkhofv. the Netherlands, App. No. 14215/88, Eur. Comm’n Decision of 13 December 1989 
Melchers & Co. v. Germany, App. 13258/87,1990 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 138 
Martins v. Spain, App. No. 16358/90, 73 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 120 (1992)
Fornieles v. Spain, App. No. 17512/90, 73 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 214 (1992)
Pauger v. Austria, App. No. 16717/90, 80 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 24 (1995)
Lukanov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 21915/93, 80 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 108 (1995) 
Pauger v. Austria, App. No. 24872/94, 80 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 170 (1995)
Tauira v. France, App. No. 28204/95, 83 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 112 (1995)
309
A.G. V.R v. Netherlands, App. No. 20060/92, Decision of the EHR Comm’n of 10 April 1995 
Varnava v. Turkey, App. No. 16064-66, 16068-73/90, Decision of the EHR Comm’n of 14 
April 1998,
I/A CHR
Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, "Other Treaties" Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court 
(Art. 64, American Convention on Human Rights), I/A Court H.R. (ser. A), No. 1 (1982) 
Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica 
(Advisory Opinion), I/A Court H.R. (ser. A) No. 4 (1984)
Case 52, Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, Judgment of 30 May 1999
Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the
Framework of the Guarantees o f the Due Process of Law', Opinion of 1 Oct. 1999
I/A HR Comm’n
Case 10.580, Quinones v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report no. 10/95, OEA/ser.L./V/II.91, 
Doc. 7, at 76 (1996)
Case 10.970, Mejia v. Peru, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report no. 5/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, Doc. 7, at 
157(1996)
Case 11.245, Gimenezv. Argentina, Report No. 12/96, Inter-Am.C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91 
Doc. 7 at 33 (1996)
Case 11.227, Diaz v. Colombia, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report no. 5/99, OEA/ser.L/V/11.95, Doc. 7 
rev 99(1997)
Case 11.430, Rodriguez v. Mexico, Report No. 43/96, Inter-Am.C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 
Doc. 7 rev. at 485, (1997)
Case 11.381, Nicaraguan Customs Service v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report no. 14/97, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, Doc. 7 rev. 535 (1997)
ACHR
Comm. 15/88, Mpaka-Nsusu Andre Alphonse v. Zaire, 7th Annual Report of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1993-94, 30th Sess. (1994)
Case 40/90, Ngozi Njoku v. Egypt, ACHR Report of 11 Nov. 1997, 11th Annual Report of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1997/98, 22nd and 23rd Ordinary 
Sessions, Annex II (1998)
HRC
Comm. R.2/8, Lanza v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. 40, at 111 (1980)
Comm. R.l/4, Ramirez v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. 40, at 121 (1980)
Comm. R.l/6, Sequeira v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. 40, at 127 (1980)
Comm. R.2/11, Motta v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. 40, at 132 (1980)
Comm. 32/1978, Touron v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. 40, at 120 (1981).
Comm. R.2/10, Altesor v. Uruguay, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. 40, at 122 (1980)
Comm. R.7/28, Weinberger v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. 40, at 114 (1981) 
Comm. R. 10/44, Pietroroia v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. 40, at 153 (1981) 
Comm. R.13/56, Casariego v. Uruguay, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. 40, at 185, (1981) 
Comm. R. 14/63, Antonaccio v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. 40, at 114 (1982) 
Comm. R.2/10, Altesor v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. 40, at 122 (1980)
Comm. R.26/121, A.M. v. Denmark, UN GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. 40, at 212 (1982)
Comm. 84/1981, Barbato v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. 40, at 124 (1983);
Comm. 74/1980, Estrella v. Uruguay, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. 40, at 150, 156 (1983) 
Comm. 75/1980, Fanali v. Italy, U.N. GAOR. 38th Sess., Supp. 40, at 160 (1983)
310
Comm. 85/1981, Romero v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. 40, at 159 (1984)
Comm. 123/1982, Lluberas v. Uruguay, UN GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. 40, at 175 (1984)
Comm. 146/1983 Baboeram v. Suriname, UN GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. 40, at 187 (1984) 
Comm. 168/1984, V.Ov. Norway, UN GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. 40, at 232 (1984)
Comm. 1/1976, A v. S., UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 17 (1984)
Comm. 158/1983, O.F. v. Norway, UN GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. 40, at 204 (1985)
Comm. 118/1982,7.5. v. Canada, UN GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. 40, at 151 (1986).
Comm. 172/1984, Broeks v. Netherlands, UN GAOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. 40, at 139 (1987) 
Comm. 180/1984, Danning v. Netherlands, UN GAOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. 40, at 151 (1987) 
Comm. 182/1984, Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, UN GAOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. 40, at 160
(1987)
Comm. 217/1986, H.v.D.P. v. Netherlands, UN GAOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. 40, at 185 (1987) 
Comm. 191/1985, Blom v. Sweden, UN GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. 40, at 211 (1988)
Comm. 201/1985, Hendricks v. Netherlands, UN GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. 40, at 230 (1988) 
Comm. 210/1986,225/1987, Pratt v. Jamaica, UN GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. 40, at 222 (1989) 
Comm. 401/1990, J.P.K v. Netherlands, UN GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. 40, at 405 (1991)
Comm. 403/1990, T. W.B.Mv. Netherlands, UN GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. 40, at 411 (1991) 
Comm. 381/1989, L.E.S.K. v. Netherlands, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. 40, at 374 (1992) 
Comm. 393/1990, A.C. v. France, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. 40, at 384 (1992).
Comm. 402/1990, Brinkhof v. Netherlands, UN GAOR, 48th Sess., Annex, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/48/ D/402/1990 (1993)
Comm. 470/1991, Kindler v. Canada, UN GAOR, 48th Sess. Supp. no. 40, Annex XII, at 138, 
UN Doc. A/48/40 (1993)
Comm. 467/1991, V.E.M. v. Spain, UN Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/467/1991 (1993)
Comm. 321/1988, Thomas v. Jamaica, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. 40 (II), at 1 (1994)
Comm. 441/1990, Blanco v. Nicaragua, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. 40, at 12 (1994)
Comm. 44/1990, Casanovas v. France, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. 40, at 131 (1994)
Comm. 452/1991, Glaziou v. France, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. 40(11), at 250 (1994) 
Comm. 421/1990, Trebutien v. France, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. 40(11), at 277 (1994) 
Comm. 453/1991, Coerielv. Netherlands, UN Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/453/1991 (1994)
Comm. 540/1993, Atachahuav. Peru, UN GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. 40(11), at 112 (1995) 
Comm. 575, 576/1994, Guerra v. Trinidad and Tobago, UN Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/575/ 1994 and 
576/1994(1995)
Comm. 584/1994, Valentijn v. France, 51st Sess, Supp. 40(11), at 253 (1996)
Case 589/1994, Tomlin v, Jamaica, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/589/1994 (1996)
Comm. 645/1995, Bordes v. France, UN Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/645/1995 (Decision of the HRC,
1996)
Comm. 577/1994, Campos v. Peru, UN Doc. CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994 (1998)
Comm. 824/1998, Nicolov v. Bulgaria, UN Doc. CCPR/C/68/D/824/1998 (2000)
CAT Committee
Comm. 10/1993, A.E.M. v. Spain, UN GAOR, CAT, 13th Sess. Annex 5, at 43, UN Doc. 
A/50/44 (1994)
Comm. 26/1995, Mbulu v. Canada, UN Doc. CAT/C/15/D/26/1995 (1995)
ILO Procedures
Case 893, Canadian Labour Congress v. Canada, LXIII ILO Official Bulletin (ser. B) No. 3
(1980)(Report of the CFA)
311
Case 1318, German Worker's Confederation v. Federal Republic o f Germany,  LXVIII ILO 
Official Bulletin (ser B) No. 3 (1985)(Report of the CFA)
Observance o f the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. Ill), 
by the Federal Republic o f Germany, LXX ILO Official Bulletin (ser. B) Supp. 1 (1987)(Report 
of Commission of Inquiry)
ICC ('commercial arbitration")
Case 2272 (1975), A v. B, excerpts in Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 (1990) 11 
Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt, 3 ICSID Rep. 45 (1993)
Inspection Panel Reports
Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project, Report of the IDB Investigation Mechanism of 15 Sept. 1997, 
IDB Doc. GN-1947-8
Argentina/Paraguay: Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project, Report of the Inspection Panel of 16 Sept. 
1997
Administrative Tribunals




Ferrer v. Arden, 11 E.R. 263 (1599)
Bushby v. Munday, 56 E.R. 908 (1821)
Grainger v. Hill, 132 E. R. 769 (1838)
Henderson v. Henderson 67 E.R. 313 (1843), 6 Q.B. 288 (1844)
Ex parte Partington, 153 E. R. 284 (Ex. 1845)
State R. v. Harrington Middle Quarter (Inhabitants) [1855] E.R. 288 (C.A.)
Godard v. Gray [1870] Q.B. 139 
Wemyss v. Hopkins [1875] L.R. 10
Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson [1892] 1 Q.B. 431 
Sim v. Robinow, 19 Sess. Cas. (R.) 665 (1892)
Mayor o f Bradford v. Pickles [1895] A.C. 587 
Allen v. Flood [ 1898] A.C. 1
Hoysteadv. Commissioner o f Taxation [1926] A.C. 155 (P.C.)
La Societe du Gaz de Paris v. La Societe Anonyme de Navigation, "Les Armateurs Frangais 
[1926] Sess. Cas. 13 (H.L.)
St. Pierre v. South American Stores (Gath & Chaves) Ltd. [1935] All E.R. 408 (C.A)
The Arantzazu Mendi [1939] 1 All E.R. 719(H.L.)
Greenhalgh v. Mallard [1947] 2 All E.R. 255 (C.A.)
Sambasivianm v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya [1950] A.C. 458 (P.C.)
The "Fehmarn" [1958] 1 All E.R. 333 (C.A.)
The Eleftheria [1969] 2 All E.R. 641 (P.)
Ferdinand Wagner v. Laubscher Bros. & Co. [1970] 2 Q.B. 313 (C.A.)
Chaplin v. Boys [1971] A.C. 356
The Atlantic Star [1972] 3 ALL E.R. 705 (C.A.)
The Atlantic Star [1973] 2 All E.R. 175 (H.L.)
Yat Tung Investment Co. Ltd. v. Dao Heng Bank Ltd. [1975] A.C. 581 
Henry v. Geoprosco InternationalLtd[\916] Q.B. 726
312
The Ampthill Peerage Case [1977] A.C. 547
Fidelitas Shipping Co. Ltd v. V/0 Exportchleb [1977] 1 Q.B. 630
SaifAli v. Sydney Mitchell & Co. [1978] 3 All ER 1033 (H.L)
MacShannon v. Rockware Glass Ltd. [1978] A.C. 795
Mike Trading and Transport Ltd. v. R. Pagnan & Fratelli (The "Lisboa") [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
546 (C.A.)
Vervaeke v. Smith [1983] 1 A.C. 145
R v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1983] 3 All E.R. 358 (Q.B.)
Smith Klein & French Labs Ltd. v. Bloch [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730 (C.A.)
The "Abidin Dover» [1984] A.C. 398
South Carolina Insurance Co. v. Assurantie Maatschappij 'de Zeven Provincien' NV [ 1985] 2 
All E.R. 1046 (C.A.)
Midland Bank pic. v. Laker Airways Ltd. [1986] 1 All E.R. 526 (C.A.)
Dallalv. Bank Mellat [1986] 1 Q.B. 441
Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd. [1987] A.C. 460
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak [1987] 3 All E.R. 510 (P.C.)
Du Pont (E.I.) de Nemours & Co. v. Agnew & Kerr [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 585 (C.A.) and
[1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 240 (C.A.)
Maclaine Watson v. Dept, o f Trade and Industry [1989] 3 All E.R. 523 (H.L.)
Australian Commercial Research & Development Ltd. v. ANZ McCaughan Merchant Bank
[1989] 3 All E.R. 65 (Ch.)
Berisford (S&W) Pic. V. New Hampshire Insurance Co. [1990] 2 Q.B. 631 
Cleveland Museum of Art v. Capricorn Art [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 166 (Q.B.)
Arnold v. National Westminster Bank pic. [1991] 2 A.C. 93 
Standard King v. Thomas McKenna Ltd [1991] 1 All E.R. 653 (C.A.)
New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Starbag Bau AG [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 361 (C.A.)
Steamship Owners Protection & Indemnity Association (Bermuda Ltd.) v. Gann [1992] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 528 (Q.B.)
Pan American World Airways v. Andrews, 1992 S.L.T. 268 
Showlag v. Mansour [1994] 2 All E.R. 129 (P.C.)
Continental Bankv. Aeakos Compania Naviera [1994] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 505 (C.A.)
The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 87 (C.A.)
RTZv. Connolly [1998] A.C. 854
R  v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate; Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [1999] 2 All 
E.R. 97 (H.L.)
U.S.
Tobeyv. County of Bristol, 23 Fed. Cas. 1313 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)
Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. 352 (1859)
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1877)
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895)
Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294 (1917)
U.S. v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 227 (1922)
Kahn v. Tazwell, 266 P. 238,243 (1928)
Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men's Association, 283 U.S. 522 (1931)
Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936)
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad, 315 U.S. 698 (1942)
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 (2nd Cir. 1942)
313
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326U.S.310(1945)
Burns v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 65 A.2d 445 (1945)
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947)
Covey Gas & Oil Co. v. Checketts, 187 F. 2d 561 (9th Cir. 1951)
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)
Torres v. S.S. Rosario, 125 F. Supp. 496 (D.C.N.Y. 1954)
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959)
Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1959)
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961)
Sanders v. U.S., 373 U.S. 1 (1963)
National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375U.S.311 (1964)
Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460,468 (1965)
Ramsay v. Boeing Co., 432 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970)
Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 265 N.E.2d 739 (1970)
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
Breman v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)
Neumeierv. Keuhner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 129, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972)
Plum Tree Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754 (1973)
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800 (1976)
Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas International Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1977)
U.S. v. Wheeler, Arizona, 435 U.S. 313 (1978)
Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979)
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980)
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)
Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories Division of American Home Products Organization, 510 F. 
Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)
Federated Department Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981)
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981)
Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1981)
E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 522 F. Supp. 588 (D.C. Del. 1981) 
Continental Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank, 543 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
Brinco Mining Ltd. v. Federal Insurance Co., 552 F. Supp. 1233 (D.D.C. 1982)
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. V. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)
W R Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983)
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 577 F. Supp. 348 (D.D.C. 1983), 559 F. 
Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1983), 568 F. Supp. 84 (D.D.C. 1983), 604 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1984) 
ChuaHanMowv. U.S., 730F.2d 1308(1984)
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984)
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (1984)
Medina v. Chase Manhattan Bank Ltd., 737 F.2d 140 (1984)
American Home Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 603 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)
Burger King Corp., v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)
314
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)
In re Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544 (1985)
Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679 (1985)
Ronar, Inc. v. Wallace, 649 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, 483 U.S. 143 (1987)
In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987) 
Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F. 2d 508 (4th Cir. 1987)
China Trade and Development Corp. v. MVChoong Yong, 837 F.2d. 33 (2nd Cir. 1987)
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989)
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 725 F. Supp. 317 (S.D. Miss.
1989)
Ferens v. John Deere, Inc., 494 U.S. 516 (1990)
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)
Neuchatel Swiss General Ins. Co. v. Lufthansa Airlines, 925 F. 2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1991)
Howe v. Goldcorp Investments, Ltd., 946 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1991)
Davidson v. Exxon Corp. 778 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. La. 1991)
GauShan Co. v. Banker's Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992)
Kepler v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 860 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Mich. 1994)
Morrison Law Firm v. Clarion Co., 158 F.R.D. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996)
Hooker v. Burson, 960 F. Supp. 1283 (M.D. Tenn. 1996)
Animation Station v. Chicago Bulls, LP, 992 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
Australia
Huddart Parker Ltd. v. The "Mill Hill", 81 C.L.R. 502 (1950)
Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes v. Wilson, 94 C.L.R. 577 (1954)
Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co. Inc. v. Fay, 165 C.L.R. 197 (1988)
National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd. v. Sentry Corp., 87 Aust. L. Rep.539 (1989);
Voth v. Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd., 171 C.L.R. 538 (1990)
Sentry Corp. v. Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co., 95 Aust. L. Rep. (1990) 11 
McKain v. R.W. Miller & Co. (S. Austl.) Pty Ltd., 175 C.L.R. 1 (1991)
Stevens v. Head, 176 C.L.R. 433 (1993)
Re Wakim, ex parte McNally and others, 163 Aust. L. Rep. (1999) 270.
Canada
Johns-Manville Corp. v. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co. [1991] Recueils de 
jurisprudence de Quebec 616 (C.A.)
CanastrandIndustries Ltd. v. The 'Lara S' [  1992] 3 F.C. 398 (T.D.)
P. W.A. Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc., 98 D.L.R. (4th) 277 
(Alberta Q.B. 1992)
Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board), 102 D.L.R. (4th) 96 
(Supreme Court of Canada, 1993)
France
Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt, Judgment of 12 July 1984, 3 ICSID 
Rep. 79 (Cour d’appel)
Simitch, Cass, le civ., 6 Feb. 1985 [1985] R.C. 369 
Cour d'appel, Colmar, May 2, 1985, D.P. II 1856
315
Guinea v. Atlantic Triton Co., Judgment of 18 Nov. 1986, 3 ICSID Rep. 7 (France, Cour de 
cassation)
Cie de Signaux et d'Entreprises Electriques (CSEE) v. Soc. Sorelec, Cass, le civ. [1986] D. 265, 
obs. Audit
Miniera diFragne, Cass, le civ., 20 Oct. 1987 [1987] IV J.C.P. 400
Omnium de traitement et de Valorisation v. Hilmarton, Judgment of 10 June 1997, 22 Yearbook 
of International Commercial Arbitration (1997) 696 (Cour de Cassation)
Israel
Eichmann v. Attorney-General of Israel, 36 I.L.R. (1962) 277 (Supreme Court)
Civ. App. 25/63, Oneon Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Moshe, 17 P.D. 646 (1963)(Supreme Court)
C.A. 440/70, Ganem v. Ganem, 26 (2) P.D. 829 (1971)(Supreme Court)
Civ. App. 591/73, Baschist v. Workers in Rishon Le Zion andZichron Yaacov Vineyards, 28 (1) 
P.D. 759 (1974)(Supreme Court)
Civ. App. 718/75, Amram v. Scornik, 31 (1) P.D. 29 (1976)(Supreme Court)
Civ. App. 221/78, Ovadia v. Cohen, 33 (1) P.D. 293 (1979)(Supreme Court)
Civ.App. 9/79, Korpol v. Horowitz, 34(1) P.D. 260 (1979)(Supreme Court)
P.App., 30/82 Multi-lock Inc. v. Rav-Bariach Ltd., 36 (3) P.D. 272 (1982)(Supreme Court)
Civ. App. 2705/91, Abu-Ghichla v. The East Jerusalem Electric Co., 48 (1) P.D. 556
(1993)(Supreme Court)
H.C. 1000/92, Bavli v. High Rabbinical Court of Jerusalem, 48 (2) P.D. 221 (1994)(Supreme 
Court)
Japan
Koniglike Java China Paletvaat Lijnen BV Amsterdam v. Tokyo Marine and Fire Insurance Co., 
20 Japanese Annual of International Law (1976) 106 (Supreme Court, 1975)
Goto v. Malaysian Airlines System Berhad, 26 Jap. Ann. Int’l L. (1983) 122 (Supreme Court, 
1981)
Greenline Shipping Co. Ltd. v. California First Bank, 28 Jap. Ann. Int’l L. (1985) 243 (Supreme 
Court, 1983)
Miyakoshi Machine Tools Co. Ltd. v. Gould Inc., Hanrei Jiho No. 1348 (Tokyo District Court, 
1989)
Netherlands
Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt, Judgment of 12 July 1984 ICSID Rep. 
92 (District Court)
Pistacor, HR, 1 Feb. 1985, NJ 698 JCS [1989] Netherlands International Law Reports 59 
Harvest Trader, HR, 28 Oct. 1988 [1989] NJ 765
New Zealand
Attorney General v. Mobil Oil NZ Ltd. [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 649, 4 ICSID Rep. 117 (1987) 
McConnell Dowell Constructors Ltd. v. Lloyd's Syndicate 396 [1988] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257 
Apple Computer Inc. v. Apple Corp. SA [1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. 598
Singapore
The Vishva Aurva [1992] 2 Singapore Law Reports 175
Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling Corp. v. PTAirfast Services Indonesia [1992] 2 S.L.R 776 
Djoni Widjajav. Bank o f America National Trust and Savings Association [1993] 3 S.L.R. 678
316
Switzerland
Guinea v. Marine International Nominees Establishment (MINE), Judgment of 4 Dec. 1985, 4 
ICSID Rep. 35 (Tribunal Federal)
Marine International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Guinea, 4 ICSID Rep. 45, 51
(1986)(Supervisory Authority of the Office des Poursuites of Geneva)
Other Jurisdictions
Guinea v. Marine International Nominees Establishment (MINE), Judgment of 27 Sept. 1985, 4 
ICSID Rep. 32 (Belgium, Court of First Instance)
Order of Nov. 12, 1985, Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt, 5 Praxis des Intemationalen Privat und 
Verfahrensrechts 297 (1986)(Germany)
The Adhiguna Meranti [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 384 (Hong Kong C.A.)
Hapimagv. Mona Martens on [1976] A.D. 101 (Sweden)
Treaties
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 29 July 1899, The 
Hague Conventions and Declarations o f1899 and 1907 (James Brown Scott, ed., 2nd ed., 1915) 
41
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 18 Oct. 1907, The 
Hague Conventions and Declarations o f1899 and 1907 (James Brown Scott, ed., 2nd ed., 1915) 
41
Covenant of the League of Nations, 17 June 1919, 1 L.N.T.S. 7 
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 16 Dec. 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 390 
General Act for the Settlement of International Disputes, 26 Sept. 1928, 93 L.N.T.S. 344 
Convention on the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Italy-France),
3 June 1930, 153 L.N.T.S. 135
Convention regarding the Recognition and Enforcement of Judicial Decisions
(Italy-Switzerland), 3 Jan. 1933, 142 L.N.T.S. 17
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 Dec. 1944, 15 UNTS 295
Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June
1945, XV U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 355
Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 27 Dec. 1945,2 
U.N.T.S. 134
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 13 Feb. 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 
15
Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, 9 Oct. 1946, 15 U.N.T.S. 40 
Charter for an International Trade Organisation, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Employment - Final Act and Related Documents, 24 March 1948, U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4 
(1948)(not in force)
American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, 30 April 1948,449 U.N.T.S. 83
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 Dec. 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 278
Revised General Act for the Settlement of International Disputes, 28 April 1949, 912 U.N.T.S. 
101
Freedom of Association and Right to Organize Convention, 17 June 1948, ILO Convention no. 
87
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 Aug. 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 Nov. 1950, 
E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
317
Protocol on the Code of the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community, 18 
April 1951,261 U.N.T.S. 247
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 20 Apr. 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 
First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 20 March 1952, E.T.S. 9 (1952)
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 
Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, 25 March 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 
167
Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance 
Obligations to Children, 15 April 1958, 539 U.N.T.S. 29
Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Economic Community, 17 April 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 147
Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Atomic Energy Community, 17 
April 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 256
European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, 29 April 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 
243, E.T.S. 23
European Convention on Extradition, 13 July 1957, E.T.S. 24
Treaty instituting the Benelux Economic Union, 3 Feb. 1958, 381 U.N.T.S. 165
Convention on the High Seas, 29 Apr. 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82
Optional Protocol of Signature to the Conventions on the Law of the Sea Concerning the 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 29 April 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 172 
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
10 June 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38
Convention concerning the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judicial Decisions, 
Arbitral Awards and Authentic Acts in Civil and Commercial Matters (Belgium-Germany), 30 
June 1958, 387 U.N.T.S. 245
Convention concerning the Recognition and Enforcement of Judicial Decisions and Arbitral 
Awards (Belgium-Switzerland), 29 April 1959, 443 U.N.T.S. 35
Convention concerning the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judicial Decisions and 
other Enforceable Instruments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Belgium-Italy), 6 April 1962, 
490 U.N.T.S. 317
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 24 April 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261
Protocol no. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 16
Sept. 1963, E.T.S. 46
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, 18 March 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
Treaty concerning the Establishment and the Statute of a Benelux Court of Justice, 31 March 
1965,924 U.N.T.S. 1
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 Dec. 
1965, UN G.A. Res. 2106A (XX), GAOR, 12th Sess, Supp. No. 14 (A/6014) 47, UN Doc. 
A/CONF. 32/4
Convention on the Choice of Court, 25 Nov. 1965, art. 6(1), Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, Recueil des Conventions de la Haye (1970) 96 (not in force)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol, 16 Dec. 1966, UN 
GA Res. 2200 A (XXI), GAOR, 21st Sess, Supp. No. 16 (A/6316) 52, UN Doc. A/CONF. 32/4 
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, 27 Sept. 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, 29 I.L.M. (1990) 1413 (updated version)
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
American Convention on Human Rights, 22 Nov. 1969, O.A.S. T.S. 36, O.A.S. Off. Rec. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, Doc. 21, Rev. 6 (1979), 9 I.L.M. (1970) 673
318
Protocol on the Interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 3 June 
1971, 1975 O.J. (L204) 28
Convention concerning the Recognition and Enforcement of Judicial Decisions in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, of Judicial Settlements and of Notarial Acts (Italy-Austria), 16 Nov. 1971, 
1388 U.N.T.S. 277
European Convention on State Immunity, 16 May 1972, E.T.S. 74.
Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance 
Obligations, 2 Oct. 1973, 1021 U.N.T.S. 209.
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 30 Jan. 1975,14 I.L.M. 
(1975)336
Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, 28 May 1979, 18 I.L.M. 
(1979) 1203
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, 18 Dec. 1979,
G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 
Inter-American Convention on Extradition, 25 Feb. 1981, 20 I.L.M. (1981) 723 
Convention concerning Occupational Safety and Health and the Working Environment, 22 June 
1981, ILO Convention no. 155
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 27 June 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 
Rev. 5,21 I.L.M. (1982) 58
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Statute of the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea, 10 Dec. 1982, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. (1982) 1261 
Convention Providing for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (Canada-U.K.), 24 April 1984, 1988 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 74 (Cmd. 519) 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
10 Dec. 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46. 39 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 51), UN Doc. A/39/51, at 197 (1984), 
23 I.L.M. (1984) 1027
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 22 March 1985, 26 I.L.M.
(1987) 1516
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or
Between International Organizations, 21 March 1986, 25 I.L.M. (1986) 543
The Amman Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration, 14 April 1987
U.S- Canada Free Trade Agreement, 2 Jan. 1988, 27 I.L.M. (1988) 868
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 16 Sept.1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9,28 I.L.M. (1988) 620
Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, 15 Dec. 1989, 1991 O.J. (L 229) 1
Convention applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 on the Gradual Abolition of 
Checks at Common Borders, 19 June 1990, 30 I.L.M. (1991) 84
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families, 18 Dec. 1990, G.A. res. 45/158, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 
262, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990)(not yet in force)
Protocol of Tegucigalpa of Reforms to the Charter of the Organisation of the Central American 
States, 13 Dec. 1991
Treaty Establishing the European Union, 7 Feb. 1992, 1992 O.J. (C224) 6 
Agreement on a European Economic Area, 2 May 1992, art. 107, 1994 O.J. (LI) 3 
Agreement on the Statute of the Central American Court of Justice, 10 Dec. 1992, 34 I.L.M. 
(1995)921
North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 Dec. 1992, 32 I.L.M. (1993) 289 and 605 
Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE, 15 Dec. 1992, 32 I.L.M. (1993) 
557
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and their Destruction, 13 Jan 1993, 32 I.L.M. (1993) 800
319
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 14 Sept. 1993, 32 I.L.M. (1993) 
1480
Commonwealth of Independent States Treaty on Creation of an Economic Union, 24 Sept.
1993, 34 I.L.M. (1995) 1298
Treaty Establishing the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa 17 Oct.
1993, 4 Journal Officiel de l'OHADA (1997)
Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 5 Nov. 1993, 33 
I.L.M. 1067(1994)
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation, Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures and Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 15 April 
1994,33 I.L.M. (1994) 1144
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 
(1994)1197
Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlements of Disputes, 15 April
1994, 33 I.L.M. (1994) 1226
Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 11 May 1994, E.T.S. 155
Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective 
Complaints, 9 Nov. 1995, E.T.S. 158
Protocol Modifying the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, 10 
March 1996
Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 Oct. 1997, O.J. (C 340) 173
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 8 June 1998 (not yet in force)
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/Conf. 183/9, 37
I.L.M. (1998) 999
Agreement on Cooperation and Relationship Between the United Nations and the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 8 Sept. 1998, G.A. Res. 52/521, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., 92nd 
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/521 (1998).
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 6 
Oct. 1999, UN Doc. GA Res. A/54/4 (1999), 39 I.L.M. (2000) 281 (not yet in force)
Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, 15 Oct. 1999 (not yet in force)
Protocol no. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 26 
June 2000, E.T.S. 177
International instruments
Model Draft on Arbitral Procedure, U.N. Doc. A/3859 [1958] II Y.B. Int. L. Comm. 80 
Declaration of the Government of Japan under article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, 312 U.N.T.S 155 
(1958)
Declaration of the Government of the Belgium under article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, 302 
U.N.T.S. 251 (1958)
Declaration of the Government of Malta under article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, 580 U.N.T.S.
205(1966)
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers (1966)
Declaration of United Kingdom under article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, 654 U.N.T.S. 335 (1969) 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N., 
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970)
ECOSOC Resolution 1503 (XLVIII), 48 U.N. ESCOR (No. 1A) at 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.l 
(1970)
Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1974 O.J. (L350) 1
320
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 1 Aug. 1975, 14 I.L.M. 
(1975)1292
Executive Board of UNESCO, Decision 104 EX/3.3, 28 April 1978
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res.
31/98 (XXXI), G.A.O.R. Supp. No. 17. UN Doc. A/31/17 (1978)
Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, O.A.S. Official Records 
OAS/Ser.L.V/II, Doc. 31, rev. 3 (1980)
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning 
the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 19 Jan. 1981, 1 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 10 
(1981-82), 20 I.L.M. (1981) 230
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning 
the Settlement of the Iranian Hostages Crisis, 19 Jan. 1981, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3 
(1981-82), 20 I.L.M. (1981) 224
ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, 1 ICSID Rep. 157 (1984)
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 21 June 1985, UN Doc. 
A/40/17, Annex I, 24 I.L.M. (1985) 1302
Declaration of Senegal under article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, 1984-85 I.C.J. Y.B. 93-94 (1985) 
GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/W/6 (1987)
Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 13 Feb. 1988 
EC Council Decision 88/591,25 Nov. 1988,1988 O.J. (L319) 1.
Rules of Procedure (CERD), 1 Jan. 1989, UN Doc. CERD/C/35/Rev.3 (1989)
Non-Compliance Procedure, Decision II/5, Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Annex IV, 29 June 1990, U.N. 
Doc. UNEP/Oz.L. Pro.2/3, as revised by U.N. Doc. UNEP/Oz.L.Pro.2/3 (1992), 32 I.L.M. 
(1993) 874
United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition, 14 Dec. 1990, G.A. Res. 45/115, U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/45/116 (1991), 30 I.L.M. (1991) 1407
Provisions for a CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Report of Valetta, 8 Feb. 
1991, 30 I.L.M. (1991)390
Governing Body Decision 10, art. 40(4), 26 June 1992, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1992/10 
Governing Council Decision 13, 25 Sept. 1992, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1992/13 (UN Compensation 
Commission)
Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States 
(entry into force 20 Oct. 1992)
Decisions of the Stockholm Council Meeting of the CSCE Council, 15 Dec. 1992
Council Regulation (EEC) 404/93 of 13 Feb. 1993 on the Common Organisation of the Market
in Bananas, 1993 O.J. (L 47) 1
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of the International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991, SC Res. 827, 25 May 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), 32 I.L.M.
(1993) 1203
ICSID Model Clauses, 4 ICSID Rep. 357 (1993)
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide 
and Other Serious Violations of the International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory 
of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, between 1 Jan. 1994 and 31 Dec. 1994,
S.C. Res. 955, 8 Nov. 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. (1994) 1598 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24 (52), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.6
(1994)
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. 
ITR/3/REV.1 (1995)
321
Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/105 (1996)
Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 6 Oct. 1996 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. IT/323/Rev.lO (1996)
Draft Protocol for the Consideration of Communications concerning Non-Compliance with the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Annual Report of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on its 14th and 15 Sess., 1 Jan 1997, Annex 
IV, UN Doc. E/1997/22, E/C.12/1996/6
Rules of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE, 1 Feb. 1997 
Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, 11 Aug. 1997, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/3/Rev.5 (1997)
Rules of Procedure of the CIS Economic Court (1997)
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 37 I.L.M. (1998) 440
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 18 Dec. 2000,2000 O.J. (C364) 1
Reports
Minutes of the Proceedings of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, with Annexes (League of 
Nations, 1920)
Memorandum on Articles 10,11 and 16 of the Covenant Submitted to the Committee on 
Arbitration and Security of the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament Conference, League 
of Nations, IX Disarmament, 3 C.A.S. (1928) 39
Commentaire sur le Projet de Convention sur la Procedure Arbitrate adopte par la Commission 
du Droit International a sa cinquieme session (ONU Secretariat, 1955)
International Law Commission, Summary Records of the 421st Meeting [1957] Y.B. Int. L. 
Comm. 191
Report to the General Assembly on Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, UN Doc. A/3859 
[1958] II Y.B. Int. L. Comm. 82
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report of the Executive Directors on 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, 18 March 1965, 1 ICSID Rep. 23
Report of the Committee of Experts to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 
Problems arising from the Co-existence of the United Nations Covenants on Human Rights and 
the European Convention on Human Rights -  Part I: Problems arising from the Co-existence of 
the Two Systems o f Control provided for by the European Convention and by the UN Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, 29 Feb. 1968, Doc. No. CM (68) 39
Report of the Committee of Experts to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 
Problems arising from the Co-existence of the United Nations Covenants on Human Rights and 
the European Convention on Human Rights -  Differences as regards the Rights Guaranteed,
1 Aug. 1970, Doc. No. H (70) 7
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Information Report on the Protection of 
Human Rights in the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional 
Protocol and in the European Convention on Human Rights, 27 April 1976, Doc. No. 3773 
Opinion of the United Nations Legal Counsel, 1977-78 Yearbook of the Human Rights 
Committee 130
Secretariat Memorandum prepared by the Directorate of Human Rights of the Council of 
Europe, Effects o f the Various International Human Rights Instruments providing a Mechanism 
for Individual Communications on the Machinery of Protection established under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 1 Feb. 1985, p. 3, Doc. No. H (85) 3
Report of the 3rd Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, 21 June 1991, UN Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.3/11 (1991)
Report of the 4th Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, 25 Nov. 1992, UN Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15 (1992)
322
Memorandum from President (World Bank), Operations Inspection Function: Objectives,
Philip Alston “Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, 
including Reporting Obligations under International Instruments on Human Rights” U.N. 
GAOR, World Conference on Human Rights, Prep. Comm., 4th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 5, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/PC/ 62/Add. 11/Rev. 1 (1993)
Report of the International Law Commission, Commentary on Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, UN GAOR 51 Sess., Supp. No. 10, Doc. A/51/10 (1996)
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 154, U.N. Doc. A/21/22 (1996)
Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening 
of the Role of the Organization, 52 GAOR Sup. 33, U.N. Doc. A/52/33 (1997)
Annual Report of the Inspection Committee of the ADB Board 1997-98, 7 Aug. 1998, Doc. No. 
ICB/SR1-98
Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Procedures and Mechanisms relating to 
Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol, 17 Sept. 1999, UN Doc. FCCC/SBI/1999/7 (1999) 
Committee on International Civil and Commercial Litigation, Declining and Referring 
Jurisdiction in International Litigation - Third Interim Report submitted to the International 
Law Association London Conference (2000)
Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing 
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (2000),
Books
Andronico O. Adede, The System for Settlement of Disputes under the UNCLOS (1987)
Carlton K. Allen, Law in the Making (6th ed., 1958)
Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Reservations in Unilateral Declarations Accepting the Compulsory 
Jurisdiction of the International Court o f Justice (1995)
Neil Andrews, Principles of Civil Procedure (1994)
Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2000)
John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., 1995)
John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (1990)
M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 
(2nd rev. ed, 1987)
Henri Batiffol and Paul Lagarde, Droit International Prive (7th ed, 1981-83)
Raj Bhala and Kevin Kennedy, World Trade Law (1998)
Arie Bloed (ed.), The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe — Analysis and Basic 
Documents, 1972-1993 (1993)
Gary B. Bom, International Civil Litigation in United States Courts (3rd ed, 1996)
Gary B. Bom, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States (1994)
L. Neville Brown and Francis G. Jacobs The Court of Justice o f the European Communities 
(3rd ed, 1989)
L. Neville Brown and Tom Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(4th ed, 1994)
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th ed, 1998)
Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs (1998)
Thomas Buergenthal and Robert E. Norris (eds.), Human Rights: The Inter-American System
(1982)(6 volumes)
Dennis Campbell (ed.) International Execution Against Judgment Debtors (1993)
Anthony Carty, The Decay of International Law? (1986)
Abram Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich and Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Legal Process: 
Materials for an Introductory Course (1968)
323
Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes, The New Sovereignty - Compliance with International 
Regulatory Agreements (1995)(1998 reprint)
Bin Cheng, General Principles of Lctw as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (1987) 
Collected Edition of the 'Travaux Preparatoirs' o f the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Council of Europe, 1975)
Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict o f Laws (1963)
Christian Dadomo and Susan Farran, The French Legal System (2nd ed., 1996)
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986)
Abdul H. El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (2nd ed., 1999)
S.Z. Feller, Extradition Law (1980) 262 (in Hebrew).
Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990)
P.R. Ghandhi, The Human Rights Committee and the Right of Individual Communication - Law 
and Practice (1988)
Max Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society (1965)
Forest L. Grieves, Supra-nationalism and International Adjudication (1969)
H.L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed., 1994)
H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (1983)
Lois Henkin, How Nations Behave (1979)
Louis Henkin, Richard C. Pugh, Oscar Schachter and Hans Smit, International Law Cases and 
Materials (3rd ed., 1993)
Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Value (1995)
Peter Herzog, Civil Procedure in France (1967)
Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1994)
(1996 reprint)
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651)(C.B. Macpherson, ed., 1981)
Mannely O. Hudson, The Permanent Court o f International Justice 1920-1942 (1943) 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals o f Other 
States: Documents concerning the Origin and the Formation o f the Convention (ICSID, 1968) 
John Jackson, The World Trade Organization (1998)
John Jackson The World Trading System (2nd ed., 1997)
Robert Y. Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds.) 1 Oppenheim's International Law (9th ed., 1992) 
Hans Kelsen General Theory o f Norms (Michael Hartney, trans., 1991)
Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems o f Legal Theory (1934)(1992 reprint)
Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (M. Knight trans., 1970)
Harold Koch and Franck Diedrich, Civil Procedure in Germany (1998)
Walter Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention (1994) 
K.P.E. Lasok, The European Court o f Justice: Practice and Procedure (2nd ed., 1994)
Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society and Policy 
(1992) Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for 
Political Inquiry (1950)
Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (1958) 
League o f Nations Official Journal (League of Nations, 1920-45)
Andreas Lowenfeld, International Litigation and Arbitration (1993)
Andreas Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness: Essays in 
Private International Law (1996)
Mohieddien Mabrouk, Les Exceptions De Procedure Devant Les Juridictions Internationales 
(1966)
J.D. McClean, Morris: The Conflict o f Laws (4th ed., 1993)
Dominic McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee (1991)
324
Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (1961)(1998 reprint)
Theodor Meron, Human Rights Law Making in the United Nations (1986)
John G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (3rd ed., 1998)
John H. Merryman The Civil Law Tradition (2nd ed., 1985)
Henry Morgenthau, Politics Amongst Nations (6th ed., 1985)
Myron H. Nordquist et al. (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982:
A Commentary (\988)(5 Volumes)
Manfred Nowak, A Commentary on the UN. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1993) 
Walter K. Olson, The Litigation Explosion - What Happened when America Unleashed the 
Lawsuit ( 1991)
Fatsah Ouguergouz, Le Charte africaine des droits de Thomme etdes peuples (1993)
Radcliffe and Cross, The English Legal System (G.J. Hand and D.J. Bentley, eds., 6th ed., 1977) 
Jackson H. Ralston, The Law and Procedure of International Tribunals (1936)
Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System (2nd ed., 1980)(1990 reprint)
W. Michael Reisman and Aaron M. Schreiber, Jurisprudence: Understanding and Shaping Law 
(1987)
W.V.H. Rogers et al, On Tort (1984)
Santi Romano, L'ordre juridique (L. Franfois and P. Gothot, trans., 2nd ed., 1975)
Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996 (1997)
(3 volumes)
Philippe Sands (ed.), Manual on International Courts and Tribunals (1999)
Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (1995)
Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (1991)
George Schwarzenberger, 1 International Law (1945)
George Schwarzenberger, 1 International Law (3rd ed., 1957)
Eugene F. Scoles and Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed., 1992)
Malcolm N. Shaw, International law (4th ed., 1997)
Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (1996)
Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd ed. 1984)
Terence P. Stewart (ed.), II The GATT Uruguay Round-A Negotiating History 
(1986-1992)(\993)
Alexander M. Stuyt, Survey of International Arbitrations 1794-1989 (1990)
David St. John Sutton, John Kendall and Judith Gill, Russell on Arbitration (21st ed., 1997) 
Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (1993)
Grigorii I. Tunkin, Theory of International Law (William E. Butler, trans., 1974)
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea -  Official Records (United Nations, 
1976)
United Nations Conference on International Organisation (United Nations, 1945)
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records (United Nations,
1969-71)(3 volumes)
United Nations General Assembly Official Records (UN, 1945-99)
United Nations Security Council Official Records (UN, 1945-99)
Michel van de Kerchove and Franfois Ost, Legal System Between Order and Disorder (Ian 
Stewart trans., 1994)
Allen D. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion (1969)
J.H.W. Virzijl, The Jurisprudence of the World Court (1965)
Arthur Watts, The International Law Commission 1949-1998 (1999)
Hans Wehberg, The Problem of an International Court o f Justice (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 
1918)
325
Nina Zaltzman, Res judicata in Civil Proceedings (1991)(in Hebrew)
Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand (eds.), 1 Basic Documents o f International Economic Law
(1990)
Tom Zwart, The Admissibility of Human Rights Petitions (1994)
Articles
Georges Abi-Saab “Cours general de droit international public” 207 Recueil des cours (1987) 9 
Georges Abi-Saab “Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. 
L.& Pol. (1999)919
Georges Abi-Saab “The International Court of Justice as a World Court” Fifty Years of the 
International Court o f Justice (Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice, eds., 1996) 3 
Evert A. Alkema “The Enigmatic No-Pretext Clause: Article 60 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights” Essays on Human Rights: a collection o f essays in honour of Bert Vierdag (Jan 
Klabbers and Rene Lefeber, eds., 1998) 41
Philip Allot “The Concept of International Law” 10 European Journal of International Law
(1999)31
Tom Barkhuysen and Michiel van Emmerik “Improving the Implementation of Strasbourg and 
Geneva Decisions in the Dutch Legal Order: Reopening of Closed Cases or Claims of Damages 
against the State” The Execution o f Strasbourg and Geneva Human Rights Decisions in the 
National Legal Order (T. Barkhuysen et al, eds., 1999)
M. Cherif Bassiouni “Accountability for International Crime and Serious Violations of 
Fundamental Human Rights: Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice -  The Need for 
Accountability” 59 Law and Contemporary Problems (1996) 9 
M. Cherif Bassiouni “Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying 
International Procedural Protections And Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions” 3 
Duke J. Comp. & IntT L. (1993)235
Carl Baudenbacher “Between Homogeneity and Independence: The Legal Position of the EFTA 
Court in the European Economic Area” 3 Columbia Journal of European Law (1997) 169 
Richard Baxter “Introduction to Symposium on the International Court of Justice” 11 Va. J.
IntT L. (1971)291
William E. Beckett “Les questions d'interet general au point de vue juridique dans la 
jurisprudence de la Cour permanente de justice intemationale” 39 Recueil des cours (1932) 131 
Raj Bhala “The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade” 14 American University 
International Law Review (1999) 845
Raj Bhala “The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication” 9 Journal of 
Transnational Law and Policy (1999) 1
Richard E. Bissel “Recent Practice of the Inspection Panel of the World Bank” 91 A.J.I.L.
(1997) 741
Joost Blom “Report on Canada” Declining Jurisdiction, Declining Jurisdiction in Private 
International Law (J.J. Fawcett, ed., 1995) 121
Michael Bogdan “Report on Sweden” Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law (J.J. 
Fawcett, ed., 1995) 371
Alan E. Boyle “Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Law of the Sea and the Environment” 
International Justice (Kalliopi Koufa, ed., 1997) 295
Daniel D. Bradlow “International Organisations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World 
Bank Inspection Panel” 34 Va. J. IntT L. (1994) 553
Stanley M. Brand “ ‘To Endure for Ages to Come’: a Bicentennial View of the Constitution: 
Battle Among the Branches: The Two Hundred Year War” 65 North Carolina Law Review 
(1987) 901
Harry C. Bredemeier “Law as an Integrative Mechanism” Law and Sociology (W.M. Evan, ed., 
1962)73
326
John W. Bridge “The Court of Justice of the European Communities and the Prospects for 
International Adjudication” International Courts for the Twenty First Century (Mark W. Janis, 
ed., 1992) 87
Catherine Brolmann “The 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: The History of 
Draft Article 36bis” Essays on the Law of Treaties (Jan Klabbers and Rene Lefeber eds. 1998) 
121
Bruce Broomhall “Looking Forwards to the Establishment of an International Criminal Court:
Between State Consent and the Rule of Law” 8 Crim L.F. (1997) 317
Bartram S. Brown “Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National
Courts and International Criminal Tribunals” 23 Yale J. IntT L. (1998) 383
George D. Brown “The Ideologies of Forum Shopping - Why Doesn't a Conservative Court
Protect Defendants?” 71 N.C.L. Rev. (1993) 649
A.S.I.L./N.V.I.R., Proceedings of the 4th Hague Joint Conference (1997) 364 
Christine E. Burgess “When May a President Refuse to Enforce the Law?” 72 Texas Law 
Review (1994) 631
Lucius Caflisch “The OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration: Necessary or Redundant?” 9
A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1995) 23
Megalos A. Caloyanni “L'organisation de la Cour permanente de justice et son avenir” 38 
Recueil des cours (1931) 651
Dennis Campbell “Preliminary Observations on Article 219” 5 The Law of the European 
Community - A Commentary (Dennis Campbell, ed., 35th ed., 1998) 6-169 
Christina Cema “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: its Organization and 
Examination of Petitions and Communications” The Inter-American System o f Human Rights 
(David J. Harris and Stephen Livingstone, eds. 1998) 65
Jonathan I. Chamey “The Implications of the International Dispute Settlement System of the 
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea on International Law” 9 A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1985) 33 
Jonathan Chamey “The Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth of International 
Courts and Tribunals” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 697
Jonathan I. Chamey “The Implications of Expanding International Dispute Settlement Systems: 
The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea” 90 A.J.I.L. (1996) 69
Jonathan I. Chamey “Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals” 271 
Recueil des cours (1998) 101
Jonathan Chamey “Third Party Dispute Settlement and International Law”36 Colum. J. 
Transnat. L. (1997) 65
Jonathan Chamey “Universal International Law” 87 A.J.I.L. (1993) 529
Dan Ciobanu “Litispendence between the International Court of Justice and the Political Organs
of the United Nations” 1 The Future o f the International Court o f Justice (Leo Gross, ed., 1976)
209
Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg “Exorcising the Evil of Forum Shopping” 80 
Cornell L. Rev. (1995) 1507
Jean Combacau “Le Droit International: Bric-a-Brac ou Systeme?” 31 Archives de Philosophic 
du Droit (1996) 85
John R. Cook “The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the United Nations Compensation 
Commission: New Machinery for Resolving Claims” 9 A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1995) 28
Philippe Couvreur “The Effectiveness of the International Court of Justice in the Peaceful 
Settlement of International Disputes” The International Court of Justice -  Its Future Role after 
Fifty Years (A.S. Muller, D. Raic and J.M. Thuransky eds., 1997) 83 
James Crawford “The Charter of the United Nations as a Constitutions” The Changing 
Constitutions of the United Nations (Hazel Fox, ed., 1997) 3
Steven P. Croley and John H. Jackson “WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, 
and Deference to National Governments” 90 A.J.I.L. (1996) 193
327
Gennady M. Danilenko “The Economic Court of the Commonwealth of Independent States” 31 
N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 893
William J. Davey “The WTO/GATT World Trading System: An Overview” I Handbook of 
WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement (Pierre Pescatore, ed., 1997) 75
Scott Davidson “The Procedure and Practice of the Human Rights Committee under the First 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” 4 Canterbury L. 
Rev. (1991)337
Bruno De Witte “The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of
Human Rights” The EU and Human Rights (Philip Alston, ed., 1999) 859
Vera Gowlland-Debbas “The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and the
Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case” 88 A.J.I.L. (1994) 643
Adolfo M. De La Muela “Les Principes Directeurs des Regies de Competence Territoriale des
Tribunaux Internes en Matiere de Litiges Comportant un element International” 135 Recueil des
cours (1973) 1
Louis F. Del Duca and George A. Zaphiriou “Report on the U.S.A” Declining Jurisdiction in 
Private International Law (J.J. Fawcett, ed., 1995) 401
Joseph F. Dimento and Pamela M. Doughman “Soft Teeth in the Back of the Mouth: the 
NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement Implemented” 10 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. (1998) 651 
Masato Dogauchi “Report on Japan” Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law 
(J.J. Fawcett, ed, 1995) 303
Henry Donnedieu de Vabres “Le conflict des lois de competence judiciare dans les actions 
personnelles” 26 Recueil des cours (1929) 261
Donald C. Dowing “Forum Shopping and Other Reflections on Litigation Involving U.S. and 
European Businesses” 7 Pace International Law Review (1995) 465
Jeffrey L. Dunoff “Institutional Misfits: the GATT, the ICJ and Trade-Environment Disputes”
15 Mich. J. IntT L. (1994) 1043
Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel Trachtman “ The Law and Economics of Humanitarian Law 
Violations in Internal Conflict” 93 A.J.I.L. (1999) 394
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “The Constitutional Dimension of the UN Charter Revisited” 1 Max 
Planck Year Book of UN Law (1997) 30
Pierre-Marie Dupuy “The Danger of the Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal 
System and the International Court of Justice” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 791 
Theodore Eisenberg and Lynn M. LoPucki “Shopping for Judges: an Empirical Analysis of 
Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations” 84 Cornell L. Rev. (1999) 967
Marc-Andre Eissen “The European Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Problems of Coexistence” 22 Buff. L. Rev. (1972) 181 
Colleen Enache-Brown and Ari Fried “Universal Crime, Jurisdiction and Duty, the Obligation 
of Aut Dedere Aut Judicare in International Law” 43 McGill L.J. (1998) 613 
Judd Epstein “Report on Australia” Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law 
(J.J. Fawcett, ed, 1995) 79
William Ewald “Comment on MacCormick” 82 Cornell L. Rev. (1997) 1071
Marc Fallon “Report on Belgium” Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law (J.J.
Fawcett, ed, 1995) 99
Bardo Fassenbender “The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International 
Community” 36 Colum. J. Transnat. L. (1998) 529
Jose Faur “Law and Hermeneutics in Rabbinic Jurisprudence: a Maimonidean Perspective” 14 
Cardozo Law Review (1993) 1657
J. J. Fawcett “General Report” Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law (J.J.
Fawcett, ed, 1995) 1
Gerald Fitzmaurice “The General Principles of International Law Considered from the 
Standpoint of the Rule of Law” 92 Receuil de cours (1957) 1
328
Gerald Fitzmaurice “Some Problems regarding the Formal Sources of International Law” 
Symbolae Verzijl (1958) 172
Chrisopher A. Ford “Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 38(l)(c) and
‘General Principles of Law”’ 5 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. (1994) 35
Mirjam Freudenthal and Frans van der Velden “Report on the Netherlands” Declining
Jurisdiction in Private International Law (J.J. Fawcett, ed., 1995) 321
Wolfgang Friedmann “General Course in Public International Law” 127 Receuil des cours
(1969)37
Girogio Gaja “New Instruments and Institutions for Enhancing the Protection of Human Rights
in Europe?” The EU and Human Rights (Philip Alston, ed., 1999) 781
Kenneth S. Gallant “Securing the Presence of Defendants before the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia: Breaking with Extradition” 5 Crim L.F. (1994) 557
Pamela B. Gann “The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program” 21 Stan. J. IntT L. (1985) 373
Helene Gaudemet-Tallon “Report on France” Declining Jurisdiction in Private International
Law (J.J. Fawcett, ed., 1995) 175
P.R. Ghandhi “The Human Rights Committee and the Right of Individual Communication” 57
B.Y.I.L. (1986) 201
Steven Goldstein “Report on Israel” Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law (J.J. 
Fawcett, ed., 1995) 259
Gidon Gottlieb “The Nature of International Law: Toward a Second Concept of Law”, IV The 
Future o f the International Legal Order -  The Structure o f the International Environment (Cyril 
E. Black and Richard A. Falk, eds., 1972) 331
Michael H. Gottesman “Draining the Dismal Swamp: the Case for Federal Choice of Law 
Statutes” 80 Geo. L.J. (1991) 1
Christine Gray and Benedict Kingsbury “Inter-State Arbitration since 1945: Overview and 
Evaluation” International Courts for the Twenty First Century (Mark W. Janis, ed., 1992) 55 
Robert A. Green “Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between Governments:
A Comparison of the International Tax and Trade Regimes” 23 Yale J. Int'l L. (1998) 79 
Leo Gross “The International Court of Justice and the United Nations” Essays on International 
Law and Organization (1984) 845
K. Scot Gudgeon “Arbitration Provisions of U.S. Bilateral Investment Disputes” International 
Investment Disputes: Avoidance and Settlement (Seymor J. Rubin and Richard W. Nelson, eds.,
1985)41
Gilbert Guillaume “The Future of International Judicial Institutions” 441.C.L.Q. (1995) 848 
Lakshman D. Guruswamy “Should UNCLOS or GATT/WTO Decide Trade and Environment 
Disputes” 7 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade (1998) 287
Elihu Hamon “Res Judicata and Identity of Actions - Law and Rationale” 1 Israel L. Rev. 
(1966)539
Trevor C. Hartley “Antisuit Injunctions and the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments 
Convention” 49 I.C.L.Q. (2000) 166
John W. Head “ Supranational Law: How the Move toward Multilateral Solutions is Changing 
the Character of ‘International’ Law” 42 Kan. L. Rev. (1994) 605 
Laurence R. Heifer “Forum Shopping for Human Rights” 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. (1999) 285 
Laurence R. Heifer and Anne-Marie Slaughter “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication” 107 Yale L.J. (1997) 273
Peter E. Herzog “Article 219” 5 The Law of the European Community -  A Commentary (Dennis 
Campbell, ed, 35th ed, 1998) 6-170.
Rosalyn Higgins “International Law in a Changing System” 58 Cambridge L.J. (1999) 78 
Rosalyn Higgins, “Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process” 17 I.C.L.Q. 
(1968)58
Susan Hurt “Res Judicata Effects of State Agency Decisions in Title VII Actions” 70 Cornell L. 
Rev. (1985) 695
329
John H. Jackson “Fragmentation or Unification among International Institutions: The World 
Trade Organization” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 823
Francis G. Jacobs “The Protection of Human Rights in the Member States of the European 
Community - the Impact of the Case Law of the Court of Justice” Human Rights and 
Constitutional Law: Essays in Honour o f Brian Walsh (James O'Reilly, ed., 1992) 243 
Mark W. Janis “Individuals and the International Court” The International Court of Justice -  
Its Future Role after Fifty Years (A.S. Muller, D. Raic and J.M. Thuransky eds., 1997) 205 
Robert Y. Jennings “The Discipline of International Law” 1 Collected Writings (1998) 314 
Robert Y. Jennings “The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Settlement of Disputes” 
1 Collected Writings (1998) 433
Robert Y. Jennings “The Judicial Enforcement of International Obligations” 1 Collected 
Writings (1998) 494
Robert Y. Jennings “A New Look at the Place of the Adjudication in International Relations 
today” 1 Collected Writings (1998) 450
Robert Y. Jennings “The Progress of International Law” 1 Collected Writings (1998) 271 
Robert Y. Jennings “The Proliferation of Adjudicatory Bodies: Dangers and Possible Answers” 
9 A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1995) 2
Robert Y. Jennings “The Role of the International Court of Justice in the Development of 
International Protection Law” 1 Review o f European Community and International 
Environmental Law (1992) 240
Leslie E. John “Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive Damages in the Borderland of 
Contract and Tort” 74 Calif. L. Rev. (1986) 2033
Friedrich K. Juenger “Forum Shopping, Domestic and International” 63 Tul. L. Rev. (1989) 553 
Immanuel Kant “Eternal Peace” The Philosophy o f Kant (Carl J, Friedrich, ed., 1993)(1795) 
Michael M. Karayanni “The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Forum Selection 
Clauses” 34 Duquesne University Law Review (1996) 1009
J. Patrick Kelly “The International Court of Justice: Crisis and Reformation” 12 Yale J. IntT L. 
(1987)342
David Kennedy “When Renewal Repeats: Thinking against the Box” 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. 8c 
Pol. (2000) 335
Benedict Kingsbury “The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of 
International Law” 19 Mich. J. IntT L. (1998) 345
Benedict Kingsbury “Forward: Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a 
Systematic Problem” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 679
Harold H. Koh “Transnational Legal Process” 75 Neb. L. Rev. (1996) 181 
Harold H. Koh “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?”106 Yale L.J. (1997) 2599 
Juliane Kokott and Frank Hoffmeister, “Opinion 2/94, Accession of the Community to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” 90 
A.J.I.L. (1996) 664
Pieter H. Kooijmans “International Arbitration in Historical Perspective: Past and Present” 
International Arbitration: Past and Prospects (A.H.A. Soons, ed. 1990) 23 
Martti Koskenniemi “Letter to the Editors of the Symposium” 93 A.J.I.L. (1999) 351 
Pieter J. Kuyper, “The Law of the GATT as a Special Field of International Law: Ignorance, 
Further Refinement or Self-Contained System of International Law” XXV Neth. Y.B. IntT Law
(1994) 227
Carolyn B. Lamm and Abby Cohen Smutney “The International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes: Responses to Problems and Changing Requirements” 12 Mealey’s 
International Arbitration Report (1997) 20
Elihu Lauterpacht “The Development of the Law of International Oraganizations by the 
Decisions of International Tribunals” 152 Recueil des cours (1976) 377 
Koen Lenaerts “Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution - The Case of the European 
Union” 21 Fordham Int'l L.J. (1998) 746
330
Markus Lenenbach “Antisuit Injunctions in England, Germany and the United States: Their 
Treatment under European Civil Procedure and the Hague Convention”, 20 Loy. L.A. Int’l & 
Comp. L.J. (1998) 257
Saul Litvinoff “Good Faith” 71 Tul. L. Rev. (1997) 1645
Neil MacCormick “Institutional Normative Order: A Conception of Law” 82 Cornell L. Rev.
(1997) 1051
Peter C. Maki “Interpreting GATT Using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
A Method to Increase the Legitimacy of the Dispute Settlement System” 9 Minnesota Journal of 
Global Trade (2000) 343
Gabrielle Marceau “NAFTA and WTO Dispute Settlement Rules -  A Thematic Comparison” 
International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (Emst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, ed., 1997) 489
Gabrielle Marceau “Review Essays of Dispute Settlement Mechanisms -  Regional or 
Multilateral: Which One is Better” 31 J. World Trade (1997) 167
Zanifa McDowell “Forum Non Conveniens: The Caribbean and its Response to Xenophobia in 
American Courts” 49 I.C.L.Q. (2000) 108
Patricia A. McKeon “An International Criminal Court: Balancing the Principle of Sovereignty 
against the Demands for International Justice” 12 St. John’s J. Legal Comment. (1997) 535 
Theodor Meron “The Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals and the Proposed International 
Criminal Court” 9 A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1995) 15
Theodor Meron “Norm Making and Supervision in International Human Rights: Reflections on 
Institutional Order” 76 A.J.I.L. (1982) 754,
Salvatore Messina “Les tribunaux mixtes et les rapports interjuridictionnels en Egypte” 52 
Receuil des cours (1932) 363
Sean D. Murphy “Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia” 93 A.J.I.L. (1999) 57
Rachel Murray “Decisions by the African Commission on Individual Communications under 
the African Charter in Human and People’s Rights” 46 I.C.L.Q. (1997) 412 
Eric P. Myjer “The Settlement of Disputes Under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the 
Case of the Confidentiality Commission” The Convention on the Prohibition and Elimination of 
Chemical Weapons: A Breakthrough in Multilateral Disarmament (Daniel Bardonnet, ed.,
1997)537
Note “A Comparative and Critical Assessment of Estoppel in International Law”, 50 U. Miami 
L. Rev. (1996)369
Note “Forum Shopping Reconsidered”, 103 Harv. L. Rev. (1990) 1677
Peter Nygh “Choice of Law Rules and Forum Shopping in Australia” 46 South Carolina L. Rev.
(1995) 899
Mary Ellen O’Connell “New International Legal Process” 93 A.J.I.L. (1999) 334 
Shigeru Oda “Dispute Settlement Prospects in the Law of the Sea” 44 I.C.L.Q. (1995) 863 
Shigeru Oda “The International Court of Justice from the Bench” 244 Recueil de cours (1993) 9 
Bernard H. Oxman “ The Rule of Law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea” 7 European Journal of International Law (1996) 353
David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis “The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law” 92 A.J.I.L.
(1998)398
Antonio R. Parra “Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modem Investment 
Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment”, 12 ICSID 
Rev., F.I.L.J. (1997) 287
Kevin W. Patton “Dispute Resolution under the North American Commission on Environmental 
Co-operation” 5 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 87 (1994)
Antonio Perez “WTO and UN Law: Institutional Comity in National Security” 23 Yale J. Int’l 
L. (1998) 301
331
Joseph M. Perillo “Abuse of Right: A Pervasive Legal Concept” 27 Pacific Law Review (1995) 
37
John A. Perkins “The Changing Foundations of International Law: From State Consent to State 
Responsibility”!5 Boston University International Law Journal (1997) 433 
Emst-Ulrich Petersmann “Constitutionalism and International Adjudication: How to 
Constitutionalize the U.N. Dispute Settlement System?” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 753 
Emst-Ulrich Petersmann “International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement 
System 1948-1996: An Introduction” International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute 
Settlement System (Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, ed., 1997) 5
Monica Pinto “ Fragmentation or Unification among International Institutions: Human Rights 
Tribunals” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 833
Jean-Pierre Queneudec “Article 95” La Charte Des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par 
article (Jean Pierre Cot and Alain Pellet, eds., 1985) 1280
Juan Jose Quintana “The International Court of Justice and the Formulation of General 
International Law: The Law of Maritime Delimitation as an Example” The International Court 
of Justice -  Its Future Role after Fifty Years (A. S. Muller, D. Raic and J.M. Thuransky eds.,
1997)367
Michael D. Ramsey “Escaping ‘International Comity’” 83 Iowa L. Rev. (1998) 893 
Richard W. Raushenbush, “Antisuit Injunctions and International Comity” 71 Va. L. (1985) 
1039
Joseph Raz “The Relevance of Coherence” 72 B.U.L. Rev. (1992) 273
W. Michael Reisman “Creating, Adapting and Designing Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for
the International Protection of Human Rights” 9 A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1995) 8
W. Michael Reisman “Supervisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice:
International Arbitration and International Adjudication” 258 Recueil des cours (1996) 9
Judith Resnik “Tiers” 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. (1984) 837
Alexander Reus “Judicial Discretion: A Comparative View of the Doctrine of Forum Non 
Conveniens in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany” 16 Loy. L.A. Int’l & 
Comp. L.J. (1994) 455
R. Jason Richards “Richards v. Jefferson County: The Supreme Court Stems the Crimson Tide 
of Res Judicata” 38 Santa Clara Law Review 691 (1998)
Arthur H. Robertson “The Implementation System: International Measures” The International 
Bill o f Rights -  the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Louis Henkin, ed., 1981) 332 
Arthur .H. Robertson “The United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
European Convention on Human Rights” 43 B.Y.I.L. (1968-69) 21
Cesare P.R. Romano “The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the 
Puzzle” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 709
Leila Nadya Sadat and S. Richard Carden “The New International Criminal Court: an Uneasy 
Revolution”, 88 Geo. L.J. (2000) 381
Klaus T. Samson “Human Rights Coordination within the UN System” The United National 
and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Philip Alston, ed., 1992) 620
Pieter Sanders “Arbitration” XVI International Encyclopaedia o f Comparative Law (Mauro 
Cappelletti vol. ed., 1996) 34
Philippe Sands “Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of International Law” 1 Yale Human 
Rights and Development Law Journal (1998) 85
Haimo Schack “Report on Germany” Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law (J.J. 
Fawcett, ed., 1995) 189
Egon Schewlb “The International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial 
Discrimination” 15 I.C.L.Q. (1966) 996
Henry G. Schermers “Constituent Treaties of International Organizations” Essays on the Law of 
Treaties', a collection of essays in honour of Bert Vierdag (Jan Klabbers and Rene Lefeber, eds.,
1998) 19
332
Christoph Schreuer “Commentary on the ICSID Convention”, 12 ICSID Rev., F.I.L.J. (1997) 59 
Stephen M. Schwebel “Authorizing the Secretary-General of the UN to Request Advisory 
Opinions of the ICJ” Justice in International Law (1994) 72
Stephen M. Schwebel “The Prospects for International Arbitration: Inter-State Disputes: 
Comments on a Paper by Ambassador M.C.W. Pinto” Justice in International Law (1994) 223 
Stephen M. Schwebel “Reflections on the Role of the International Court of Justice” Justice in 
International Law (1994) 3
Stephen M. Schwebel “Relations Between the International Court of Justice and the United 
Nations” Justice in International Law (1994) 14
Gary L. Scott and Craig L. Carr “Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of Customary 
International Law” 25 Denv. J.I.L.P. (1996) 71
Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldem “Access of International Organizations to the International Court of 
Justice”, The International Court of Justice -  Its Future Role after Fifty Years (A.S. Muller, D. 
Raic and J.M. Thuransky eds., 1997) 189
Andrea M. Seielstad “Unwritted Laws and Customs, Local Legal Cultures and Clinical Legal 
Education” 6 Clinical Law Review (1999) 127
Mehanshe Shawa “The Relation between the Jurisdiction of the Family Court and the 
Jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Court” 44 Hapraklit (1998) 44 (in Hebrew)
G. Richard Shell “Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration” 35 
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. (1988) 623
G. Richard Shell “Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: an Analysis of the World 
Trade Organization” 44 Duke L.J. (1995) 829
Jianming Shen “The Basis of International Law: Why Nations Observe” 17 Dickinson Journal 
of International Law (1999) 287
Kurt Siehr “Report on Switzerland” Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law (J.J. 
Fawcett, ed., 1995) 381
Bruno Simma “Self-Contained Regimes” XVI Neth. Y.B. Int’l Law (1985) 111
Jose Luis Siqueiros “Bilateral Treaties on the Reciprocal Protection of Foreign Investment” 24
Cal. W. Int’l L.J. (1994) 255
Hans Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A. 
L. Rev. (1962) 44
Louis B. Sohn “Broadening the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice” 77 
A.J.I.L. (1983) 124
Louis B. Sohn “International Arbitration in Historical Perspective: Past and Present”
International Arbitration: Past and Prospects (A.H.A. Soons, ed. 1990) 9
Dean Spielmann “Human Rights case Law in the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts:
Conflicts, Inconsistencies and Complementarities” The EU and Human Rights (Philip Alston, 
ed., 1999) 757
Allan R. Stein “Erie and Court Access” 1 Yale L. J. (1991) 1935
Richard H. Steinberg “Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA and WTO:
Regional Trajectories of Rule Development” 91 A.J.I.L (1997) 231 
Brigitte Stem “Concluding Remarks” 9 A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1995) 49
A.J. Stone, III “Consti-Tortion: Tort Law as an End-Run around Abortion Rights after Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey” 8 American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
(2000)471
Alec Stone Sweet “Constitutional Dialogues in the European Community” The European 
Courts and National Courts -  Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Ann-Marie Slaughter et al, eds.,
1998)305
Paul Szasz “General Law-Making Process” 1 United Nations Legal Order (Oscar Schachter and 
Christopher C. Joyner, eds., 1995) 35
Deanell Reece Tacha “Judges and Legislators: Enhancing the Relationship” 44 American 
University Law Review (1995) 1537
333
Maxime E. Tardu “The Protocol to the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the Inter-American System: A Study of Co-Existing Petition Procedures” 70 A.J.I.L. (1976) 
778
Louise E. Teitz “Taking Multiple Bites of the Apple: A Proposal to Resolve Conflicts of 
Jurisdiction and Multiple Proceedings” 25 Int’l Lawyer (1992) 21
Giorgos Tenekides “L’exception de litispendance devant les organisms intemationaux” XXXVI 
Revue generate de droit international public (1929) 502
Gunther Teubner “’Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society” Global Law
Without a State (Gunther Teubner ed., 1996) 3
Hugh Thirlway “Comment” 9 A.S.I.L. Bulletin (1995) 47
Christian Tomuschat “International Courts and Tribunals with Regionally Restricted and/or 
Specialized Jurisdiction” Judicial Settlement o f International Disputes: The International Court 
of Justice, Other Courts and Tribunal, Arbitration and Conciliation (Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law, 1974) 285
Tullio Treves “Conflicts between the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the 
International Court of Justice” 31 N.Y.U.J. Int. L. & Pol. (1999) 809
Tullio Treves “The Jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea” 37 Ind. J. 
Int. L. (1997) 396
Tullio Treves “Recent Trends in the Settlement of International Disputes” I Bancaja 
Euromediterranean Courses of International Law (1997) 395
A. A. Cancado Trinidade “Co-existence and Co-ordination of Mechanisms of International 
Protection of Human Rights” 202 Receuil des cours (1987) 9
Nicolas Valticos “Activites Normatives et Quasi Normative: Controle” A Handbook on 
International Organizations (Rene Jean Dupuy, ed., 2nd ed., 1998) 461
Christine van den Wyngaert and Guy Stessens “The International Non Bis In Idem Principle:
Resolving some of the Unanswered Questions” 48 I.C.L.Q. (1999) 779
Allen D. Vestal “Rationale of Preclusion” 9 St. Lou. U.L.J. (1964) 29
Jeffrey Waincymer “Reformulated Gasoline under Reformulated WTO Dispute Settlement
Procedures: Pulling Pandora out of a Chapeau?” 18 Mich. J. Int’l L. (1996) 141
Prosper Weil “Cours general de droit international public” 237 Recueil des cours (1992) 9
Prosper Weil “Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?” 77 A.J.I.L. (1983) 413
Joseph H.H, Weiler and Ulrich R. Haltem “Constitutional or International? The Foundations of
the Community Legal Order and the Question of Judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz” The
European Courts and National Courts - Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Ann-Marie Slaughter et
al, eds., 1998)331
Louise Weinberg “Against Comity” 80 Geo. L.J. (1991) 53
Siegfried Wiessner and Andrew R. Williard “Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights 
Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity” 93 A.J.I.L.
(1999)316
Maureen Williams “Report on Argentina” Declining Jurisdiction, Declining Jurisdiction in 
Private International Law (J.J. Fawcett, ed., 1995) 71
Skelly Wright “The Federal Courts and the Quality of State Law” 13 Wayne L. Rev. (1967) 317 
Norbert Wuhler “The United Nations Compensation Commission: A New Contribution to the 




Uniformity of Process Act, 1832 
Judicature Act, 1873 
Administration of Justice Act 1920, s. 9
334
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, s. 2, 4
Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, s. 5, Schedule 1
Arbitration Act 1979, s. 4
Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 49
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, s. 34
Extradition Act, 1989, s. 6, 12
Arbitration Act 1996, s. 2, 9, 21, 58, 67-69
Civil Procedure Rules, Rule 3.4
Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 15, rules 1, 2, 4
Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 18, rule 11
U.S.
U.S. Constitution, art. Ill, § 2, art. IV, §1, amend. V 
9 U.S. § 1,2, 3, 10, 13 
22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-91 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1404
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, § 4, 13 Uniform Laws Annotated 263 
(1980 & 1991 Supp.)
Canada
Divorce Act, 1985, Ch. 3, s. 3 (2),
Civil Code, art. 3135, 3137 (Quebec)
Code of Civil Procedure No. 6, art. 797 (Quebec)
France
Civil Code, art. 14, 1351
New Code of Civil Procedure (N.C.P.C.), art. 48, 92, 100, 101
Germany
B.G.B. §. 242
Z.P.O. §§ 23, 28, 38,40, 91, 261, 328, 1027a 
Greece
Code of Civil Procedure, art. 31,222
Act No. 1429/1984, art. 4 [1984] KodexNo. B 327 ff (Greece)
Israel
Jurisdiction of Rabbinical Courts (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 1953, art.31
Foreign Judgments Enforcement Law, 1958, art. 2, 6, 11
Amendment of Family Laws (Alimony) Law, 1959, art. 18
Arbitration Law, 1968, art. 5, 23
Contract Law (General Part), 1973, art. 12
Criminal Law, 1977, art. 14
Netherlands
Code of Civil Procedure (WBRv), art. 429c 
New Civil Code (NBW), art. 1-2 
Penal Code, art. 68
335
New Zealand
Arbitration Act, 1908, art. 5 
Admiralty Act, 1973, s. 6
Switzerland 
Civil Code, art. 2
Statute of Private International Law, art. 5, 9, 114
Other Jurisdictions
Civil Code, art. 1071 (Argentina)
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act, 1987, art. 5 (Australia)
Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 65 (Austria)
Preliminary Title to Criminal Procedure Code, art. 13 (Belgium 
Civil Procedure Law § 244 (China)
Transnational Causes of Action (Product Liability) Act 1997, s. 4 (Dominica)
Contract Act, s. 36 (Finland)
Code of Civil Procedure, 1942, art. 2, 3, 4, 797 (Italy)
Code of Civil Procedure, art 25, 200, 231 (Japan)
Law on Foreign Investment of 1995, art. 27 (Kazakhstan)
Civil Code, art. 18 (Turkey)
Miscellaneous
Am. Jur. 2d., Alternative Dispute Resolution § 81 
Am. Jur. 2d., Courts § 91 
Am. Jur. 2d., Judgments §§ 514, 661, 664 
Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed., 1999)
22 C.J.S. § 258
Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed., 1990)(reissue)
House of Lords, Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234
Restatement of the Law, 2nd, Conflict of Laws § 84 comment c, e (1971), §98 comment b (1971)
Restatement of the Law, 2nd, Conflict of Laws § 80
Restatement of the Law, 2nd, Judgments §§ 17-19,24, 27
Restatement of the Law, 3rd, Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 404
Restatement of the Law, 3rd, Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 103, comment b
(1987) and § 475, comment a (1990)
Stephen M. Schwebel, Address to the Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the UN, 26 
Oct. 1999
President o f the World Court Warns o f 'Overlapping Jurisdictions ’ in Proliferation o f 
International Judicial Bodies, UN Press Release GA/L/3157, 27 Oct. 2000
336
